Consider the following claims: -/- 1. The drought caused the famine. -/- 2. Drowsy driving causes crashes. -/- 3. How much I water my plant influences how tall it grows. -/- 4. How much novocaine a patient receives affects how much pain they will feel during dental surgery. -/- The metaphysics of causation asks questions about what it takes for claims like these to be true—what kind of relation the claims are about, and in virtue of what these relations obtain.

In this article, I defend Neo-Gricean accounts of language and communication from an objection about linguistic development. According to this objection, children are incapable of understanding the minds of others in the way that Neo-Gricean accounts require until long after they learn the meanings of words, are able to produce meaningful utterances, and understand the meaningful utterances of others. In answering this challenge, I outline exactly what sorts of psychological states are required by Neo-Gricean accounts and conclude that there is (...) sufficient evidence that these types of psychological states are present in and capable of being understood by the children in question. (shrink)

Research questions in mainstream epistemology often take for granted a cognitive internalist picture of the mind. Perhaps this is unsurprising given the seemingly safe presumptions that knowledge entails belief and that the kind of belief that knowledge entails supervenes exclusively on brainbound cognition. It will be argued here that the most plausible version of the entailment thesis holds just that knowledge entails dispositional belief. However, regardless of whether occurrent belief supervenes only as the cognitive internalist permits, we should reject the (...) idea that dispositional belief supervenes only in cognitive internalist-friendly ways. These observations, taken together, reveal two things: first, that a cognitive internalist picture of the mind is much more dispensable in epistemology than has been assumed and, second, that pursuing questions in extended epistemology need not involve any radical departure from the commitments of more traditional epistemological projects. (shrink)

Where does consciousness come from and how does it work? Is it a purely biological thing? Where does the brain leave off and the mind begin? These questions, once viewed as ethereal and impossible to study empirically, are now being addressed by science in bold and startling new ways.In Consciousness, world-renowned neuropsychiatrist J. Allan Hobson presents a witty and introspective consideration of this mysterious concept, connecting it to specific areas of the brain and their chemical and physical states. Hobson guides (...) his readers through the various states of waking, dreaming, and nonconsciousness using the theories and data of neuroscience, psychiatry, and neurophysiology. Although his ideas are based in science, his imaginative approach keeps us in touch with the mysterious and seductive nature of his subject.Richly woven, with references to literature, philosophy, and the author's personal experiences, Consciousness is a delightful and compact introduction to a concept central to the human experience. (shrink)

Even the simplest known living organisms are complex chemical processing systems. But how sophisticated is the behaviour that arises from this? We present a framework in which even bacteria can be identified as capable of representing information in arbitrary signal molecules, to facilitate altering their behaviour to optimise their food supplies, for example. Known asion/Representation theory, this framework makes precise the relationship between physical systems and abstract concepts. Originally developed to answer the question of when a physical system is computing, (...) AR theory naturally extends to the realm of biological systems to bring clarity to questions of computation at the cellular level. (shrink)

Here I reply to criticisms by Jeroen de Ridder and S. Kate Devitt to my "Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology".

Despite optimistic reports about the results of amputation for advanced vascular disease, the patient’s assessment of advantages and disadvantages is seldom acknowledged. A detailed social study of 67 amputees has revealed considerable disparity between the patient’s views and those of the medical staff. About a third of the patients are forced to retire from active work by the amputation; about three-quarters report a serious decline in their social activities; only about half are really independent with prostheses in the long term; (...) a quarter report severe and intractable symptoms related to their amputation stumps; only about a quarter feel that the amputation was definitely beneficial; and only about one in five feel that the medical staff have provided adequate support during their hospital stay. Amputees face physical and financial disability, isolation, and discomfort. Every effort must be made to explain the implications of amputation honestly and realistically and to ensure continuing patient assessment and support. (shrink)

Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. Age seems to matter when considering severity, but perhaps not small age differences. In the following article we consider Small Differences : small differences in age are not relevant when considering differential illness severity. We show that SD cannot be accommodated within utilitarian, prioritarian or egalitarian theories. Attempting to accommodate SD by postulating a threshold model becomes exceedingly complex and self-defeating. The only way to accommodate SD seems to be to (...) accept some form of relevance view, where some age differences are irrelevant. This view can accommodate SD, but at the expense of consistent priority orderings. Severity thus becomes unsuitable for systematic decision-making. We argue that SD should be dismissed and that we should accept a continuous relationship between severity of illness and age. (shrink)

O objetivo deste ensaio é examinar a proposta de Sandy Goldberg, segundo a qual há divisão de trabalho epistêmico em certos processos de aquisição de conhecimento – ao menos em se tratando de conhecimento testemunhal. Goldberg propõe mostrar a veracidade desta alegação salientando a nossa dependência epistêmica em relação a outros indivíduos, ou mesmo comunidades inteiras. Nós, então, vamos propor o tratamento de um famoso caso tipo-Gettier que, segundo Gilbert Harman, revelaria algumas dimensões sociais do conhecimento. Por fim, nós esperamos (...) tirar algumas lições da explicação oferecida por Goldberg, dentre as quais a mais importante a ser tomada é que, havendo tal divisão de trabalho epistêmico em processos de aquisição de conhecimento, muitas vezes, não são apenas as propriedades epistêmicas do sujeito que determinam a sua posse de conhecimento ou ignorância, de modo que o conhecimento é mais social do que individual em se tratando de uma ampla gama de casos. (shrink)

Aristotle and the sea battle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--Aristotle's different possibilities, by K. J. J. Hintikka.--On Aristotle's square of opposition, by M. Thompson.--Categories in Aristotle and in Kant, by J. C. Wilson.--Aristotle's Categories, chapters I-V: translation and notes, by J. L. Ackrill--Aristotle's theory of categories, by J. M. E. Moravcsik.--Essence and accident, by I. M. Copi.--Tithenai ta phainomena, by G. E. L. Owen.--Matter and predication in Aristotle, by J. Owens.--Problems in Metaphysics Z, chapter 13, by M. J. Woods.--The meaning (...) of agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, by H. A. Prichard.--Agathon and eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle, by J. L. Austin.--The final good in Aristotle's Ethics, by W. F. R. Hardie.--Aristotle on pleasure, by J. O. Urmson.--Bibliography (p. 335-41). (shrink)

Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...) immense complexity of the brain processes underlying consciousness, it represents them as fundamentally different from nonmental physical phenomena (dualist intuition), using 'simulations' to produce 'Sm-type understanding'/predictions that seems radically different from 'Sp-type understanding'. (By analogy, different sensory modalities, handled by distinct brain systems, evoke qualitatively different experiences.) Brain systems for Sp representations of our brain processes never evolved, because they would be useless. When lacking a single 'template' matching different aspects of reality (objective vs. subjective = simulated), complementary 'models' are needed ('neuro-complementarity'), like the wave–particle duality in quantum mechanics. Thus, it seems plausible that Sp and Sm evolved because they were needed to cope with different challenges, and that 'problem intuitions' are side effects of these useful but different brain systems. (shrink)

Background Equal access to healthcare is a core principle in Norway’s public healthcare system. The COVID-19 pandemic challenged healthcare systems in the early phase – in particular, related to testing and hospital capacity. There is little knowledge on how older people experienced being infected with an unfamiliar and severe disease, and how they experienced the need for healthcare early in the pandemic Aim To explore the experiences of older people infected by COVID-19 and their need for testing and hospitalisation. Research (...) design An explorative and descriptive approach, with qualitative interviews conducted in October 2020. Participants and research context Seventeen participants above 60 years of age hospitalised due to COVID-19 during spring 2020 were recruited 6 months after discharge. Ethical considerations Ethical approval was granted by the Regional Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics in South-Eastern Norway (155425). Findings The main finding was that the informants experienced vulnerability and arbitrariness. This finding was supported by three sub-themes: experiences with a severe and unfamiliar disease, the strict criteria and the importance of someone advocating needs. Discussion Participants described varying access to healthcare. Those who did not meet the national criteria to be tested or hospitalised struggled against the system. Findings reveal arbitrary access to healthcare, in contrast to Norway’s ethical principle of fair and just access to health services. Moreover, to access and receive necessary healthcare, informants were dependent on their next-of-kin’s advocacy. Conclusion Even when dealing with an unfamiliar disease, health professionals’ assessments of symptoms must be performed with an ethical obligation to applicate competent appraisal and the exercise of discernment; this is in line with care ethics and ethical standards for nurses. These perspectives are a significant part of caring and the intension of doing good. (shrink)

J C Forge; A Role for Philosophy of Science in the Teaching of Science, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 109–117, http.

El objetivo de este artículo es definir la concepción del acto involuntario de Francisco Suárez y mostrarla como un medio que permite comprender y profundizar en su teoría de la acción humana. En esta cuestión, el Doctor Eximio parte de presupuestos elaborados por Tomás de Aquino que amplía y adapta siguiendo sus propias tesis metafísicas y teológicas sobre la relación entre Dios y las creaturas. Mostraremos cómo Suárez vincula el verdadero involuntario con el _simpliciter_, lo forzado, necesario e indeseado, dejando (...) al _secundum quid_ como un acto mixto en el que la libertad y la voluntad, pese a las injerencias externas, no quedan anuladas. Por último, subrayaremos las consecuencias de la definición suareciana de lo involuntario sobre la noción de libertad, haciendo patente que tanto una como otra serían imposibles fuera del marco teórico que él sustenta, caracterizado por la eficiencia humana (y su dependencia de la divinidad) y no por la premoción física. (shrink)

Research on human beings has significantly increased in ethical and scientific complexity. Ethics review is at a fork in the road. Either we significantly increase the resources we provide to support institutional research ethics committees. Or we abandon the institutional base of human research ethics review and move to model of expert suprainstitutional ethics committees.

The role of microaggressions has gained increasing philosophical attention in recent years. However, microaggressions only tell part of the story. An often-overlooked component of inequality is the uneven and unjust distribution of microaffirmations. In this paper, I give a new definition of microaffirmations as signals that a recipient belongs to some valued or high-status class. Microaffirmations can—but need not—lead individuals to gain a sense of confidence, belonging, and merit. I then explain the harms of microaffirmations, arguing that when microaffirmations are (...) distributed inequitably, they can have larger ramifications for injustice, harming some vulnerable groups more than others. In addition, microaffirmations can lead individual actors to make choices based on who gives them microaffirmations and where they receive them, and thus can have outsized influence over the direction of an individual’s life because individuals tend to migrate to where they feel valued, appreciated, and included. I then turn to solutions to the problems I raise. I argue we should attend to and attempt to rectify inequalities in microaffirmations because doing so can help ensure not just the absence of negative attention, but also that the presence of positive attention is flowing in a just and equitable way. (shrink)

The ancients, Friedrich Nietzsche notes, held Homer's objective art and Archilochus's subjective art in equally high esteem. However, if a work of art must be "objective," how are we to understand the subjective artist, who, like Archilochus, produces art from his own subjective experience? Guided by a clue from Schiller's May 18, 1796 letter to Goethe, Nietzsche employs Schopenhauer's theory of music in his consideration of the subjective artist. Turning to Paul Ricoeur's distinction between image as copy and image as (...) fiction, I argue, will assist us in understanding how Nietzsche resolves the problem of the subjective artist. (shrink)

First published in 1952, British Empirical Philosophers is a comprehensive picture of one of the most important movements in the history of philosophic thought. In his introduction, Professor A. J. Ayer distinguishes the main problems of empiricism and gives a critical account of the ways in which the philosophers whose writings are included in this volume attempted to solve them. Editors Ayer and Raymond Winch bring together an authoritative abridgement of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding ; Bishop George Berkeley’s (...) Principles of Human Knowledge ; almost the entire first book of David Hume’s Treatise Concerning Human Nature ; and extracts from Thomas Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man and John Stuart Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. (shrink)