First published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The eight essays contained in this book explore the portrayal of women, and various philosophical responses to that portrayal in contemporary post-civil rights society. They bring feminist voices to the conversation about gender and attests to the importance of feminist critique in what is sometimes claimed to be a post-feminist era.

The idea of ‘moral responsibility’ is typically linked with praise and blame, and with the notion of ‘the voluntary’. It is often thought that if we are free, in the relevant sense, we may “deserve” praise or blame; otherwise, we do not. But when we look at whether and why we need the notions of praise and blame, we find that they are not as intimately connected with desert as many philosophers have thought. In particular, this paper challenges the idea (...) that forms of evaluation and behavior tied to our “reactive attitudes” (especially resentment) best further morality’s aims, properly understood. (shrink)

Here is the usual way philosophers think about science and induction. Scientists do many things— aspire, probe, theorize, conclude, retract, and refine— but successful research culminates in a published research report that presents an argument for some empirical conclusion. In mathematics and logic there are sound deductive arguments that fully justify their conclusions, but such proofs are unavailable in the empirical domain because empirical hypotheses outrun the evidence adduced for them. Inductive skeptics insist that such conclusions cannot be justified. But (...) “justification” is a vague term— if empirical conclusions cannot be established fully, as mathematical conclusions are, perhaps they are justified in the sense that they are partially supported or confirmed by the available evidence. To respond to the skeptic, one merely has to explicate the concept of confirmation or partial justification in a systematic manner that agrees, more or less, with common usage and to observe that our scientific conclusions are confirmed in the explicated sense. This process of explication is widely thought to culminate in some version of Bayesian confirmation theory. (shrink)

Defense of incompletable grounding and discussion of implications for ontological economy.

The use of technologies in personnel selection has come under increased scrutiny in recent years, revealing their potential to amplify existing inequalities in recruitment processes. To date, however, there has been a lack of comprehensive assessments of respective discriminatory potentials and no legal or practical standards have been explicitly established for fairness auditing. The current proposal of the Artificial Intelligence Act classifies numerous applications in personnel selection and recruitment as high-risk technologies, and while it requires quality standards to protect the (...) fundamental rights of those involved, particularly during development, it does not provide concrete guidance on how to ensure this, especially once the technologies are commercially available. We argue that comprehensive and reliable auditing of personnel selection technologies must be contextual, that is, embedded in existing processes and based on real data, as well as participative, involving various stakeholders beyond technology vendors and customers, such as advocacy organizations and researchers. We propose an architectural draft that employs a data trustee to provide independent, fiduciary management of personal and corporate data to audit the fairness of technologies used in personnel selection. Drawing on a case study conducted with two state-owned companies in Berlin, Germany, we discuss challenges and approaches related to suitable fairness metrics, operationalization of vague concepts such as migration* and applicable legal foundations that can be utilized to overcome the fairness-privacy-dilemma arising from uncertainties associated with current laws. We highlight issues that require further interdisciplinary research to enable a prototypical implementation of the auditing concept in the mid-term. (shrink)

Summary The paper presents the result of a collective reflection inspired by the individual suggestions of 30 researchers working in different research areas. They are all familiar with the Experimental Phenomenology of Perception, and are aware of the importance that this approach might represent nowadays in their specific research field. The picture that emerges from this ‘mosaic’ stimulates us to consider the potential future developments of this approach if we accept that we need to push its borders beyond the traditional (...) aims of the study of perception (as masterfully developed by the historic Italian Maestri of this approach). If we take this broader view, the Experimental Phenomenology of Perception can extend its perimeters from an analysis of strictly perceptual aspects to an analysis of cognitive and metacognitive aspects (such as aesthetic evaluations, the perception of risk, the experience of certainty/uncertainty in a reasoning process, the perception of proximity to/distance from the solution to a problem and meaning-making in language). The cognitive and metacognitive aspects referred to are grounded in and modelled on the perceiver’s experience of a given situation. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe some of the highlights of Melchior’s checking account and then suggest that its explanatory value could be enhanced with a less analyzed concept of checking. This thought inspires a rearguard defense of sensitivity, by no means aiming to rescue it from all its well-known problems, wherein it is suggested that sensitivity fares better as a necessary condition for knowledge when all the bells and whistles with which it has been adorned over the years are stripped (...) away. Finally, I investigate a recognizably Moorean position involving methods that can be construed as sensitive, such that persons using them can claim to have checked that skeptical hypotheses are false. (shrink)

Assessing the impact of CSR initiatives can be a complex task for marketers given the variety of methods of communicating about CSR as well as the broad range of stakeholders that CSR initiatives might interest. Social media helps increase the visibility and credibility of CSR communication and provides new ways of reaching and involving stakeholders in CSR initiatives. Using data collected and coded from Facebook pages of the Top 100 Global Brands, the authors introduce a new measure of effectiveness for (...) CSR communication; CSR communication productivity (CCP). The findings indicate that CCP has a positive impact on firm performance (Tobin’s Q). The authors also investigate the impact of External Stakeholder Involvement in CSR initiatives. The results suggest that when external stakeholders are involved in an organization’s CSR initiatives, both CCP and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) improve. In addition, third-party evaluations of CSR performance positively moderate the impact of External Stakeholder Involvement on CCP. These findings offer contributions to CSR communication and social media marketing theories. They also have implications for marketing managers regarding how to measure and benchmark CCP, and how to maximize returns by involving external stakeholders in CSR efforts. (shrink)

Introduction: Foucault and political philosophy -- Marx: antinormative critique -- Lenin: the invention of party governmentality -- Althusser: the failure to denormativise Marxism -- Deleuze: denormativisation as norm -- Rorty: relativising normativity -- Honneth: the poverty of critical theory -- Geuss: the paradox of realism -- Foucault: the lure of neoliberalism -- Conclusion: What now?

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) are not moral authorities. Standardization of CECs’ professional role does not confer upon them moral authority. Certification of particular CECs does not confer upon them moral authority (nor does it reflect such authority). Or, so we will argue. This article offers a distinctly Orthodox Christian response to those who claim that CECs—or any other academically trained bioethicist—retain moral authority (i.e., an authority to know and recommend the right course of action). This article proceeds in three parts. (...) First, we discuss recent movements toward the certification of CECs in the United States, focusing primarily on proposals and programs put forth by the American Society for Humanities and Bioethics (ASBH). Second, we outline two secular reasons to be concerned about the relevant trends toward certification. For one thing, certification is currently being advanced via political dominance, rather than gaining authority by reliance on rigorous philosophical argument or reason. For another, the trends operate on the assumption that there exists a secular, content-full, canonical, morality. There is no such morality. Next, we argue that Orthodox Christians should resist the current trends toward certification of CECs. Specifically, we unpack ways in which the ASBH’s certification program (and those like it) conflict with Orthodox claims about moral authority and the moral life more generally. We conclude that Orthodox Christians should resist the current certification trends. (shrink)

Naturalism admits of no single, simple definition (usually depending on the naturalist's commitment to science). After distinguishing ontological or metaphysic naturalism from methodological naturalism, I discuss the historical development of ontological naturalism, as well as arguments for or against naturalism. I then take moral goodness and badness as a case study of the problems and prospects for ontological naturalism.

Editor's introduction -- Author's introduction -- Interrelational subjects and social sublimation -- The gestation of the other in phenomenology -- The look of love and ecological subjectivity -- Social melancholy, shame and sublimation -- Responsible subjects and witnessing -- Witnessing subjectivity and testimony -- Witnessing, recognition, and response ethics -- Between ethics and politics -- Response ethics and the nonhumans -- Animal ethics: toward an ethics of responsiveness -- Service dogs: between animal studies and disability studies -- Earth ethics and (...) creaturely cohabitation -- Witnessing in the age of spectacle -- Death as a penalty and instant death -- Rape as spectator sport and creepshot entertainment -- The spectacle of war -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

Locke's Second treatise in context -- The life and times of John Locke -- The political and philosophical context of the Second treatise -- Overview and key themes -- The Second treatise in Locke's philosophy -- Key themes -- Reading the text -- Getting started: the problem of absolutism -- From the First treatise to the Second treatise -- The state of nature -- Equality -- Freedom -- The law of nature -- Right and duty to punish: executive power of (...) the law of nature -- Natural rights -- State of nature, history and realism -- The state of war and slavery -- War -- Slavery -- Private property -- Self-ownership -- Original acquisition -- World ownership and equality -- The invention of money -- Property and colonial acquisition -- Patriarchal power and the family -- The status of children -- The duty of parents and the role of the family -- The obligations of children and parents -- The conjugal or sexual contract -- The origins of political society -- The original contract -- The second stage agreement and the role of majorities -- The problem of consent -- The Lockean state -- Legislative power -- Executive power -- Prerogative -- Conquest, tyranny and the dissolution of the state -- Conquest -- Usurpation -- Tyranny, rebellion and resistance -- When to rebel and resist? -- Reception and influence -- Locke's influence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries -- History, religion and Locke: contemporary interpretations of Locke -- Locke, property and contemporary liberalism -- Notes -- Further reading -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

Recent research in neurochemistry has shown there to be a number of chemical compounds that are implicated in the patterns of lust, attraction, and attachment that undergird romantic love. For example, there is evidence that the phenomenon of attachment is associated with the action of oxytocin and vasopressin. There is therefore some reason to suppose that patterns of lust, attraction, and attachment could be regulated via manipulation of these substances in the brain: in other words, by their use as 'love (...) drugs'. A growing bioethical literature asks searching questions about this prospect, and especially about the use of such drugs to enhance or reignite attachment in flagging relationships. This Element examines some of the central arguments on the topic, and sounds a note of caution. It urges that there are reasons to think the states of attachment produced or facilitated by the use of such drugs would not be desirable. (shrink)

Our capabilities in space are growing almost as fast as our ambitions. Many nations, companies, and private actors are currently vying to secure historic “firsts” in space, raising complex social and ethical questions. There is surprisingly little serious analysis of these issues, however, and they are rarely discussed in undergraduate class discussions, despite their popularity with students. To help correct this deficit, a student research team designed 11 case studies to help instructors across the curriculum introduce space into their classes. (...) These are designed for ease of use, with self-contained background information, suggested readings/movies, and a series of juicy questions. (shrink)

Genealogy -- New norms -- Politics -- Sex -- Life -- Law -- Difference -- Conclusion.

Today there is a tendency to do ethics on the basis of what I should like to call the “self-other model.” On this view, an action has no moral worth unless it benefits others–and not even then, unless it is motivated by altruism rather than selfishness. This radical rift between self-interest and virtue traces back at least to Philo of Alexandria, according to whom, “lovers of self, when they have stripped and prepared for conflict with those who value virtue, keep (...) up the boxing and wrestling until they have either forced their opponents to give in, or have completely destroyed them.” More recently, the distinction between those who value themselves and those who “value virtue” has been drawn sharply by Bernard Williams: “[I]n moral theory … it is not the Kantian leap from the particular and the affective to the rational and universal that makes all the difference; it is rather the Humean step–that is to say, the first Humean step–from the self to someone else.”. (shrink)

Although we are enthusiastic about a Darwinian approach to culture, we argue that the overview presented in the target article does not sufficiently emphasize the crucial explanatory role that psychology plays in the study of culture. We use a number of examples to illustrate the variety of ways by which appeal to psychological factors can help explain cultural phenomena.

Have I made a mistake in my Anarchism, or has the editor of Liberty himself tripped? At any rate, I must challenge the Anarchism of one sentence in his otherwise masterful paper upon 'State Socialism and Anarchism.' If I am wrong, I stand open to conviction. It is this. 'They [Anarchists] look forward to a time...when the children born of these relations shall belong exclusively to the mothers until old enough to belong to themselves.'.

Recent moral philosophy has been characterized by some serious attempts to show that both Kantian and utilitarian moralities leave us with insufficient room to pursue our personal projects and relationships. These moralities have been charged with demanding a kind of impartiality that leaves us with too little space for developing ourselves and our friendships, family relations, communities, and nations in the ways best suited for us. Critics claim these theories implausibly maintain that if our personal relationships and affinities do not (...) further the ends of moral duty or maximum utility, they are of no value and hence we lack reason to devote ourselves to them. In what follows, I will assume that a conception of morality would indeed be implausible if it were to demand impartiality in the strong sense that it would be impermissible to favor our own projects and ambitions, to care especially about the welfare of certain persons rather than others, and sometimes to give preference to those we care most about, even when we could benefit strangers more. (shrink)

I would like to begin by talking about General Education in America. General Education plays a very particular and interesting role in American Higher Education. A typical undergraduate at one of our colleges or universities is expected to satisfy a range of requirements in his or her major area of study (mathematics, economics, philosophy, etc.); and they will also take a range of electives – courses that are not required for graduation but in which the student might want to explore (...) a developing interest. In addition to both of these, however, most undergraduate institutions (though not all) require that students satisfy a range of general education requirements as well. These are the requirements that must be satisfied for the student to count – in the opinion of the institution – as generally educated. They are the requirements, in other words, that every student must fulfill regardless of their areas of interest or specialty in order to be prepared to enter the broader world and to aspire to live a good life in it. (shrink)

Healthcare trends, stressors, and workplace violence -- Patient privacy and exploitation -- Abuse and assault -- Fraud and theft -- Suspicious death and homicide -- Investigations, sanctions, and discipline -- Prevention strategies and the future of healthcare crime.

This paper presents a new explanation of how preferring the simplest theory compatible with experience assists one in finding the true answer to a scientific question when the answers are theories or models. Inquiry is portrayed as an unending game between science and nature in which the scientist aims to converge to the true theory on the basis of accumulating information. Simplicity is a topological invariant reflecting sequences of theory choices that nature can force an arbitrary, convergent scientist to produce. (...) It is demonstrated that among the methods that converge to the truth in an empirical problem, the ones that do so with a minimum number of reversals of opinion prior to convergence are exactly the ones that prefer simple theories. The approach explains not only simplicity tastes in model selection, but aspects of theory testing and the unwillingness of natural science to break symmetries without a reason. (shrink)