: In this paper I will focus on the notion of “dominant patterns”, as revealed by the recently discovered typescript of what we can assume to be Dewey’s fragmentary and incomplete preliminary lecture notes for the Lecture Series on Social and Political Philosophy. I will show that the way the notion of “dominant patterns” is dealt with in the text of the lecture notes is not only consistent with the conceptual content of the whole series of the Lectures in China (...) as published by R. W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen, but also gives us further arguments to appreciate the centrality of this question to the development of Dewey’s philosophical project during this period. In particular, I will argue that a comparative reading of the lecture notes and of the Lectures in China allows us to appreciate the central role dominant patterns play for Dewey’s understanding of social groupings as embodying habitual patterns of action and the way habit formation shapes and gives content to the interests that groups identify with and are identified by in social practices. Secondly, I will argue that such a comparative reading allows us to appreciate how in the lecture series Dewey has developed the notion of dominant patterns into a theory of social domination which is basically described in terms of habitualized recognitive relations. Hence, the discovery of the lecture notes is also very helpful in deepening our understanding of the Deweyan approach to the question of social recognition – and in particular of the dynamics of institutional recognition and its ideological function – and how it relates to habitualized patterns of dominant-subservient relations. -/- domination, habits, social philosophy, struggle for recognition, conflict, groups, hegemony, power, institutionalization. (shrink)

Beginning with a brief presentation of the historical data and conceptual issues that have led to the emergence of the doctrine of the notion of Transitional Justice, I will describe the orientation adopted in two paradigmatic historical contexts, the Nuremberg trial at the end of the Second World War and the post-apartheid reconciliation process in South Africa. Supported by documents from International Human Rights Law and other international legal sources (Rome Statute) I will then offer a provisional definition of what (...) I call a Critical Transitional Justice. The conclusion highlights how the relationship between retrospective and prospective responsibility today is not exclusionary: as central principles of Critical Transitional Justice, they contribute in conferring normative legitimacy to transformative processes of adapting the international system to compliance to general principles of human rights. (shrink)

La storia del termine laicus, nel corso del Medioevo, mostra un'interessante evoluzione. Inizialmente laico ha un valore positivo e si riferisce semplicemente al popolo di Dio; si passa successivamente a una valutazione chiaramente negativa dall'XI al XIII secolo. In questo periodo si definisce il laico secondo una doppia negazione: come il non chierico e il non monaco, e come idiota e illitteratus, cioè il cristiano privo di istruzione. Si torna a importanti posizioni di apprezzamento positivo nel XIV-XV secolo, anche in (...) connessione con l'espandersi dell'uso del volgare, in cui laico e illetterato non coincidono più e si afferma una figura nuova di cristiano autentico: il laico che vive nel mondo in modo utile a sé e agli altri, dedito all'esercizio delle virtù e alla frequentazione della cultura.The history of the term laicus, in the course of the Middle Ages, shows an interesting development. Initially laicus has a positive value and refers simply to the people of God; later a clear negative meaning becomes prevalent: from the 11th to the 13rd century. In this period laicus is defined according to a double negative sense: as the non-clerical and the not-monk, and as idiota et illitteratus, i.e. the Christian without learning. A new important positive meaning appears during 14th and 15th century, also connected with the diffusion of vernacular languages, in which laicus and illitteratus don't overlap and the term means a new figure of authentic Christian: the layman who lives in the world in a useful way to himself and others, devoting himself to the exercise of virtue and to study of learning. (shrink)

The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that assume the bulk of emergency care during large-scale disasters in the developing world must expend considerable time and resources to ensure donations to sustain their field operations. This long-standing dilemma for the humanitarian community can create a competitive environment that: • Compromises the delivery and quality of services,• Allows the effectiveness of operations to be compromised by a lack of cooperation and collaboration,• Disrupts the timely and accurate coordination and analysis of outcome measures that• Undermines (...) the long-term capacity of indigenous aid organizations. (shrink)

"Con uno stile piano, e nello stesso tempo acceso, Italo Mancini presenta una sintesi che potrebbe raccogliersi attorno al quesito sul "che fare, adesso?", soprattutto da parte di un credente, di fronte a forme sempre più avvertite di appesantimento e di invecchiamento della Terra.

Revisión de la actividad “Acto de Homenaje y Entrega de Legajos Reparados de los/as Detenidos/as, Desaparecidos/as y Asesinados/as de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación”.

Paper given at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America, University of South Carolina, October 24-26, 2008 -/- The local problem of the soul-body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between Nature and Spirit. This relates to Hegel's naturalism: the idea that there is one single reality - living reality - and different levels of description of it. This implies, moreover, that it is possible to ascribe some form of naturality also (...) to the social body of institutionalized ethical life. Hegel’s position can thus be characterised as a kind of aristotelian social naturalism: this, at bottom, is the combined meaning of the Hegelian theses that soul is the substance of Spirit, and habit its universal form. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone exponer el carácter problemático de la base sistemática de la estética hegeliana desarrollada en la Enciclopedia a partir del análisis de algunas de sus temáticas centrales y de las modificaciones que sufren en las tres ediciones de esta obra. Primero se examina la definición enciclopédica del ideal y la noción de obra de arte contenida en ella. Luego se aborda la disputada cuestión de la autonomización del arte respecto de la religión. Finalmente, se analiza la (...) intuición como medio propio del arte y las consiguientes determinaciones del mismo, a saber: la inmediatez y la finitud. (shrink)

In this paper I expose Caligaris and Starostas argument on the logical character of the initial moments in Hegels and Marxs dialectics; I argue that the categories of Marxs theory of labor-value must be read in such a way that value, or substance of value, is taken non-substantially, arising only with the emergence of exchange value, or the value-form; Finally, I attempt to justify this reading from the standpoint of the idea of self-posited presuppositions, as developed by Slavoj Zizek.

Lightness -- Quickness -- Exactitude -- Visibility -- Multiplicity.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the central role of the notion of " habit " (Gewohnheit) in Hegel's theory of " embodiment " (Verleiblichung) and to show that the philosophical outcome of the Anthropology is that habit, understood as a sensorimotor life form, is not only an enabling condition for there to be mindedness, but is more strongly an ontological constitutive condition of all its levels of manifestation. Moreover, I will argue that Hegel's approach somehow makes a (...) model of embodied cognition available which offers a unified account of the three main senses of embodiment understood as both a physiological, a functional, and a phenomenological process. In this sense Hegel's approach to habit can make a useful contribution to the contemporary debate on embodiment in philosophy of mind, the cognitive sciences, and action theory. For a long time habit in 20th century philosophy and science has been mostly read in a negative way, identified with mechanical and repetitive routine. The reconstruction of Hegel’s approach is particularly relevant here and can fruitfully contribute to this discussion, since it offers us not only a model that assigns to habit a positive constitutive role in the formation of embodied human mindedness but which also overcomes the dualism between habitual motor routine and intentional activities that is prevalent nowadays in the cognitive sciences and in action theory, and allows for some sense of natural agency as belonging to animal life. Furthermore, Hegel’s approach cuts across the great divide between associationist and holistic approaches to habit that has for a long time dominated the philosophical debate on habit and still shapes the current opposition between classical cognitive science and embodied cognitive science. (shrink)

I tackle the definition of the relation between first and second nature while examining some problems with McDowell's conception. This, in the first place, will bring out the need to extend the notion of second nature to the social dimension, understanding it not just as `inner' second nature — individual mind — but also as `outer' second nature — objective spirit. In the second place the dialectical connection between these two notions of second nature will point the way to a (...) critical use of the concept itself, which will link up with a theory of reification. Furthermore, I shall endeavor to fit my reflection into the problematic constellation of critical theory: my analysis in fact rests on the question whether, within a critical theory, the philosophy of nature can be recaptured today, in such a way as to give meaning to the very notion of socio-philosophical criticism of reality. (shrink)

In this paper, making reference to Robert Brandom's philosophical proposal - and against the background of Brandom's debate with Jürgen Habermas - I shall endeavor, first, to define the relation between recognition and normativity and then between recognition and criticism; in the final part of the paper I shall suggest a perspective that approaches recognition in terms of capacities. On this basis I attempt to see the critical attitude as something that is founded more on individual potentials than on formal (...) criteria and that is essentially connected with a power of redescription: a dialectical anthropology of recognition is thus the most promising base to account for that which substantiates our critical powers. (shrink)

The theory of recognition arises within Hegel's confrontation with epistemological skepticism and aims at responding to the questions raised by modern skepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. This is possible to the extent that the theory of recognition is the guiding thread of a critique of the modern foundational theory of knowledge and, at the same time, the point of departure for an alternative approach. In this article I will dwell (...) on six stages of the evolution of Hegel's thought prior to the Phenomenology (1797-1806),stages shed great light on the direction taken by his argumentative strategy. Synthetically, the stages are as follows: 1. Hegel naturalizes the epistemological questions; 2. to do so he critiques foundationalism qua theory of empirical knowledge; 3. and qua theory of epistemic justification; 4. the critique of foundationalism is linked to a critique of the corresponding representationalistic theory of perception; 5. this, in turn, is linked to a critique of the monological theories of self-consciousness and to the development of a model of the rise of self-conscious knowing; 6. finally, Hegel synthesizes these epistemological views in a theory of knowledge qua recognition and in a metaphilosophical theory of philosophical rationality qua self-recognition: knowledge without foundation is thus the condition of possibility of philosophy’s self-justification. (shrink)

Abstract. Focusing on part one of Tales of the Mighty Dead and on its relation to the afterword to Between Saying and Doing, I illustrate what reconstructive methodology is and argue that theoretical thinking is one of its instances. I then show that the historical understanding involved in telling the story of a philosophical tradition is another case of reconstruction: one that deepens our understanding of the retrospective character of reconstruction itself, adding something new to our conception of rationality. I (...) then explore a further instance of reconstructive rationality, that is what Brandom calls “reconstructive metaphysics”, i.e. a reconstructive theory whose aspiration is global rather than local. Finally, I argue that Brandom’s reconstructive metaphysics is basically a pragmatist metaphysics. (shrink)

The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of recognitive spiritual consciousness. On this basis it will be argued that recognition has a foothold in nature. As a consequence, recognition should not be understood as a bootstrapping process, that is, as a self-positing and self-justifying normative social phenomenon, intelligible within itself and independently of anything external to it.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in (...) the socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional-teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article I will first reconstruct a Deweyan model of social ontology, based on the process of habituation. Habit ontology leads to a social philosophy that is not merely descriptive, since it involves a critical redescription of the social world. I will argue that a habit-modeled social ontology is critical insofar as it includes an account of social transformation and of the inevitability of social conflict. Such an understanding is based on a diagnosis of social pathologies of our (...) form of life and includes an account of the experience of domination. Accordingly, it is described as a matter of an imbalance of recognition that embodies subjugating patterns and is seen from the critical perspective of freedom understood as emancipation from oppression. This leads to a reconstruction of the genesis of critical attitudes from life's processes of habituation, which leads to an extended naturalist account of social authority. (shrink)

Neste artigo, trago a uma maior explicitação o conceito de direito da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel, buscando reabilitá-lo como alternativa às concepções jusnaturalistas e juspositivistas tradicionais. Busco uma resposta à questão “o que significa ter um direito?” a partir da Filosofia do Direito hegeliana. Questiono pela gênese e locus do direito e argumento que este se origina de uma relação de reconhecimento recíproco intersubjetivo, posteriormente consubstanciando-se objetivamente na eticidade, por meio das instituições sociais. A partir das conclusões de que (...) (i) ter um direito significa ser intersubjetivamente reconhecido como possuidor de uma reivindicação legítima a algo; e que (ii) tal reconhecimento intersubjetivo se torna progressivamente objetivo nas instituições, proponho a ideia de “título de reconhecimento” como definidora do conceito de direito. (shrink)

Analisarei o romance Um Diário do Ano da Peste de Daniel Defoe como sendo um experimento mental que nos fornece prescrições consistentes sobre como agir em tempos de pandemia. Para mostrar que obras de ficção não possuem apenas valor estético, mas também um caráter cognitivo, defenderei o cognitivismo crítico e sustentarei desse modo que os ganhos cognitivos que temos a partir de uma obra de ficção acontecem em uma reflexão posterior à experiência imediata com a obra. Em seguida, argumentarei que (...) a ficção possui uma vantagem heurística frente à filosofia e às ciências, pois uma narrativa ficcional fornece ao espectador uma perspectiva privilegiada dos fatos ou dos pensamentos de uma personagem. Essa perspectiva pode sensibilizar o espectador e fazê-lo ter empatia pela personagem que sofre; e isso pode funcionar, em tempos de pandemia, como uma defesa das medidas de prevenção, a exemplo do isolamento social. (shrink)

Metametaphysics is the study regarding the foundations and the methodology of Metaphysics. We’ll analyze in this paper three methodologies that established the origins of Metametaphysics in the Analytic Tradition: that of Alexius Meinong, Rudolf Carnap and Willard van Orman Quine. According to Meinong, there is a distinction between ‘to exist’ and ‘there is’ and, in order to preserve the intuition that every intentional act is directed towards an object, there are things that do not exist. According to Carnap, the questions (...) in Metaphysics can be easily answered by empirical or inferential means once we adopt a linguistic framework and answer these questions internally to this framework. Quine argued that to take an entity as existing is to take it as the value of a bound variable. Metametaphysics is relevant because it disambiguates our vocabulary and makes the philosophers avoid verbal disputes. Our objective in this paper was not to show our preferences to one of these methodologies but to provide a starting point for those who are not familiar with these matters — just so other researchers may engage with the issues that belong to Metametaphysics. (shrink)

Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment.. Secondly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a (...) dialectical concept which connects ‘impulse’ and ‘habit’, ‘original’ or ‘native’ and ‘acquired’ nature, ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing ‘routine’ and ‘art’ as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies. (shrink)

Enterprise Risk Management and security have become a fundamental part of Enterprise Architecture, so several frameworks and modeling languages have been designed to support the activities associated with these areas. Archi- Mate’s Risk and Security Overlay is one of such proposals, endorsed by The Open Group. We investigate the capabilities of the proposed security-related con- structs in ArchiMate with regard to the necessities of enterprise security modeling. Our analysis relies on a well-founded reference ontology of security to uncover ambiguity, missing (...) modeling elements, and other deficiencies of the security mod- eling capabilities in ArchiMate. Based on this ontologically-founded analysis, we propose a redesign of security aspects of ArchiMate to overcome its original limitations. (shrink)