Bioart ‒ a New Challenge in Contemporary Art. Lately, in contemporary art, one can find, more and more often, live animals with the status of artwork. Although animal rights activists consider this a flagrant violation of their most elementary rights, contemporary artists with a wide range of motivation often incorporate the live animal into their work and give it the title of artistic work. Another challenge in contemporary art is biotech art that provides the public with another field of representation (...) that has as main themes its living tissues, cells and nucleus, DNA, bacteria, grafts, patches of tattooed skin, guinea pigs, phosphorescent rabbits, and a wide floral palette. To this trend, several art galleries rallied, that consider the living animal and certain aspects of biotechnological research, artwork, and their exposure as being a natural thing. Moreover, in recent decades, to this new current of bioart, groups of specialists from different fields also joined: biologists, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, jurists, philosophers, and heterogeneous groups of art lovers. The questions addressed to all those who accept and consider this original work of art are the following: Why is the live animal in an exhibition, more aesthetically valuable than when it lives in its natural life or in a zoo, and why is the representation of DNA more relevant in the art gallery than in the laboratory?. Lastly, has BioArt any transformative capabilities on the general public? (shrink)

Einleitung - S. Peetz: Subjekt und Freiheit. Antike Grundlagen moderner Konzeptionen der Willensfreiheit - G. Schmidt: Die Paradoxie des Subjekts - A. Friedrich Koch: Die Logik des Scheinens und der Sinn von "ich" - B. Tuschling: Epochen, Stufen und Dimensionen von Subjektivität und Transzendentalität bei Kant: 1770, 1781/87, 1790, 1799/1800 - M. Baum: Person und Persönlichkeit bei Kant - S. Sedgwick: Die Leerheit des 'Ich': Kants Transzendentale Deduktion in "Glauben und Wissen" - E. Düsing: Subjektivität und göttliches Sein bei Fichte (...) - mit Ausblicken auf Kierkegaard - J. Engfer: Kants Konzeption der menschlichen Vernunft und Plessners Begriff der Exzentrizität - T. Nenon: Freiheit, Verantwortung und Selbstbewusstsein bei Husserl - R. Cristin: Die Abenteuer des Bewusstseins. Zum Subjektbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger - C.-A. Scheier: Über logische und andere Subjekte. (shrink)

La Alianza de Dios con los hombres constituye lo esencial de la Revelación. El primer texto que menciona la Alianza es el relato de la Creación, y el segundo aparece en los Evangelios, cuando Jesús anuncia la Nueva Alianza en su sangre. Pero no son dos Alianzas, la Antigua y la Nueva, sino una y la misma.God´s Covenant with men contitutes the essence of Revelation. The first text to give account of a Covenant is the narration of Creation ant the (...) last one appears in the Gospels, when Jesus announces the New Covenant through his blood. Nevertheless, there are not two covenants, an Old one and a New one. In the Bible, the different narrations of covenants are a renewal of the unique Covenant. It´s man who is summoned to change his attitude in order to answer, always in a more profound way, to God´s call. (shrink)

In the second half of the 19th century, pre-Hispanic jade artifacts from Mexico—especially jade celts and votive axes—stood at the center of scholarly debates on the origins of American civilizations. The contradiction between the prevalence of carved jades, on the one hand, and the apparent absence of jade mineral deposits in the Americas, on the other, resuscitated centuries-old theories that placed the beginnings of pre-Hispanic civilizations in China. The increasing availability of Chinese and Mexican jades in the same spaces of (...) commercial exchange, collection, display, and study—following French imperialist interventions in China and Mexico in the 1860s, which resulted in the plunder of a massive number of antiquities; and in a broader context of interest in jade that brought together artifacts from the South Pacific and from Neolithic contexts in Europe—contributed material proof to these theories. The so-called “jade question” was mostly dismissed by the 20th century, but the debates surrounding jade's mineralogical identity and provenance provide insight into the kinds of epistemological configurations, material limitations, and geopolitical arrangements that bore upon the emergence of new disciplines, including mineralogy, archaeology, and prehistory, as well as the new sciences of the pre-Hispanic past. This essay explores these processes and reconstructs the dense networks of private and public institutions, scholars, collectors, dealers, and connoisseurs, that made jade artifacts from Mexico—and Central America—into a scientific, aesthetic, and commercial category. (shrink)

This paper revisits the often debated question Can machines think? It is argued that the usual identification of machines with the notion of algorithm has been both counter-intuitive and counter-productive. This is based on the fact that the notion of algorithm just requires an algorithm to contain a finite but arbitrary number of rules. It is argued that intuitively people tend to think of an algorithm to have a rather limited number of rules. The paper will further propose a modification (...) of the above mentioned explication of the notion of machines by quantifying the length of an algorithm. Based on that it appears possible to reconcile the opposing views on the topic, which people have been arguing about for more than half a century. (shrink)

The concept of self-legislation or autonomy is one of the outstanding innovations of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that it also builds on previous positions. Even if Kant in the Groundwork classifies all other moral principles as heteronomous, it is important to recognize that Kant incorporates elements of Wolff’s theory of self-legislation and Crusius’ theory of obligation into his theory of autonomy. In this essay, I present the relevant themes in Wolff and Crusius and discuss how they (...) were taken up by Kant in the mid-1780s. (shrink)

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...) emotions ?embedded? or ?extended? in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of ?embedded? emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are ?extended? or ?distributed.? (shrink)

In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel treats human sensibility differently in the sections on anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. With the recent revival of Hegel’s work, there has been a lively debate about how to understand the progression from more primitive to more sophisticated human capacities. This paper differentiates three influential readings to that effect – the animals-first, the emancipatory, and the rational-first reading – and argues that they risk misconstruing mental development as a transition from one category of capacities to (...) the other. The transition is rendered in terms of either accumulation, emancipation, or maturation. But this basic picture confuses the capacities characterizing us as a kind of animal, a kind of consciousness, and a conceptually self-conscious being. This paper explains how anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology articulate complementary, but irreducible categories of human capacities. The apparently more basic capacities are abstractable aspects of those that come later in the order of presentation. The distinct kinds of capacities do not stand separately on a three-step ladder of mental development but are aspects of one singular and synchronous development of the human mind. Their particular development is mutually dependent on each other but can be properly accounted for only in distinctive categorial terms. (shrink)

Two of Heidegger’s most fundamental distinctions, authenticity and inauthenticity, the existential and the existentiell, are motivated by Aristotle’s δύναμισ/ένέργεια distinction. Even the basic concept of truth must be understood in terms of δύναμισj and ένέργεια. Moreover, Heidegger’s existential imperative only becomes fully comprehensible within the Aristotelian context, revealing the intrinsic interrelation of Heidegger’s two distinctions with one another.

The concept of emergence is widely used in both the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. In the philosophy of mind it serves to refer to seemingly irreducible phenomena, in cognitive science it is often used to refer to phenomena not explicitly programmed. There is no unique concept of emergence available that serves both purposes.

This paper discusses Hegel's conception of self-consciousness in the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. It argues that Hegel articulates self-consciousness as a living being's capacity to conceive of itself in light of the life-form it instantiates. I start by critically reassessing the prevalent readings of the Self-Consciousness chapter, each of which focuses on one of three constitutive aspects of self-consciousness: sociality, corporeality or practicality. Second, I reconstruct how the opening of the chapter aims to reveal that the initial (...) rift between the sensory and the conceptual capacities of consciousness is resolved by the unity of consciousness as a life-form. Third, I discuss the specification of this life-form as Geist and argue that, by introducing the notion of Geist, Hegel indicates that the generic capacity of the human being to conceive of itself in light of its life-form always particularizes itself in a conception of human life that determines a historic and social form of life. Fourth, I outline how the master-slave dialectic illustrates the interdependency between sensory and conceptual capacities. Hegel's tale undermines the assumption of a self-contained capacity for reason by displaying how conceptual capacities, actualized by a living being, rely from the outset on objective constraints. I conclude by contending that the Self-Consciousness chapter paves the way for the central role that the idea of life plays in the Logic in exemplifying the objectivity of the concept. (shrink)

In this essay we have highlighted some significant differences between two visions of the human being: an inter- and transdisciplinary visions of the integral man which consider the human as a hypercomplex being, created by a long process of self-poiesis of its natural and cultural history and another scientific utopian/dystopic vision which projects the necessity of the existence of a superintelligent artificial being in the future, the cyborg, which would replace humanity.

L'éthique bachelardienne est une éthique simple, mais pas du tout simpliste : l'homme du théorème est complété par l'homme du poème. Mais si l'éthique est une direction de la pensée qui doit maîtriser notre avenir, la poétique est la source ontologique de cette pensée. C'est-à-dire, la liberté de rêver doit être à l'origine de la liberté créatrice de la pensée ou de l'homme des théorèmes. En fait, il ne s'agit pas d'une éthique fermée dans les modèles artificiels d'une pensée techniciste, (...) mais toujours d'une éthique soutenue, à l'origine, par une poétique de la pensée ouverte. (shrink)

Dieser Band ist Harald Holz zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet. Er bietet keine Festschrift in dem Sinne, dass in den versammelten Texten an das Werk Harald Holz' im einzelnen angeschlossen wurde. Die Beitrager - Freunde, Schuler, Weggefahrten, Kollegen - mochten vielmehr ihre Anerkennung im allgemeinen dadurch ausdrucken, dass sie sich um die gemeinsame Sache, die Philosophie, bemuhen. In den Texten sind Aspekte der Arbeitsgebiete der einzelnen Autoren mit Interessen des Jubilars verbunden, was sich um so leichter ergab, als letztere ausserordentlich weit (...) gespannt sind. Die Beitrage sind geordnet unter den Titeln: Anschauung und Wesen - Zweifel und Wissen - Normen und Kriterien - Glauben und Handeln.". (shrink)

Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is possible only due (...) to its belonging to a comprehensive theoretical horizon. For that purpose, I first analyze Heidegger’s influential account on moods in Being and Time, in order to clarify his claim that moods have their own understanding. Although Heidegger asserts that attuned understanding becomes itself when it is interpreted, he nevertheless rejects conceptual unfolding as a legitimate disclosure of the intelligible content of moods. I amend Heidegger’s account by engaging Hegel’s approach to this topic in his Philosophy of Mind. In this text, Hegel argues that feelings cannot give an account of their purport by feeling alone. Affective states not only manifest the need and urge to express themselves, but they reach their full extent when their meaning is disclosed within the entirety of the mind. It may be the case that affective states cannot always be fully clarified, but, even within a non-cognitivist account of moods, their intelligibility requires our acquaintance with articulated understanding. (shrink)

Wittgenstein accepts the linguistic hypothesis about science according which science is the corpus of significant propositions. The epistemological problem can be divided into the problem of demarcation and the problem of justification. The answer to the demarcation problem consists in a criterion for significant propositions. Wittgenstein proposes a syntactical criterion. A proposition has sense if it is composed of elementary propositions and logical operators. The domains that contain senseless propo- sitions must be excluded from the scientific field. Wittgenstein’s solution to (...) the justification problem consists in the hypothesis of identity between tautology and necessary truth. In this way, the logical decision methods may be extended to the epistemo- logical decision. Wittgenstein’s epistemological conclu- sion is that only mathematics and logic (but not physics) are justified, because their propositions are tautologies. (shrink)

Any religion has an ethical component. Thus, the examination of ethical problems is very important for religious studies. Consequentialism is an ethical doctrine according to which a fact is good only if it has good consequences. In order to avoid infinite regression, there is the need for a moral foundation in conformity with the criterion of goodness. The consequentialists proposed various criteria for goodness, such as pleasure, happiness or utility. Any fact will be judged as good only if its consequences (...) belong to the moral basis. The correctness of ethical judgments depends on the analysis of consequence relations. This study takes into account material and strict implication as representations of consequence. Both of them generate ethical paradoxes. If consequence is represented by material implication, according to the Manichean ethics, a fact is either good or bad; there are no neutral ethical facts. If consequence is analyzed by strict implication, the necessary facts will not have a moral value. The present study is to suggest an original solution to these paradoxes. (shrink)

This book offers a faithful and meticulous reading of Heidegger's magnum opus , Being and Time .