For centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings. The new interest (...) gave rise to important questions. How is `logical anarchy' avoided? Is it ever rational to accept an inconsistent theory? In what sense, if any, can inconsistent theories be considered as true? The present collection of papers is the first to deal with this kind of questions. It contains case studies as well as philosophical analyses, and presents an excellent overview of the different approaches in the domain. (shrink)

In this book, Peter Vickers argues that inconsistency in science has been massively exaggerated by philosophers. In his view, inconsistent science is neither as rampant nor as damaging as many have supposed. To argue his point, he develops a specific method he calls theory eliminativism and applies it to four case studies from the history of physics and mathematics .The method is original and convincing, and the case studies well researched and compelling. Vickers’ monograph provides a challenge (...) to any philosopher of science who takes inconsistency claims seriously, while also introducing a potentially very useful methodology for analyzing away problematic ‘theory’ discourse in other philosophical debates. Overall then, this is a very creative text and useful for both those directly interested in .. (shrink)

For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent scientific theories. However, there is still much controversy over how exactly we should conceive of scientific theories in the first place. Here I argue for a new approach, whereby all of the truly important questions about inconsistency in science can be asked and answered without disagreements about theories and theory-content getting in the way. Three examples commonly described as ‘internally inconsistent theories’ are analysed in the light (...) of this approach. In the process, the question ‘Is the theory inconsistent or not?’ is identified as a bad, or at least unimportant, question. (shrink)

As consistency is such an important topic in logic, researchers have for a long time investigated how to attain and maintain it. But consistency can also be studied from the point of view of its opposite, inconsistency. The problem with inconsistency in classical logic is that by the principle of explosion a single inconsistency leads to triviality. Paraconsistent logics were introduced to get around this problem by defining logics in such a way that the explosion principle does (...) not apply to them. Another approach stays in the classical framework and evaluates the amount of inconsistency in a set of formulas. The great bulk of this work has been done for propositional logic and presents many interesting issues about inconsistency. A previous paper introduced the concept of generalized propositional logic (GPL) to provide a uniform method for measuring inconsistency in logics that allow the application of unary operator pairs, such as for modality, time, and space, to propositional logic formulas. The universality of GPL manifests itself in the fact that such an operator pair is evaluated in a uniform manner across all such logics. The difference lies solely in the choice of a frame for each logic. But some logics also contain nonunary operators. For example, temporal logics typically contain a binary Until operator. The purpose of this paper is to show how to extend generalized propositional logic to extended generalized propositional logic (EGPL) by adding nonunary operator pairs and measure inconsistency in such logics. The universality of EGPL manifests itself in the fact that once the evaluation of the nonunary operators is given, it carries over to all such logics. For example, the temporal Until operator becomes applicable to modal logic. Furthermore, while relative inconsistency measures were previously considered for GPL, they are now extended to EGPL and a new approach removes an undesirable feature from the previous version. Also, this paper provides results about various properties of the new inconsistency measures. Many examples and explanations are given to illustrate the issues involving this extension. (shrink)

It is widely believed that inconsistency is one of the greatest sins a scholar can commit. This issue is especially relevant in linguistics due to the rich diversity of data types, exceptions to the rules, counterexamples to the hypotheses, and background assumptions which constantly come into conflict with methodological principles. Bringing together ideas from linguistics and philosophy of science, this groundbreaking book seeks to answer the following questions: which kinds of inconsistency arise in linguistic theorising? Under which (...) conditions can inconsistencies be tolerated? And how can inconsistencies be resolved? It is the first study to develop a novel metatheoretical framework that accounts for the emergence and the resolution of inconsistency in linguistic theorising, and to reveal the strategies of inconsistency resolution in theoretical linguistics. Supported by detailed case studies, the findings of this metatheoretical analysis can be applied to improve the effectiveness of the working linguist's problem-solving activity. (shrink)

Branching time logics have been studied in computer science since the 1980s primarily to model the tree of computations for discrete transition systems. Inconsistency measures for propositional log...

In this paper I apply the concept of _inter-Model Inconsistency in Set Theory_ (MIST), introduced by Carolin Antos (this volume), to select positions in the current universe-multiverse debate in philosophy of set theory: I reinterpret H. Woodin’s _Ultimate L_, J. D. Hamkins’ multiverse, S.-D. Friedman’s hyperuniverse and the algebraic multiverse as normative strategies to deal with the situation of de facto inconsistency toleration in set theory as described by MIST. In particular, my aim is to situate these positions (...) on the spectrum from inconsistency avoidance to inconsistency toleration. By doing so, I connect a debate in philosophy of set theory with a debate in philosophy of science about the role of inconsistencies in the natural sciences. While there are important differences, like the lack of threatening explosive inferences, I show how specific philosophical positions in the philosophy of set theory can be interpreted as reactions to a state of inconsistency similar to analogous reactions studied in the philosophy of science literature. My hope is that this transfer operation from philosophy of science to mathematics sheds a new light on the current discussion in philosophy of set theory; and that it can help to bring philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science closer together. (shrink)

Scientific publications depict science as an orderly endeavour and the epitome of rationality. In contrast, scientific practice is messy and not strictly rational. Here, I analyse this inconsistency, which is recurrent, and try to clarify its meaning for the functioning of science. The discussion is based on a review of relevant literature and detailed analysis of the role of each of the three intervening elements, the scientist, his/her practice and the scientific publication, with an emphasis on the (...) circular mode of the latter’s creation. This way, I will discuss the nature, causes and relevance of the inconsistency. That corresponds to answering three questions, respectively: ‘what are the characteristics of the inconsistency?’, ‘what are its origins?’ and ‘how could it be interpreted within a model for the structure and functioning of science?’ From this discussion it is concluded that, contrary to the negative character generally attributed to it, the inconsistency between practice and reporting is part of the production mechanism of science. (shrink)

Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies that (...) the principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available. (shrink)

In Beauty and Revolution in Science, James McAllister advances a rationalistic picture of science in which scientific progress is explained in terms of aesthetic evaluations of scientific theories. Here I present a new model of aesthetic evaluations by revising McAllister’s core idea of the aesthetic induction. I point out that the aesthetic induction suffers from anomalies and theoretical inconsistencies and propose a model free from such problems. The new model is based, on the one hand, on McAllister’s original (...) model and on further developments by Theo Kuipers in his “Beauty, a Road to the Truth?”. On the other hand, it is based on empirical findings about affection and emotion, and a naturalistic aesthetic theory. The new model is thus a naturalistic model with a wider explanatory range and much more internal consistency that McAllister’s. (shrink)

I show that the standard approach to modeling phenomena involving microscopic classical electrodynamics is mathematically inconsistent. I argue that there is no conceptually unproblematic and consistent theory covering the same phenomena to which this inconsistent theory can be thought of as an approximation; and I propose a set of conditions for the acceptability of inconsistent theories.

In a recent issue of this journal, M. Frisch claims to have proven that classical electrodynamics is an inconsistent physical theory. We argue that he has applied classical electrodynamics inconsistently. Frisch also claims that all other classical theories of electromagnetic phenomena, when consistent and in some sense an approximation of classical electrodynamics, are haunted by “serious conceptual problems” that defy resolution. We argue that this claim is based on a partisan if not misleading presentation of theoretical research in classical electrodynamics.

Quasi-truth (a.k.a. pragmatic truth or partial truth) is typically advanced as a framework accounting for incompleteness and uncertainty in the actual practices of science. Also, it is said to be useful for accommodating cases of inconsistency in science without leading to triviality. In this paper, we argue that the formalism available does not deliver all that is promised. We examine the standard account of quasi-truth in the literature, advanced by da Costa and collaborators in many places, and (...) argue that it cannot legitimately account for incompleteness in science. We shall claim that it conflates paraconsistency and paracompleteness. It also cannot properly account for inconsistencies, because no direct contradiction of the form S ∧ ¬S can be quasi-true according to the framework; contradictions simply have no place in the formalism. Finally, we advance an alternative interpretation of the formalism in terms of dealing with distinct contexts where incompatible information is dealt with. This does not save the original program, but seems to make better sense of the apparatus. (shrink)

We put forward the hypothesis that there exist three basic attitudes towards inconsistencies within world views: (1) The inconsistency is tolerated temporarily and is viewed as an expression of a temporary lack of knowledge due to an incomplete or wrong theory. The resolution of the inconsistency is believed to be inherent to the improvement of the theory. This improvement ultimately resolves the contradiction and therefore we call this attitude the ‘regularising’ attitude; (2) The inconsistency is tolerated and (...) both contradicting elements in the theory are retained. This attitude integrates the inconsistency and leads to a paraconsistent calculus; therefore we will call it the paraconsistent attitude. (3) In the third attitude, both elements of inconsistency are considered to be false and the ‘real situation’ is considered something different that can not be described by the theory constructively. This indicates the incompleteness of the theory, and leads us to a paracomplete calculus; therefore we call it the paracomplete attitude. We illustrate these three attitudes by means of two ‘paradoxical’ situations in quantum mechanics, the wave-particle duality and the situation of non locality. (shrink)

In different papers, David Liggins and Chris Daly tell philosophers what they should not do. There is no sign of them withdrawing any of these prohibitions, but I show that they fail to be consistent when asserting them. The inconsistency concerns when a philosopher should defer to the empirical findings of science.

There is a critical inconsistency in the literature on analogical retrieval. On the one hand, a vast set of laboratory studies has found that people often fail to retrieve past experiences that share deep relational commonalities, even when they would be useful for reasoning about a current problem. On the other hand, historical studies and naturalistic research show clear evidence of remindings based on deep relational commonalities. Here, we examine a possible explanation for this inconsistency—namely, that remindings based (...) on relational principles increase as a function of expertise. To test this claim, we devised a simple analogy‐generation task that can be administered across a wide range of expertise. We presented common events as the bases from which to generate analogies. Although the events themselves were unrelated to geoscience, we found that when the event was explainable in terms of a causal principle that is prominent in geoscience, expert geoscientists were likely to spontaneously produce analogies from geoscience that relied on the same principle. Further, for these examples, prompts to produce causal analogies increased their frequency among nonscientists and scientists from another domain, but not among expert geoscientists (whose spontaneous causal retrieval levels were already high). In contrast, when the example was best explained by a principle outside of geoscience, all groups required prompting to produce substantial numbers of analogies based on causal principles. Overall, this pattern suggests that the spontaneous use of causal principles is characteristic of experts. We suggest that expert scientists adopt habitual patterns of encoding according to the key relational principles in their domain, and that this contributes to their propensity to spontaneously retrieve relational matches. We discuss implications for the nature of expertise and for science instruction and assessment. (shrink)

Inconsistencies in science take several forms. Some occur at the level of substantive claims about the world. Others occur at the level of methodology, and take the form of dilemmas, or cases of conflicting epistemic or cognitive values. In this article, I discuss how methodological dilemmas arise. I then consider how scientists resolve them. There are strong grounds for thinking that emotional judgement plays an important role in resolving methodological dilemmas. Lastly, I discuss whether and under what conditions this (...) reliance on emotional judgement is rationally warranted. I consider two possible mechanisms, based on coherence and induction, able to ensure that scientists’ emotional responses to methodological dilemmas are rationally warranted. (shrink)

Among the many acid-base concepts, the theory of Usanovich is one of the least known despite the most general scope including almost all chemical reaction types and even redox chemistry. Published 1939 in a Soviet journal in Russian language, it gained little immediate attention, and was later criticized mainly as being too broad in scope. Although several articles recently remembered Usanovich and his acid–base theory, one major inconsistency again was overseen: the electron is put in a row along with (...) anions. Chemical history probably correctly puts this concept aside, also because it added little explanation capabilities beyond the elaborated considerations of the simultaneously published acid–base theory of Gilbert N. Lewis which was later refined by Pearson (hard and soft acids and bases, “HSAB”). A modified version of the core of Usanovich' concept is finally discussed. It combines the classic protic and aprotic acid–base concepts on the foundations of Lewis’ and Pearsons ideas. (shrink)

Current debates over inductive risk and the role of values in science have largely revolved around the question of the moral responsibilities of scientists: Do scientists have the duty to consider the potential non-epistemic consequences of theories they advocate and, if yes, what values should be taken into account in decision-making? The paper discusses two different – though potentially complementary – responses to this question: a) H. Douglas’s view that scientists should avoid causing reckless or negligent harm to others (...) as a result of the decisions they make and b) K. Elliott’s Multiple Goals Criterion. Drawing from the case of potential coronavirus transmission by sharing the Holy Communion that recently divided Greek society and medical experts, it shows the tensions emerging between autonomy and the moral responsibilities of scientists, when the boundaries of science are blurred and the epistemic goal of truth is inconsistent with alternative goals. It argues that the balance attempted between scientific principles and religious beliefs was unattainable and concludes that the need to distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic values, which is traditionally related to the ideal of value free science, should be reconsidered and even prioritized among the responsibilities of scientists. (shrink)

I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory.

Nowadays there is a growing tendency in the philosophy of science to think that some phenomena cannot be exhaustively explained, or even described, by a single theory or a particular approach. Thus, we are occasionally required to use various approaches in order to give account of the phenomenon we are analyzing. And sometimes, we can appreciate this as an invitation to be pluralist in certain respects about our understanding of a particular aspect in science. -/- During the last (...) decade applications of pluralism have increased and led to several other relevant debates in the philosophy of science. By the strengthening of pluralism, new questions have emerged, and more importantly, new alternatives have been offered in dealing with problems about how to interpret the ontology and the ontological commitments of particular theories, or how to apply strategies to analyze and understand specific episodes from the history of science, or how to work within different, and sometimes incompatible, explanations about a particular phenomenon, among others. In general, pluralism seems to be a very rich and yet not enough explored path for the philosophy of science in general. -/- Today, it is recognized that, at least for methodological purposes, the application of pluralism to the study of science can offer a great number of benefits. One of them would be the opportunity of analyzing the role that some epistemic virtues -such as scope, fruitfulness, consistency, and simplicity, to name just a few- play in the scientific activity. From the different pluralist positions, a lot has been said about empirical adequacy, refutability and explanatory power yet consistency power, yet, consistency has not been equally dealt with. -/- As a matter of fact, the lack of consistency and its philosophical implications have been studied from an angle that does not necessarily involve a pluralism of any kind. At the moment, it is commonly accepted that inconsistencies are more frequent in scientific development that the traditional philosophy of science could have expected and the idea that inconsistency is not always a synonym of logical anarchy, as it was suggested in the classical literature of logic and the philosophy of science, has been gaining support. All this has been possible, mostly, thanks to the emergence of paraconsistent logics and the availability of case studies that show how inconsistency is not an uncommon phenomenon in science. -/- But pluralism does not necessarily entail inconsistency toleration nor vice versa. Accordingly the main motivation for this volume is to explore the links between pluralism and inconsistency toleration in science, in order to connect the reflections on inconsistency toleration with broader and major issues in philosophy of science. In order to do so, we will suggest two different lines of investigation: first, to focus on the implication of some pluralistic accounts in the philosophy of science, regarding inconsistency; and second to analyze the implications of some paraconsistent approaches regarding pluralism in science. (shrink)

Recently, there has been some discussion of how Dutch Book arguments might be used to demonstrate the rational incoherence of certain hidden variable models of quantum theory. In this paper, we argue that the 'form of inconsistency' underlying this alleged irrationality is deeply and comprehensively related to the more familiar 'inconsistency' phenomenon of contextuality. Our main result is that the hierarchy of contextuality due to Abramsky and Brandenburger corresponds to a hierarchy of additivity/convexity-violations which yields formal Dutch Books (...) of different strengths. We then use this result to provide a partial assessment of whether these formal Dutch Books can be interpreted normatively. (shrink)

In this book we present a collection of papers on the topic of applying paraconsistent logic to solve inconsistency related problems in science, mathematics and computer science. The goal is to develop, compare, and evaluate different ways of applying paraconsistent logic. After more than 60 years of mainly theoretical developments in many independent systems of paraconsistent logic, we believe the time has come to compare and apply the developed systems in order to increase our philosophical understanding of (...) reasoning when faced with inconsistencies. This book wants to be a first step toward an application based, constructive debate to tackle the question which systems are best applied for which kind of problems and which philosophical conclusions can be drawn from such applications. (shrink)

Defining culture as social learning means that culture is present in many birds and mammals, suggesting that cetacean culture is not so special and does not require special explanation. Contrary to their own claims, Rendell and Whitehead present culture as having variant forms in different species, and these forms seem inconsistently applied and compared across species.

Some eliminativists have predicted that a developed neuroscience will eradicate the principles and theoretical kinds (belief, desire, etc.) implicit in our ordinary practices of mental state attribution. Prevailing defenses of common-sense psychology infer its basic integrity from its familiarity and instrumental success in everyday social commerce. Such common-sense defenses charge that eliminativist arguments are self-defeating in their folk psychological appeal to the belief that eliminativism is true. I argue that eliminativism is untouched by this simple charge of inconsistency, and (...) introduce a different dialectical strategy for arguing against the eliminativist. In keeping with the naturalistic trend in the sociology and philosophy of science, I show that neuroscientists routinely rely on folk psychological procedures of intentional state attribution in applying epistemically reliable standards of scientific evaluation. These scientific contexts place ordinary procedures of attribution under greater stress, producing evidence of folk psychological success that is less equivocal than the evidence in mundane settings. Therefore, the dependence of science on folk psychology, when combined with an independently plausible explanatory constraint on reduction and an independently motivated notion of theoretical stress, allows us to reconstitute the charge of (neurophilic) eliminativist inconsistency in a more sophisticated form. (shrink)

Pluralism has many meanings. An assessment of the need for logical pluralism with respect to scientific knowledge requires insights in its domain of application. So first a specific form of epistemic pluralism will be defended. Knowledge turns out a patchwork of knowledge chunks. These serve descriptive as well as evaluative functions, may have competitors within the knowledge system, interact with each other, and display a characteristic dynamics caused by new information as well as by mutual readjustment. Logics play a role (...) in the organization of the chunks, in their applications and in the exchange of information between them. Epistemic pluralism causes a specific form of logical pluralism. Against this background, the occurrence of inconsistencies will be discussed together with required reactions and systematic ways to explicate them. Finally, the place of inconsistencies in the sciences will be considered. Seven theses will be proposed and argued for. The implications of each of these for pluralism will be considered. The general tenet is that paraconsistency plays an important role, bound to become more explicit in the future, but that the occurrence of inconsistencies does not basically affect the need for pluralism. (shrink)

This paper defines what is and what is not science. These novel science definitions demonstrate that illustrations, like mathematics, can be scaler, real, not real, valid, and invalid. These definitions identify non-inertial reference frame logic inconsistencies, emphasizing the continued search for relative movement definitions. This search leads to Aristotle’s primary circular and secondary rectilinear movement concepts defining the at-rest reference frame, motion, and relative movement. These three novel movement definitions are confirmed using Ptolemy’s dropped ball observation, Michelson-Morley’s null (...) result, a dropped ball on a rotating platform Coriolis effect, and light’s Doppler shift. The novel relative movement definitions demonstrate Ptolemy’s dropped ball and Michel-son-Morley’s reflected light represent motion in an at-rest reference frame. The novel relative movement definition reveals the Coriolis effect and light’s Doppler shift describe the same physical process. Two future experiments are suggested to confirm the novel movement definitions. Developing the novel relative movement concepts will require applying mathematics to circular movement velocity concepts, such as rotational inertia and angular velocity. (shrink)

Some philosophers have recently argued that contrary to the traditional view, good scientific theories can in fact be logically inconsistent. The literature is now full of case-studies that are taken to support this claim. I will argue however that as of yet no-one has managed to articulate a philosophically interesting view about the role of logically inconsistent theories in science that genuinely goes against tradition, is plausibly true, and is supported by any of the case studies usually given.

Peter Vickers examines 'inconsistent theories' in the history of science--theories which, though contradictory, are held to be extremely useful. He argues that these 'theories' are actually significantly different entities, and warns that the traditional goal of philosophy to make substantial, general claims about how science works is misguided.

There has always been interest in inconsistency in science, not least within science itself as scientists strive to devise a consistent picture of the universe. Some important early landmarks in this history are Copernicus’s criticism of the Ptolemaic picture of the heavens, Galileo’s claim that Aristotle’s theory of motion was inconsistent, and Berkeley’s claim that the early calculus was inconsistent. More recent landmarks include the classical theory of the electron, Bohr’s theory of the atom, and the on-going (...) difficulty of reconciling Einstein’s general relativity and quantum theory. But over the past few decades philosophers have taken a particular and increasing interest in inconsistency in science. In 2002 this culminated in the first collection of articles specifically dedicated to the topic: Inconsistency in Science, edited by Joke Meheus, published by Kluwer, and featuring twelve articles on a range of topics in the philosophy of science and mathematics.Since then philosophic. (shrink)

For more than a century, it has been a standard ploy to argue against relativism on the grounds of self-referential incoherence . This paper determines the particular form this sort of charge takes when applied to a problematic passage in which Kuhn defends his relativistic theory of science by applying that theory to the debate between his critics and hirnself. If Kuhn were to give up relativism with respect to facts and truth but retain it with respect to the (...) strength of reasons, a pair of dilemmas charging circularity andinconsistency could be circumvented. (shrink)

This article discusses the history of the concepts of potential infinity and actual infinity in the context of Christian theology, mathematical thinking and metaphysical reasoning. It shows that the structure of Ancient Greek rationality could not go beyond the concept of potential infinity, which is highlighted in Aristotle's metaphysics. The limitations of the metaphysical mind of ancient Greece were overcome through Christian theology and its concept of the infinite God, as formulated in Gregory of Nyssa's theology. That is how the (...) concept of actual infinity emerged. However, Gregory of Nyssa's understanding of human rationality went still further. He said that access to the infinity of God was to be found only in an asymptotic ascension, as expressed in apophatic theology, and this view endangered the rationality of theology. Deeply influenced by the apophatic tradition, Nicholas of Cusa avoided this danger by showing that infinity could be accessed by symbolic representation and asymptotic mathematical reasoning. Thus, he made an immense contribution in making infinity rationally accessible. This endeavor was finally realized by Georg Cantor. This rational accessibility revealed discernible structures of infinity, such as the continuum hypothesis, and the cardinal numbers. However, the probable logical inconsistency of Georg Cantor's all-encompassing Absolute Infinity points to an intuitive understanding of infinity that goes beyond its rational structures – as in apophatic theology. (shrink)

If sensory organs encode environment, this code must be decoded to perception. The currently dominant theory of perception – predictive coding – assumes a “Bayesian decoder,” a probability function, which will present an optimal guess, given previous encodings of the environment – old codes testing new codes. Such a process would delay perception noticeably. This is inconsistent with the perception of music, which for several reasons must be direct.

Fictionalism plays a significant role in philosophy today, with defenses spanning mathematics, morality, ordinary objects, truth, modality, and more.1 Fictionalism in the philosophy of science is also gaining attention, due in particular to the revival of Hans Vaihinger’s work from the early twentieth century and to heightened interest in idealization in scientific practice.2 Vaihinger maintains that there is a ubiquity of fictions in science and, among other things, argues that Nietzsche supports the position. Yet, while contemporary commentators have (...) focused on fictionalism in Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, his view of fictions in science has remained largely unexamined.3 In this article, I begin... (shrink)

In his valuable book [3], Israel Scheffler presents an extended critique of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science. Scheffler argues against Kuhn's “main thesis,” namely that “... paradigm change in science is not generally subject to deliberation and critical assessment”. Scheffler does recognize, though, that there are important elements of Kuhn's view that themselves seem to conflict with this “main thesis.” For these elements seem to make possible deliberation, critical assessment, and objectivity in the discussion of scientific paradigms. So (...) it appears from Scheffler's critique that Kuhn's position is inconsistent. The puzzle is compounded by Kuhn's admission—indeed, insistence—that his book does contain “a preliminary codification of good reasons for theory choice. These are... reasons of exactly the kind standard in philosophy of science: accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like”. In his recent reply to Kuhn, Scheffler quotes this passage from Kuhn and says: “If these reasons are not... to be construed as utterly free of all constraints or themselves paradigm-dependent, then they allow the comparison of rival paradigms and make paradigm debates intelligible. Such intelligibility is, however, at odds with Kuhn's statement that the proponents of competing paradigms ‘will inevitably talk through each other’”. In this interchange between Scheffler and Kuhn, one gets the impression of people, if not paradigms, talking “through each other.” I think that this nonmeeting of minds is due to interpreting Kuhn as an opponent of objectivity when in fact he is not an opponent but a proponent. It is this misinterpretation which produces the apparent inconsistency in Kuhn's position. In this paper I suggest a way of understanding Kuhn which resolves this apparent inconsistency in his work and might help to focus discussion on the real issue between Kuhn and many of his critics. This suggestion has the crucial consequence of shifting the focus from objectivity to the real issue, namely truth. (shrink)

It has recently been argued by Davey (2014) that inconsistency is never tolerated in science, but only discretely isolated. But when talking about inconsistencies in science, not much attention has been paid to the inconsistencies between theory and observation. Here I will argue that inconsistency toleration actually takes place in science, and that when we examine actual inconsistent theories, inconsistencies between theory and observation look anything but homogeneous. I will argue, appealing to certain properties of (...) empirical theories, especially holism, that at least two sub-types of inconsistencies regarding theory and observation can be distinguished: those that satisfy a criterion of observational independence and those that do not. (shrink)

This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by F. A. Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions that support Frisch's claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frisch's position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frisch's position, I find that I (...) can present the theory in a way both authors can agree upon. Differences then manifest themselves purely within the reasoning methods employed. Introduction Features of the Theory Frisch's Inconsistency Claim Defending Frisch 4.1 Muller 4.2 Belot Difficulties for Frisch and a Compromise Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In the increasing body of metatheoretical literature on "causal mechanisms," definitions of "mechanism" proliferate, and these increasingly divergent definitions reproduce older theoretical and methodological oppositions. The reason for this proliferation is the incompatibility of the various metatheoretical expectations directed to them: (1) to serve as an alternative to the scientific theory of individual behavior (for some social theorists, most notably Jon Elster); (2) to provide solutions for causal inference problems in the quantitative social sciences, in social history, and in the (...) (3) qualitative research context; and (4) to serve as an alternative for narratives (Charles Tilly). Mechanisms can do (1) only as under-specified law-like regularities, deliver (2) as robust generative processes represented by models, and accomplish (3) as fragile generative processes (stories), but these are not all compatible. (edited). (shrink)

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.

The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst philosophers of science. One of the foremost strains of this approach—the model-theoretic approach —is to represent scientific theories as families of models, all of which satisfy or ‘make true’ a given set of constraints. However some authors have criticised the approach on the grounds that certain scientific theories are logically inconsistent, and there can be no models of an inconsistent set of constraints. Thus it would (...) seem that the MTA fails to represent inconsistent scientific theories at all, and this raises concerns about the way it represents in general. In a series of papers and a recent book da Costa and French have developed a variant of the MTA approach which they call ‘partial structures’, and which they claim can accommodate inconsistent theories. I assess this claim, looking to two theories which have been called ‘inconsistent’: Bohr’s theory of the atom and classical electrodynamics. (shrink)