An inconsistency in the (supposed) prohibitions of philosophy

Abstract

In different papers, David Liggins and Chris Daly tell philosophers what they should not do. There is no sign of them withdrawing any of these prohibitions, but I show that they fail to be consistent when asserting them. The inconsistency concerns when a philosopher should defer to the empirical findings of science.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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References found in this work

Realism and reason.Hilary Putnam (ed.) - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
In defence of error theory.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.
Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):321-337.
Animalism and Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.

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