Transparency, Values and Trust in Science

Ruch Filozoficzny 77 (4):73-94 (2022)
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Abstract

Current debates over inductive risk and the role of values in science have largely revolved around the question of the moral responsibilities of scientists: Do scientists have the duty to consider the potential non-epistemic consequences of theories they advocate and, if yes, what values should be taken into account in decision-making? The paper discusses two different – though potentially complementary – responses to this question: a) H. Douglas’s view that scientists should avoid causing reckless or negligent harm to others as a result of the decisions they make and b) K. Elliott’s Multiple Goals Criterion. Drawing from the case of potential coronavirus transmission by sharing the Holy Communion that recently divided Greek society and medical experts, it shows the tensions emerging between autonomy and the moral responsibilities of scientists, when the boundaries of science are blurred and the epistemic goal of truth is inconsistent with alternative goals. It argues that the balance attempted between scientific principles and religious beliefs was unattainable and concludes that the need to distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic values, which is traditionally related to the ideal of value free science, should be reconsidered and even prioritized among the responsibilities of scientists.

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Stathis Psillos
University of Athens

References found in this work

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
A new direction for science and values.Daniel J. Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.

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