Since its publication almost 150 years ago, The Idea of a University has had an extraordinary influence on the shaping and goals of higher education. The issues that John Henry Newman raised--the place of religion and moral values in the university setting, the competing claims of liberal and professional education, the character of the academic community, the cultural role of literature, the relation of religion and science--have provoked discussion from Newman's time to our own. This edition of The (...) class='Hi'>Idea of a University includes the full text of "University Teaching" and four selections from "University Subjects," together with five essays by leading scholars that explore the background and the present day relevance of Newman's themes. In the essays Martha Garland discusses the character and organization of the early nineteenth-century English universities upon which Newman based much of his vision; Frank M. Turner traces the impact of Newman's influence during the vast expansion of higher education since World War II; George Marsden investigates how the decreasing emphasis on religion has affected higher education; Sara Castro Klaren examines the implications of Newman's views on education and literature for current debates between proponents of a curriculum based on western civilization and one based on multiculturalism; and George Landow considers what the advent of electronic communication will mean to university teaching, research, and community. To aid accessibility, the edition also includes an analytical table of contents, a chronology and biographical sketch of Newman's life, questions for discussion, expanded notes, and a glossary of names, all of which will help make this the standard teaching text for Newman's work. (shrink)

Philosophers in eighteenth-century Britain had a keen interest in human nature, and made great strides in developing more scientific conceptions of human nature by borrowing and adapting the methods from natural history and natural philosophy. Human nature was analyzed at the level of the individual: how to cultivate a moral sense, or a more refined taste with respect to beauty. Even more attention was paid to the members of a society, and to the stages of development, especially in relation to (...) laws, government, and other social institutions. Entering a new economic age of prosperity, British thinkers focused on social progress in manners and conversational skills, as well as in the arts and sciences. This chapter examines these developments and the work of some of the most important proponents of the science of human nature. It concludes with some reflection on the legacies of the eighteenth-century views in Britain, Europe, and America. (shrink)

In The Idea of a Social Science Winch, argues that, sociology is more properly conceived as a branch of philosophy than of empirical science. Winch falls victim here to the Humean assimilation of the empirical to the generalizable. He notes that much of our talk about social practice is in terms of conventions, so that explanations of social action can be given without recourse to statistical or experimental findings. But such talk depends nonetheless on the accuracy and detail with (...) which the situations in which actions occur are? recorded, and this is surely an empirical enterprise. It is the misleading conception of sociology as a discipline, characterized by common procedures, that leads Winch to espouse the assimilation of sociology to conceptual inquiry. We need to see instead that sociology embraces a group of questions and subjects so loosely connected that it would be mistaken to speak of, and idle to project, a procedure common to all of them. (shrink)

This book challenges common historical misperceptions of both the history of the sciences in early modern France and the history of the French Enlightenment. Tracing the complex historical relationship between them, this reinterpretation critiques the view that the sciences were always politically neutral and that the philosophes were proto-republican. By reexamining the moral, political, and social ideas of those who defended the ascendency of the sciences, this book demonstrates the evolution of political views, in particular with the (...) marquis de Condorcet, from a commitment to absolute monarchy to revolutionary republicanism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Aim of Hegel's Science of Society The Method of Hegel's Science of Society Comprehension versus Critique.

First published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book is a comprehensive investigation of the work of Joseph Alois Schumpeter, one of the great economists of the twentieth century. In this study, Yuichi Shionoya highlights Schumpeter's methodological views and emphasizes his ideal of a universal social science. Taking on board all aspects of his work, he reconstructs a system which encompasses theory and metatheory. The originality of Schumpeter's work - which the author calls the two-structure approach to the evolution of mind and society - is examined in (...) the light of the intellectual field in Germany and Austria in the early twentieth century. This book is a major contribution to the history of economic thought. (shrink)

It has been speculated, by Chomsky and others, that our capacity for scientific understanding is not only enabled but also limited by a biologically endowed science forming faculty . I look at two sorts of consideration for the SFF thesis and find both wanting. Firstly, it has been claimed that a problem‐mystery distinction militates for the SFF thesis. I suggest that the distinction can be coherently drawn for cases, but that the purported‘evidence’for even a fairly lose general demarcation of problems (...) and mysteries is not best explained by a SFF. Secondly, I consider in detail a range of cognitive considerations for the SFF thesis and contend that it is at best moot whether science can be so construed as to make it feasible that it is a faculty competence. (shrink)

Winch identifies the central problem of sociology, "that of giving an account of the nature of social phenomena," with philosophy, particularly epistemology. In his attempt to undermine the "underlabourer" conception of philosophy, he draws support from Wittgenstein by reinterpreting the latter's assertion that "What has to be accepted, the given, is--so one could say--forms of life." The social character of language and meaningful behavior is treated as the starting point for a new conception of philosophy, as well as of sociology.--J. (...) E. M. (shrink)

This book uses the philosophy of Wittgenstein as a perspective from which to challenge the idea of a critical social theory, represented pre-eminently by Giddens, Habermas and Bhaskar.

The bases of tenets of the World came from the East; Pythagoras learnt all there up the 26 years. At a home, the east ideas where took in no; then he bound the mathematics with the elements of matter. This was the best way to a blood feud of the all Humanity. The 17th age gave the bases of mathematics and the Greek atomism; this had led to the paranoia in all sciences. The LCE was brought in 19th age (...) with bases no; really it was the box of Pandora in the form of wrong sciences of the Nature. The wise revenge of Pythagoras was in the form of riddle for the best thinkers in the World in all times; us solved one in the 50th years. A base of the World is of the material space (MS) with praatoms (PAs) Ao; they are of the affinity to matter. A density of the MS is of ~ 5.10‐6 kg/m3 close to the Ears. PA Ao is of quant of matter and antimatter; they are of rotate in the different sides. All matter takes up Ao and to grow. In the giant stars to go the bursts giving Ao, or caloric. The matter of being in the World on base of the key law of conservation of heat (caloric) and matter by loss of energy; it is main. Leibniz offered to the conservation of mv2 in the World. But Newton knew that any move is damped, and it need in filled up. This the author proved by tests over the 300 years just. D.Bernoulli given to the model of gas. I. Kant proved that mv2 is the quantity of heat by stop of the body; it is no the energy! A key leitmotiv of thought is blocked the grasp of facts if ones not leaded to an accepted concept. P. Mayer had the blunder in base of the LCE; a work of gas expansion in Torricelli tube is equal nil strong! This is the gross blunder of a sick paranoiac! The 21 age gave up a new philosophy and a way to endless engine. The super skills from ideal quartz with moving jaws to respond to the all new philosophy and sciences. (shrink)

Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already (...) taken over, if the categories of neuroscience were complete, then it would be possible to speculate about its relation to earlier stages of thought. However, that is not the situation. The categories of science have yet to emerge. The puzzling character of new scientific objects reveals that we are on the threshold of profound conceptual change. The Humanities are at a crossroad. Do the Humanities scoff at the encroachment of science and risk the fate of those who resisted the Copernican revolution? Do they embrace the changes only to be burned at the stake like those who accepted the Copernican revolution? I suggest that the Humanities mobilize their collective power to create the categories in terms of which science will explicate the very idea of a person. Over the last fifty years, philosophers in the Kantian tradition have offered strategies for developing the new categories in humanistic terms. One approach follows “color” and “consciousness” through their passage from a common sense image of the world to a developing scientific image. It is a journey that illustrates the problems and the puzzles ahead. It indicates the perils of the next recategorization of the world. (shrink)

Peter Winch’s 1958 book The Idea of a Social Science contains two distinguishable sets of theses, one set bearing on the individual-level understanding of human beings, the other on the society-level understanding of the regularities and institutions to which human beings give rise. The first set of claims is persuasive and significant but the second is a mixed bunch: none is well established and only some are sound.

Beginning with a reflection on ‘conceptual schemes’ and ‘very’ ideas and proceeding to examine different approaches to thinking philosophy of science not only with Kant but also between traditional analytic and hermeneutico-phenomenological approaches, this essay features a review of Kant’s 1755 solar nebular hypothesis and a reading of Nietzsche and Kant on cosmology along with a reflection on chemistry and the properties of cinnabar. Overall it is argued that a philosophy of science must be critical rather than normative/prescriptive. Seeking to (...) raise the question of science along with the question of truth, the essay also raises the question of esoteric historiography in science, including alchemy. (shrink)

A collection of essays arising from the first International Conference on Social Philosophy, which addressed some of the issues facing humankind at the end of the 20th century including: justice; freedom; power; equality; privacy; conscience versus law; technology and changing values; population; business ethics; nuclear war; violence; terrorism; and peace.

_This inquiry joins the idea of a vital principle at work in two systems for spiritual liberation and medical treatment, South Asian Yoga and Āyurveda, to an interpretation of the second axiom of thermodynamics applied to open systems, a predictive mathematical account of matter. Though often first associated with philosophy or religion, Yoga and Āyurveda take human physiology as a function of the natural world, as does thermodynamics. The idea of “life force” or “vitality” emerges at the intersection (...) of these two epistemologies. The religious or philosophical principle of prā__ṇ__a__ (succinctly, life energy) has its roots in a naturalist perspective, and a principle from mathematics and physical science yields the abstract concept of entropy (succinctly, energy loss). The discussion reconsiders the philosophical idea of a life force, or vital principle, and its potential application in health care._. (shrink)

Identifications, diagnoses, and treatments of pseudo-problems form a family of classic methodologies in later nineteenth century philosophy and at least partly, as I shall argue, in the philosophy of science. They were devised, not by academic philosophers, but by three of the greatest of the philosopher-scientists. (Later, the idea was taken up by academic philosophers, of course. But I will not discuss that development). Here I show how Ernst Mach, Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann each deployed methods of this (...) general kind, how they identified different pseudo-problems, how they gave different diagnoses of such problems, and how they suggested quite different treatments for them. I argue that it was Mach who really first developed the idea of a pseudo-problem, that he did so in a relatively focused way on the basis of two kinds of examples. Hertz’s contribution was much more limited, identifying two specific pseudo-problems concerning physics, and suggesting a way in which they might be treated. Boltzmann’s conception of pseudo-problems, though, was far less focused, being applied to a very wide range of problems in philosophy and physics. However, his conception was certainly more influential in philosophy, and perhaps ultimately more fruitful and suggestive. I argue for the originality and continuing interest of such approaches, and I try to dissociate them from any problematic ‘positivism’. (shrink)

This insightful selection, features four discourses from The Idea of a University: Knowledge Its Own End; Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning; Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill; and Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religion. Also included are excerpts from the "Preface" and the following appendices: Discipline of Mind; Literature and Science; and Style. Edited by Leo L. Ward, this volume also contains an introduction, a list of principal dates in Newman's life, and a bibliography.

This is an English translation of Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, one of the most significant works in the German tradition of philosophy of nature and early nineteenth-century philosophy of science. It stands in opposition to the Newtonian picture of matter as constituted by inert, impenetrable particles, and argues instead for matter as an equilibrium of active forces that engage in dynamic polar opposition to one another. In the revisions of 1803 Schelling incorporated this dialectical view into a (...) neo-Platonic conception of an original unity divided upon itself. The text is of more than simply historical interest: its daring and original vision of nature, philosophy, and empirical science will prove absorbing reading for all philosophers concerned with post-Kantian German idealism, for scholars of German Romanticism, and for historians of science. (shrink)

This insightful selection, features four discourses from The Idea of a University: Knowledge Its Own End; Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning; Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill; and Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religion. Also included are excerpts from the "Preface" and the following appendices: Discipline of Mind; Literature and Science; and Style. Edited by Leo L. Ward, this volume also contains an introduction, a list of principal dates in Newman's life, and a bibliography.

This book provides an analytical understanding of some of Tagore’s most contested and celebrated works and ideas. It reflects on his critique of nationalism, aesthetic worldview, and the idea of ‘surplus in man’ underlying his life and works. It discusses the creative notion of surplus that stands not for ‘profit’ or ‘value’, but for celebrating human beings’ continuous quest for reaching out beyond one’s limits. It highlights, among other themes, how the idea of being ‘Indian’ involves stages of (...) evolution through a complex matrix of ideals, values and actions—cultural, historical, literary and ideological. Examining the notion of the ‘universal’, contemporary scholars come together in this volume to show how ‘surplus in man’ is generated over the life of concrete particulars through creativity. The work brings forth a social scientific account of Tagore’s thoughts and critically reconstructs many of his epochal ideas. Lucid in analysis and bolstered with historical reflection, this book will be a major intervention in understanding Tagore’s works and its relevance for the contemporary human and social sciences. It will interest scholars and researchers of philosophy, literature and cultural studies. (shrink)

Is there such a thing as a ‘Logic of Discovery’? Do we even have a consistent idea of such a thing? The approved answer to this seems to be “No.” Thus Popper argues “The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it.” Again, “… there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this (...) process.” Reichenbach writes that philosophy of science “… cannot be concerned with [reasons for suggesting hypotheses], but only with [reasons for accepting hypotheses].” Braithwaite elaborates: “The solution of these historical problems involves the individual psychology of thinking and the sociology of thought. None of these questions are our business here.”. (shrink)