Truth is the adequate reflection of objective reality by an individual in the process of cognition, a reflection which reproduces the object being cognized as it exists outside of and independent of cognition; it is the objective content of human perceptions, concepts, sensations, judgments, deductions, theories, as verified by societal experience. Truth is the infinite associated sequence and continuity of the results of acquiring knowledge, the increasingly all-sided and profound reflection of interacting, changing, contradictory objects. This historical concept (...) of truth is the foundation of the dialectical materialist distinction between relative and absolute truth. Also associated with this is the Marxist understanding of cognition as the dialectical movement from relative to absolute truth. The problem of truth is one of the principal problems of dialectical logic. Truth must not be identified with logical truth in the sense of an epistemo-logical description of an adequate relation between the objective content of knowledge and objective reality, or as the concept of the formal conditions for the expression of truth. (shrink)

"This book discusses the vast and complex range of choices in between blanket amnesty and total accountability through criminal justice, and does so with ...

Marxism proved and developed the theory of the infinite process of the increase of absoluteness in relative truth ; and this, together with the introduction of the dialectical materialist concept of practice into gnoseology , led to a fundamental change in the entire theory of knowledge, elevating it to the level of a theory of ascent toward genuine knowledge of the objectively real world via contradiction.

The concept of truth is a fundamental category in the theory of knowledge and philosophy in general. Other philosophical categories presuppose the concept of truth as their content or as the goal of investigatory inquiry. Philosophy begins historically with rejection of any form of opinion in the name of truth and with the counterposing of what truly exists to the variety of appearance. Thus was born theoretical thought, for which in antiquity philosophy was a synonym.

This dissertation explores several accounts of the intuitions speakers have concerning the truth values of utterances of sentences containing vague nouns and adjectives. While some semanticists have attempted to account for these intuitions with multi-valued logics and supervaluation theories of truth, I focus on how utterances of vague sentences affect hearers' beliefs. ;Following a critique of the major semantical accounts of vagueness, I propose a formal theory of how beliefs are revised following utterances of sentences of the form (...) X is A, X is A and B, and X is A and not A, where A and B are vague scalar adjectives. Formally, a hearer's beliefs are represented as a set of weighted sentences, and the information conveyed by a speaker's utterance is represented as a set of weighted conditionals. When a speaker utters a sentence, a function on these sets yields the hearer's revised beliefs. I derive from this theory a criterion for proper assertability: a sentence is properly assertable in a given context if the maximum information loss that could obtain between competent discourse participants is less than some threshold. I argue that this criterion often predicts the truth-value judgements competent speakers make which violate the basic rules of logic. I extend these theories to utterances of sentences containing vague non-scalar nouns. ;In the second half of the dissertation, I propose two semantic accounts of vagueness. One incorporates the assertability criterion into its definition of truth. The other is independent of it. The former accounts for a large set of intuitions concerning the truth values of utterances of vague sentences. The latter accounts for only a subset of those intuitions, leaving the rest to be explained independently by the theory of proper assertability. ;I conclude with brief discussions of the Sorites Paradox and the experimental data obtained by Tversky and Kahneman which purport to demonstrate people's poor intuitions concerning the probabilities of conjunctions. (shrink)

I try to show that there is much sap (synthetic a priori) knowledge although one may not find many, or even any, sap true statements in most natural languages. Reasons are given for the difficulty of expressing sap truths in natural languages, but it is argued that these are not necessary features of language as such. There are, then, sap true statements in some possible languages.Admission of the sap gives one a way of distinguishing logical from metaphysical possiblity. Something is (...) metaphysically impossible just in case it is a sap truth that it is impossible. I argue that the realm of logically possible entities is vastly larger than the realm of metaphysically possible entities.My.defence of the sap begins with a partial defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In particular, I attack the intentionality circle argument,Quine's indeterminacy thesis and some applications of the Kripke/Putnam theory of meaning for natural kind terms. Without being a conclusive defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction, this section makes the defence of the sap more secure. Arguments are then mounted in direct defence of the sap by showing that the purported reduction of sap truths to analytic truths is mistaken. Examples are adduced to show that, even where expressions of natural language fail, one can stipulate usage in ways that allow expression of sap truths. I then consider and reply to various objections, giving an example of the sort of meaning theory which illegitimately legislates the analyticity of any purported sap true statement. (shrink)

There is probably no more contentious question in contemporary social science than the Marxist theory of social revolution. This is because people often see only the political side in Marxism, and for this of course there are grounds enough.

As we all know, metaphysics and objective truth are basically antagonistic, while dialectical materialism and objective truth are uniform. This is the common sense of Marxist philosophy and needs no argument. What, then, is the relationship between formal logic as a science and objective truth? This involves the problem of the correctness of thought form and the truthfulness of thought content. As shown, this problem is still an unsettled dispute in philosophy and logic circles. There are two (...) opposite views: one view holds that formal logic should concern itself with the correctness of thought form and the truthfulness of thought content; the other holds that formal logic should concern itself only with the correctness of thought form, but not the truthfulness of thought content. The substance of the issue involves the problem of the relationship between formal logic and objective truth. We consider that the science of formal logic itself does not and cannot assume the task of solving objective truth, since it is basically distinguished from the philosophy of dialectical materialism. However, formal logic does not exclude objective truth. It differs basically from metaphysics in that formal logic is a science. Thus, there is no inherent and necessary link between formal logic and objective truth. Formal logic does not study the problem of objective truth. (shrink)

In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the (...) resources of semantic contextualism. To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and non-relative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions’ being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable. (shrink)

To clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “accidental lab leak” hypotheses in view of potential xenophobia, plausibly involve modifying evidential standards for (in)convenient claims. Societies could accept that scientists handle (in)convenient claims just like nonscientists, and give experts less political power. Or societies could hold scientists to (...) a higher bar, by expecting them not to modify evidential standards to avoid costs only incidentally tied to error. (shrink)

This collection of writings on aesthetics includes selections from Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Mikhail Bakhtin, Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Amy Mullin, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Frederich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. This collection may still be available as a print-on-demand title at the Ryerson University bookstore.

In this essay, David Waddington and Noah Weeth Feinstein explore how Dewey's conception of science can help us rethink the way science is done in schools. The authors begin by contrasting a view of science that is implicitly accepted by many scientists and science educators — science as a search for truth — with Dewey's instrumentalist, technological, and nonrealist conception of science. After demonstrating that the search-for-truth conception is closely linked to some ongoing difficulties with science curricula that (...) students find particularly alienating, they then analyze some of the educational opportunities that Dewey's vision opens up. Ultimately, Waddington and Weeth Feinstein argue that Dewey offers a humble and humanistic vision of science and science education practice that captures the power of science by connecting it clearly to everyday human activities and challenges. (shrink)

How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental‐state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account (...) for intuitions being a basic evidential source is to interpret their subject matter in psychologistic terms. Intuitions provide evidence about the contents of the intuiter's concept, where “concept” is understood as a psychological structure. (shrink)

This article examines a thesis of interest to social epistemology and some articulations of First Amendment legal theory: that a free market in speech is an optimal institution for promoting true belief. Under our interpretation, the market-for-speech thesis claims that more total truth possession will be achieved if speech is regulatedonlyby free market mechanisms; that is, both government regulation and private sector nonmarket regulation are held to have information-fostering properties that are inferior to the free market. After discussing possible (...) counterexamples to the thesis, the article explores the actual implications of economic theory for the emergence of truth in a free market for speech. When confusions are removed about what is maximized by perfectly competitive markets, and when adequate attention is paid to market imperfections, the failure of the market-for-speech thesis becomes clear. The article closes by comparing the properties of a free market in speech with an adversarial system of discourse. (shrink)

The subjectivist-agnostic interpretation of the category of truth, which we examined in Part One, on "critical rationalism," has deep epistemological roots. Hence, Lenin's analysis of the epistemological intentions of "physical" idealism, which emerged at the end of the last century, is fully applicable to a description of the epistemological falsification of Karl Popper and his followers.

Lawyers and the legal system have been much criticized in recent years. Despite popular perceptions, the legal system contains numerous mechanisms and rules designed to ensure fair results. This paper shows how the legal system tries to implement, in commercial transactions, the ethical principles of truthfulness and fairness. The Anglo-American development of Equity Courts is reviewed briefly. Several examples of the Law's enforcement of ethical principles are presented, in four different legal areas: Contracts, Securities, Goods, and Real Estate. The intent (...) here is to present an overview of the problem, with area-specific illustrations, rather than a comprehenisve examination of the cases in just one area. (shrink)

The text which follows was put together from answers given to questions at meetings held by PD Ouspensky in London and New York between 1935 and 1944. ...