O foco deste artigo é analisar as antropologias históricas dos historiadores Reinhart Koselleck e Jörn Rüsen, com o objetivo de pontuar as similaridades e as diferenças entre elas. Para tal, partimos do significado que Koselleck atribui à teoria da história, entendida por ele como teoria das “condições de possibilidade da história”, tendo como objeto de estudo aquilo que é comum a toda experiência histórica, que a estrutura e a torna possível. Assim, Koselleck trabalhou a partir de pares de categorias antropológicas, (...) ou universais, tais como ter de morrer/poder matar e interno/externo. Rüsen também fez algumas análises a partir do uso de pares antropológicos. A partir da análise e comparação das teorias destes dois historiadores chegamos à tese de que Koselleck constrói uma antropologia histórica baseada no “conflito”, enquanto a de Rüsen é calcada na noção de “humanidade”, sendo esta uma grande diferença epistemológica entre os autores. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The presence of truth and honesty is a permanent demand, and becomes vital the more committed and intimate a relationship is. Medical practice is relevant to this discussion when one questions whether or not a physician should always tell their patient the truth in the face of a progressive or potentially fatal disease, regarding the diagnosis, outcome, therapy and evolution of the specific disease. From this discussion we aim, with the present report, to look at the truth applicable to (...) the patient‐physician relationship, and its ethical and moral implications; and also to look at where the Brazilian Code of Medical Ethics (BCME) and the medical literature stand regarding this issue. One concludes that there are only two moments not to tell a patient the truth: when the patient does not want to be informed, and when the truth could be iatrogenic. The question now is, when would the truth be iatrogenic? Physicians, in our opinion, would not be able to judge solitarily when the truth might be deleterious to their patient. Alternatively, we propose the appointment of a multidisciplinary commission to help the doctor with such a decision. (shrink)

“Seguramente, hasta hoy no creía que no aumentará de peso ni se achicará al aumentar la velocidad de la nave, ni que lo que es ahora para usted ya pasó para Fulano y aún no ocurrió para Zutano, ¿verdad? Desengáñese, porque el autor de este libro, nada menos que profesor de astrofísica relativista y autoridad mundial en agujeros negros y otros portentos, le hará dudar de todo eso” (del prólogo de Mario Bunge). -/- -/- “Como Borges —escribe el autor—, (...) he sentido que el del tiempo es el problema esencial de la metafísica de Occidente. Lo he estudiado durante más de 30 años. Me convertí en físico relativista por este problema. Y jamás rechacé la metafísica, como otros colegas, que, borrachos de ignorancia, desprecian lo que ignoran. Estudié lógica, semántica, ontología, epistemología. A veces los medios se transformaron en fines, y publiqué abundantemente filosofía. Siempre fui un outsider: un científico para los filósofos, un astrónomo para los físicos, un físico para los astrónomos. No me quejo: me evité lo peor de todos esos mundos”. -/- . (shrink)

Starting from the sixties of the past century theory change has become a main concern of philosophy of science. Two of the best known formal accounts of theory change are the post-Popperian theories of verisimilitude (PPV for short) and the AGM theory of belief change (AGM for short). In this paper, we will investigate the conceptual relations between PPV and AGM and, in particular, we will ask whether the AGM rules for theory change are effective means for approaching the truth, (...) i.e., for achieving the cognitive aim of science pointed out by PPV. First, the key ideas of PPV and AGM and their application to a particular kind of propositional theories - the so called "conjunctive propositions" - will be illustrated. Afterwards, we will prove that, as far as conjunctive propositions are concerned, AGM belief change is an effective tool for approaching the truth. (shrink)

In this paper we provide a compact presentation of the verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) and defend it against the sustained attack recently mounted by Alexander Bird (2007). Advocated by such authors as Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers, VS is the view that progress can be explained in terms of the increasing verisimilitude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness, or approximation to the truth) of scientific theories. According to Bird, VS overlooks the central issue of the appropriate grounding of scientific (...) beliefs in the evidence, and it is therefore unable (a) to reconstruct in a satisfactory way some hypothetical cases of scientific progress, and (b) to provide an explanation of the aversion to falsity that characterizes scientific practice. We rebut both of these criticisms and argue that they reveal a misunderstanding of some key concepts underlying VS. (shrink)

There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost (...) everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice. (shrink)

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including (...) a recent one advanced by Hannes Leitgeb (Analysis 74.1). (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Parenting and Moral Development provides a collection of state-of-the-art theories and research on the role that parents play in moral development. Contributors who are leaders in their fields take a comprehensive, yet nuanced approach to considering the complex links between parenting and moral development.

In questo libro, che apparve nel 1975 a coronamento di tutta l'ultima fase della riflessione bontadiniana, viene pienamente raggiunto l'obbiettivo che il filosofo si era in essa proposto, vale a dire la rigorosa fondazione della metafisica classica perseguitata attraverso l'affinamento critico del suo nucleo essenziale. Tale nucleo è individuato nel principio di Parmenide che, cimentandosi dialetticamente con l'esperienza del divenire, si determina in ultima istanza come principio di creazione.

Plantinga’s free will defense is sometimes regarded as a successful response to the logical problem of evil. Still, a recent objection concludes Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are incompatible. According to this objection, in Plantinga’s defense, Jesus’ having a creaturely essence entails that Jesus suffers from transworld depravity and sins in the actual world, but this result conflicts with Plantinga’s theodicy and with Christian theism, where Jesus is sinless. In this paper, I argue that this objection is unsound, because creaturely essences (...) suffer from transworld depravity only contingently, so it is not necessarily true that their instantiations go wrong in the actual world. Hence, Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are not incompatible, so both answers to the problem of evil can be endorsed in conjunction. (shrink)

A chapter of the book Elogio del Cientificismo.

BackgroundThe expressions of a “wish to hasten death” or “wish to die” raise ethical concerns and challenges. These expressions are related to ethical principles intertwined within the field of medical ethics, particularly in end-of-life care. Although some reviews were conducted about this topic, none of them provides an in-depth analysis of the meanings behind the “wish to hasten death/die” based specifically on the ethical principles of autonomy, dignity, and vulnerability. The aim of this review is to understand if and how (...) the meanings behind the “wish to hasten death/die” relate to and are interpreted in light of ethical principles in palliative care.MethodsWe conducted a meta-ethnographic review according to the PRISMA guidelines and aligned with Noblit and Hare’s framework. Searches were performed in three databases, Web of Science, PubMed, CINAHL, with no time restrictions. Original qualitative studies exploring the meanings given by patients, family caregivers and healthcare professionals in any context of palliative and end-of-life care were included. A narrative synthesis was undertaken. PROSPERO registration CRD42023360330.ResultsOut of 893 retrieved articles, 26 were included in the analysis, accounting for the meanings of a total of 2,398 participants. Several factors and meanings associated with the “wish to hasten death” and/or “wish to die” were identified and are mainly of a psychosocial and spiritual nature. The ethical principles of autonomy and dignity were the ones mostly associated with the “wish to hasten death”. Ethical principles were essentially inferred from the content of included articles, although not explicitly stated as bioethical principles.ConclusionsThis meta-ethnographic review shows a reduced number of qualitative studies on the “wish to hasten death” and/or “wish to die” explicitly stating ethical principles. This suggests a lack of bioethical reflection and reasoning in the empirical end-of-life literature and a lack of embedded ethics in clinical practice. There is a need for healthcare professionals to address these topics compassionately and ethically, taking into account the unique perspectives of patients and family members. More qualitative studies on the meanings behind a wish to hasten death, their ethical contours, ethical reasoning, and implications for clinical practice are needed. (shrink)

La representación científica del mundo se construye sobre un tejido de teorías en las cuales hay enunciados generales que representan leyes naturales. Estas leyes son patrones de sucesos regulares. Un presupuesto básico de la ciencia es que todo acontecimiento es legal: ocurre regido por leyes que son fijas. ¿Es compatible esa legalidad con la libertad de elección que creemos tener? ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones para la libertad política que debemos esperar en una sociedad organizada y racional? ¿Cuál es el rol (...) de la ética en todo esto? Trataré de responder a estas preguntas aquí, defendiendo la concepción de una sociedad abierta, democrática y plural, que maximice la libertad de elección y acción de las personas que la forman. (shrink)

Fundamento: Los adolescentes constituyen un grupo vulnerable y la maternidad en esta etapa, una problemática de actualidad. Objetivo: exponer particularidades sociodemográficas y de la maternidad en madres adolescentes del municipio de Cumanayagua, en el período septiembre a mayo del año 2014. Método: estudio descriptivo, corte transversal. Se trabajó con el universo conformado por 35 madres adolescentes y sus hijos. Se operó con un formulario de datos sociodemográficos, el análisis de documentos y la entrevista semiestructurada. Los resultados fueron procesados por el (...) paquete estadístico SPSS 15.0 para Windows y se utilizaron tablas de frecuencia y porcientos. Resultados: predominaron madres adolescentes de la etapa tardía con una media de edad 17,89; deserción escolar, más del 50% conviven con los padres con pareja o sin ella; embarazos deseados ; ocurrencia de nacimiento a términos, partos eutócicos, estados buenos de salud física y psicológica percibidos ; percepción de apoyo familiar. Conclusiones: las madres adolescentes de la etapa tardía que se caracterizaron por una maternidad percibida de manera satisfactoria contaron con apoyo familiar, vínculo de pareja, baja percepción de riesgos para su salud física y psicológica. Basis: Teenagers constitute a vulnerable group and motherhood during this period is a topical problem. Objective: Setting out socio-demographic and motherhood characteristics in teenage mothers from Cumanayagua municipality from September to May 2014. Method: Descriptive study, cross section. The population consisted of 35 teenage mothers and their children. A socio-demographic data form, document analysis as well as semi-structured interview were used. The results were processed by the SPSS statistical package for Windows and frequency and percentage tables were used. Results: Late stage teenage mothers with the average ages of 17, 18 and 19 prevailed; school dropouts ; more than 50 % of them live with their parents with or without a partner; planned pregnancies ; occurrence of full-term births ; ectopic childbirths ; good physical health states ; good psychological states ; family support perception. Conclusions: Those late stage teenage mothers who were characterized by motherhood perceived in a satisfactory way, counted on family support, romantic ties, low physical and psychological health risk perception. (shrink)

As a multi-layered theory of the foundations of “‘mathematicizing’ logic”, Husserlian pure logic is stratified on three levels (sub-theoretical, theoretical, meta-theoretical), which are then themselves transversally split in two sides (apophantic and ontological). This paper investigates how symbolic knowledge works in this framework—viz. in terms of ‘How can the subjective operating with symbols be justified in the process of obtaining objective contents of knowledge?’ To do so, it innovates in showing how Husserl’s theory of semiotic intentionality provides the epistemological-transcendental foundation (...) for the syntactic-semantic correspondence of the meaning relationship that is operative at the kernel of pure logic—i.e. on the theoretical level, between systems of axioms and formal manifolds. And thereby, it bridges the gap between the two volumes of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (namely, the Prolegomena and the six Investigations). (shrink)

Admitiendo la distinción propuesta por Mayr entre biología funcional y biología evolutiva, sugerimos que estos dos dominios de investigación siguen dos distintos modos de considerar lo viviente que pueden ser entendidos, pero en dos sentidos diferentes, como teleológicos. Para distinguir esas dos formas de teleología hacemos una comparación entre la explicación funcional típica de la biología funcional y la explicación seleccional propia de la biología evolutiva. Cada uno de estos tipos de explicación obedece a una regla metodológica especial: la explicación (...) funcional sigue al principio de adecuación autopoiética; y la explicación seleccional sigue al principio de adecuación adaptativa. Pero, mientras el primero será presentado como estando subordinado a un principio general da causación; el segundo será presentado como siendo independiente de él. Finalmente, en el contexto de una breve discusión relativa al concepto de symmorphosis, sostenemos que, en la biología contemporánea, la noción de adecuación adaptiva es preeminente sobre la noción de adecuación funcional: esta encuentra su fundamento en aquella.Admitting Mayr’s distinction between functional and evolutionary biology we suggest that these two dominions of inquiry follow two different modes of onsider the living that can be considered, but in two different senses, as being teleological. To distinguish these two forms of teleology we make a comparison between the functional explanation, typical of functional biology, and the selective explanation, proper of evolutionary biology. Each one of this kind of explanation obeys an special methodological rule: the functional explanation follows the principle of autopoietic adequacy; and the selective explanation follows the principle of adaptive adequacy. But, while the former principle will be presented as being subordinated to a general principle of causation; the later will be presented as being independent of it. Finally, in the context of a brief discussion concerning the concept of symmorphosis, we argue that, in contemporary biology, the notion of adaptive adequacy is preeminent over the notion of functional adequacy: the later find its fundament in the former. (shrink)

This paper deals with Husserl’s idea of pure logic as it is coined in the Logical Investigations. First, it exposes the formation of pure logic around a conception of completeness ; then, it presents intentionality as the keystone of such a structuring ; and finally, it provides a systematic reconstruction of pure logic from the semiotic standpoint of intentionality. In this way, it establishes Husserlian pure logic as a phenomenological epistemology of mathematical logic.

We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning (...) belief revision aiming at truth approximation and inference to the best explanation are also highlighted. (shrink)

-- 2. La Gnoseología como filosofía de la ciencia (parte I, sección 2) ; Historia de la teoría de la ciencia (parte I, sección 3) -- 3. El Sistema de las doctrinas gnoseológicas ; Las cuatro familias básicas (parte II, sección 1) -- 4. El sistema de las doctrinas gnoseológicas ; Descripcionismo (parte II, sección 2) ; Teoreticismo (parte II, sección 3) -- 5. Adecuacionismo (parte II, sección 4) ; Circularismo (parte II, sección 5) ; Glosario.

ABSTRACT:Business ethics research has long been interested in understanding the conditions under which ethical consumption is consistent versus context-dependent. Extant research suggests that many consumers fail to make consistent ethical consumption decisions and tend to engage in ethical decisions associated with ingroup identity cues. To fill this gap, four experiments examine how construal levels moderate the influence of ingroup versus outgroup identity cues in ethical consumption. The studies support the contention that when consumers use concrete construal to process information, they (...) will focus on ingroup cues and make ethical consumption decisions that are aligned with ingroup biases. However, when consumers use abstract construal, they will act more consistently with their inner goals rather than focusing on ingroup and outgroup cues. Social goodwill, which indicates desires to give back to society, is identified as mediating the effects. The findings have important implications for ethical consumption and social influence literature. (shrink)

The problems that arise from the presence of self-attacking ar- guments and odd-length cycles of attack within argumentation frameworks are widely recognized in the literature on defeasible argumentation. This paper introduces two simple semantics to capture different intuitions about what kinds of arguments should become justified in such scenarios. These semantics are modeled upon two extensions of argumentation frameworks, which we call sustainable and tolerant. Each one is constructed on the common ground of the powerful concept of admissibility introduced by (...) Dung in [10]. The novelty of this approach consists in viewing the admissibility of a subset of arguments as relative to potentially challenging subsets of arguments. Both sustainable and tolerant semantics are more credulous than preferred semantics (i.e. they justify at least the same arguments, and possibly more). Given certain sufficient conditions they coincide among them as well as with other semantics introduced by Dung. (shrink)

La hermenéutica del ser peruano -- El giro hermenéutico de occidente -- El giro pragmático en la filosofía posmoderna -- El conservadurismo anómico del uno posmoderno de la tolerancia -- El hombre sin absolutos.

Knowledge representation is a central issue in a number of areas, but few attempts are usually made to bridge different approaches accross different fields. As a contribution in this direction, in this paper I focus on one such approach, the theory of conceptual spaces developed within cognitive science, and explore its potential applications in the fields of philosophy of science and formal epistemology. My case-study is provided by the theory of truthlikeness, construed as closeness to “the whole truth” about a (...) given domain, as described in the underlying language. I show how modeling propositions and their relations within a conceptual space has interesting implications for two issues in truthlikeness theory: the so called problem of language dependence, and that of measure sensitivity. I conclude by pointing at some open issues arising from the application of conceptual spaces to the analysis of philosophical problems. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a reconstruction of Aristotle's discussion of incontinence, which stresses the relevant aspects from the point of view of a virtue ethics, focusing as a such not primarily on particular actions but on habitual dispositions of character. The paper emphasizes also the connection between Aristotle's account of incontinence and his conception of practical rationality, especially the issue concerning the temporal dimension of practical reason.

Peter Geach cunhou a expressão “falácia socrática” para se referir a duas proposições que, segundo ele, são defendidas por Sócrates: que uma definição é necessária para usarmos corretamente um termo e que o estudo de exemplos de ocorrências do termo não é útil à sua elucidação. Várias respostas críticas foram dadas a Geach. No presente texto, retomo e comento estas duas proposições. Argumento que a segunda é realmente falsa, mas Sócrates não a adota. Mostro também que a primeira não é (...) falsa se adequadamente qualificada. Destaco ainda que Geach não ofereceu, em seu artigo, um argumento para provar que o princípio que ele chamou de “falácia socrática” é de fato uma falácia em qualquer contexto de aplicação. (shrink)

Kant is usually considered a cold moralist who does not give any importance to feeling and emotions. In this paper I show that Kant has a place for love although he uses this word in different meanings through his work. I will analyze the use and meaning of five different uses of the term love: self-love, practical love, love as affect, love as passion, and sexual love. I show that Kant has a place for love in his theory, in a (...) plurality of shades and meanings, going from the practical love to romantic love. Some of their expressions are meaningful for the moral life, such as practical love, some are not. Kant portrait romantic love as a silly affect, sometimes as a dangerous passion who can even call for medication. And about sex, he claims that it is nothing but the use of the other as a means, which may obtain a higher juridical status if this use is reciprocal, in the case of marriage. (shrink)

Do passeio pela filosofia Deleuze-Guattariana ao encontro com o possível conceito de programas de vida Resumo: De todas as maneiras de incursionar uma filosofia, o passeio pareceu ser a abordagem possível diante do emaranhado pensamento de Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari. Ainda que alguns se dediquem a localizar onde começa e onde termina a contribuição de cada um nas obras que os dois filósofos escreveram juntos, é nesse entre, no encontro de dois pensadores, que enfrentavam questões específicas em cada campo (...) de ação, mas que foram capazes, por meio da troca, ou melhor do roubo recíproco, como gostava de dizer Deleuze, que se produziu um pensamento que não se acomoda ou se ajusta à tradição. Desse passeio, destaca-se o encontro com um possível conceito presente em diferentes obras desses filósofos que é o programa de vida. Não se trata de um conceito efetivo, pois ele não é alçado a esse status pelos seus autores, ou pelo menos de forma objetiva. Cabe a este artigo, enfim, apresentar um plano sobre o qual esse protoconceito possa ser desenvolvido. Palavras-chave: Programa de vida; Deleuze; Guattari; Intersecção. The stroll of Deleuze-Guattarian philosophy and meeting with the possible concept of life programs: Of all the ways of studying philosophy, the stroll seemed to be the possible approach to the tangled intersected thinking of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Although some are dedicated to locating where each one's contribution begins and ends in the works that the two philosophers wrote together, it is in this between, at the meeting of two contemporary thinkers, that they generally faced questions specific to each field of action. That finally, they were able, through an exchange, or rather reciprocal theft, as Deleuze liked to say, that philosophy has been produced which does not fit but is not excluding from what tradition has conventionally called philosophy - reason. This tour highlights the encounter with a possible concept present in different works of these philosophers, which is the program of life. This is not an effective concept, as it is, they not raised to this status by its authors, or at least objectively. It is up to this article, finally, to present a plan on which this developing of concept. Key Works: Life program; Deleuze; Guattari; Intersection. Le promenade par la philosophie Deleuze-Guattarien à la rencontre avec la possible notion de programme de vie De toutes les manières de connaitre une philosophie, le promenade semblait être l’approche possible devant l’enchevêtrement de pensée intersecté de Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari. Encore que certain se consacrent a localiser où commence et termine la contribution de chacun dans les oeuvres que les deux philosophes ont écrit ensemble, c’est dans ce entre, la rencontre de deux penseurs contemporains, qui ont généralement confronté les questions spécifiques a chaque champs d’actions, mais qui à la fin, ont été capable, grâce a l’échange, ou mieux du vol réciproque, comme aimait dire Deleuze, que s’est produite une philosophie que ne s’ajustait pas, mais aussi qui ne s’est exclue pas de ce que la tradition convenu a appelé philosophie- la raison. De ce chemin, ce démarque la rencontre avec une possible notion présente dans différentes oeuvres de ces philosophes qui est le programme de la vie. Il ne s’agit pas d’une notion efficace car il n’est élevé pas à ce statut par ses auteurs, ou au moins de forme objectif. Incombe a cet article, enfin, de présenter un plan sur lequel ce ‘proto-notion’ peut être développé.Mots clés : Programme de vie; Deleuze; Guattari; Intersection. Data de registro: 06/12/2019 Data de aceite: 13/10/2020. (shrink)

O presente texto resulta de trabalho apresentado como pôster no Seminário de Estudos “Os Intelectuais e a Educação”, realizado de 19 a 23 de outubro na Faculdade de Educação da Unicamp, sob o tema “Gramsci e a Educação”. A intenção é apresentar resultado de leitura e fichamento realizada a partir dos Cadernos do Cárcere no item que trata acerca dos Intelectuais. Temas como o Estado Educador, os Intelectuais, Filosofia da Práxis, correspondem à fundamentação teórica da pesquisa que estamos desenvolvendo sobre (...) Avaliação Educacional em Revista. Daí a relevância de Gramsci para nossa investigação. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa investigar se a afirmação eu sou, eu existo, presente no quarto parágrafo da Segunda Meditação, expressa única e exclusivamente uma existência, ou se é a expressão, também, do conhecimento sobre o que é o Eu que se descobre existente. Para tanto, além dos textos cartesianos, serão abordadas algumas linhas interpretativas que se ocupam desta questão sobretudo as teses de Alquié, Frankfurt e Marion. A partir da discussão realizada, pretende-se defender que o eu sou, eu existo expressa, (...) concomitantemente, o conhecimento da existência do Eu e o conhecimento de que o Eu existe como ser pensante. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, eu apresento a teoria kantiana do mal. Mostrarei que Kant divide o mal em três níveis: fraqueza, impureza e perversidade, relacionando-os com afetos e paixões. Eu defendo que Kant apresenta várias formas de curar o mal nos diversos textos, tais como Doutrina da Virtude, Antropologia, Ideia para uma história universal do ponto de vista cosmopolita e Religião nos limites da simples razão. Eu tentarei mostrar que a virtude é impotente para curar o mal e que Kant apresenta uma (...) comunidade ética para esse fim. Por fim, eu compararei a construção de comunidade ética com o estabelecimento de uma sociedade civil jurídica. (shrink)