Very few data exist in France on: (1) nurses’ knowledge and behaviour concerning ethical decisions in clinical practice; and (2) their knowledge of ethical rules in clinical research. This questionnaire-based audit tried mainly to assess these questions in a large French university teaching hospital. Of the 257 questionnaires distributed to nurses in 23 clinical units of the hospital, 206 were returned (80% response rate). When responding to the vignette describing a clinical situation requiring an ethical decision to be made, most (...) nurses acted as the patient’s advocate although they have had no formal training in ethics. Indeed, 66% of nurses responding considered that the patients themselves should be the primary decision makers in situations that relate to their health and medical care. For children or comatose patients, the decision should be left to the relatives according to 72% of the responses. The results indicated that the role of health care professionals in ethical decisions made for a given patient should be marginal. Nurses’ knowledge concerning research protocols, particularly their ethical requirements and consequences, is poor at present and information from and communication with doctors should be improved. (shrink)

Résumé La collaboration avec une chorégraphe engage une réévaluation du travail de sculpture. Cette interprétation débouche sur des formes nouvelles par l’intermédiaire de sculptures animées qui s’apparentent à des formes de marionnettes.

This paper is going to discuss, what will be called, ‘The Internet of Bodies’. Our physical and virtual worlds are blending and shifting our understanding of three key areas: (1) our identities are diversifying, as they become hyper-enhanced and multi-sensory; (2) our collaborations are co-created, immersive and connected; (3) our innovations are diverse and inclusive. It is proposed that our bodies have finally become the interface.

This book is the first of its kind to offer a new definition of contemporary management. It uses Michel Henry’s philosophy and takes the real, sensitive and pathetic subjectivity of individuals as the starting point of the analysis as opposed to the usual large categories of representations; resources; images; and discourses. This book thus proposes to rethink management by insisting on the dialectic of strength and vulnerability; its power of constraint, imitation and imagination; and finally its framework of action situated (...) in a fourfold concern for the self, for people, for institutions and for the environment. These different notions are useful in order to experience a deeper understanding of management that is free from the obsolescence of the distant recommendations of ancient protomanagement and the outdated and dubious prescriptions of the so-called “scientific management”. (shrink)

In showing how the bureaucratic space negatively influences the moral conscience of managers, Robert Jackall’s sociological writings have pointed up one of the darkest sides of organizations. In fact, in the business ethics literature there is much to support Jackall’s pessimistic contentions, suggesting that bureaucracy can rob individual managers of their sense of responsibility. How then can this space for individual freedom, so essential in re-establishing responsible management, be recreated? In order to answer this question, we propose to interpret Jackall’s (...) Moral Mazes ( 1988 ) from the standpoint of Blaise Pascal’s Jansenist ethics and conception of humankind. Our discussion here of Pascal’s “reason of effects,” his theory of “double thought” and his distinction between respect and esteem takes Jackall’s analysis forward and opens new lines of thought about managerial responsibility. The article concludes with some thoughts on further research in the field of business ethics arising from Pascalian anthropology or what we call here “skeptical humanism.”. (shrink)

Church and Fitch have argued that from the verificationationist thesis “for every proposition, if this proposition is true, then it is possible to know it” we can derive that for every truth there is someone who knows that truth. Moreover, Humberstone has shown that from the latter proposition we can derive that someone knows every truth, hence that there is an omniscient being. In his article “Omnificence”, John Bigelow adapted these arguments in order to argue that from the assumption "every (...) contingent proposition is such that if it is true something brought it about that it is true" we can derive that there is an omnificent being: a being that brings it about that every true contingent proposition is true. In my reply to his article, I show that Bigelow’s argument is flawed because there is some formal property that the knowledge operator has but that the bringing about operator lacks. This is the property of distributing over conjunctions. I explain why what brings it about that some conjunctive proposition is true need not bring it about that its conjuncts are true. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently found it congenial to talk in terms of grounding. Grounding discourse features grounding sentences that are answers to questions about what grounds what. The goal of this article is to explore and defend a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of grounding discourse. We are familiar with David Lewis's applications of the method of counterpart theory to de re modal discourse. Counterpart-theoretic interpretations of de re modal idioms and grounding sentences share similar motivations, mechanisms, and applications. I shall (...) explain my motivations and describe two applications of a counterpart theory for grounding discourse. But, in this article, my main focus is on counterpart-theoretic mechanisms. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. We address the question of consistency strength of certain filters and ultrafilters which fail to satisfy the Galvin property. We answer questions [Benhamou and Gitik, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 173 (2022) 103107; Questions 7.8, 7.9], [Benhamou et al., J. Lond. Math. Soc. 108(1) (2023) 190–237; Question 5] and improve theorem [Benhamou et al., J. Lond. Math. Soc. 108(1) (2023) 190–237; Theorem 2.3].

Graham Oppy has argued that possible explanation entails explanation in order to object to Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss’s new cosmological argument that it does not improve upon familiar cosmological arguments. Gale and Pruss as well as Pruss individually have granted Oppy’s inference from possible explanation to explanation and argue that this inference provides a reason to believe that the strong principle of sufficient reason is true. In this article, I shall undermine Oppy’s objection to the new cosmological argument by (...) arguing that it is logically possible that some truths are merely possibly explained. (shrink)

The meanings of tolerance nowadays form a complex and ambiguous maze that far exceeds the scope of this essay. To clarify the following pages, however, we propose a preliminary distinction between original tolerance and modern tolerance.By original tolerance we mean the attitude that consists of putting up with, or not preventing, that which should not by law take place. It is motivated by prudence or condescension with regard to human failings. It is a sort of last resource. In any event, (...) it is neither a permission nor an authorization: it is a favor, subject to revocation. As far back as one goes in human history, one finds traces of this elementary social practice.By modern tolerance, we mean the form of tolerance that has developed in modern times and is formulated by Castellion, Spinoza, Locke and in particular Pierre Bayle. To tolerate is to consent to the idea that in the name of freedom, in principle recognized by all, other men think and act according to principles that we do not share or with which we do not agree. In other words, tolerance is the corollary of freedom. (shrink)

This article defends the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) from a simple and direct valid argument according to which PSR implies that there is a truth that explains every truth, namely an omni-explainer. Many proponents of PSR may be willing to bite the bullet and maintain that, if PSR is true, then there is an omni-explainer. I object to this strategy by defending the principle that explanation is irreflexive. Then I argue that proponents of PSR can resist the conclusion that (...) there is an omni-explainer by denying that explanation distributes over conjunction. In the final section, I consider a plausible revision of this assumption. I argue there that, given the revised assumption, PSR seems to yield a striking picture of the explanatory structure of the universe. I explain why the resulting model does not appear utterly implausible to me. (shrink)

We develop the theory of cofinal types of ultrafilters over measurable cardinals and establish its connections to Galvin’s property. We generalize fundamental results from the countable to the uncountable, but often in surprisingly strengthened forms, and present models with varying structures of the cofinal types of ultrafilters over measurable cardinals.

Cet article s’intéresse au marché de l’édition scientifique et à son évolution dans le cadre de l’Internet et du développement du libre accès. Il s’attache à montrer la diversité de ce marché en fonction des champs scientifiques, notamment par le type d’éditeurs impliqués, les lectorats concernés, les économies associées. Il met en exergue le nécessaire discernement de ces marchés face aux critiques générales de dysfonctionnement soulignées. Il pointe certains effets contrastés du numérique conduisant à certaines reconfigurations paradoxales. Enfin, la vision (...) prospective sur le devenir de ce marché insiste sur la pluralité des modalités de progression vers le libre accès, le poids de la dimension politique et celui des processus d’évaluation de la recherche. La voie d’un partenariat public-privé est privilégiée au regard de certaines valeurs centrales : indépendance, qualité, accessibilité et pérennité des publications scientifiques.This article investigates the scientific publishing market and how it is being transformed by the Internet and the development of open-access services. We illustrate the diversity of the market in terms of scientific fields, and especially in the types of publishers and readerships concerned, and of the associated economics. In view of the sweeping criticisms of dysfunctional practices illustrated in the article, we alert readers as to the need for discernment among these markets. The article points to a number of contrasting effects of digital publishing that are leading to various paradoxical reconfigurations. Finally, this forward-looking study of the publishing market’s future emphasises the multiple forms of the onward march towards open access and the influence exerted by the political dimension and the research evaluation process. Public-private partnerships are the preferred option to cater for the central values of independence, quality, accessibility and the enduring nature of scientific publications. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with the coextension difficulty for nominalist theories of properties that reject tropes alongside universals. After carefully explaining the coextension difficulty and describing the theories it targets, the chapter describes different solutions to the difficulty. These solutions differ with respect to how much involved they are into a dualist approach to coextension. A dualist approach to a case of coextension consists in agreeing with the realist that the relevant ascriptions of properties are numerically distinct. A monist approach (...) to a case of coextension consists in contending that the relevant ascriptions of properties are identical. In this chapter, I defend a monist approach to cases of coextension that appeals to a counterpart theory for propositions. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that properties play causal roles: they capture the causal powers of things. But do properties have their causal roles essentially? David Lewis did not think so. He adhered to the doctrine of quidditism, namely the doctrine that the identity of properties is primitive and that they can trade their causal roles. Quidditism is controversial. But Lewis did not see why he should want to reject it. He knew that he could avoid quidditism on the cheap by (...) treating individuals and properties alike in rejecting transworld multilocation of properties and endorsing a counterpart theory for properties. But he did not see why he should want to do so. In this article, I argue that Lewis should have wanted to endorse a counterpart theory for properties in order to reject quidditism. My argument concerns resemblance relations among properties. Another constitutive role of properties is that they capture objective resemblances between their instances. The premises of my argument are intuitive claims about resemblances among some properties that Lewis held on Humean grounds. (shrink)

The influence of Jules Lequier on the development of continental philosophy is currently being revived. Ghislain Deslandes introduces Lequier's thought while highlighting its influence in the development, throughout the twentieth century, including in process thought, pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology.

We continue [4] and study sets in generic extensions by the Magidor forcing and by the Prikry forcing with non-normal ultrafilters.

I call anti-resemblism the thesis that independently of any contextual specification there is no determinate fact of the matter about the comparative overall similarity of things. Anti-resemblism plays crucial roles in the philosophy of David Lewis. For instance, Lewis has argued that his counterpart theory is anti-essentialist on the grounds that counterpart relations are relations of comparative overall similarity and that anti-resemblism is true. After Lewis committed himself to a form of realism about natural properties he maintained that anti-resemblism is (...) true about the relations of overall similarity that enter his counterpart theory and his analysis of counterfactuals. However, in this article I argue that Lewis’s account of degrees of naturalness for properties combined with his modal realism entails that anti-resemblism is false. The Lewisian must amend Lewis’s system if she aims to benefit from the alleged virtues of anti-resemblism. I consider two ways of amending it, neither of which is a free lunch. (shrink)

In this paper, we answer a question asked in Koepke et al. regarding a Mathias criteria for Tree-Prikry forcing. Also we will investigate Prikry forcing using various filters. For completeness and self inclusion reasons, we will give proofs of many known theorems.

This paper introduces the reader to Meinong's work on the metaphysics of magnitudes and measurement in his Über die Bedeutung des Weber'schen Gesetzes. According to Russell himself, who wrote a review of Meinong's work on Weber's law for Mind, Meinong's theory of magnitudes deeply influenced Russell's theory of quantities in the Principles of Mathematics. The first and longest part of the paper discusses Meinong's analysis of magnitudes. According to Meinong, we must distinguish between divisible and indivisible magnitudes. He argues that (...) relations of distance, or dissimilarity, are indivisible magnitudes that coincide with divisible magnitudes called "stretches". The second part of the paper is concerned with Meinong's account of measurement as a comparison of parts. According to Meinong, since measuring consists in comparing parts only divisible magnitudes are directly measurable. Indivisible magnitudes can only be measured indirectly, by measuring the divisible stretches that coincide with them. (shrink)

Cet article montre, – à partir de l’analyse des chapitres VIII, IX et X du Traité théologico-politique, – que la critique de la Bible entreprise par Spinoza ruine dans ses fondements toute forme d’intégrisme religieux et constitue un plaidoyer pour la liberté de pensée philosophique, ouvrant ainsi un espace pour la tolérance.

Un temps de crise grave peut devenir un moment de grande espérance. Nous savons aujourd'hui que la civilisation du logos sous laquelle l'Occident vit depuis près de trois mille ans, dans une dialectique constante entre philosophie et christianisme, arrive à un point à la fois d'accomplissement et d'épuisement. Elle avait d'abord donné sa confiance à des explications englobantes. Celles-ci ont trouvé, dans l'Antiquité, leur forme quasi idéale : le logos avait pris alors un tour mystique et débouchait vers un Au-delà (...) de tout, qui n'a laissé indifférent ni l'islam ni le christianisme. Dans la modernité, il s'était organisé de manière parfaitement immanente ou soigneusement historique. A présent, il continue son chemin, mais devant l'épuisement des idées et des constructions qui lui donnaient corps et sens, il ne conserve que son armature essentiellement mathématique, dépouillée de toute réalité, sinon celle du nombre - ce que, dans notre langage actuel, nous appelons le " virtuel ". Nous pouvons recueillir aujourd'hui l'efficacité de ces pensées et pratiques pénétrées de la dynamique du Tout et du Rien. Mais, au point où nous en sommes actuellement, il y a une vraie menace que le Tout bascule vraiment dans le Rien et que nous allions à la catastrophe éthique, humaine, cosmique. Il a manqué sans doute à cette civilisation le respect du Quelque chose : ni tout, ni rien, mais substance, action, relation. Ici Aristote, dans l'Antiquité, et Thomas d'Aquin, au seuil de la modernité, peuvent venir à notre secours et nous aider à retrouver notre épaisseur d'homme, à ne pas fuir le jeu étrange en nous de la matière pénétrée de ce que nous appelons esprit, qui à la fois lui est immanent et la dépasse, à restituer par là un humanisme et une approche non aliénante du divin. Il y a sans doute là un motif d'espérance. Mais ce grand motif d'espérance réside surtout dans le tournant anthropologique contemporain : nous comprenons aujourd'hui que l'homme n'existe pas en réalité sans son frère qui lui parle. A la lumière de cette conversation essentielle, on doit pouvoir définir un humanisme et une politique ; une perspective s'ouvre aussi pour réinterpréter la religion et particulièrement le christianisme. À l'horizon apparaissent le symbole, la relation, la mort et la résurrection, l'amour. (shrink)

La tolérance, telle que l'entend l'édit de Nantes, est un pis-aller. Les partis catholiques et réformés s'accordent sur l'idée que la tolérance est provisoire, car la restauration de l'unité religieuse doit demeurer la visée. Mais les réformés, minoritaires, sont en position défensive. Beaucoup parmi eux pensent que la tolérance ne tiendra que s'ils continuent de se faire craindre des catholiques. D'où la promotion, par Agrippa d'Aubigné, de l'esprit de résistance. Mais les forces armées protestantes sont réduites en 1629. En fonction (...) de ce nouveau contexte, Moyse Amyraut, tout en professant un parfait loyalisme à l'égard du monarque catholique, sera amené à formuler les linéaments d'une nouvelle théorie de la tolérance, selon laquelle la tolérance n'est plus une grâce temporaire, mais un droit. (shrink)

This article has two goals: a historical and a speculative one. The historical goal is to offer a coherent account of Spinoza’s view on mereological composition. The speculative goal is to show that Spinoza’s substance monism is distinct from versions of monism that are currently defended in metaphysics and that it deserves the attention of contemporary metaphysicians. Regarding the second goal, two versions of monism are currently defended and discussed in contemporary metaphysics: existence monism according to which there actually exists (...) exactly one concrete entity; and priority monism that is famously defended by Jonathan Schaffer and according to which there exists exactly one fundamental concrete being, the cosmos, and several derivative concrete beings that are the parts of the cosmos. In this article, I argue that substance monism is neither an existence nor a priority monism because, while Spinoza’s monist is committed to the existence of a unique fundamental individual—the substance—and to the existence of several derivative individuals—the bodies or modes of extension—, Spinoza denies that the substance is mereologically complex. Regarding the first goal, the paper solves several interpretative puzzles by arguing that Spinoza distinguishes between three kinds of composition and that his talk of composition between the substance and its modes is by his own light not to be interpreted as literally true. (shrink)