Certains ont proclamé la " fin de l'Histoire ". Ne serait-ce pas plutôt celle de la philosophie politique moderne qu'il conviendrait de guetter? Depuis cinq siècles, en effet, l'action politique a eu pour objet l'institution et la consolidation de la souveraineté, tandis que la philosophie politique structurait ses principes de gouvernement à partir de ce concept : penser la politique c'était penser la souveraineté. Or la souveraineté, née en Europe, forgée à travers les guerres qui donnèrent aux peuples le sentiment (...) de leur particularité, s'y achève sous nos yeux, en une Union des peuples fondée désormais sur la paix, à la suite d'un génocide suicidaire. Pour penser l'achèvement, la philosophie politique ne saurait plus se contenter de répéter ses affirmations communes sur la volonté du peuple, l'indivisibilité de la république, la dictature du prolétariat et les droits de l'homme. Aucune n'a pu fonder l'existence libre de la multitude : elles ont soit révélé dans l'histoire leur absolue contradiction en allant, parfois, jusqu'au crime, soit permis d'ouvrir le chemin de la vie libre sans être capables, cependant, de le tracer jusqu'au bout. Ces catégories ressortissent à un monde et à sa fable que les temps présents abandonnent au passé. Le problème constitutif de la philosophie politique - les conditions de la vie libre - n'a pas disparu pour autant, mais la solution nouvelle est à inventer. Une double tâche s'impose désormais : montrer en quoi la souveraineté est achevée et ce que cela signifie, jusque dans les chemins divergents qu'empruntent l'Europe et les Etats-Unis ; formuler des propositions sérieuses capables d'orienter le débat politique de notre temps quelle moralité nouvelle, autre que la souveraineté, inventer pour des peuples européens qui, faute de pouvoir encore se faire la guerre, se sont du coup, sans autre projet, abandonnés au marché? (shrink)

After providing a novel taxonomy of lottery procedures for fairly distributing scarce goods, I defend a new weighted lottery theory. This taxonomy is necessary because the debate between unweighted and weighted lottery theorists overlooks a range of cases, overlap cases, in which conducting an unweighted lottery is impossible or implausible. Therefore, to account for all such cases, lottery theorists must adopt a weighted lottery. However, while no extant weighted lottery is adequate in overlap cases, my new weighted lottery theory is. (...) I conclude by discussing my theory’s practical implications. (shrink)

This article offers a new theory about how using lotteries to distribute scarce benefits satisfies beneficiaries' claims. In the first section of the article I criticize John Broome's view and on the basis of these criticisms set out four desiderata for a philosophically adequate account of claim satisfaction by lottery. In section II I propose and defend a new view called the dual structure view, so called because it posits that claimants have two types of claims in the relevant scarce (...) benefit distribution cases under discussion. This view meets all the desiderata set out in section I. Section III draws out the practical implications of my view for a variety of temporally extended cases, including the distribution of corneas to patients who have suffered corneal degeneration. (shrink)

We present a Kripke model for Girard's Linear Logic (without exponentials) in a conservative fashion where the logical functors beyond the basic lattice operations may be added one by one without recourse to such things as negation. You can either have some logical functors or not as you choose. Commutatively and associatively are isolated in such a way that the base Kripke model is a model for noncommutative, nonassociative Linear Logic. We also extend the logic by adding a coimplication operator, (...) similar to Curry's subtraction operator, which is resituated with Linear Logic's contensor product. And we can add contraction to get nondistributive Relevance Logic. The model rests heavily on Urquhart's representation of nondistributive lattices and also on Dunn's Gaggle Theory. Indeed, the paper may be viewed as an investigation into nondistributive Gaggle Theory restricted to binary operations. The valuations on the Kripke model are three valued: true, false, and indifferent. The lattice representation theorem of Urquhart has the nice feature of yielding Priestley's representation theorem for distributive lattices if the original lattice happens to be distributive. Hence the representation is consistent with Stone's representation of distributive and Boolean lattices, and our semantics is consistent with the Lemmon-Scott representation of modal algebras and the Routley-Meyer semantics for Relevance Logic. (shrink)

La démocratie représentative ne va plus de soi. Le courant libéral au pouvoir pratique l'exclusion et l'enfermement : la légalité le tue, il triche en Amérique, il triche en Italie. Le courant socialiste, seul, assume la révolte morale des Droits de l'Homme. Mais il s'avère incapable par la force d'une loi légitimée à un échelon national de maîtriser une économie mondiale liée à la démocratie verticale ; le régime de la loi égale pour tous, fait sourire la canaille et pleurer (...) l'électeur. Comment imaginer un complément de démocratie horizontale assurant une Europe nouvelle pour demain? (shrink)

(1) What may be gained by applying concepts generalised from economics to methodological problems? The perspective of cost-benefit analysis ('CBA' for short) may help the researcher to see what sorts of questions he should take into account when dealing with particular methodological problems. This claim is supported by applying generalised CBA-thinking to two standard problems of methodology. (2) In the practice of research the handling of basic statements does not normally constitute any problem, and no conscious decision is involved. In (...) the methodological reconstruction the key questions are: 'How can a particular basic statement be criticised?' and 'What are the costs of defending a statement that is "problematic"?' The problem of the empirical 'base' is an investment problem: whether or not to invest time and effort into processing a particular basic statement into a falsifying hypothesis for the theory we wish to test. The valuation of the costs of rejecting or, as the case may be, of defending a basic statement, are objective. (3) With respect to theories, in basic science, the issue is not one of acceptance or rejection of a single theory, but rather of theory preference. Both the rational response to a falsification and rational theory preference are governed by CBA-considerations. The option for one of two competing theories is based upon a CBA where the valuation of benefits and costs is objective. Theory change is an objective process, at least in those fields, where theorising is closely controlled by empirical testing: the better theory drives out the less good theory. The costs of defending a theory that is less good than its competitor are mainly epistemic resources forgone. The use of CBA in methodology not only is compatible with Popper's position, but it may pay to view Popper's methodology as an application of CBA to epistemic situations. (shrink)

1. Badly understood words are the main hindrance to the discovery of truth. But they need not be, especially in physical science, where the senses, experience, and geometrical reasoning prevail. Reflection on motion led ancient philosophers into opinions about it so absurd that they are almost forgotten and merit no attention. But even the better presentday scientists, in their treatment of motion, employ language too abstract and of doubtful reference--for example, the attraction of gravity, effort, latent forces, and the like--which (...) make otherwise learned writings unintelligible. Hence this essay. (shrink)

Confronted with problems or situations that do not yield toknown theories and world views, scientists and students are alike. Theyare rarely able to directly build a model or a theory thereof. Rather,they must find ways to make sense of the circumstances using theircurrent knowledge and adjusting what is recognized in the process. Thisway of thinking, using past ways of perceiving the physical world tobuild new ones does not follow a logical path and cannot be described astheory revision. Likewise, in many (...) situations it is awkward, indeedoften impossible, to resort to analogical reasoning to account for it.This paper presents a new mechanism, called `tunnel effect', that mayexplain, in part, how scientists and students reason while constructinga new conceptual domain. `Tunnel effect' is also contrasted withanalogical reasoning. (shrink)

Trolley problems and like cases are often thought to show the inadequacy of purely consequentialist moral theories. In particular, they are often taken to reveal that consequentialists unduly neglect the moral significance of the causal structure of decision problems. To precisify such critiques and one sort of deontological morality they motivate, I develop a formal modeling framework within which trolley problems can be represented as suitably supplemented structural causal models and various consequentialist and double effect-inspired moral theories can be viewed (...) as disagreeing over the inputs of a common decision rule. (shrink)

Philosophers’ two favorite accounts of rational choice, Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT), each face a number of serious objections. Especially troubling are the recent charges that these theories are dynamically inconsistent. I note here that, under the epistemic assumptions that validate these charges, every decision theory that satisfies a pair of attractive postulates is doomed to a similar fate and then survey various lessons rational choice theorists might opt to draw from this.

In the first comprehensive and full-length study of the English historical economists, Gerard Koot traces their revolt against the theory, policy recommendations and academic dominance of classical and neoclassical economics in Britain between 1870 and 1926. English Historical Economics, 1870–1926 shows how these historical critics challenged the deductive method and mechanistic assumptions of the economic orthodoxy, developing an historical and inductive method for economic studies and laying the foundation for the professional study of economic history. The author examines the (...) effect of this new methodology upon English politics, discussing the intellectual framework that the historical economists provided for the conservative attack on laissez-faire philosophy in links between such larger social, economic, political and intellectual controversies and the origin and growth of English historical economics. (shrink)

O. The idea of scientific progress in contemporary philosophy of science. Explicating the concept of cognitive progress means at the same time articulating an ideal of science. A desirable ideal: explain a lot and offer certainty. 1. Working out the ideal with the "foundationalist-positivist" approach. If the question, "When is it rational to accept a theory?" is answered, "When it has sufficient inductive support," this leads to insoluble problems. Reactions to the collapse of this approach - especially relativism and theory (...) instrumentalism. 2. The Popperian alternative: rational theory preference despite fallibility of methods for determining truth or greater accuracy of representations. What good reasons can there be for the conjecture that one theory is superior to a competing theory in its achievement as a description? Achievements to date as fallible but objective indicators of strength in describing. The sorts of risks for a theory differ in explanation and in prediction. Corresponding to the risks are the chances for cognitive progress. Instead of a cumulative index, itemized indication of success and failure in explanation and prediction with regard for importance of the questions at issue. On the concept of the "scientific importance" of questions. Postscript: On the political consequences of the sceptical position in philosophy of science. (shrink)

The Belgian scientific literature dealing with political parties has four main characteristics. First it pays great attention to party doctrines and to parliamentary struggle. Indeed, in the nineteenth century political parties do not strike by their organization, which is still undeveloped, nor by their functions, which are still limited, but by the public debate they are stimulating in Parliament and in the press. Only from the end of the century, when the suffrage is extended, the organization of the parties wilt (...) get more articulated and their functions more complicated. Secondly the literature pays great attention to the legitimation of the political parties, which are still controversial particularly because they should threaten the national union. The authors exert oneselves to prove that parliamentary government is by definition a party government. They distinguish parties from factions in order to make the first acceptable. Thirdly the literature deals with the party system.The Belgian authors take the two party system which exists in Great Britain as example and try to prove that the alternation of two parties, the party of conservation and the party of progress, is necessary for the good working of the institutions. Fourthly, the literature, particularly the historica!, is rather descriptive and is characterized by a lack of comparisons, generalizations and hypothesis.Two periods can be distinguished in the literature. In the first period, 1830-1894, the suffrage is limited and the political scene is dominated by two parties.This period is marked by the publications of Emile de Laveleye, one of the most prolific writers of the second half of the nineteenth century. In the second period, 1894-1914, the advent of the socialist party disturbs the working of the classical party government. Maurice Vauthier is the main author of this period. He tries to establish the characteristics of the party government and its chances in the future. (shrink)

Dans son article de 1913, «L’intérêt de la psychanalyse», Freud déclarait que la philosophie pouvait profiter des lumières de la psychanalyse parce que celle-ci peut dévoiler la motivation subjective et individuelle de doctrines philosophiques prétendument issues d’un travail logique et impartial, et ainsi désigner à la critique les points faibles du système d’un philosophe. Mon texte présente quelques exemples de l’utilisation de la psychanalyse pour identifier l’impact de l’inconscient sur la pensée de certains philosophes tels que Parménide, Berkeley, Kant, Sartre. (...) À la lumière de ces exemples, j’examine brièvement quelques questions à propos du conseil de Freud : Est-il praticable ? Quand peut-on l’appliquer ? Comment en rendre l’application moralement acceptable ? Selon quels critères juger de la valeur de vérité d’interprétations psychanalytiques de ce genre ? Quels sont les bénéfices, et en valent-ils la peine ?In his article of 1913, " The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest", Freud stated that philosophy could profit from psychoanalysis because it can indicate the subjective and individual motives of philosophical theories which are ostensibly based on impartial logical work, and in this way it can draw critical attention to the weak spots in a philosopher’s system. This paper presents a few examples of the use of psychoanalysis to identify the impact of the unconscious on the theories of certain philosophers, e.g., Parmenides, Berkeley, Kant, Sartre. In the light of these examples, I examine briefly a number of questions concerning Freud’s recommendation : Can it be put into practice ? In what circumstances ? How can it be applied in a way that is morally defensible ? By what criteria can one evaluate the truth value of such psychoanalytic interpretations ? What are the advantages, and are they worth the effort required ? (shrink)

There is hardly any university, college, or even high school left where they do not teach Darwinism—and rightly so. Yet, most of these places do more preaching than teaching. They teach more than they should, and at the same time, they teach less than they should. This book wants to evaluate Darwin’s legacy from a philosophical viewpoint by trying to analyze the strong points as well as the weak points of what came to be known as neo-Darwinism.

The association of Wittgenstein’s name with the notion of artificial intelligence is bound to cause some surprise both to Wittgensteinians and to people interested in artificial intelligence. After all, Wittgenstein died in 1951 and the term artificial intelligence didn’t come into use until 1956 so that it seems unlikely that one could have anything to do with the other. However, establishing a connection between Wittgenstein and artificial intelligence is not as insuperable a problem as it might appear at first glance. (...) While it is true that artificial intelligence as a quasi-distinct discipline is of recent vintage, some of its concerns, especially those of a philosophical nature, have been around for quite some time. At the birth of modern philosophy we find Descartes wondering whether it would be possible to create a machine that would be phenomenologically indistinguishable from.. (shrink)