Like _Beyond All Appearances_,_ _which it supplements, Paul Weiss’s new book is a fundamental work which faces all the hard issues which are not only at the heart of philosophy but at the core of our entire culture. Readers of Mr. Weiss’s phenomenology of religion will need no introduction to this new work which expands and clari­fies many of the issues raised in _Beyond All Appearances. _However, no knowl­edge of Paul Weiss’s previous books is required to understand (...) and appreciate this brilliant new exposition. Weiss’s plain style makes his ideas accessible to all intelligent readers, whether or not they have been trained as professional philosophers. Here in _First Considerations _Mr. Weiss addresses himself to such topics as actuality, internalization, evidence, names, substance, being, natures and possibilities, existence, unity and the cosmos—issues which have engrossed him as a moral philosopher and meta­physician throughout his distinguished career. In his progress through the ideas and issues expounded in this new book Mr. Weiss is concerned with the human condition distinctive of this species of ours. Rigorously applied, his moral philosophy is as complete and thorough as that of any of the major thinkers, and provides as complete a guide as, for example, that of Buddhism. A highly original work, no doubt well in advance of current trends in philosophy, _First Considerations _will provoke further thought and discussion and will be regarded as a seminal work in modern philosophical approaches. (shrink)

Reality is fundamentally unitary, on the hypothesis under consideration, but the is of this assertion expresses a contingent fact. The necessity expressed in the metaphysical formulation does not refer to reality in itself but rather to the relation between reality and truth. Metaphysical truth is necessary truth in the sense that it relates of necessity to the real. It is necessary with respect to the real; it states what reality is but not what it must be. Thus the question whether (...) reality is one or many is a legitimate metaphysical question and if a true answer can be given it is true necessarily. But it is not necessarily true. For metaphysics does not attempt to establish the ontological necessity of reality. In other words, it may be a necessary truth of metaphysics that reality is both one and many and, yet, an open ontological question whether or not it must be so. (shrink)

Being is the all encompassing. You are instancing Being; I am instancing Being. Being is that which we presuppose. Concerning the human world, we know that Charles Darwin wrote not only The Origin of Species, but The Descent of Man. He tried to account for how man arrived, but he did not succeed in that the way he succeeded in The Origin of Species, which attempted to cover many kinds of entities and their way of origin. In order to make (...) the transition to man, he had to say, well, look at the monkey facing the rising sun and he takes an attitude as if it were a prayer. That is jumping a big distance. He has not made and shown the jump. Of course, if he could show that one is continuous with the other then this would conflict with the claim of the Bible about Adam and Eve. The Origin of Species, of course, was directed at Aristotle who had a doctrine of fixed species. The very title of Darwin’s book was like a punch in the nose. (shrink)

The Executive Council pro tem of the HSA, organized during a business session of the Wofford Symposium at Spartanburg, S. C. last November, met et Vanderbilt University the following March and drafted a constitution for the Society. The members of this Council were Darrel E. Christensen of Wofford College, Robert L. Perkins of the University of South Alabama, Frederick G. Weiss, George L. Kline, Warren E. Steinkraus, Donald P. Verene, and Otho M. Adkins. Shortly thereafter the constitution was (...) adopted and an election was held. Professors Christensen, Steinkraus, Perkins, and Verene were elected President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer of the Society. * * * PURPOSE * * * The purpose of the HSA, as specified by Article II of the constitution, is "to promote the study of the philosophy of Hegel, its place within the history of thought, its relation to social, political, and cultural movements since his time, and its relevance to contemporary issues and fields of knowledge. In addition to the study of the thought and significance of Hegel, the Society has as its purpose the furtherance of original philosophical thought which has its basis in the philosophy of Hegel or which treats issues in the style, manner, or method of Hegel.". (shrink)

The Executive Council of the HSA has engaged Darrel E. Christensen to serve as Chairman of a Committee for Arrangements for the symposium on "Hegel and the Sciences" being planned for December 4-6, 1970. Professor George L. Kline is serving as a member of this Committee. A third member will be announced shortly, when the site of the meeting has been determined. Persons interested in contributing to the program are invited to submit papers, proposals for papers, or indications of (...) the type of paper to which they might wish to direct a prepared commentary. The theme is construed to embrace the following four areas of investigation: Hegel's philosophies of nature and the sciences within the context of his philosophy as a hole and the thought of his time, implications of Hegel's philosophies of nature and the sciences for understanding other aspects of his philosophy, the relation of Hegel's thought and method of relating to the sciences to developments and issues in the sciences and the philosophy of science since his time, and the contributions of philosophers who in some identifiable way have practiced Hegel's method or style of doing philosophy as these relate to the sciences or to the philosophy of science since his time. The scope of the theme may be modified, et the discretion of the Committee on Arrangements, to accommodate a promising paper. The deadline for completed papers to be submitted is September 1, after which they will be mimeographed and copies sent to commentators and, a little later, to persons who register to attend the meeting. The plan is to have mimeographed copies of commentaries in the hands of authors of principal papers by early November. Papers are to be 5,000 to 12,500 words in length, but the oral presentation should not exceed 30 minutes. Commentaries and replies may run 2,000 words each, but the oral presentation should not take longer than about 12 minutes. The Hegel Society of America will retain copyright on the material presented to the Symposium, which copyright will automatically revert to the respective authors of material not placed for publication by the Committee on Arrangements of the Society by February 1, 1972. Correspondence regarding the program should be addressed to: Darrel E. Christensen, Department of Philosophy, Wofford College, Spartanburg, South Carolina 29301. (shrink)

Under the balmy Mediterranean skies of Santa Margherita Ligure on the beautiful Italian Riviera, forty Hegelian scholars from nine countries put their heads together on the theme “Hegel’s Philosophie des subjectiven Geistes” at the Conference of the Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung, May 24–27, 1973. Enjoying the generosity of the Italian Government and the official hospitality of the Municipality of Santa Margherita, the participants heard and discussed four papers by German scholars, two each by Italians and Americans, and one each by a Dutch (...) and a French scholar. Professor Valerio Verra of the University of Rome served as host, and Professor Dieter Henrich, President of the Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung, introduced the theme of the Conference and officiated the proceedings. Chairing individual sessions and participating in the discussions were such internationally known figures as Hans-Georg Gadamer of Germany, Eric Weil and Marcel Régnier of France, W. H. Walsh and Anthony Kenny of Great Britain, and Enrico de Negri of Italy. (shrink)

This book approaches Hegel from the standpoint of what we might call the question of knowledge. Hegel, of course, had no "theory of knowledge" in the narrow and abstract sense in which it has come to be understood since Locke and Kant. "The examination of knowledge," he holds, "can only be carried out by an act of knowledge," and "to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water (...) until he had learned to swim. " * While Hegel wrote no treatise exclusively devoted to epistemology, his entire philosophy is nonetheless a many-faceted theory of truth, and thus our title - Beyond Epistemology - is meant to suggest a return to the classical meaning and relation of the terms episteme and logos. I had originally planned to include a lengthy introduction for these essays, setting out Hegel's general view of philosophic truth. But as the papers came in, it became clear that I had chosen my contributors too well; indeed, they have all but put me out of business. In any case, it gives me great pleasure to have been able to gather this symposium of outstanding Hegel scholars, to provide for them a forum on a common theme of great importance, and especially, thanks to Arnold Miller, to have Hegel himself among them. Frederick G. Weiss Charlottesville, Va. • The Logic of Hegel, trans. from the Etu;yclopaedta by William Wallace. 2nd ed. (shrink)

"This book of Hegalian selections by Professor Weiss is... very valuable. the passages incorporated are quite excellently chosen. Professor Weiss has included a long excerpt from the introductory chapters of the 'Encyclopaedia', which are Hegel's own, most successful attempt to introduce his system. He has also included some colorful sections from the 'Phenomenology', some weighty sections from the 'Science of Logic', as also the magnificently revealing paragraphs on the Absolute Idea at the end of 'Logic' in the 'Encyclopaedia'. (...) There are also good excerpts from the 'Philosophy of Nature' and 'Philosophy of Right'. And since the translations are good, a great deal of the difficult self-revisionary thought of Hegel comes across, helped by Professor Weiss's own valuable comments."--Foreword. (shrink)

Ever the restless thinker, Weiss has once more revised his metaphysical system, introducing the Dunamic-Rational as one of the five ultimate conditions to which Being gives rise and identifying emphatics as the way by which particular beings and such other pivotal realities interrelate. These systemic adjustments give needed prominence to the dynamic features of reality.

English summary: Gadamer's main work, Truth and Method, will be published in 2010, exactly 50 years after the first edition, in a slightly corrected version as an inexpensive student edition. This is seen as one of the few standard works of German post-war philosophy which has achieved worldwide recognition. The huge reaction to this is surprising for many reasons, among other things because in this work an important new theory is presented in intimations only using the author's own conceptual instruments; (...) in fact the author is careful when touching on ancient themes in the philosophical approach to the world. The main question in the work is: What actually happens when we understand? Gadamer focuses on the historical dimensions of understanding, including his famous rehabilitation of prejudice. In addition to the systematic excursus, the book contains an intellectual history of hermeneutics, which is convincing in its virtuosity in dealing with a variety of inspirational figures such as Hegel, Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger. The amiability and objectivity with which Gadamer invites his readers to a discussion are what account for the enormous influence of this exemplary textbook. German description: Wir sagen, dass wir ein Gesprach fuhren, aber je eigentlicher ein Gesprach ist, desto weniger liegt die Fuhrung desselben in dem Willen des einen oder anderen Partners. Was bei einem Gesprach herauskommt, weiss keiner vorher. Das Hauptwerk Wahrheit und Methode erscheint 2010, genau 50 Jahre nach der Erstausgabe, in durchgesehener und korrigierter Form als preiswerte Studienausgabe. Dieses Buch, das sein Autor erst im Alter von 60 Jahren schrieb, wurde zu einem Uberraschungserfolg der philosophischen Literatur. Als eines der wenigen weltweit anerkannten Standardwerke der deutschen Nachkriegsphilosophie wurde es in viele Sprachen ubersetzt.Die grosse Resonanz konnte aus vielerlei Grunden erstaunen, unter anderem weil hier nur in Andeutungen eine grosse neue Theorie mit eigenem begrifflichen Instrumentarium vorgestellt wird; der Autor umkreist vorsichtig uralte Themen des philosophischen Weltzugangs. Vor allem geht es um die Frage: Was geschieht eigentlich, wenn wir verstehen? Er stellt die geschichtliche Dimension des Verstehens in den Mittelpunkt, auch durch seine beruhmte Rehabilitierung des Vorurteils. Die systematischen Exkurse werden erganzt durch eine Geistesgeschichte der Hermeneutik, die in ihrer virtuosen Behandlung so unterschiedlicher Anreger wie Hegel, Dilthey, Husserl und Heidegger uberzeugt. Die Freundlichkeit und Sachlichkeit, mit der Gadamer seinen Leser ins Gesprach einladt, machen den Rang dieses vorbildlichen Lehrbuchs aus. (shrink)

Dieses Buch bietet eine elementare, in sich geschlossene Einführung in die analytische Sprachphilosophie anhand einer systematischen und chronologischen Behandlung der Referenzproblematik: Welche Rollen spielen die singulären Terme (vor allem Eigennamen und Kennzeichnungen) in natürlichen Sprachen? Es werden die Lösungsversuche Meinongs, Freges, Russells, Carnaps, Strawsons, Donnellans und Kripkes rekonstruiert und miteinander verglichen. Jeder der Beiträge dieser bedeutenden analytischen Philosophen wird unter drei Gesichtspunkten betrachtet. Erstens: Was leistet er zur Lösung des Problems der leeren Referenz? (Was z.B. bedeutet ein singulärer Term wie (...) «Pegasus», der nichts zu bezeichnen scheint?) Zweitens: Was leistet er zur Lösung des Problems des ausgeschlossenen Dritten? (Ist z.B. ein Satz wie «Pegasus ist weiss oder Pegasus ist nicht weiss», der gemäss dem Gesetz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten logisch wahr sein müsste, in Wirklichkeit falsch?) Drittens: Was leistet er zur Lösung des Problems der indirekten Kontexte? (Wie kommt es z.B., dass «Peter glaubt, dass der Abendstern ein Fixstern ist» wahr und «Peter glaubt, dass der Morgenstern ein Fixstern ist» falsch sein kann?). (shrink)

InhaltVorwortSiglenverzeichnisEröffnung und GrußwortePlenarvorträgeGünter ZÖLLER: Fichte in Berlin in München Claudio CESA : Urfragen und Gestalten der Menschheitsgeschichte im Hinblick auf den späten FichteBernard BOURGEOIS: Über die Sich-selbst-Gleichheit der Fichteschen Rechts- und StaatslehreReinhard LAUTH: Zur grundsätzlichen Richtung der philosophischen Fichte-Forschung Fichtes letzte Darstellungen der Wissenschaftslehre Urs RICHLI: Die ursprüngliche Konstitution des Wissens in Fichtes später WissenschaftslehreAlexander SCHNELL: Schema – Soll – SeinAndreas SCHMIDT: Jenseits des Selbstbewußtseins. Zur intellektuellen Anschauung in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1810Daniel DOHRN: Freiheit und Gebundenheit in der Wissenschaftslehre 1811Christian (...) KLOTZ: Fichtes Deduktion der Bewußtseinsform in der Wissenschaftslehre 1811Kunihiko NAGASAWA: Gott und Wissen in der WL von 1810Hans-Peter FALK: Fichtes späte Wissenschaftslehre Hitoshi MINOBE: Die Freiheit der Erscheinung in der Wissenschaftslehre von 1811Anton A. IVANENKO: Der zweideutige Begriff des Seins im Vortrag der Wissenschaftslehre vom Jahre 1812 Michael Bastian WEISS: Das Als und das Nicht-Als, oder: Szenario des Bildens. Zu Fichtes theoretischem Appell zum Praktischen in der Wissenschaftslehre 1812Benedetta BISOL: Die Ich-Lehre in der Wissenschaftslehre 1812M. Jorge de CARVALHO: Reflexion und ReflexibilitätMartin BONDELI: Zum Begriff der Apperzeption in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre 1813/1814Hartmut TRAUB: Liebe, Sein und Leben. Vom inneren Wesen der Wissenschaftslehre Cristiana SENIGAGLIA: Das Prinzip Individualität und seine praktische Bedeutung.Überlegungen zu Fichtes Diarien. (shrink)

Review of R. Goldwater and M. Treves, eds. Artists on Art, in Leonardo, l0 (l977), 78. Review of George Linden, Reflections on the Screen, and Paul Weiss, Cinematics, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXXVIII, 2 (December l977), 266 8.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Works of George Santayana, volume IX, Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion ed. by Martin A. Coleman, David E. Spiech, and Faedra Lazar WeissKrzysztof (Chris) Piotr SkowrońskiEdited by Martin A. Coleman, David E. Spiech, and Faedra Lazar WeissThe Works of George Santayana, volume IX, Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion Cambridge, MA, and London, England: The MIT Press, 2023; 359 pp., incl.indexIt is (...) not merely a re-edition of Santayana’s book that is at stake here. This ninth volume of The MIT Critical Edition of The Works of George Santayana is a next step in showing us his vast output with extensive range, depth, and, most importantly, significant stimulation for our generation of scholars and non-scholars. Just to illustrate the scope of Santayana’s work: volume V of the present MIT Critical Edition, published in the years 2001–2008, consists of eight thick books with Santayana’s correspondence throughout seventy years of intellectual activity (around 3000 letters to roughly 350 recipients, William James, Josiah Royce, Bertrand Russell, Sidney Hook, Horace Kallen, B.A.G. Fuller, Hugo Münsterberg, among them), containing philosophical and cultural insights that substantially compliment the views he expressed in his published texts.The original idea of the MIT Critical Edition was to present the published and unpublished works, followed by an elaborate editorial apparatus. As we can read in the present volume, “The goal of the editors is to produce texts that accurately represent Santayana’s final intentions regarding his works while recording all evidence on which editorial decisions have been based” (p. 307). How complex and fascinating the whole project has been we can also learn from a recently published book by Herman Saatkamp, who edited the Santayana edition for twenty-six years (Charles Padrón and Chris Skowroński, eds., Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., A Life of Scholarship with George Santayana: [End Page 462] Essays and Reflections, Brill/Rodopi, 2021). As we can read in Saatkamp’s book (p. 139), the story goes back to 1976, when John Lachs, top Santayana expert, asked Saatkamp to write the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and put forward a proposal for The Works of George Santayana. As the latest of its results today, we have the ninth volume just published, while future volumes are still being prepared for publication (twenty volumes are currently projected).More specific answers to questions: Do we need a critical edition to do this? Is it not enough just to publish the original volume anew? depend largely on the target audience. For those who are unfamiliar with Santayana, having in hand Volume IX shows that it is just a part, although an important part, of a much larger project, and Paul Forster’s lengthy introduction would be very helpful. Forster competently outlines Santayana’s work and life, and subsequently analyzes the book, chapter by chapter, so that we have a penetrating insight into its whole substance. Also, further down in the volume (pp. 303–306), we find a “Chronology of the Life and Work of George Santayana” that is informative to those unfamiliar with Santayana.I suspect that those audiences who are familiar with Santayana have been waiting for this volume impatiently. The original 1913 publication, by Charles Scribner’s Son (New York)—which itself was a collection of rather independent texts in the form of chapters—has been expanded with Santayana’s preface to the second edition, of 1926. Most importantly, however, the whole text (these two editions: 1913 and 1926) have been re-edited, revised, and corrected according to the criteria of a critical edition. Some terms, phrases, names, as well as other issues are explained extensively in a 140-page part entitled “Notes to the Text” (pp. 159–302). Some of these notes are instructive indeed, not only because they explain passages in the text, but also because they refer to other works by Santayana where he explains the issue at hand into more detail or from a different viewpoint. From these notes we learn much more about the ideas discussed and the figures to which Santayana refers in his reflections than we would by reading... (shrink)

So wohl Campbell als auch Whately sind sehr besorgt um die verschiedenen argumentations Formen zu analisieren, aber nicht in seiner abstrecten Vielfalt, sondern den verschiedenen Ableihungen des gebrauches oder der gegenwärtigen argumentations absicht im Entwurf jedes Arguments. In seiner Analyse haben sie beobachtet, dass die etische Begründung bemerkensmert verschieden als die Wissenschafliche. Beide Verfasser sind damit einverstanden dass es einen grossen Unterschied gibt zwischen: der existenten Prämisse in der Wissenchaftlichen Probe, und zweitens, die Form in der die Prämissen im induktiven (...) (oder moralen) Begründung verbunden sind, wiel in diesen letzten verschaffen die Prämissen getrennter Wiese eine Kosistenz auf dem Abschluss, aber sie müsen zusammen bleiben damit der Abschluss beweisbarer ist. Dieser Unterschied zwischen den art die Wharheit oder probabilität zwischen Wissenschaft und Humanität zu erzeugen, ist eines der grossen Themen der Philosophie aber das hermeneutische Paradigma zweifalt über die wissenschaftliche Folgerung, sind die Prämissen nicht doch der gleichen art vorgestellt, wer weiss, mit einer gewiss logischen Interdependenz zwischen inhnen und eine extralogische argumentative last die sie verbindet dem Anlass die Schlussfolgenung konsistente zu machen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination by Donald Wayne Viney and George W. ShieldsLeon NiemoczynskiThe Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination. Donald Wayne Viney and George W. Shields. Anoka, MN: Process Century Press, 2020. 584 pp. $40.00 cloth.Over the past decade process philosophy has undergone a significant renaissance most notably due to the towering presence of the thought of Alfred North Whitehead in (...) that tradition. Charles Hartshorne by manner of contrast has not had such a towering presence. Part of the reason this is the case is due to a paucity of introductory literature on the thought of Charles Hartshorne—literature that might contribute to a “starter kit” so to speak in mastering Hartshorne’s massive oeuvre. The Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination by Donald Wayne Viney and George W. Shields, both former students of Hartshorne and experts in process philosophy themselves, have authored a welcome contribution to an introductory literature that will most certainly elevate awareness of Hartshorne’s importance to its rightful place alongside that of Whitehead. The book is successful in its aims of “giving a reasonably comprehensive account of Hartshorne’s philosophy with an eye of presenting his best arguments...” (the “correcting what we see as misunderstandings of his views appearing in the critical literature” part may have been best left out) and “updating Hartshorne scholarship” (viii). There are ten chapters in total, appendix essays, the aforementioned bibliography, endnotes, and name and subject indexes.The Preface situates the mind of Charles Hartshorne as spanning the twentieth century and engaging metaphysics even when it was unfashionable to do so. Hartshorne thought about a wide-ranging and diverse range of subjects in both philosophy and science, aesthetics, metaphysics, applied philosophy, and theology. He never questioned modern science or evolution and believed that while metaphysics and empirical science have different methods each ensures its own way to objectivity. One learns that Hartshorne’s process metaphysics is also called “neo-classical” philosophy or speculative philosophy. His thought “gave full weight to the dynamic, relational, processive temporal and creative, affective dimensions of the universe” (vi). Hartshorne was known as much for his “panentheism,” or view that God transcends nature but also may be found immanently within it, as he was for his critique of traditional or scholastic classical theology—especially in his logic of theism where he recreates a modal version of the ontological argument. [End Page 94]Chapter 1, “The Career and Personality of Charles Hartshorne,” discusses just that. What seemed most important to me was the discussion of Hartshorne’s formative background of reading novels and poetry by Emerson, Melville, or Camus as a way of intensely living, his studying under William Ernest Hocking, and his Sheldon Traveling Fellowship where he studied for a time with Husserl and read and reviewed Heidegger. Probably the most important biographical details are that Hartshorne was given the assignment of editing the Peirce papers along with Paul Weiss as a Research Fellow while at Harvard University and he also met and graded for Whitehead, who along with C.S. Peirce, would become the twin pillars of all his thinking as a “Peircean and Whiteheadian” (11). From Peirce, we learn that Hartshorne took “possibility is best conceived of as a continuum with no least member” and from Whitehead, “actuality is discrete and discontinuous (atomistic), composed of momentary flashes of experiences” (11). For Hartshorne process and relativity are metaphysically basic.Chapter 2 begins with Hartshorne’s idea that, “Nature comes to us as constituted by feelings, not as constituted by lifeless, insentient matter” (28). Reality has an affective tone in which there is a layered complexity of feeling and social relation. In other words, contra Locke or Hume, feeling is objectively part of an objective affective continuum and is not nominalistically “painted on bare sense impressions” (46). Such might be described as a doctrine of “panexperientialism”— “the view that the basic constituents of reality are flashes of experience” (46). Experience and feeling stretch in their continuity to meet the bounds of nature. Chapter two continues with a wonderful discussion of Hartshorne’s aesthetics: “beauty is the mean between extremes” (48).Chapter 3 provides a... (shrink)

"--Jeffrie Murphy, The Philosophical Review (forthcoming).

"This book is a sorely needed corrective. Animal Spirits is an important--maybe even a decisive--contribution at a difficult juncture in macroeconomic theory.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A number of observations have led researchers to postulate that, despite being replication‐defective, human endogenous retroviruses (HERVs) may have retained the potential to cause or contribute to disease. However, mechanisms of HERV pathogenicity might differ substantially from those of modern infectious retroviruses or of the infectious precursors of HERVs. Therefore, novel pathways of HERV involvement in disease pathogenesis should be investigated. Recent technological advances in sequencing and bioinformatics are making this task increasingly feasible. The accumulating knowledge of HERV biology may (...) also facilitate the definition and general acceptance of criteria that establish HERV pathogenicity. Here, we explore possible mechanisms whereby HERVs may cause disease and examine the evidence that either has been or should be obtained in order to decisively address the pathogenic potential of HERVs. (shrink)

Identity Economics provides an important and compelling new way to understand human behavior, revealing how our identities--and not just economic incentives--influence our decisions. In 1995, economist Rachel Kranton wrote future Nobel Prize-winner George Akerlof a letter insisting that his most recent paper was wrong. Identity, she argued, was the missing element that would help to explain why people--facing the same economic circumstances--would make different choices. This was the beginning of a fourteen-year collaboration--and of Identity Economics. The authors explain how (...) our conception of who we are and who we want to be may shape our economic lives more than any other factor, affecting how hard we work, and how we learn, spend, and save. Identity economics is a new way to understand people's decisions--at work, at school, and at home. With it, we can better appreciate why incentives like stock options work or don't; why some schools succeed and others don't; why some cities and towns don't invest in their futures--and much, much more. Identity Economics bridges a critical gap in the social sciences. It brings identity and norms to economics. People's notions of what is proper, and what is forbidden, and for whom, are fundamental to how hard they work, and how they learn, spend, and save. Thus people's identity--their conception of who they are, and of who they choose to be--may be the most important factor affecting their economic lives. And the limits placed by society on people's identity can also be crucial determinants of their economic well-being. (shrink)

America is at war with terrorism. Terrorists must be brought to justice.We hear these phrases together so often that we rarely pause to reflect on the dramatic differences between the demands of war and the demands of justice, differences so deep that the pursuit of one often comes at the expense of the other. In this book, one of the country's most important legal thinkers brings much-needed clarity to the still unfolding debates about how to pursue war and justice in (...) the age of terrorism. George Fletcher also draws on his rare ability to combine insights from history, philosophy, literature, and law to place these debates in a rich cultural context. He seeks to explain why Americans--for so many years cynical about war--have recently found war so appealing. He finds the answer in a revival of Romanticism, a growing desire in the post-Vietnam era to identify with grand causes and to put nations at the center of ideas about glory and guilt.Fletcher opens with unsettling questions about the nature of terrorism, war, and justice, showing how dangerously slippery the concepts can be. He argues that those sympathetic to war are heirs to the ideals of Byron, Fichte, and other Romantics in their belief that nations--not just individuals--must uphold honor and be held accountable for crimes. Fletcher writes that ideas about collective glory and guilt are far more plausible and widespread than liberal individualists typically recognize. But as he traces the implications of the Romantic mindset for debates about war crimes, treason, military tribunals, and genocide, he also shows that losing oneself in a grand cause can all too easily lead to moral catastrophe.A work of extraordinary intellectual power and relevance, the book will change how we think not only about world events, but about the conflicting individualist and collective impulses that tear at all of us. (shrink)

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that improving democratic politics requires keeping emotion out of it. Marcus advances the provocative claim that the tradition in democratic theory of treating emotion and reason as hostile opposites is misguided and leads contemporary theorists to misdiagnose the current state of American democracy. Instead of viewing the presence of emotion in politics as a failure of rationality and therefore as a failure of citizenship, Marcus argues, democratic theorists need to understand that emotions are in (...) fact a prerequisite for the exercise of reason and thus essential for rational democratic deliberation and political judgment. Attempts to purge emotion from public life not only are destined to fail, but ultimately would rob democracies of a key source of revitalization and change. Drawing on recent research in neuroscience, Marcus shows how emotion functions generally and what role it plays in politics. In contrast to the traditional view of emotion as a form of agitation associated with belief, neuroscience reveals it to be generated by brain systems that operate largely outside of awareness. Two of these systems, "disposition" and "surveillance," are especially important in enabling emotions to produce habits, which often serve a positive function in democratic societies. But anxiety, also a preconscious emotion, is crucial to democratic politics as well because it can inhibit or disable habits and thus clear a space for the conscious use of reason and deliberation. If we acknowledge how emotion facilitates reason and is "cooperatively entangled" with it, Marcus concludes, then we should recognize sentimental citizens as the only citizens really capable of exercising political judgment and of putting their decisions into action. (shrink)

African-American Philosophers brings into conversation seventeen of the foremost thinkers of color to discuss issues such as Black existentialism, racism, Black women philosophers within the academy, affirmative action and the conceptual parameters of African-American philosophy.