Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same (...) object. If an emotional awareness does not have a unique character, then it is unlikely that emotions provide an understanding that is different from unemotional states of awareness: they are perhaps little more than “hot-blooded” instances of the same understanding. If, on the other hand, an emotional state involves a perceptual awareness that is unique to the emotion, then emotions are cognitively significant, providing an understanding of the object of the emotion that is absent in a similar but unemotional episode of awareness. I argue the latter and substantiate the claim that emotions are essential to moral virtue because they can be essential to a full understanding of the situations that they involve. In such cases, emotions are not merely a symptom of the possession of an adequate understanding, but are rather necessary for having an adequate understanding. (shrink)

One of the most significant developments in the area of emotion theory in recent years is the revival of the psychoevolutionary approach to classification. This essay appraises the prospects for such an approach. The first contention is that the supposed advantages of psychoevolutionary classification over functional classification in scientific psychological research is less than presumed , particularly with respect to the utility of the classification , which is the basis of the argument for the superiority of psychoevolutionary classification. The second (...) and central contention is that classification in terms of mechanisms proposed by empirical psychology and neuroscience has better prospects than psychoevolutionary classification with respect to both the utility for psychological research and the ability to carve psychological systems at their joints , that is , to produce natural kind divisions that distinguish emotions from other psychological traits. (shrink)

Anticolonial theorists and revolutionaries have long turned to dialectical thought as a central weapon in their fight against oppressive structures and conditions. This relationship was never easy, however, as anticolonial thinkers have resisted the historical determinism, teleology, Eurocentrism, and singular emphasis that some Marxisms place on class identity at the expense of race, nation, and popular identity. In recent decades, the conflict between dialectics and postcolonial theory has only deepened. In _Decolonizing Dialectics _Geo Maher breaks this impasse by bringing the (...) work of Georges Sorel, Frantz Fanon, and Enrique Dussel together with contemporary Venezuelan politics to formulate a dialectics suited to the struggle against the legacies of colonialism and slavery. This is a decolonized dialectics premised on constant struggle in which progress must be fought for and where the struggles of the wretched of the earth themselves provide the only guarantee of historical motion. (shrink)

There has been significant debate over both the imiplications and the merit of Leopold's land ethic. I consider the two most prominent objections and a resolution to them. One of these objections is that, far from being an alternative to an “economic” or cost‐benefit perspective on environmental issues, Leopold's land ethic merely broadens the range of economic considerations to be used in addressing such issues. The other objection is that the land ethic is a form of “environmental fascism” because it (...) subordinates the welfare of humans to the good of the ecological whole. I argue that these objections are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of his theory by advocates and detractors alike. The land ethic is centrally a psychological theory of moral development and ecological rationality that advocates a shift in the way that environmental problems are conceptualized and approached. (shrink)

Despite the tremendous growth of interest in both emotion and character in recent years, little has been said about the relation between the two. I argue that emotions have a proximal and fundamental role in determining character. The proximal role consists in the effects of emotion on the way that a person perceives and ensuingly cognizes the object of emotion. This plays a significant part in determining character-relevant actions. The fundamental role consists in the function that emotions have in sustaining (...) values on which character traits are based. Emotions enable character traits to persist by maintaining the importance of these values and thus countering “axiological entropy,” which is the diminution over time of the tacit sense of importance of such values. Emotions are thus essential to the possession of character traits, and character development involves developing an appropriate emotional repertoire. (shrink)

This paper highlights the dark side of power imbalance regarding its consequences in agri-food supplier–buyer relationships. We report on findings from two studies. The first study is based on a sample of 105 key informants, while study 2 is based on a sample of 444 key informants, all from the cocoa agri-food supply market of Ghana. While the first study focuses on the antecedents of power imbalance and its consequences, the second study explores the role of cooperatives/collective action in minimizing (...) supplier exploitation. Data from these studies were analysed using the partial least squares technique. Analysis of these findings shows switching costs’ impact on power imbalance to be curvilinear, while power imbalance has a curvilinear relationship with opportunism. The negative consequences of power imbalance are further exacerbated by dependency and the lack of joint action. Furthermore, we found the negative impact of power imbalance on financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members than for cooperative members, while, counterintuitively, we found the positive impact of economic satisfaction on financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members than for cooperative members. (shrink)

This article seeks to advance connecting the two societal priorities of environmental protection and what has been called ‘Indigenous reconciliation’ through arts-based communication (and particularly arts-based research), to help engage and inspire people towards sustaining a healthy planet and a just society. Through lenses of social justice, decolonizing critique and holistic environmental ideologies, this work explores theoretical and practical, real-world intersections of environmentalist, Indigenous and arts-based imperatives and ways of knowing. The goal is twofold: first, to seek to engage readers (...) in viewing the colonization of the planet and its First Peoples as intimately related, and ultimately, to bring together diverse literatures to suggest ideas, language and a model to foster communication aimed at redressing both of those colonialist evils. To acknowledge this intersection of environmental and Indigenous approaches in arts-based settings, the term ‘environmental conciliation’ is proposed and defined as ‘environmental protection in ways that acknowledge, address, and aim to redress imbalances in power among Indigenous people and non-Indigenous settlers honestly, respectfully, openly, creatively and positively. (shrink)

Was ist Wahrheit? Zufolge welcher Standards erkennt man, was wahr oder falsch ist? Wie lassen sich derartige Kriterien rechtfertigen? Die vornehmlich durch die Wende zur Sprache und die Ausbildung einer Metatheorie der analytischen Wissenschaften geprägte neuere Erörterung dieser Hauptfragen zur Wahrheit führt auf Vorfragen: Von welchen Gebilden sagen wir in welcher Weise, sie seien wahr oder falsch? Was sind und was leisten Definitionen, Kriterien, Regeln, Bedingungen der Wahrheit und Falschheit? Die vorliegende Schrift entfaltet einen systematischen Rahmen, in dem die Vorfragen (...) zur Wahrheit beantwortet und die Hauptfragen in neuer Weise organisiert werden. (shrink)

In this essay I focus on two areas discussed in Michael Brady’s Emotion: The Basics, namely perceptual models of emotion and the relation between emotion and virtue. Brady raises two concerns about perceptual theories: that they arguably collapse into feeling or cognitive theories of emotion; and that the analogy between emotion and perception is questionable at best, and is thus not an adequate way of characterizing emotion. I argue that a close look at perception and emotional experience reveals a structure (...) of emotion that avoids these problems. I then explore other ways in which emotions can be operative in virtuous acts and virtue traits outside of their relation to motivation. The patterns of emotional response that we have can affect virtue because they affect the way in which we see and take-in information about the world, and the gravity that such perceptions have for us. In addition, emotions are critical to virtue because they maintain the level of importance that values have for us, and in doing so forestall axiological entropy, namely the fading of the importance that values have for us, and thus the virtues that are dependent on those values. (shrink)

The paper examines the contribution of the French philosopher Michel Foucault to the subject of ethics in organizations. The paper combines an analysis of Foucault’s work on discipline and control, with an examination of his later work on the ethical subject and technologies of the self. Our paper argues that the work of the later Foucault provides an important contribution to business ethics theory, practice and pedagogy. We discuss how it offers an alternative avenue to traditional normative ethical theory that (...) both converges and diverges with other extant alternatives. By situating ethics as practices of the self, and by demonstrating the conditions under which freedom in organizations can be exercised, Foucault’s ethics attempt to connect an understanding and critique of power with a personal project of self. He therefore provides a theory of subjectivity that potentially informs a reshaping of contemporary virtue ethics theory, value-based management, and business ethics teaching. (shrink)

Many theories of meaning hold that meaning is found in some sort of subjective state. However, subjective accounts of meaning have not engaged in a systematic analysis of the subjective state or presented a sustained argument for why meaning is found in that particular state and not some other type of subjective state. This paper argues that emotions play a fundamental role in the meaningfulness of activities in our lives. It contends that emotions are essential to meaning because they are (...) constitutive of two separate subjective states that are necessary for meaning. The paper thus identifies the particular subjective responses upon which meaning depends. (shrink)

This paper aims to establish the meaning of Dharma as the principle of self-denial and emptiness. Dharma, a key concept in the religious thought of India, has the literal meaning of "supporter.” Something that supports something else does not exist for itself. Just as the truth supporting the universe is Dharma, so the four pillars supporting the roof of the house to prevent it from collapsing are also Dharma. The four pillars supporting the house do not exist for themselves, but (...) create an empty space in the house. In this respect, the essence of Dharma is self-denial, self-sacrifice. The traditional ascetic practices and religions in India is referred to as sanatana dharma, and the core is the complete extinction of I-ness. When individual consciousness is completely lost, mokṣa is achieved. The moment the eternal truth is achieved, the individual consciousness becomes zero, and this position can be likened to the center where the x- and y-axes meet in the coordinates of mathematics. Just as the center in the coordinates of mathematics is a place where the value of the x-axis is zero and the value of the y-axis is zero, the center of the universe, that is, nirvāṇa is achieved when individual consciousness is completely lost. Dharma is the path of becoming nothing to reach the zero point, and the process of self-denial is bound to entail pain. The pain involving voluntary self-denial can be rather a positive nourishment for the realization of Dharma. In fact, we can say that the core of the Hindu ethics of Aśrama-dharma and Varṇa-dharma is voluntary renunciation for the complete extinction of individual consciousness and renunciation concerning that which is possible. (shrink)

I argue two things. One is that conceptual considerations about the nature and identification of psychological systems suggest that these recent empirical findings, being based on manipulated conditions, are not relevant to the issue of what emotions are and thus do not underwrite noncognitivism. The other is that these same considerations lend support to the idea that paradigm emotions, including the purported noncognitive basic emotions, are in fact cognitive. Central to these claims is the concept of proper function, particularly as (...) laid out by Ruth Millikan, which has received insufficient attention in work on the nature of emotion. (shrink)