Recently, there has been a shift away from traditional truth-conditional accounts of meaning towards non-truth-conditional ones, e.g., expressivism, relativism and certain forms of dynamic semantics. Fueling this trend is some puzzling behavior of modal discourse. One particularly surprising manifestation of such behavior is the alleged failure of some of the most entrenched classical rules of inference; viz., modus ponens and modus tollens. These revisionary, non-truth-conditional accounts tout these failures, and the alleged tension between the behavior of modal vocabulary and classical (...) logic, as data in support of their departure from tradition, since the revisionary semantics invalidate some of these patterns. I, instead, offer a semantics for modality with the resources to accommodate the puzzling data while preserving classical logic, thus affirming the tradition that modals express ordinary truth-conditional content. My account shows that the real lesson of the apparent counterexamples is not the one the critics draw, but rather one they missed: namely, that there are linguistic mechanisms, reflected in the logical form, that affect the interpretation of modal language in a context in a systematic and precise way, which have to be captured by any adequate semantic account of the interaction between discourse context and modal vocabulary. The semantic theory I develop specifies these mechanisms and captures precisely how they affect the interpretation of modals in a context, and do so in a way that both explains the appearance of the putative counterexamples and preserves classical logic. (shrink)

Nowak and Michaelson have done us the service of presenting direct and clear worries about our account of demonstratives. In response, we use the opportunity to engage briefly with their remarks as a useful way to clarify our view.

The standard semantics for modality, together with the influential restrictor analysis of conditionals (Kratzer, 1986, 2012) renders conditional ought claims like “If John’s stealing, he ought to be stealing” trivially true. While this might seem like a problem specifically for the restrictor analysis, the issue is far more general. Any account must predict that modals in the consequent of a conditional sometimes receive obligatorily unrestricted interpretation, as in the example above, but sometimes appear restricted, as in, e.g., “If John’s speeding, (...) he ought to pay the fine.” And the problem runs deeper, for there are non-conditional variants of the data. Thus, the solution cannot lie in adopting a particular analysis of conditionals, nor a specific account of the interaction between conditionals and modals. Indeed, with minimal assumptions, the standard account of modality will render a myriad of claims about what one ought to, must, or may, do trivially true. Worse, the problem extends to a wide range of non-deontic modalities, including metaphysical modality. But the disaster has a remedy. I argue that the source of the problem for the standard account lies in its failure to capture an inferential evidence constraint encoded in the meaning of a wide range of modal constructions. I offer an account that captures this constraint, and show it provides a general and independently motivated solution to the problem. (shrink)

The standing tradition in theorizing about meaning, since at least Frege, identifies meaning with propositions, which are, or determine, the truth-conditions of a sentence in a context. But a recent trend has advocated a departure from this tradition: in particular, it has been argued that modal claims do not express standard propositional contents. This non-propositionalism has received different implementations in expressivist semantics and certain kinds of dynamic semantics. They maintain that the key aspect of interpretation of modal claims is the (...) characteristic dynamic effect they have on the context. I argue that pessimism about truth-conditions arises from an overly simplistic picture of content, context and their interaction. While I agree with the critics that an important aspect of modal meaning is the dynamic effect modals have on the context, I argue that they have mischaracterized the nature and the complexity of this effect. A more nuanced account of the interaction between modals and context shows that far from being incompatible with propositional meaning, the dynamic aspect of meaning is precisely what allows us to predict the correct propositional content of an utterance. (shrink)

Natural languages are riddled with context-sensitivity. One and the same string of words can express many different meanings on occasion of use, and yet we understand one another effortlessly, on the fly. How do we do so? What fixes the meaning of context-sensitive expressions, and how are we able to recover the meaning so effortlessly? -/- This book offers a novel response: we can do so because we draw on a broad array of subtle linguistic conventions that determine the interpretation (...) of context-sensitive items. Contrary to the dominant tradition, which maintains that the meaning of context-sensitive language is underspecified by grammar and that interpretation relies on non-linguistic cues and speakers' intentions, this book argues that meaning is determined entirely by discourse conventions, rules of language that have largely been missed and the effects of which have been mistaken for extra-linguistic effects of an utterance situation on meaning. The linguistic account of context developed here sheds new light on the nature of linguistic content and the interaction between content and context. At the same time, it provides a novel model of context that should constrain and help evaluate debates across many subfields of philosophy where appeal to context has been common, often leading to surprising conclusions such as epistemology, ethics, value theory, metaphysics, metaethics, and logic. (shrink)

King’s Felicitous Underspecification (FU) is a rich, thought-provoking book, which draws on a wide range of novel and largely unappreciated linguistic examples to argue that we should take the idea of a felicitously underspecified use of context-sensitive language very seriously. If felicitous underspecification is as prevalent as King argues, understanding the mechanisms involved in its interpretation is crucial for our overall understanding of linguistic communication. FU further offers a sophisticated account of these mechanisms. In this piece, I critically examine some (...) of the main themes in FU. In doing so, I raise some worries for the interpretive mechanisms King posits. Specifically, I pose some challenges for his intentionalist GCA meta-semantics, and raise worries about the central interpretive role he assigns to his proposed contextual update rule, FUU. (shrink)

The Rigidity Thesis states that no rigid term can have the same semantic content as a nonrigid one. Drawing on Dummett (1973; 1991), Evans (1979; 1982), and Lewis (1980), Stanley (1997a; 1997b; 2002) rejects the thesis since it relies on an illicit identification of compositional semantic content and the content of assertion (henceforth, assertoric content). I argue that Stanley’s critique of the Rigidity Thesis fails since it places constraints on assertoric content that cannot be satisfied by any plausible notion of (...) content appropriately related to compositional semantic content. For similar reasons, I also challenge a recent two-dimensionalist defense of Stanley by Ninan (2012). The moral is far-reaching: any theory that invokes a distinction between semantic and assertoric contents is unsatisfactory unless it can plausibly explain the connection between them. (shrink)

Traditionally, pronouns are treated as ambiguous between bound and demonstrative uses. Bound uses are non-referential and function as bound variables, and demonstrative uses are referential and take as a semantic value their referent, an object picked out jointly by linguistic meaning and a further cue—an accompanying demonstration, an appropriate and adequately transparent speaker’s intention, or both. In this paper, we challenge tradition and argue that both demonstrative and bound pronouns are dependent on, and co-vary with, antecedent expressions. Moreover, the semantic (...) value of a pronoun is never determined, even partly, by extra-linguistic cues; it is fixed, invariably and unambiguously, by features of its context of use governed entirely by linguistic rules. We exploit the mechanisms of Centering and Coherence theories to develop a precise and general meta-semantics for pronouns, according to which the semantic value of a pronoun is determined by what is at the center of attention in a coherent discourse. Since the notions of attention and coherence are, we argue, governed by linguistic rules, we can give a uniform analysis of pronoun resolution that covers bound, demonstrative, and even discourse bound readings. Just as the semantic value of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is conventionally set by a particular feature of its context of use—namely, the speaker—so too, we will argue, the semantic values of other pronouns, including ‘he’, are conventionally set by particular features of the context of use. (shrink)

This précis outlines some of the key themes in Context and Coherence. At the core of Context and Coherence is the meta-semantic question: what determines the meaning of context-sensitive language and how do we interpret it as effortlessly as we do? What we can express with language is obviously constrained by grammar, but it also seems to depend on various non-linguistic features of an utterance situation, for example, pointing gestures. Accordingly, it is nearly universally assumed that grammar underspecifi es content: (...) the interpretation of context-sensitive language depends in part on extra-linguistic features of the utterance situation. Contra this dominant tradition, the book develops and defends a thoroughly linguistic account: context-sensitivity resolution is entirely a matter of grammar, which is much more subtle and pervasive than has typically been noticed. In interpreting context-sensitive language as effortlessly as we do, we draw on our knowledge of these subtle, but pervasive, linguistic cues—what I call discourse conventions. If this is right, the dominant, extra-linguistic account must be rejected. It not only mischaracterizes the linguistic conventions affecting context-sensitivity resolution, but its widespread, and often implicit, endorsement leads to philosophically radical conclusions. The recent arguments for non-truth-conditional and non-classical semantics for modal discourse provide just one illustration of this point. But appeals to context are quite common within a wide range of debates across different subfi elds of philosophy, and they typically assume the extra-linguistic model of context-sensitivity resolution. If the account of context-sensitivity developed in Context and Coherence is on the right track, such arguments have to be reconsidered. (shrink)

We all make mistakes in pronunciation and spelling, but a common view is that there are limits beyond which a mistaken pronunciation or spelling becomes too dramatic to be recognized as of a particular word at all. These considerations have bolstered a family of accounts that invoke speaker intentions and standards for tolerance as determinants of which word, if any, an utterance tokens. I argue this is a mistake. Neither intentions nor standards of tolerance are necessary or sufficient (individually or (...) jointly) for determining which word an utterance tokens. Instead, drawing in part on empirical research on word production, I offer an alternative account, Originalism-plus-Transfer (OPT), according to which word tokening depends entirely on lexical selection during word production, and on how the selected lexical item is situated within the network of causal/historical connections leading back to its neologizing. Once the elements of my account are in place, as a bonus, we will have resources for a promising answer to the question of word individuation as well. (shrink)

We often use language creatively, introducing new expressions on the fly. That we can successfully communicate with novel expressions without antecedent semantic knowledge has led many to a dynamic meaning hypothesis: namely, we can actively renegotiate extant semantic conventions to better suit our communicative, practical, and even normative concerns. We argue that this hypothesis is a mistake: meanings are non-negotiable, and so, lexical innovation cannot proceed by way of meaning-negotiation.

_The Relational Horse_ explores the possibilities of including the horse’s perspective into the study of human-horse relationships. Case studies from across a range of time periods, activities, and disciplines provide fresh ways to understand horses, themselves, in relationships with humans.

Pensamiento atrevido y nuevo, visión abierta, donde el lector hallará cuestiones clave del conocimiento, pero también del confundir y fundir, metafísica, física, antropología, sociedad. Desde la psicología a la reunión de los hombres en ciudades, la política, todo penetrado de la mirada estética, como si el saber fuera una de las bellas artes. Cuestiones como la Orden del Temple, la francmasonería, el ciber-arte, la clonación de obras artísticas o las bibliotecas digitales se convierten en ejemplos para una filosofía alternativa. Ilia (...) Galán, Titular de Estética y Teoría del Arte en la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid y profesor invitado en las universidades de Oxford, Harvard, la Sorbona, New Tork University, etc. Columnista habitual en El País, y otros periódicos. Entre sus libros, editados en varios idiomas, destacan: El Dios de los dioses (Ciencia del Arte) 1993, El romanticismo: Schelling o el arte divino Madrid, 1999, Actualidad del pensamiento de Sem Tob (filosofía hispano-hebrea del siglo XIV), 2003, 2004. Teorías del arte desde el siglo XXI, 2005, Sabiduría oculta en el Camino de Santiago, 2011. (shrink)

This article presents the relationship between the notions of equality and freedom assumed by Castoriadis as necessary conditions for social autonomy project. The chiasmatic figure that Castoriadis establishes between equality and freedom will be approached with the aim of clarifying whether both notions should be addressed jointly or, on the contrary, they can be considered separately for an autonomy project as well. Once exposed the difficulties that appear in the representation that establishes a correspondence between both terms, attention will be (...) directed to the need of the figure of law as a legal element to guarantee the privileges that are granted to the members of the community in the Autonomy project that is equal participation. To conclude, the article will be directed to a silence in the work of Castoriadis; who can be considered a subject in the autonomy project, that is, who should participate in the formation of the new institutions. (shrink)

El artículo se propone examinar las condiciones por las que los derechos humanos no son respetados en su totalidad para todos los seres humanos. En concreto, estudia la relación entre ser sujeto de justicia y la posesión del estatus de ciudadanía y, por otro lado, la relación entre privación de derechos y ausencia de ciudadanía. En este sentido, se exploran algunos de los discursos que han permitido la cesura entre el hombre como sujeto político y el hombre como sustrato biológico. (...) Se propone tomar la profunda intimidad entre el acceso a los derechos y el ser sujeto reconocido por el Estado como el vector explicativo de la vulneración de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

The dominant view maintains that names are directly referring, rigid terms, the primary function of which is to designate an individual. But, as has long been noted, proper names also allow for predicative uses and combine with quantifiers and definite, indefinite, and numerical determiners. Any adequate semantic account of proper names thus must make sense not just of their referential uses but also of their seemingly predicative ones. Predicativists maintain that such uses manifest a name’s semantically encoded, predicative meaning, while (...) the directly referential theorists argue that they involve polysemic or pragmatic, metalinguistic re-interpretations. But while competing accounts differ radically in their analyses of such uses, they all, in the wake of Kripke’s attack on descriptivism, share a common feature: they interpret a predicative use of a name N as expressing (either semantically or pragmatically) the property of being called N. I argue that no such account of predicative uses currently on offer is successful. Indeed, adequately characterizing being called condition is more difficult than has been appreciated. The best attempt—on predicative and directly referential accounts alike—leaves a surprising consequence: names are ambiguous in a way unlike any other we witness with other kinds of lexical items. (shrink)

The traditional view is that 'now’ is a pure indexical, denoting the utterance time. Yet, despite its initial appeal, the view has faced criticism. A range of data reveal 'now’ allows for discourse-bound (i.e., anaphoric) uses, and can occur felicitously with the past tense. The reaction to this has typically been to treat ‘now’ as akin to a true demonstrative, selecting the prominent time supplied by the non-linguistic context or prior discourse. We argue this is doubly mistaken. The first mistake (...) concerns the semantic value of ‘now’, which is not a time, but a state — the consequent state of a prominent event. The second is that ‘now’ is a pure indexical after all, insofar as its interpretation is determined without recourse to extra-linguistic supplementation. Specifically, we argue that any occurrence of 'now’ selects the consequent state of the most prominent event, where event-prominence is linguistically maintained through prominence-affecting updates contributed by coherence relations. Our analysis accounts straightforwardly for a wide range of discourse initial and discourse bound uses of ‘now’, while giving it a simple indexical meaning. (shrink)

This Handbook introduces key issues in the philosophy of language as currently practised. Topics include: the nature of language; the nature and role of semantic content; the dynamics of communication and speech acts; tense and modality; discourse dynamics; and the expressive, evaluative, subjective, and social aspects of language.

Prior interpretations of the tattoos of nonhuman animals etched upon the preserved human bodies from the Pazyryk archaeological culture of Inner Asia have focused on solely human-generated meanings. This article utilizes an ethnoarchaeological approach to reassess these tattoos, by analogizing the nature and possibilities of human-ridden horse intersubjectivities in the present with those of the past. As enlightened by people who live with horses, including the author, the process of learning to ride can be seen as an interspecies apprenticeship process, (...) where both humans and horses pass along social knowledge as thoughtful actors with defined roles. From this perspective, the horse tattoos are presented as polysemic materializations of the bonds between particular Pazyryk horses and people, of blended identities, and of cosmological values related to time, memory, and belonging. The article concludes that exploring smaller-scale human-nonhuman animal interactions in the present allows for fresh interpretations of similar interactions in the past and provides a means for archaeology to move beyond the objectification of animals as sets of resources or symbols. (shrink)

The discussion that follows rehearses some familiar arguments and replies from the Kripke/Putnam/Burge critique of the traditional Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein views on names and predicates. Its main contributions are, first, to introduce a novel way of individuating tokens of the same expression, (what we call “articulations”) second, to then revise standard views on deference, (as this notion is understood to pertain to securing access to meaning for potentially ignorant, and confused agents in the externalist tradition going back to Putnam and Burge) and (...) lastly, to emphasize the often conflated distinction between disambiguation and meaning fixing. Our line on deference is that it is not, and should not be conceived as, an intentional mental act, but rather indicates an historical chain of antecedent tokenings of the same expression. (shrink)

In this paper we are dealing with Kant's view on the phenomenon of incongruous counterparts, in particular with the argument from his article 'On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space', where the phenomenon of incongruous counterparts is used as an argument for the existence of the absolute and objective space, and with the argument from Kant's Inaugural Dissertation in which he uses the phenomenon of incongruous counterparts again, but this time for a different purpose - as (...) an argument in favor of the idea of space as a pure intuition. Our aim is to show that Kant's argument from 'On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space', although it shows the inadequacy of Leibniz's definition of congruence, does not in fact represent the reductio ad absurdum of the relationist view, for his argument in favor of the existence of the absolute space represents merely the inference to the best explanation. We also propound an alternative account of the phenomenon of incongruous counterparts, which is in line with the relationist theory. Furthermore, we call in question Kant's argument from the Inaugural Dissertation, according to which incongruence could not be explained discursively, and we put forward a conceptual determination of incongruence in terms of the notions of similarity, equality and congruence, taken as the possibility of objects to be included within the same spatial boundaries. U ovom radu bavimo se Kantovim shvatanjem fenomena inkongruentnih pandana pre svega njegovim argumentom iz spisa 'O osnovnim principima razlikovanja smerova u prostoru', gde Kant fenomen inkongruentnih pandana koristi kao argument u prilog tvrdnje o postojanju apsolutnog i objektivnog prostora, kao i argumentom iz Kantove Inauguralne disertacije, u kojoj se on ponovo poziva na fenomen inkongruentnih pandana, ali ovoga puta sa drugacijim ciljem - kao argument u prilog shvatanja prostora kao cistog opazaja. Cilj nam je da pokazemo kako Kantov argument iz spisa 'O osnovnim principima razlikovanja smerova u prostoru', iako pokazuje neadekvatnost Lajbnicove definicije kongruencije, ipak ne predstavlja reductio ad absurdum relacionisticke pozicije, buduci da njegov argument u prilog postojanja apsolutnog prostora predstavlja samo zakljucak na najbolje moguce objasnjenje, kao i da ponudimo alternativno objasnjenje fenomena inkongruentnih pandana, koje je u skladu sa relacionistickom teorijom. Takodje, dovodimo u pitanje Kantov argument iz Inauguralne disertacije, prema kojem se inkongruencija ne moze izraziti diskurzivno, nudeci pri tome pojmovno odredjenje inkongruencije preko pojmova slicnosti, jednakosti i kongruencije, shvacene kao sposobnost objekata da zauzmu istovetne prostorne granice. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest próba rekonstrukcji rozwoju duchowego Zaratustry, głównego bohatera dzieła Nietzschego Tako rzecze Zaratustra. Ów rozwój polega na osiąganiu trzech stadiów świadomości: fazy konformistycznego wielbłąda, przepełnionego negacją lwa i finalnie dziecka afirmującego życie. Metodologia badań zastosowana w artykule opiera się na analizie, rekonstrukcji i syntezie tekstu Tako rzecze Zaratustra. Przeprowadzone badania osadzone są w kontekście tezy Heideggera o komplementarności głównych aspektów nietzscheanizmu: woli mocy i wiecznego powrotu. Zaratustra, aby przeistoczyć się w lwa, a następnie w dziecko, będzie musiał odkryć (...) i zaakceptować ową komplementarność. Głównym antagonistą proroka jest duch ciężkości, symbolizujący negację życia i destruktywną miłość bliźniego. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.

The paper by Bergnar and Bunford in this edition of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology is a sophisticated examination of a central question that has lacked consensus in the philosophy of psychiatry, namely, what is “the key aspect of the meaning of this fundamental term, mental disorder”? To settle this question, the authors use an empirical approach by surveying graduate students in clinical psychology. In this way, they attempt to invoke the Wittgensteinian method of determining the meaning of a term by (...) seeing how it is used. The empirical results, the authors argue, serve as strong evidence in support of the position that the term ‘mental disorder’ designates disability... (shrink)

Our focus is in this paper is in answering the question what is required of interlocutors in order for them to pick up a word, and use/apply it successfully. Putting our cards on the table, our answer will be not much.

There are various reasons one might think that the semantic content of occurrences of sentences does not coincide with assertoric content –content of belief and assertion– corresponding to those sentences. But if a semantic theory exploiting such distinction is to play a role in explaining communication, there needs to be a tight connection between the two types of content. Drawing upon the considerations of McDowell and Evans concerning rigidity, Stanley proposes to extend Lewis’ argument for the distinction between the two (...) types of content –an argument concerning behavior of certain English language operators– to argue that modals do not operate on assertoric, but merely on semantic contents of sentences they embed. I argue that the Dummett-Evans-Stanley line of argument fails due to its inability to explain the connection between semantic and assertoric content. Unable to provide a plausible way of recovering assertoric content from semantic content, the theory renders successful communication mysterious. The moral of its failure is far-reaching –any theory that appeals to the distinction between these two types of content remains less than fully satisfactory unless the challenge of accounting for their connection is met. (shrink)

A once commonplace view is that only a semantic theory that interprets sentences of a language according to what their utterances intuitively say can be correct. The rationale is that only by requiring a tight connection between what a sentence means and what its users intuitively say can we explain why, normally, those linguistically competent with a language upon hearing its sentences uttered can discern what they say. More precisely, this approach ties the semantic content of a sentence to intuitions (...) about “says that” reports. Cappelen and Lepore forcefully argued against this approach. But given their criticism, what constraints are there on a correct assignment of semantic conent to sentences of a language? Two choices are available regard: either give up the strategy of identifying semantic content by looking at indirect speech reports, or, conclude that the intuition about the connection between meaning and intuitions about indirect reports is basically on the right track, but needs to be further constrained. We will explore both strategies and argue that ultimately we should reject the intuitions about indirect reports as tests on semantic theory, and propose a more direct strategy for identifying semantic content. (shrink)

In demonstration, speakers use real-world activity both for its practical effects and to help make their points. The demonstrations of origami mathematics, for example, reconfigure pieces of paper by folding, while simultaneously allowing their author to signal geometric inferences. Demonstration challenges us to explain how practical actions can get such precise significance and how this meaning compares with that of other representations. In this paper, we propose an explanation inspired by David Lewis’s characterizations of coordination and scorekeeping in conversation. In (...) particular, we argue that words, gestures, diagrams and demonstrations can function together as integrated ensembles that contribute to conversation, because interlocutors use them in parallel ways to coordinate updates to the conversational record. (shrink)

This volume addresses the intriguing issue of indirect reports from an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributors include philosophers, theoretical linguists, socio-pragmaticians, and cognitive scientists. The book is divided into four sections following the provenance of the authors. Combining the voices from leading and emerging authors in the field, it offers a detailed picture of indirect reports in the world’s languages and their significance for theoretical linguistics. Building on the previous book on indirect reports in this series, this volume adds an empirical (...) and cross-linguistic approach that covers an impressive range of languages, such as Cantonese, Japanese, Hebrew, Persian, Dutch, Spanish, Catalan, Armenian, Italian, English, Hungarian, German, Rumanian, and Basque. (shrink)

En este trabajo se muestra la conveniencia y necesidad de aunar procedimientos filológicos tradicionales y metodologías propias del análisis del discurso que permiten relacionar las estrategias y recursos lingüísticos empleados en la elaboración de los textos, al examen y análisis de los textos escritos en nuestro pasado [1]. Para alcanzar dicho objetivo es necesario abordar una complicada y laboriosa tarea de recontextualización histórica, social, discursiva y comunicativa. El corpus empleado consta de 10 cartas escritas por Alonso de Medina a La (...) Gasca, desde Arequipa en 1549. Concretando más, se examinan los procedimientos lingüísticos empleados por el locutor de estas cartas para construir su identidad discursiva, así como el papel que desempeñan en la configuración de dicha identidad, el _ethos prediscursivo_ o _identidad social_, con atención especial a la ideología o _doxa_ (política/ley-religión). [1] Como señalaba Bustos Tovar (2016, etc.) la finalidad de todo análisis filológico debe explorar nuevas metodologías que, partiendo de que los textos son actos de comunicación que poseen un _sentido_ y que obedecen a una intención, ayuden a determinar cuestiones como los rasgos relevantes para determinar el sentido de los textos y los diferentes modos de construcción del discurso. (shrink)

This paper explores the proposals of Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito, two of the top representatives of the Italian Thought, around the notion of community and commons. Starting from an analysis of the community based on the munus, the statute of the commons is examined as opposed to the right of property. Next, the discussion around the notion of use of the commons and its difficult reconciliation with the legal apparatus is presented. Finally, the notion of inappropriateness that underpins the (...) Italian study of the commons is studied. (shrink)