Fodor and demonstratives in LOT

Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 35 (1):75-92 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.

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Author Profiles

Una Stojnić
Princeton University
Ernie LePore
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

The Riddle of Understanding Nonsense.Krystian Bogucki - 2023 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (4):372–411.

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