We comment here one of the most categorical, radical and fundamental concepts of Schopenhauer’s pessimism: the theory of positivity of pain and negativity of pleasure. We present its development in the philosopher’s capital work The World as Will and Representation and defend that it is present in a vital way in his three metaphysics, but is only made explicit in the last (of customs). Finally, we “dialogue” with the problematical issues that G. Simmel and C. Janaway address this argument and (...) propose a possible explanation of the thinker’s strategy to reserve its notability to the last book. (shrink)

Il volume analizza il pensiero trascendentale di Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) nei suoi elementi costitutivi. In particolare viene messo in evidenza che l’intento principale della filosofia fichtiana è quello di edificare un “sistema della libertà”, fondato sul primato del pratico (das Praktische) e dei costitutivi pratici della coscienza umana: l’intuizione intellettuale, l’immaginazione produttiva, lo Streben ed in primis il volere. Viene quindi sottolineato che uno dei vertici della speculazione di Fichte è rappresentato dal concetto di “volere puro” che costituisce il (...) fondamento del conoscere e dell’agire, determinando la natura stessa dell’uomo e dell’assoluto. Nel volume vengono ampiamente utilizzati i nuovi testi messi a disposizione dall’edizione critica delle opere fichtiane curata da Reinhard Lauth: particolare attenzione viene data ai manoscritti di lezioni Dottrina della scienza nova methodo (1796-99) e all’epistolario intercorso tra Fichte e F.H. Jacobi sul rapporto tra la riflessione filosofica e la fede religiosa. Nella parte finale del libro compaiono due Appendici: la prima è dedicata al filosofo bretone Jules Lequier (1814-1862), autore che - ispirandosi a Fichte - elabora una filosofia della libertà tesa a superare una concezione della natura umana deterministica e positivistica; la seconda Appendice è incentrata sull’originale interpretazione del pensiero cartesiano data da Reinhard Lauth (1919-2007): quest’ultimo scorge nel cogito cartesiano il fondamento di una filosofia trascendentale ante litteram che anticipa le posizioni di Kant e di Fichte e che pone le basi per un “pensiero trascendentale della libertà”. -/- AUTORE Tommaso Valentini (Spoleto, 1979) è professore associato di “Filosofia politica” presso l’Università degli Studi “Guglielmo Marconi” di Roma, dove insegna anche “Storia della filosofia moderna”. È docente incaricato di “Ermeneutica filosofica” presso la Pontificia Università Antonianum. Nel 2003 si è laureato in Filosofia sotto la guida del Prof. Armando Rigobello; nel 2008 ha conseguito il titolo di Dottore di ricerca (PhD) in “Etica e antropologia filosofica” presso l’Università degli Studi del Salento. Dal 2006 al 2008, grazie ad una borsa di studio, ha condotto le sue ricerche sul pensiero classico tedesco a Monaco di Baviera presso la Ludwig-Maximilians Universität e la Fichte-Kommission dell’Accademica Bavarese delle Scienze. Dal 2015 è membro del Consiglio nazionale dell’ADIF (Associazione Docenti Italiani di Filosofia). È co-direttore della rivista scientifica on line «Aretè. International Journal of Philosophy, Human & Social Sciences». Ha pubblicato numerosi articoli su Kant, J.G. Fichte, il personalismo e l’ermeneutica filosofica (in particolare Paul Ricoeur). Tra le sue pubblicazioni: Soggetto e persona nel pensiero francese del Novecento, Editori Riuniti university press, Roma 2011; I fondamenti della libertà in J.G. Fichte, Editori Riuniti university press, Roma 2012; Filosofia e cristianesimo nell’Italia del Novecento, Drengo Edizioni, Roma 2012; nel 2015 è stato curatore del volume Natura umana, persona, libertà. Prospettive di antropologia filosofica ed orientamenti etico-politici, LEV, Roma 2015; nel 2017 è stato curatore (con il Prof. Luca Mencacci) del volume collettaneo dal titolo “La dialettica esaurita? A 100 anni dalla Rivoluzione d’Ottobre. Interpretazioni politiche, filosofiche, estetiche”, Presentazione del Prof. Rocco Pezzimenti, Drengo Edizioni, Roma; per la rivista «Aretè» ha curato (con il Prof. Andrea Gentile) due numeri monografici: nel 2017 il volume dal titolo “A partire da Kant: interpretazioni e metamorfosi del trascendentale”, nel 2019 il volume dal titolo “Dialettica. Sui molteplici significati di un concetto teoretico e storico-politico”. (shrink)

In philosophy of language, a distinction has been proposed between two aspects of lexical competence, i.e. referential and inferential competence (Marconi 1997). The former accounts for the relationship of words to the world, the latter for the relationship of words among themselves. The distinction may simply be a classification of patterns of behaviour involved in ordinary use of the lexicon. Recent research in neuropsychology and neuroscience, however, suggests that the distinction might be neurally implemented, i.e., that different cognitive architectures (...) with partly distinct neural realizations might be responsible for cognitive performances involving inferential and referential aspects of semantics. This hypothesis is strongly consistent with patient data supporting the notion of a functional double dissociation between inferential and referential abilities, and with a set of direct cortical mapping studies and neuroimaging experiments suggesting that inferential and referential abilities are underpinned by at least partly different regions of the human brain (e.g., Marconi et al. 2013; review in Calzavarini 2017). The initial hypotheses formulated in the setting of the philosophy of language, along with the neuropsychological experimental evidence (about how referential and inferential competences may be neurally instantiated) can be the input to computational modelling activities involving the inferential and the referential aspects of lexical competence. The aim of the talk is to offer a critical discussion of the kind of formalisms that can be used to model the two aspects of lexical competence, and of the main difficulties related to the use of these computational techniques. -/- Inferential (=symbolic) vs referential (=connectionist) formalisms. (shrink)

We offer a new outlook on the vexed question of the reference of natural-kind terms. Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly and they are rigid designators: their reference is unchanged even in worlds in which the referent lacks some or all the properties associated with it in the actual world, and which are useful to us in identifying that referent. There have, however, been heated (...) debates about what should be taken as a natural-kind term. Some challenge the very existence of a separate category of natural-kind terms ; some their being directly referential ; some raise the possibility that direct reference extends to terms beyond those usually assumed to fall under the category, e.g. to ‘polemical’ terms. When these debates turn on the question of what natural kinds are, they take on a strong epistemological or metaphysical dimension. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. This we define as speakers’ being disposed to use words in line with the norms of their linguistic community and as consenting to being corrected when it is manifest that their use and understanding of a word does not match common practice. When those dispositions are present, speakers defer semantically to something beyond themselves. Here, our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined. In other words, one can say that the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, participants are confronted with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements, e.g. An emu is a bird. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension, e.g. discoveries that require excluding certain species now thought to be birds from the Aves class. The scenario is such that it is clear that the ‘discoveries’ bring us closer to the actual essence, if there is one, of birds. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms – for instance summer, contract or rape – exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for bird. If so, then there’s a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond the usual set of terms. What would be shown in this way is that speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical. We are at the pre-test stage for the survey. We cannot yet report on our results. We should, however, have initial results by March, which, we believe, will enrich the observations made by previous empirical studies. References: Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Häggqvist, S. & Wikforss, Å. 2015. Experimental semantics: the case of natural kind terms, in J. Haukioja, Experimental Philosophy of Language, London, Bloomsbury./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2009. Against arguments from reference, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, 332-356./ Marconi, D. 1997. Language, Speech, and Communication. Lexical Competence. Cambridge : MIT Press./Moravcsik, J. 2016. Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI./Schroeter, L. & Schroeter, F. 2014. Normative concepts: a connectedness model, Philosophers’ Imprint 14, 1-26./ Wikforss, Å. 2010. Are natural kind terms special?, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary, The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, New York, Routledge, 64-83. (shrink)

According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to (...) know whether or not [1] is true. This follows from ‘the silence of physics’—the fact that physics neither does nor can tell us about the intrinsic non-structural nature of the physical, and the consequences of this fact for any adequate account of the meaning of the word ‘physical’. (shrink)

This is the long-awaited publication of a set of writings by the British philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) on critical, anthropological, and cultural themes only hinted at in his previously available work. At the core are six essays on folktale and magic in which Collingwood applies the principles of his philosophy of history to problems in the long-term evolution of human society and culture. The volume opens with three substantial introductory essays by the editors, authorities in their various (...) fields, who provide their explanatory and contextual notes to guide the reader through the texts. The Philosophy of Enchantment highlights the broad range of Collingwood's intellectual engagements, their integration, and their relevance to current areas of debate in the fields of philosophy, cultural studies, social and literary history, and anthropology. (shrink)

In his target paper, John Welwood tells us that we have to beware of 'spiritual bypassing -- using spiritual ideas and practices to sidestep personal, emotional -- unfinished business--, to shore up a shaky sense of self, or to belittle basic needs, feelings, and develop-mental tasks, all in the name of enlightenment'. It's arguable that there is an equal danger of 'narrative bypassing' -- using the idea of one's life as a narrative to 'sidestep personal, emotional --unfinished business--, to shore (...) up a shaky sense of self -- all in the name of' a good life. (shrink)

Originally published in 1965. This is a textbook of modern deductive logic, designed for beginners but leading further into the heart of the subject than most other books of the kind. The fields covered are the Propositional Calculus, the more elementary parts of the Predicate Calculus, and Syllogistic Logic treated from a modern point of view. In each of the systems discussed the main emphases are on Decision Procedures and Axiomatisation, and the material is presented with as much formal rigour (...) as is compatible with clarity of exposition. The techniques used are not only described but given a theoretical justification. Proofs of Consistency, Completeness and Independence are set out in detail. The fundamental characteristics of the various systems studies, and their relations to each other are established by meta-logical proofs, which are used freely in all sections of the book. Exercises are appended to most of the chapters, and answers are provided. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction.

In classical logic, a contradiction allows one to derive every other sentence of the underlying language; paraconsistent logics came relatively recently to subvert this explosive principle, by allowing for the subsistence of contradictory yet non-trivial theories. Therefore our surprise to find Wittgenstein, already at the 1930s, in comments and lectures delivered on the foundations of mathematics, as well as in other writings, counseling a certain tolerance on what concerns the presence of contradictions in a mathematical system. ‘Contradiction. Why just this (...) spectre? This is really very suspicious.’ ( Philosophical Remarks III–56) In the last decades, several authors (e.g. Arrington, Hintikka, Van Heijenoort, Wright, Wrigley) have been digging into Wittgenstein’s rather non-standard standpoint on what concerns the interpretation and import of contradiction in logic and mathematics, and many other authors (e.g. da Costa, Goldstein, Granger, Marconi) have been investigating the possibility of taking Wittgenstein seriously as one of the early forerunners of paraconsistency. While many advances have been made on the first front, the second set of investigations has led almost exclusively to negative results: no, no operational proposal about the construction of a logic in which (some) contradictions are made inoffensive can be read from Wittgenstein’s philosophical work; in fact, it appears that the most one can find there is the exhortation for mathematicians to alter their attitude with respect to contradictions and to consistency proofs. The play is done, and one looks for a resume of the opera. This paper fills that blank, as a thorough investigation of the possible relations between Wittgenstein and paraconsistency. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p135. (shrink)

2011 Reprint of 1943 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. "St. Thomas Aquinas" is enriched by the author's unique ability to see the world through the saint's eyes, a fresh and animated view that shows us Aquinas as no other biography has. Acclaimed as the best book ever written on Aquinas by such outstanding Thomists as Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and Anton Pegis, this brilliant biography will completely capture the reader and leave him (...) desirous of reading Aquinas' own monumental work. (shrink)

An engaging argument about what experimental music can tell us about being human. -/- In Experimenting the Human, G Douglas Barrett argues that experimental music speaks to the contemporary posthuman, a condition in which science and technology decenter human agency amid the uneven temporality of postwar global capitalism. Time moves forward for some during this period, while it seems to stand still or even move backward for others. Some say we’re already posthuman, while others endure the extended consequences of never (...) having been considered fully human in the first place. Experimental music reflects on this state, Barrett contends, through its interdisciplinary involvements in postwar science, technology, and art movements. -/- Rather than pursuing the human’s beyond, experimental music addresses the social and technological conditions that support such a pursuit. Barrett locates this tendency of experimentalism throughout its historical entanglements with cybernetics, and in his intimate analysis of Alvin Lucier’s neurofeedback music, Pamela Z’s BodySynth performances, Nam June Paik’s musical robotics, Pauline Oliveros’s experiments with radio astronomy, and work by Laetitia Sonami, Yasunao Tone, and Jerry Hunt. Through a unique meeting of music studies, media theory, and art history, Experimenting the Human provides fresh insights into what it means to be human. (shrink)

The empirical investigations over the past fifteen years of evolutionary biologists and cognitive scientists have demonstrated the accessibility and power of the human brain. Whatever moral concepts used to acknowledge the normative appraisals of human conduct are now explained through neurological hardwiring. This essay outlines some of the main views of proponents, but especially Marc Hauser, and I argue that it does not render the end of morals. It does provide an opportunity to view the facts of how the brain (...) functions but this essay finds a large domain of valuing unable to be justified by these new scientific challenges. (shrink)