The automobile is a key artifact for understanding the relationship between technology and society. As it has developed into a mass-produced and mass-consumed commodity, it has played an increasing role in social life and its built environments. In its most exaggerated manifestation, in parts of the United States, the car is a singular transport mode for expansive urban regions. This social formation, often referred to as “urban sprawl,” has been cited for its environmental and energy impact. Here, the focus is (...) on its social structural impact on motorists as well as on nonmotorists. The auto is a prime example of how material technologies have dynamic and reciprocal relationships with their social contexts. These relationships raise significant ethical issues with regard to the development and application of technology. (shrink)

A workshop in Philosophy for Children was offered this summer at Viterbo College with generous support from the Wisconsin Humanities Committee. Dr. Ronald Reed and the author conducted the week long workshop. The workshop was promoted primarily by distribution of brochures to regional schools. Four questions were addressed in the brochure: What is Philosophy for Children?, How will Philosophy for Children work in your classroom?, Why teach Philosophy for Children?, and Who should attend?. This approach was taken as part of (...) an effort at making teachers, principals and parents informed about the basic nature fo a Philosophy for Children program. (shrink)

The paper aims to further concretise our previously proposed normative-functional concept of the criminal offense. It is rooted in a liberal paradigm and guides not only the criminal offense doctrine, which provides for specific criteria to warrant a legitimate verdict and the determination of legal consequences (in the sense of an adequate additional hardship imposed in the context of the sentencing itself). Furthermore, it offers a much-needed refinement in cases where the same act violates more than one criminal statute (Konkurrenzen), (...) and for the concept of the criminal offense within the criminal proceedings. Our concept characterizes the offense by a sufficiently substantial breach of a legally required conduct norm (along with specific consequences thereof, in some cases). Such a legal rule of conduct – determined for the respective individual according to the specific circumstances they find themselves in – affects at the least their personal autonomy, and thus requires legitimisation. This legitimisation must heed the constitutional standard of proportionality – the benchmark of which establishes the individual opportunity for self-expression that is compatible with the legitimate interests of others. At its core lies a broad understanding of freedom that appropriately explains the trade-off between conflicting interests necessary for the justification of legally required standards of behaviour, at the same time. This offers a solution to the issue of trying to identify the minimum level of applicable criminal sanctions. Thus, this concept is preferable to competing concepts. (shrink)

Meine erste Begegnung mit Hans Albert fand 1962/63 statt, als ich an der Kölner Universität seine Vorlesung zur Wissenschaftslehre hörte, was mich verständlicherweise ein wenig in Verwirrung brachte, weil ich gleichzeitig an einem Seminar über Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre teilnahm und rein gar keine Gemeinsamkeit feststellen konnte. Dass ich mich Jahre später viel mit jener und fast gar nicht mehr mit dieser beschäftigen würde, hätte ich damals nicht vermutet.

Leitfaden zu einer künftigen Geschichte der Menschheit.--Über die Humanität des Künstlers.--Über historische Glaubwürdigkeit.--Über den gelehrten Zunftzwang.--Fragment einer Rede, gehalten in Mainzer Jakobiner klub.--Anrede an die Gesellschaft der Freunde der Freiheit und Gleichheit am Neujahrstage 1793.--Parisische Umrísse.

This article explores the influence of Simmel and Pareto on the social theory of J. Freund (1921-1993). Recognized as an interpreter and promoter of the sociology of both authors in the French academic context of the last third of the past century, both play a fundamental role in the construction of his social philosophy, a central part of which is his theory of essences, developed especially in L’essence du politique (1965). However, this influence has not been yet sufficiently studied. (...) This article proposes a preliminary approach, highlighting the presence of both authors in the definition of what I will be described here as Freundian “dialectical interactionism”, his methodological perspective for the study of dynamics and social equilibrium. (shrink)

Mit Georg Lukacs war Harich eng befreundet. In den funfziger Jahren arbeiteten die beiden zusammen, Harich war im Aufbau-Verlag fur die Bucher von Lukacs verantwortlich und als Chefredakteur der "Deutschen Zeitschrift fur Philosophie" fur dessen Aufsatze. Die Wirkung des ungarischen Philosophen in der DDR wurde massgeblich durch Harich gestaltet. Dabei vertraten beide ahnliche Ansatze in der Philosophiegeschichte und auch bei der Entwicklung eigenstandiger marxistischer Theorien. Der vorliegende Band druckt eine Vielzahl von Dokumenten, Manuskripten und Gutachten ab, die Harich bis (...) zu den Umbruchen von 1956 uber Lukacs verfasste. Prasentiert werden zudem die meisten Briefe von Harich an seinen Freund und Mitstreiter. Nach 1956 besuchte Lukacs die DDR nie wieder. Der Kontakt zu Harich brach vollig ab. Dieser wirkte ab 1970 aber in der DDR weiter fur seinen fruheren Weggefahrten. In mehreren Eingaben, Briefen usw. mahnte er gegenuber den offiziellen Stellen der DDR "Mehr Respekt vor Lukacs!" an, dies ist ja der Titel seines bedeutenden Aufsatzes. Eine marxistische Philosophie ohne Lukacs, so das Credo von Harich Zeit seines Lebens, sei zum Scheitern verurteilt. (shrink)

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem-solving and group (...) memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group's ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008). (shrink)

What drives much of the current philosophical interest in the idea of group cognition is its appeal to the manifestation of psychological properties—understood broadly to include states, processes, and dispositions—that are in some important yet elusive sense emergent with respect to the minds of individual group members. Our goal in this paper is to address a set of related, conditional questions: If human mentality is real yet emergent in a modest metaphysical sense only, then: (i) What would it mean for (...) a group to have emergent cognitive states? (ii) Is this even a metaphysically coherent view? (iii) Relative to which notion of emergence do we have reason to believe that certain groups in fact have emergent cognitive states? We shall argue that evidence from a wide variety of social science domains makes it plausible that there are group cognitive states and processes no less metaphysically emergent than human cognitive (and other special science) states and processes. (shrink)

Review of Paul Pietroski, Causing Actions.

In Germany the question whether to uphold or repeal the judicial prohibition on Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis is being debated from quite different standpoints. This paper differentiates the major arguments according to their reasons as a) moral, b) evaluative , and c) legal. The arguments for and against PGD can be divided by content into three groups: arguments relating to the status of the embryo, focusing on individual actions in the implementation of PGD, and relating to the foreseeable or probable consequences (...) of PGD.In Germany, from a legal perspective, the status of the embryo does not permit the intervention of PGD; from a purely moral perspective, a prohibition on PGD does not appear defensible. It remains an open question, however, whether the moral argument permitting PGD should be restricted for evaluative reasons. The paper discusses the species-ethical reasons, for which Jürgen Habermas sees worrisome consequences in the wake of PGD to the extent that we comprehend it as the forerunner of a ‘positive eugenics’. It would so disrupt the natural preconditions of our universal morality. The question of whether to prohibit or allow PGD is not merely a question of simple moral and/or legal arguments, but demands a choice between evaluative, moral and species-ethical arguments, and the question remains open. (shrink)

Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “the good [that] men do separately is small compared with what they may do collectively” (Isaacson 2004). The ability to join with others in groups to accomplish goals collectively that would hopelessly overwhelm the time, energy, and resources of individuals is indeed one of the greatest assets of our species. In the history of humankind, groups have been among the greatest workers, builders, producers, protectors, entertainers, explorers, discoverers, planners, problem-solvers, and decision-makers. During the late 19th (...) and early 20th century, many social scientists employed the notorious “group mind” idiom to express the sensible idea that groups can function as the seats of cognition, intelligence, and agency in their own right (Allport 1968; Wilson 2004). In their quest to stress (rightly) that group phenomena are something “over and above” the sum of individual contributions, a fondness for vitalist metaphors led them to believe (wrongly) that genuine group cognition must be the result of tapping into individualistically inaccessible, “holistic” forces. Today, inspired in part by historically unparalleled forms of mass collaboration enabled by the internet, it has once again become popular to speak of collective intelligence, group agency, or even the emergence of a “global brain” (cf. the wiki-edited MIT Handbook of Collective Intelligence). -/- In this chapter, I review some contemporary developments of the idea of group cognition, defined broadly as the collaborative performance of cognitive tasks such as remembering, problem-solving, decision-making, or verbal creativity for the purpose of producing a group-level outcome. My discussion serves a two-fold purpose. First, by discussing how the idea of group cognition can be operationalized, I seek to show that we can retain some central theoretical insights of the “group mind” thesis without succumbing to its eccentric metaphysical overtones. Second, by providing a useful array of generalizable taxonomic resources, I hope to foster greater degrees of mutual awareness among insufficiently integrated areas of research on group performance. (shrink)

Humans have developed various practices to confront the indeterminacy of their existence. Roughly speaking, there are two types of such practices. On the one hand are those through which humans control the uncertainty that permeates their actions and choices. These are practices of self-reassurance and risk reduc- tion. On the other hand are practices in which humans welcome or search out uncertainty, practices that are explicitly open to the risk of failure. One particu- larly remarkable example of the latter set (...) is art. Art is a practice that embraces the uncertainty of human existence in a special way. Generally speaking, art- works do not aim to reassure. Rather, they are open to uncertainty. Thus, art represents a special mode of reflecting on a constitutive feature of human exis- tence, namely, the possibility of failure. What does it mean that art is, in princi- ple, always susceptible to failure? The present article explores this question. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 50 Heft: 1 Seiten: 315-328.

In the present paper we empirically investigate the psychometric properties of some of the most famous statistical and logical cognitive illusions from the “heuristics and biases” research program by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who nearly 50 years ago introduced fascinating brain teasers such as the famous Linda problem, the Wason card selection task, and so-called Bayesian reasoning problems (e.g., the mammography task). In the meantime, a great number of articles has been published that empirically examine single cognitive illusions, theoretically (...) explaining people’s faulty thinking, or proposing and experimentally implementing measures to foster insight and to make these problems accessible to the human mind. Yet these problems have thus far usually been empirically analyzed on an individual-item level only (e.g., by experimentally comparing participants’ performance on various versions of one of these problems). In this paper, by contrast, we examine these illusions as a group and look at the ability to solve them as a psychological construct. Based on an sample ofN= 2,643 Luxembourgian school students of age 16–18 we investigate the internal psychometric structure of these illusions (i.e., Are they substantially correlated? Do they form a reflexive or a formative construct?), their connection to related constructs (e.g., Are they distinguishable from intelligence or mathematical competence in a confirmatory factor analysis?), and the question of which of a person’s abilities can predict the correct solution of these brain teasers (by means of a regression analysis). (shrink)

An important short study of Nietzsche by the famed European critic. Included are selections from the Brandes-Nietzsche correspondence.

Le présent livre a pour objet la "renaissance du pragmatisme" dans la philosophie contemporaine, qu'il tente d'éclairer en analysant les relations systématiques entre le concept de pratique et celui d'intersubjectivité. Il est le résultat de l'effort collectif de chercheurs issus de plusieurs pays, formés dans des traditions philosophiques différentes, et désireux de surmonter par le dialogue l'opposition entre philosophie anglo-américaine et philosophie continentale..

Computer-based information and communication technologies continue to transform the delivery of health care and the conception and scientific understanding of the human body and the diseases that afflict it. While information technology has the potential to improve the quality and efficiency of patient care, it also raises important ethical and social issues. This IRIE theme issue seeks to provide a forum to identify, analyse and discuss the ethical and social issues raised by various applications of information and communication technology in (...) medicine and health care. The contributions give a flavour of the extraordinarily broad landscape shaped by the intersection of medicine, computing and ethics. In fact, their diversity suggests that much more work is needed to clarify issues and approaches, and to provide practical tools for clinicians. (shrink)

Classificatory realism is the view that nature divides herself up into classes, or “natural kinds”, and claims that it is the goal of scientific classification systems to correctly identify, name, and describe these classes. On this view, the legitimacy of a classification is independent of us and our needs, and instead depends entirely on how well the structure of the classification “matches” the natural kind structure of reality. Progress with respect to classification consists in finding classifications that better match reality. (...) Ultimately, classifications are seen as representations of reality, and it is the world itself that dictates what is to count as a good or correct classification of a given domain. In this thesis I argue against classificatory realism. In the course of this argument, I develop and defend an alternative view of our diagnostic and classificatory practices in psychiatry. This alternative view takes seriously the fact that psychiatric classifications and diagnostic concepts are technical extensions of natural language — tools that are introduced by particular humans, at a particular point in time, for particular human purposes. Viewed from this alternative perspective, some of the most vexing problems in the philosophy of psychopathology suddenly become tractable. (shrink)

Based on Fichte's conception of international law from the Grundlage des Naturrechts the article examines to what extent a League of nations is compatible with the sovereignty of a nation state. Fichte's concept of sovereignty refers to a republican notion of a state which guaranties the congruence of power and right. This principle leads to an internal tension, for the League presupposes the existence of sovereign states and in the same time curtails their competences. It manifests an instance of power (...) without the legitimation of the singular nations. Fichte avoids the paradoxes of the Kantian vision of a perpetual peace, because he develops a more complex concept of political power, but it remains to be a contradictory construction. In the Rechtslehre of 1812 however, Fichte follows consistently the principle of popular sovereignty and therefore waives an explicit contract among states. He thus meets the ideal of congruence of power and right and also outlines the requirements for a realistic conception of the legalization of relations between states.Ausgehend von Fichtes Grundriss des Völkerrechts, dem Abschluss der Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre wird untersucht, inwiefern ein Völkerbund mit der Idee staatlicher Souveränität vereinbar ist. Fichtes Konzeption der Souveränität basiert auf einem republikanischen Staatsverständnis, das im Idealfall die Koinzidenz von Macht und Recht garantiert. Dieses Prinzip führt zu internen Spannungen, denn ein Bund setzt einerseits die Existenz souveräner Staaten voraus, greift aber andererseits in die Kompetenzen der Einzelstaaten ein, bildet also selbst eine Machtinstanz, ohne wie die Einzelstaaten über eine entsprechende Legitimation zu verfügen. Zwar vermeidet Fichte die Aporien der Kantischen Vision eines ewigen Friedens, weil er über einen komplexeren Machtbegriff verfügt, doch bleibt seine Konstruktion widersprüchlich. In der Rechtslehre von 1812 hält Fichte dann jedoch konsequent am Prinzip der Volkssouveränität fest und verzichtet deshalb auf einen expliziten Vertrag der Staaten untereinander. Damit trägt er dem Ideal der Kongruenz von Macht und Recht Rechnung und skizziert zugleich die Voraussetzungen für eine realistische Konzeption der Verrechtlichung der Verhältnisse zwischen den Staaten. (shrink)