Jacob Leigh _The Cinema of Ken Loach: Art in the Service of the People_ London and New York: Wallflower Press, 2002 ISBN 1-903364-31-0 211 pp.

Quantum Mechanics notoriously faces a measurement problem, the problem that the unitary time evolution, encoded in its dynamical equations, together with the kinematical structure of the theory generally implies the non-existence of definite measurement outcomes. There have been multiple suggestions to solve this problem, among them the so called many worlds interpretation that originated with the work of Hugh Everett III. According to it, the quantum state and time evolution fully and accurately describe nature as it is, implying that under (...) certain conditions multiple measurement outcomes that are seemingly mutually exclusive can be realized at the same time – but as different 'worlds' contained in a global, quantum mechanical structure, sometimes referred to as 'the multiverse'. The many worlds interpretation has, however, been confronted with serious difficulties over the course of its development, some of which were solved by the advent of decoherence theory. The present thesis critically investi- gates the state of play on a key remaining problem of the many worlds interpretation, the problem of the meaning and quantification of probabilities in a quantum multiverse. Recent attempts of deriving the pivotal statistical ingredient of quantum mechanics, Born’s rule, from either principles of decision theory or from quantum mechanics alone, supplemented with a few general premises about probability are analyzed and their premises are scrutinized. It will be argued that, though both approaches yield promising results, they both ultimately fail to clearly establish the validity of Born’s rule in the context of the many worlds interpretation. It is hence suggested that further research on this problem is indicated. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Identification of propositions as the core of attitudes and beliefs (De Houwer, 2014) has resulted in the development of implicit measures targeting personal evaluations of complex sentences (e.g., the IRAP or the RRT). Whereas their utility is uncontested, these paradigms are subject to limitations inherent in their block based design, such as allowing assessment of only a single belief at a time. We introduce the Propositional Evaluation Paradigm (PEP) for assessment of multiple propositional beliefs within a single experimental block. Two (...) experiments provide first evidence for the PEP’s validity. In Experiment 1 endorsement of racist beliefs measured with the PEP was related to criterion variables such as explicit racism assessed via questionnaire and indicators of behavioral tendencies. Experiment 2 indicates that the PEP’s implicit racism scores may predict actual behavior over and above explicit, self-report measures. Finally, Experiment 3 tested the PEP's applicability in the domain of hiring discrimination. Whereas general PEP based gender stereotypes were not related to hiring bias, results suggest a possible role of female stereotypes in hiring discrimination. In the context of these findings, we discuss both the potential and possible challenges in adopting the PEP to different beliefs. In sum, these initial findings suggest that the PEP may offer researchers a reliable and easily administrable option for the indirect assessment of propositional evaluations. (shrink)

Until quite recently, the epistemology of logical laws has not been much discussed and neither has how one can be justified in claiming that a particular inference is valid. The transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion in modus ponens will be examined in the paper through assessing Paul Boghossian's inferentialist proposal of assuming 'blind reasoning'. It will be argued that merely being justified in inferring according to a logical law a priori is worthless unless one can also be justified (...) in claiming that the inference is valid. An alternative to Boghossian's solution will be presented which addresses this need as well as the needs Boghossian had identified previously. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to regard a system's quantum state |ψ> merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We here investigate recent developments in the (...) branch that introduces hidden variables λ in addition to the quantum state |ψ> and has its roots in Einstein's views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of a concrete model that has been considered to serve as evidence for an epistemic view of the envisioned kind, as well as specific no-go results and their import. It will be argued that while an epistemic account of the particular kind is not straightforwardly ruled out by the no-go results, they demonstrate that the evidential character of the model(s) discussed rests on a rather shaky foundation, and that they make some achievements widely recognized in the literature appear worthy of doubt. (shrink)

Recently, Fahrbach and Park have argued that the pessimistic meta-induction about scientific theories is unsound. They claim that this very argument does not properly take into account scientific progress, particularly during the twentieth century. They also propose amended arguments in favour of scientific realism, which are supposed to properly reflect the history of science. I try to show that what I call the argument from scientific progress cannot explain satisfactorily why the current theories should have reached a degree of success (...) that excludes their future refutations and allows the inference to their truth. I further argue that this line of argumentation dismisses the burden of proof in a rather unfair manner by using a delaying tactic to postpone the question about the validity of the PMI in the future. (shrink)

In Theologie und Wissenschaft bei Petrus Aureoli, Florian Wöller offers an account of the theories of science and of theology as they emerge from Peter Auriol's (c. 1280-1322) commentaries on the Sentences.

t. 1. "Myśl i rzeczywistość" i inne pisma filozofizne.

À quoi les philosophes sont-ils bons ? Faire de la philosophie rend-il meilleur ? Les jugements esthétiques gardent-ils encore quelque secret, ou bien Kant a-t-il tout dit sur la question ? La culture et le statut socio-économique de votre professeur de philosophie a-t-il une influence sur ses options philosophiques ? Pourquoi avons-nous l'impression que la pensée ne saurait être un état de notre cerveau ? Que nous ne serions pas libres si nous n'étions qu'un tas de neurone ? C'est pour (...) répondre à ces questions (et à beaucoup d'autres) que philosophes et psychologues se sont alliés sous la bannière de la toute nouvelle « philosophie expérimentale ». Il s'agit de faire un peu de lumière sur ce qui se passe vraiment dans notre tête lorsque nous faisons de la philosophie et d'interroger l'origine de nos certitudes philosophiques. (shrink)

La philosophie expérimentale est un mouvement récent qui tente de faire progresser certains débats philosophiques grâce à l'utilisation de méthodes expérimentales. À la différence de la philosophie conventionnelle qui privilégie l'analyse conceptuelle ou la spéculation, la philosophie expérimentale préconise le recours aux études empiriques pour mieux comprendre les concepts philosophiques. Apparue il y a une dizaine d'années dans les pays anglo-saxons, cette approche constitue actuellement l'une des branches les plus dynamiques de la philosophie contemporaine. -/- L'objectif de cet ouvrage est (...) d'offrir un contact direct avec les travaux les plus connus et les plus discutés des philosophes expérimentaux. Il regroupe ainsi dix textes représentatifs de ce domaine jeune, mais déjà florissant, et couvre une large partie du champ philosophique contemporain (philosophie du langage, théorie de la connaissance, conscience, théorie de l'action, éthique et philosophie des sciences). (shrink)

Education and Social Change sheds a new light on Florian Znaniecki's most original program of the sociology of education. The volume contains newly discovered reports from the research under the auspices of the Columbia University in the thirties, focused on educating to participate in democratic social order and cultural innovation. Preparation for cooperative interactions with leaders lies at the core of the analysis. Included are several texts published in English which clearly expound Znaniecki's analysis of social processes in education. (...) The key idea of transforming educational systems in the direction of self-education still proves relevant. (shrink)

Deep neural networks have become increasingly successful in applications from biology to cosmology to social science. Trained DNNs, moreover, correspond to models that ideally allow the prediction of new phenomena. Building in part on the literature on ‘eXplainable AI’, I here argue that these models are instrumental in a sense that makes them non-explanatory, and that their automated generation is opaque in a unique way. This combination implies the possibility of an unprecedented gap between discovery and explanation: When unsupervised models (...) are successfully used in exploratory contexts, scientists face a whole new challenge in forming the concepts required for understanding underlying mechanisms. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

'Identity' as a concept has many faces, and its very versatility in different contexts can make it hard to define. Florian Coulmas discusses the many meanings of this slippery concept, considering why individual and collective identities are important to us, and discussing the problems asserting individual identities can create.

In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...) been proposed. This thesis is about one family of solutions, according to which facts about meaning are sui generis and can neither be reduced to other facts about the world nor to non-semantic facts about the human mind. The non-reductionist proposals by Colin McGinn and Crispin Wright will be assessed in detail and arguments against both will be introduced. The arguments stem only partially from Kripke himself, some are based on recent literature, others are completely new. The emerging situation will be used as a basis to propose an alternative non-reductionism about meaning-facts. (shrink)

In this paper, I question the dichotomy between fundamental moral disagreements, arising from divergences on moral principles, and superficial moral disagreements, that are expected to disappear under ideal epistemic circumstances. I claim that there are many other possibilities for moral disagreements, including moral disagreements that do not arise from different moral principles but would not disappear under ideal epistemic conditions. I describe two major kinds of such disagreements: semi-fundamental disagreements, which are made possible by the fact that the same moral (...) rules can be applied in different ways to the same situations, and non-morally fundamental moral disagreements, which arise by the fact that moral truths are not the only potentially non-factual truths. (shrink)

There are basically four options to which state the limiting instant in a change from one state to its opposite belongs – only the first, only the second, both or none. This situation is usually referred to as the limit decision problem since all of these options seem troublesome: The first two alleged solutions are asymmetric and thus need something to ground this asymmetry in ; while the last two options leave the realm of classical logic. I argue that including (...) the debate about dispositions enables new options for solutions to the temporal limit decision problem. Metaphysical considerations function as a symmetry-breaker and thus remove the need for a non-classical solution. Dispositions bring about the changes in the world, so they constitute the metaphysical background for the instant of change. In particular, I argue that according to the triadic process account of dispositions, the limiting instant belongs to the second interval and only the second interval. (shrink)

Schon 1926 prägte der protestantische Theologe Fritz Jahr (1895-1953) aus Halle (Saale) den Begriff Bioethik. Der von Jahr vorgeschlagene bioethische Imperativ lautet dabei: «Achte jedes Lebewesen grundsätzlich als einen Selbstzweck und behandle es nach Möglichkeit als solchen!» Dieser Band untersucht die Perspektiven von Jahrs Thesen.

This paper aims to show that Deleuze’s ideas on space and extension are heavily in debt to Leibniz. The focus is on chapter five, ‘the Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’, of Difference and Repetition. Concepts such as ‘intensive magnitude’, ‘distance’, ‘order’ and most importantly ‘spatium’ are shown to have their origin in Leibniz’s philosophy. In order to do so, the article starts with Leibniz’s critique on Cartesian mechanics and how this leads Leibniz to a conception of space that goes beyond (...) the Cartesian concept of extension. The latter lacks difference, potentiality and individuality. Leibniz argues that the Cartesian homogeneous plenum should therefore be grounded in a deeper more substantial space: the spatium. Understood as such, space is not an absolute substance but a structure of relations between substances. Although Leibniz’s texts offer enough to understand this spatium, they do not explain how the genesis of extension out of space should be understood. It is on this point that Deleuze offers a fruitful interpretation of Leibniz by conceptualizing such a genesis in terms of difference. Extension is understood as a homogenization and externalization of the internal and pure differences in space. In the end, Leibniz helps us to understand Deleuze’s theory, while Deleuze offers us an enriching interpretation of Leibniz that succeeds where authors such as Yvon Belaval and Martial Gueroult have failed. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: Einleitung: Thema, Methode und Prozedere: Thema: Demokratisches Recht - Methode: Ethisch-juristische Legitimation - Prozedere: Interdisziplinare Feldarbeit - I. JUristische Methodik: Strukturierende Rechtslehre: Lassen sich Gesetze applizieren? - Lasst sich Recht juristisch legitimieren? - Ist Ethik ausgeschlossen? - Zusammenfassung - II. MOralphilosophie: Diskursethik: Was heiSSt Moral? - Wie lasst sich Moral begrunden? - Lasst sich Moral applizieren? - Zusammenfassung - III. JUrisprudenz und Ethik: Zwischenuberlegungen zu einer interdisziplinaren Theorie demokratischen Rechts: Wie konnte eine ethisch-juristische Theorie aussehen? - Wie (...) sollte Interdisziplinaritat praktiziert werden? - Programm einer ethisch-juristischen Legitimationstheorie - IV. POlitische Philosophie: Deliberative Demokratie: Demokratie-Konzepte - Kleine Soziologie moderner Demokratien - Deliberative Demokratie - Moralischer Diskurs im Kontext - Zusammenfassung - V. VErfassungstheorie: Demokratischer Rechtsstaat: Verfassungstheoretische Grundlagen - Kleine Soziologie der Public Governance - Demokratischer Rechtsstaat - Demokratischer Rechtsstaat im Kontext - Zusammenfassung - VI. URteilstheorie: Demokratische Judikation: Urteilstheoretische Grundlagen - Kleine Soziologie der Public Judication - Demokratische Judikation - Juristische Methodik im Kontext - Zusammenfassung - VII. URteilsphilosophie: Deliberative Judikation: Judikationskonzepte - Kleine Soziologie der Judikation - Deliberative Judikation - Demokratisches Recht im Kontext - Zusammenfassung - Exkurs: Interdisziplinare Rechtslegitimation und integrative Wirtschaftsethik - Schluss: Resumee und Ausblick - Literatur- und Sachverzeichnis. (shrink)

According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with (...) first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question. (shrink)

To operate in an unpredictable environment, a vehicle with advanced driving assistance systems, such as a robot or a drone, not only needs to register its surroundings but also to combine data from different sensors into a world model, for which it employs filter algorithms. Such world models, as this article argues with reference to the SLAM problem in robotics, consist of nothing other than probabilities about states and events arising in the environment. The model, thus, contains a virtuality of (...) possible worlds that are the basis for adaptive behavior. The article shows that the current development of these technologies requires new concepts because their complex adaptive behaviors cannot be explained by referring them to mere algorithmic processes. Instead, it proposes the heuristic instrument of microdecisions to designate the temporality of decisions between alternatives that are created by probabilistic procedures of world modeling. Microdecisions are more than the implementation of deterministic processes—they decide between possibilities and, thus, always open up the potential of their otherness. By describing autonomous adaptive technologies with this heuristic, the question of sovereignty inevitably arises. It forces us to re-think what autonomy means when decisions can be automated. (shrink)

Ethnographic study of the constitution of algorithms.

Dass der Begriff 'Kreativität' mit dem künstlerischen Gestaltungsprozess verknüpft ist, scheint eine kaum hinterfragte Selbstverständlichkeit. Da durch die gestiegene Relevanz und die veränderte Funktion der Kreativität in Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft ihre Bedeutung jedoch immer wieder neu verhandelt wird, muss auch die Verbindung zwischen Kreativität und Kunst mit ihren Bedingungen und Funktionen neu gedacht werden. Florian Pfab nähert sich der 'Kreativität' aus einer begriffsanalytischen Perspektive. Mit den Mitteln der Systemtheorie entwirft er eine Definition, die den Forderungen an den Begriff zwischen (...) Schöpfermythos und evolutionärem Prinzip mit Blick auf den künstlerischen Gestaltungsprozess gerecht wird"--Back cover. (shrink)

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

Computer simulations are nowadays often directly involved in the generation of experimental results. Given this dependency of experiments on computer simulations, that of simulations on models, and that of the models on free parameters, how do researchers establish trust in their experimental results? Using high-energy physics (HEP) as a case study, I will identify three different types of robustness that I call conceptual, methodological, and parametric robustness, and show how they can sanction this trust. However, as I will also show, (...) simulation models in HEP themselves fail to exhibit a type of robustness I call inverse parametric robustness. This combination of robustness and failures thereof is best understood by distinguishing different epistemic capacities of simulations and different senses of trust: Trusting simulations in their capacity to facilitate credible experimental results can mean accepting them as means for generating belief in these results, while this need not imply believing the models themselves in their capacity to represent an underlying reality. (shrink)

This book explores the prospects of rivaling ontological and epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM). It concludes with a suggestion for how to interpret QM from an epistemological point of view and with a Kantian touch. It thus refines, extends, and combines existing approaches in a similar direction. -/- The author first looks at current, hotly debated ontological interpretations. These include hidden variables-approaches, Bohmian mechanics, collapse interpretations, and the many worlds interpretation. He demonstrates why none of these ontological interpretations can (...) claim to be the clear winner amongst its rivals. Next, coverage explores the possibility of interpreting QM in terms of knowledge but without the assumption of hidden variables. It examines QBism as well as Healey’s pragmatist view. The author finds both interpretations or programs wanting in certain respects. As a result, he then goes on to advance a genuine proposal as to how to interpret QM from the perspective of an internal realism in the sense of Putnam and Kant. -/- The book also includes two philosophical interludes. One details the notions of probability and realism. The other highlights the connections between the notions of locality, causality, and reality in the context of violations of Bell-type inequalities. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...) notion that any system of logic should have a privileged claim to correctness, I argue that there is a sense in which Carnap’s framework-relative conception of logical norms has a constitutive role to play: though they are not constitutive for the conceptual activity for thinking, they do nevertheless set the ground rules that make certain forms of scientific inquiry possible in the first place. I conclude that Carnap’s principle of tolerance is tamer than one might have thought and that, despite remaining differences, Frege’s and Carnap’s conceptions of logic have more in common than one might have thought. (shrink)