Článek si klade za cíl objasnit a obohatit Merleau-Pontyho pojetí promlouvající mluvy v kontrastu k mluvě, jíž se mluví. V kontextu tvůrčích vyjadřovacích výkonů, zejm. umění, píše Merleau-Ponty o promlouvající mluvě především jako o mluvě, jež otevírá nové horizonty zkušenosti a vede ke kognitivnímu obohacení recipienta. Mluva, jíž se mluví, je naproti tomu řečovou sedimentací kulturního významu, jejímž prostřednictvím jsou ustavené poznávací vzorce tradovány. Ve studii nejprve vysvětlujeme, jak se promlouvající mluva tvoří na pozadí běžné mluvy, jíž se mluví, a (...) jak souvisí s vnímaným světem. Poté se soustředíme na dva specifické případy promluv, jimiž se sám Merleau-Ponty explicitně nezabývá. Zaprvé jde o sekundární literaturu, jejímž posláním je sloužit nějakému původnímu autorskému dílu. Sekundární literatura sama o sobě nepřichází s původní stylotvornou vizí světa, a přesto tvoří mluvu, jež moderuje a mnohdy vůbec umožňuje porozumět původnosti myšlenek autorů v silném slova smyslu. Zadruhé se zaměřujeme na případy promlouvajících mluv, jež nás manipulují, nevedou k bohatšímu poznání světa, a přitom jsou schopny zakládat nově sdílený vzor. (shrink)

Magie a estetika odkouzlení u Collingwooda = Magic and the aesthetics of disenchantment in Collingwood / Jakub Stejskal -- Americký trávník jako cvičiště občanské ctnosti = American lawn as a training ground for civic virtue / Jan Hlávka -- Patočkova raná filosofie umění = Patočka's early philosophy of art / Jan Josl -- Koncepce a priori Mikela Dufrenna = Mikel Dufrenne's concept of the a priori / Felix Borecký -- A priori imaginace = The a priori of imagination / (...) Mikel Dufrenne. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that lying differs from mere misleading in a way that can be morally relevant: liars commit themselves to something they believe to be false, while misleaders avoid such commitment, and this difference can make a moral difference. Even holding all else fixed, a lie can therefore be morally worse than a corresponding misleading utterance. But, we argue, there are also cases in which the difference in commitment makes lying morally better than misleading, (...) as well as cases in which the difference is not morally relevant. This view conflicts with the two main positions philosophers have defended in the ethics of lying and misleading, which entail either that lying is in virtue of its nature worse than misleading or that there is no morally relevant difference between lying and misleading. (shrink)

We present a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the ACT‐R–based model of sentence processing developed by Lewis and Vasishth (2005) (LV05). The predictions of the model are compared with the results of a recent meta‐analysis of published reading studies on retrieval interference in reflexive‐/reciprocal‐antecedent and subject–verb dependencies (Jäger, Engelmann, & Vasishth, 2017). The comparison shows that the model has only partial success in explaining the data; and we propose that its prediction space is restricted by oversimplifying assumptions. We then implement a (...) revised model that takes into account differences between individual experimental designs in terms of the prominence of the target and the distractor in memory‐ and context‐dependent cue‐feature associations. The predictions of the original and the revised model are quantitatively compared with the results of the meta‐analysis. Our simulations show that, compared to the original LV05 model, the revised model accounts for the data better. The results suggest that effects of prominence and variable cue‐feature associations need to be considered in the interpretation of existing empirical results and in the design and planning of future experiments. With regard to retrieval interference in sentence processing and to the broader field of psycholinguistic studies, we conclude that well‐specified models in tandem with high‐powered experiments are needed in order to uncover the underlying cognitive processes. (shrink)

Who should be recognized as a refugee? This article seeks to uncover the normative arguments at the core of legal and philosophical conceptions of refugeehood. It identifies three analytically dist...

Inductive characterizations of the sets of terms, the subset of strongly normalizing terms and normal forms are studied in order to reprove weak and strong normalization for the simply-typed λ-calculus and for an extension by sum types with permutative conversions. The analogous treatment of a new system with generalized applications inspired by generalized elimination rules in natural deduction, advocated by von Plato, shows the flexibility of the approach which does not use the strong computability/candidate style à la Tait and Girard. (...) It is also shown that the extension of the system with permutative conversions by η-rules is still strongly normalizing, and likewise for an extension of the system of generalized applications by a rule of ``immediate simplification''. By introducing an infinitely branching inductive rule the method even extends to Gödel's T. (shrink)

As donor trust legitimises research, trust is vital for research in the fields of biomedicine, genetics, translational medicine and personalised medicine. For parts of the donor community, the consent signature is a sign of trust in research. Many consent processes in biomedical research ask donors to provide their data for an unspecified future use, which introduces uncertainty of the unknown. This uncertainty can jeopardise donor trust or demand blind trust. But which donor wants to trust blindly? To reduce this uncertainty, (...) we explore first, which future-proof actors donors could trust when signing a consent form. Second, we discuss the question Can we know if donor trust expires? and what prevents donor trust from expiring. Finally, we present possible measures that can help to nurture trust in the far future. In this article, we draw on our previous research on trust in biomedical research, on trust in the broader healthcare system and Niklas Luhmann’s and Anthony Giddens’ trust theories. Our findings suggest that, in the far future, researchers will need to consider donor autonomy, as well as societal norms and values of the time period in which the data were donated. They will need to find mechanisms where possible to publicly announce the use of old data sets. However, foremost researchers will need to treat the data respectfully. It remains vital that professionals and the society continue to elaborate on the norms and values that shape the common understanding of what is morally right and wrong when researching data. (shrink)

In typical statistical learning studies, researchers define sequences in terms of the probability of the next item in the sequence given the current item (or items), and they show that high probability sequences are treated as more familiar than low probability sequences. Existing accounts of these phenomena all assume that participants represent statistical regularities more or less as they are defined by the experimenters—as sequential probabilities of symbols in a string. Here we offer an alternative, or possibly supplementary, hypothesis. Specifically, (...) rather than identifying or labeling individual stimuli discretely in order to predict the next item in a sequence, we need only assume that the participant is able to represent the stimuli as evincing particular similarity relations to one another, with sequences represented as trajectories through this similarity space. We present experiments in which this hypothesis makes sharply different predictions from hypotheses based on the assumption that sequences are learned over discrete, labeled stimuli. We also present a series of simulation models that encode stimuli as positions in a continuous two‐dimensional space, and predict the next location from the current location. Although no model captures all of the data presented here, the results of three critical experiments are more consistent with the view that participants represent trajectories through similarity space rather than sequences of discrete labels under particular conditions. (shrink)

In a previous work we studied, from the perspective ofAlgebraic Logic, the implicationless fragment of a logic introduced by O. Arieli and A. Avron using a class of bilattice-based logical matrices called logical bilattices. Here we complete this study by considering the Arieli-Avron logic in the full language, obtained by adding two implication connectives to the standard bilattice language. We prove that this logic is algebraizable and investigate its algebraic models, which turn out to be distributive bilattices with additional implication (...) operations. We axiomatize and state several results on these new classes of algebras, in particular representation theorems analogue to the well-known one for interlaced bilattices. (shrink)

What are the characteristics to be included in a fruitful definition of democracy? More important still, which of the features commonly considered democratic had better be excluded from the dinning characteristics?

Formulating a metaphysical definition of human play faces three main difficulties. First, for many years the very possibility, or need, for such a definition has been questioned. Second, very often...

People partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In doing so, I am going to focus on two kindsof speech acts: making assertions and asking certain kinds of questions. And I am going to look at three varieties (...) of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, inquiring injus-tice and interpretative injustice.I am going to argue that what all these varieties of epistemic injustice have in common is that they unfairly inhibit the speaker’s ability to add to the common ground in the way intended by her. This in turn negatively affects which con-versational roles a speaker can play in a given conversation. Based on these results, I am going to end by looking at some of the harms that epistemic injustice inflicts upon its victims. (shrink)

This article revisits the question of how elegy was performed at the symposion, and argues that, rather thanbeing either musical or non-musical, elegy situates itself between speech and song. None of the passages in whichelegy mentions song are clearly self-referential: they tend to be generic, set in the future, concerned with otherperformers and other compositions or altogether too slippery in their language to pin them down. Moreover, there area number of elegiac pieces that appear designed to allow symposiasts to shift (...) from song to speech or speech to song,thereby introducing a new mode of performance, and so are themselves transitional. These observations about the wayelegiac texts position their own performance are complemented by considerations about their actual performance.Evidence both from ancient musicologists and from other tonal languages suggests that inbetween modes of deliverywere common in Greek poetry and the metrical shape makes elegy a prime candidate. The final section of the articleturns to the difficult term elegos in fifth-century drama. It argues that several of these passages draw on inbetweennessas one association of elegos and thus decreases the gap between elegos and surviving elegy. A coda points out that theelegiacs in Euripides' Andromache are a further example of elegy transitioning between two modes of performance. (shrink)

Under which conditions are we epistemically justied to believe that what other people tell us is true? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist: Either our justication reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told. However, different cases pull in different directions. Intuitively, someone asking for the time is subject to different epistemic standards than a surgeon consulting a colleague before a dangerous operation. Following this line of thought, (...) this paper develops an account of testimonial justication that captures our reductionist as well as our anti-reductionist intuitions. It is argued that the speaker’s commitment to an epistemic norm, as well as the hearer’s understanding of that norm, gives the hearer a presumptive right to believe what she is told. However, this justication doesn’t apply to situations with high practical risks. Here, the hearer needs reductive reasons to believe that her interlocutor is especially qualied to give her the desired information. (shrink)

In this paper, I spell out a new challenge for epistemic internalism that emerges out of the current debate on testimonial justification. Based on recent developments within this debate, one might argue as follows: Epistemic internalism can’t account for the justification of our testimony-based beliefs, because (1) we should conceive of testimonial justification along anti-reductionist lines and (2) anti-reductionism is incompatible with epistemic internalism. In response to this challenge, I show that, despite initial appearances, epistemic internalism and anti-reductionism are compatible (...) after all. Therefore, being an anti-reductionist with regard to testimonial justification doesn’t force one to reject epistemic internalism. In order to argue for this result, I will make use of resources provided by speech act theory. (shrink)

What is salvific community for Ignatius of Loyola? It is communion with Christ, a dynamic for which Ignatius used the expression ‹societies Jesu›. This wording has a revealing intertextuality. ‹Societas› is the Vulgate’s rendering of Pauline and Johannine koinōnia: «sharing in (Christ)». The NT overtones of the Ignatian experience of communion can be explored regarding a theology of relationship (person), of action (history) and of the Church (representation). Being a person is understood as being friend and servant, history as the (...) salvific kairos of Christ’s activity, and the Church as the communion representing him—each time a typically Christian conception deciding always for that option that cannot be generalised through abstraction. (shrink)

La Historia de la Filosofía se ubica en una tensión entre el tiempo y el logos, cuya adecuada comprensión decide en última instancia el papel que ésta cumple en la Filosofía. Esta tesis es desarrollada por el autor mediante el estudio del lugar que tal disciplina ocupa en la constitución del Sistema hegeliano. Según esto, la dependencia mutua del tiempo y del logos debe mostrarse por dos vías contrapuestas: de un lado, la necesidad de considerar la existencia (Dasein) del concepto (...) en el tiempo, y de otro lado, el esfuerzo que representa la Filosofía como esclarecimiento del tiempo histórico en el concepto. Por esta razón, si bien Hegel sabe de la importancia de la Historia de la Filosofía en la consolidación del Sistema (según el lema de que el saber acerca del devenir histórico de la Filosofía es ya Filosofía), su presentación de la misma revela un mayor énfasis en el lagos. A diferencia de Hegel, el autor opina que no debe hablarse de los textos filosóficos como "meros hijos de su tiempo" (y por tanto, como observables desde una perspectiva "superior" a ellos), sino que es preciso reconocer en ellos una opacidad inherente, reflejo de la cual los textos filosóficos pueden abordarse siempre de modos diversos. (shrink)

The article analyses the problems and possibilities in saying that Judaism, Christianity and Islam ‹have the same God›.

This short document, appearing for the first time in English translation, concerns the prospects of a made-for-television cultural mini-series inspired by select episodes in Kafka's works. A window is opened onto Guattari's curatorial ambitions, cinematic projects, and theory of minor cinema, bringing into focus how he translated theoretical preoccupations into the cultural sector with reference to diverse semiotic media.