Since writing his For the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche has been developing a project marked by an increasingly radical distrust of the fundamental bases of culture. This project has even reverberated in several epistolary exchanges with Georg Brandes, of which the one on December 2, 1887 stands out, with the expression “Aristocratic Radicalism.” Aristocracy can be inferred from the philosopher’s criticism of the entire gregarious dimension, through which culture is marked. And, as a response, Nietzsche, in the Posthumous of 1887, (...) presents the virtue that is affirmed in the will to dominate. In the course of this work it will be observed to what extent Nietzsche’s effort for this conception of transvalued virtue, that is, stripped of morality, is capable of contributing to the political project of domination and overcoming. The very notion of aristocracy has, in its dimension of radicalism, virtue as the will to dominate, one of its differences. Would this virtue be understood exclusively as strength, and therefore devoid of morality, informed by Christianity as a civilizing project? (shrink)

Vorrede, von T. Pinkus.--Sein und Bewusstsein, von G. Lukács und H.H.Holz.--Gesellschaft und Individuum, von G. Lukács und L. Kofler.--Grundlegendes zu einer wissenschaftlichen Politik, von G. Lukács und W. Abendroth.--Vorläufige Bilanz, von G. Lukács, W. Abendroth und H. H. Holz.--Bibliographie (p. 125-[128]).

1. Művészet és társadalom; válogatott esztétikai tanulmányok.--2. Világirodalom; válogatott világirodalom tanulmányok 2 v.

This paper addresses a theory of intergenerational justice that we refer to as “needs-based sufficientarianism”. According to needs-based sufficientarianism, the present generation ought to enable future generations to meet their basic needs — for example, their needs for drinkable water, food and health care. Our aim is to explain and defend this theory in a programmatic way. First, we introduce what we regard as the most plausible variant of needs-based sufficientarianism. Then we argue that this variant is superior to several (...) alternative ways of thinking about intergenerational justice. In particular, we defend basic needs as the currency of intergenerational justice and sufficiency as its principle. Our arguments for these claims are neither fully comprehensive nor fully conclusive. Yet, we hope that they suffice to show that needs-based sufficientarianism is a major contender, with significant pro tanto advantages over other views. (shrink)

Machine intelligence already helps medical staff with a number of tasks. Ethical decision-making, however, has not been handed over to computers. In this proof-of-concept study, we show how an algorithm based on Beauchamp and Childress’ prima-facie principles could be employed to advise on a range of moral dilemma situations that occur in medical institutions. We explain why we chose fuzzy cognitive maps to set up the advisory system and how we utilized machine learning to train it. We report on the (...) difficult task of operationalizing the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and patient autonomy, and describe how we selected suitable input parameters that we extracted from a training dataset of clinical cases. The first performance results are promising, but an algorithmic approach to ethics also comes with several weaknesses and limitations. Should one really entrust the sensitive domain of clinical ethics to machine intelligence? (shrink)

O presente trabalho se assenta sobre um tema fundamental dentro do conjunto do pensamento de Nietzsche: o tema do Destino. Se o Destino for encarrado como algo previamente decidido em relação às mais diversas situações, então a filosofia de Nietzsche se esbarra numa aporia, a de ter que enfrentar o problema do determinismo, que toca um dos maiores obstáculos da cultura: a moral. No âmbito moral tudo se encontra ordenado e determinado. Neste sentido, o desenvolvimento desta pesquisa se orienta na (...) direção de um aprofundamento das implicações filosóficas atinentes ao Destino. Encarrado como tornar-se a organização particular de impulsos, o Destino perde o sentido de predeterminação e decisão pronta e acabada sobre as diferentes situações. Em que medida falar sobre o Destino, no âmbito de pensamento nietzschiano, implica em abertura à plenitude, para além de todas as formas de determinismo? (shrink)

This volume explores how 'the market'continues to affect and redefine health professionals as moral beings and impact on the care they provide. By reflecting on the meaning of the market and the medical profession, this ground-breaking volume identifies a variety of ways to help preserve healthcare workers' integrity and ensure compassionate care.

O pensamento de Nietzsche tem na afirmação a sua ênfase, para a qual as forças constituem o seu diferencial. As forças operam no sentido de estabelecer embates entre oposições e resistências, de modo que, quanto maiores forem as oposições impetradas, maiores as resistências empregadas. A única meta a alcançar é a de pontos sempre mais culminantes de potência, passando pelo enfrentamento do ar cortante das alturas, das caminhadas invernais, do gelo, dos cumes e de toda espécie de sublime maldade. Cada (...) oposição vivida desencadeia uma resposta, que é a de resistência, gerando no organismo um quantum maior de força, tende em vista a sua superação. Assim, de superação em superação, se resiste aos limites que se apresentam em forma de mega acontecimentos a compor os diversos ciclos do retorno. Neste intercambiamento, marcado pela oposição e pela resistência, somente espécimes dotados de ímpeto e disposição fisiológica afirmativa serão capazes de superar, realizando a sua experiência de plenitude alegre e jovial. Estes espécimes, redentores da doença, concebem a filosofia como arte de cura, de modo que a vivência na solidão, para além de fuga da existência, consiste em antídoto promotor da grande saúde. (shrink)

Para muitos, Nietzsche não é considerado um filósofo, mas um poeta. Entre os diversos fatores que contribuem para negar o status philosophicus ao filósofo alemão reside, por um lado, no aspecto de seu conteúdo e, por outro, no seu aspecto formal. Quanto ao conteúdo é difícil perceber algum aspecto propositivo em seu pensamento, uma tese construtiva, ao contrário, trata-se de um pensamento desconstrutivo, demolidor, um filosofar a marteladas. Quanto a forma, o estilo da escrita nietzschiana se caracteriza pelo aforismo ao (...) invés do discurso contínuo, cada aforismo abriga um conjunto de metáforas que se destacam como enigmas a serem decifrados. Nossa proposta, neste artigo, é mostrar que apesar do conteúdo e da forma, mediante os quais, o pensamento de Nietzsche se apresenta, há uma filosofia que se dá pela superação de uma concepção racional e moral para estabelecer a genealogia de um pensamento. (shrink)

Jennifer Lackey (2016) challenged group acceptance accounts of justification by arguing that these accounts make the possession of evidence arbitrary and hence lead to illegitimate manipulation of the group's evidence. She proposes that the only way out is to rely on the epistemic propriety of the individual group members, which leads to a dilemma for group acceptance views: either they are wrong about justification, or they cease to rely only on group acceptances. I argue that there is a third option (...) based on general expectations of epistemic propriety that restricts the group's maximal justification. A group cannot be more justified than any individual in the group's position could be expected to be. I motivate this solution by a discussion of normative defeat and epistemic expectations as proposed by Goldberg (2018). (shrink)

The distribution of the focus particle even is constrained: if it is adjoined at surface structure to an expression that is entailed by its focus alternatives, as in even once, it must be appropriately embedded to be acceptable. This paper focuses on the context-dependent distribution of such occurrences of even in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers. We show that it is explained on the assumption that even can move at LF Syntax and semantics, 1979). The analysis is subsequently extended to (...) occurrences of negative polarity items in these environments, which mirror the abovementioned distribution of even and which invalidate standard characterizations of NPI licensing conditions in terms of downward-entailingness. The idea behind the extension is that NPIs denote weak elements that are associates of covert even. The paper concludes by discussing two comprehensive theories of NPI licensing and how our proposal relates to them. (shrink)

Wright (1998) and Bar-On (2004) put pressure on the idea that self-knowledge as an explanandum should be identified with privileged belief formation. They argue that setting up the discourse on the level of belief and belief formation rules out promising approaches to explain self-knowledge. Hence, they propose that we should characterize self-knowledge on the level of linguistic practice instead. I argue against them that self-knowledge cannot be fully characterized by features of our linguistic practice. I propose that in some circumstances (...) – disagreements about one's mental states – self-knowledge plays a role, but this role cannot be described in virtue of features of our linguistic practice. I consider three objections to the argument and conclude that we should not conceive self-knowledge solely in terms of linguistic practice. (shrink)

Using the technique of prepared questions, Conversations with Lukacs is a brilliant gathering of thoughts and insights covering topics as ontology, the techniques of manipulative societies, the pitfalls of combating Stalinism with Stalinist methods, and the problems of intellectuals in advanced capitalist societies. Above all, there is the restatement of Lukacs unshaken conviction that the working class, with all the changes that have occurred in its way of life and composition, is still the historical carrier of social transformation. Lukacs's interlocutors (...) in these four conversations are Hans Heinz Holz, Leo Kofler, and Wolfgang Abendroth. Each of them engages Lukacs in separate dialogues, on being and consciousness (Holz), on society and the individual (Kofler), and on the elements of scientific politics (Abendroth). Lukacs, Abendroth, and Holz work toward a "Provisional Summary" in the last conversation. The interlocutors and the editor write that "These conversations show very clearly the basis of abstraction in the experiences of everyday life.... This gives these conversations with Lukacs a more than anecdotal value; for the unmediated way in which thought is produced in conversation corresponds exactly to that primary level of experience, the data of everyday reality, whose theoretical value Lukacs emphasizes.... They aspire to bear witness to the living thought of one of the great men of our century, and to provide the opportunity to approach this thought by the simplest possible route.". (shrink)

In the past, experts have disagreed about whether Samuel Clarke accepted the idea that gravity is a power superadded to matter by God. Most scholars now agree that Clarke did not support superaddition. But the argumentation employed by Clarke to reject superaddition has not been studied before in detail. In this paper, I explicate Clarke's argumentation by relating it to an important discussion about the possibility of superadded gravity in the Clarke-Collins correspondence. I examine Clarke's responses to Collins and draw (...) on his other works to reconstruct Clarke's reasons for rejecting superadded gravity. (shrink)

Hybrid contingentism combines first-order contingentism, the view that it is contingent what individuals there are, with higher-order necessitism, the view that it is non-contingent what properties and propositions there are (where these are conceived as entities in the range of appropriate higher-order quantifiers). This combination of views avoids the most delicate problems afflicting alternative contingentist positions while preserving the central contingentist claim that ordinary, concrete entities exist contingently. Despite these attractive features, hybrid contingentism is usually faced with rejection. The main (...) reason for this is an objection that crucially involves haecceitistic properties, properties such as being identical to Plato or being identical to Aristotle. The objection alleges that by accepting the necessary existence of such haecceities, hybrid contingentists incur an explanatory commitment that they are unable to discharge, namely that of explaining how it is that certain haecceities ‘lock onto’ their target individuals even when those individuals are absent. To defend hybrid contingentism against this charge, I first clarify the haecceities objection in several respects and consider, in particular, what notion of explanation the objection is operating with. After arguing that it can be fruitfully understood as a challenge to provide metaphysical grounds for certain haecceity facts, I develop a contingentist response to the objection that draws on recent work on the connection between ground and essence. (shrink)

A categoria de Quantidade, em Hegel, é desenvolvida de tal modo a auxiliar na caracterização daquilo que se compreende por ser. Para além da liquidez, fechamento e inflexibilidade, típica de uma compreensão limitada a uma exclusividade unívoca e finalista, o ser se apresenta mediante novos desdobramentos, que lhe confere abertura. A flexibilidade, que assim caracteriza o ser, tem, na quebra da rigidez da univocidade, na interrupção do exclusivismo imediatista e no impedimento da descontinuidade finalista, o estatuto de ser para si (...) suprassumido como Quantidade. Como uni, pluri e contínua, é uma grandeza que descreve os unos para além de uma mera representação superficial. Em que medida é possível conceber o ser, pelo ultrapassamento da mera faculdade de compreensão de substância no entendimento, como Quantidade una, plural e contínua? (shrink)

A aproximação que apresentamos entre Hegel e Nietzsche não é uma reconciliação entre ambos, mas uma investigação da crítica que ambos fazem com relação a moral cristã, ou seja, do destino que o Cristianismo assumiu a partir da "tradição cristã", resultando no afastamento de seu espírito. Esse afastamento se dá a partir da cristalização de suas doutrinas em dogmas, implicando num estranhamento de Deus. Nietzsche lê este estranhamento através da moral, portanto uma falsificação do verdadeiro espírito cristão pela cristandade.

A partir do momento em que a recordação dos fatos deixa de estar vinculada a elementos internos a estes para se associar a signos externos, o esquecimento passa a se instalar. Eis o nascimento da escrita. Com isso, as técnicas de memória são ameaçadas. Nietzsche vê nesta ameaça à mnemotécnica um ganho significativo, pois permite um alívio e higienização mental de toda aquela carga moral que não permite esquecer. Ao perseguirmos este objetivo de desobstruir a mente das suas técnicas de (...) memorização, Nietzsche inaugura uma forma de escrita não centrada no conteúdo, e sim na estilística. Em que medida o expediente estilístico nietzschiano é capaz de superar a mnemotécnica? (shrink)

Uma das técnicas, pensadas por Nietzsche, para ativar a consciência moral é a técnica da memória, que o filósofo denomina mnemotécnica. Ora, submeter a memória a procedimentos com capacidade de predição e controle, equivale a despi-la daquilo que é sua característica orgânica e vital que lhe confere a capacidade de, para além de todos os enquadramentos técnicos superficiais, a todo o momento superar-se mediante o alcance de pontos mais culminantes de potência. As considerações de Nietzsche em torno do problema da (...) má consciência, assim como de sua expressão em forma de ódio e vingança é marca do ressentimento, estão ligadas aos obstáculos que se interpõem frente à ação. Pela ação, toda a carga instintiva é manifesta em forma de obra de arte pelo criador; ao contrário, se interiorizada, a carga se torna veneno degenerativo. Nietzsche atribui estes obstáculos à ação e à memória como um dos fatores preponderantes. Na Segunda Dissertação de Para a genealogia da moral, Nietzsche apresenta a má consciência como um fatalismo sem luta, o que repercute em resignação e doença. Pela má consciência às propensões naturais do agir é atribuído um olhar ruim, hostil à vida e difamador do mundo. Sua origem se liga a um movimento de interiorização dos instintos, o que resulta em luta contra si mesmo e degeneração fisiológica. A presente investigação considera as diversas técnicas que foram sendo desenvolvidas a fim de que não só as informações mais diversas não caíssem no esquecimento, mas a maneira como estas são lembradas no sentido de produzirem, ao invés de expansão da vida, encolhimento, resignação e degeneração. Estaria Nietzsche defendendo a dissolução da memória como um todo, ou redimensionando a maneira pela qual se tem vivido dela? (shrink)

A ética cristã possui em Hegel e Nietzsche um terreno comum: representado pelo embate a moral, que é o estranhamento provocado pela positividade da lei. Assim, pelo movimento de reconciliação, representado pela abertura do destino como pela unidade do amor, ambos autores contribuem para a instauração de um ethos cristão. Por essa razão, a dialética hegeliana supera o fechamento e dogmatismo, para assumir a abertura e o porvir, portanto uma filosofia de plenitude.

In this paper I propose an account of self-knowledge based on a framework of predictive processing. Predictive processing understands the brain as a prediction-action machine that tries to minimize error in its predictions about the world. For this view to evolve into a complete account of human cognition we ought to provide an idea how it can account for self-knowledge – knowledge of one’s own mental states. I provide an attempt for such an account starting from remarks on introspection made (...) by Hohwy. I develop Hohwy’s picture into a general model for knowledge of one’s mental states, discussing how predictions about oneself can be used to capture self-knowledge. I further explore empirical predictions, and thereby argue that the model provides a good explanation for failure of self-knowledge in cases involving motor aftereffects, such as the broken escalator phenomenon. I conclude that the proposed account is incomplete, but provides a valuable first step to connect research on predictive processing with the epistemology of self-knowledge. (shrink)

When economists perform experiments, they do so typically in one of two traditions: cognitive psychology experiments in the heuristics and biases tradition (H&B-experiments) and experimental economics in the tradition of Vernon Smith. What sets these two traditions apart? In this paper, I offer a novel conceptualization of their pervasive disagreements. Focusing on how each camp approaches preferences, one of the most fundamental concepts in economics, I argue that experimental economics can be reconstructed as holding that the constituents of preferences can (...) be partially located in agents’ environments, while H&B-experiments implicitly assume that the constituents of preferences are entirely located within agents’ bodies. The paper (i) outlines how my reconstruction can account for the disagreement between the two paradigms, (ii) defends the plausibility of this reconstruction, and (iii) highlights its implications for the debate about the nature of preferences in economics. (shrink)

Subverting a once widely held Quinean paradigm, there is a growing consensus among philosophers of logic that higher-order quantifiers (which bind variables in the syntactic position of predicates and sentences) are a perfectly legitimate and useful instrument in the logico-philosophical toolbox, while neither being reducible to nor fully explicable in terms of first-order quantifiers (which bind variables in singular term position). This article discusses the impact of this quantificational paradigm shift on metaphysics, focussing on theories of properties, propositions, and identity, (...) as well as on the metaphysics of modality. (shrink)

According to intentionalism, a demonstrative d refers to an object o only if the speaker intends d to refer to o. Intentionalism is a popular view in metasemantics, but Gauker has recently argued that it is circular. We defend intentionalism against this objection, by showing that Gauker’s argument rests on a misconstrual of the aim of metasemantics. We then introduce two related, but distinct circularity objections: the worry that intentionalism is uninformative, and the problem of intentional bootstrapping, according to which (...) it is impossible to have referential intentions. We also show how intentionalists could respond to these new objections. (shrink)

We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...) How do groups get to know their own mental states? This is the question of collective self-knowledge. I argue that collective self-knowledge is a distinct phenomenon that deserves our attention. In particular I suggest: that we should be interested in collective self-knowledge, because our behaviour indicates that we already engage with collective self-knowledge in practice; that groups can collectively avow, which indicates that they have privileged and peculiar access to their own intentional states; and that collective self-knowledge is not reducible to intentional states of individuals and therefore is an independent explanandum. (shrink)

One of the most pressing points in the philosophy of sport is the question of a definition of sport. Approaches towards sport vary based on a paradigm and position of a particular author. This article attempts to analyse and critically evaluates a recent definition of sport presented by Jim Parry in the context of argument that e-sports are not sports. Despite some innovations, his conclusions are in many ways traditional and build on the previous positions. His research, rooted in the (...) conceptual analysis, starts with a stipulation that sport is paradigmatically Olympic sport. He defines it then as an ‘institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill’ i.e., identifies six necessary elements of sport: human (not animals), physical (not chess), skill (not jogging), contest (not mountaineering), rule-governed (not ‘field sports’), institutionalized (not hula-hooping). Our claim is that this definition, despite its methodological clarity, is not accurate and does not sufficiently represent sport outside the Olympic context. First, to say for something to be a sport it is necessary to be a contest leads to a narrow concept of sport. Secondly, Parry’s account lacks the emphasis on game and play-like structures that are inherently present in sport (even in the Olympic sport), namely non-necessity, non-ordinariness, arbitrariness and gratuitousness. We try to direct the attention precisely on these structures and offer an alternative account of sport understood as a modern ‘hard core’ sport that nevertheless reaches important congruences with Parry’s definition. The originality of this contribution lies in presenting the essential qualities of modern ‘hard core’ sports, which, although sometimes hidden in the modern emphasis on high level performances, competition, and results, play an important role in the question how sport ought to be played and approached. (shrink)

Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate how structural rationality, in contrast to procedural rationality, allows us to offer an account of the guiding idea behind preference purification that avoids inner rational (...) agents. Afterward, I address two pressing challenges against preference purification that emerge under the structural rationality account. (shrink)

Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this volume sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the authors look (...) more specifically at issues relevant to each of these theories, such as motivation to act fairly towards future generations, the population dimension, the formation of preferences through education and how they impact on our intergenerational obligations, and whether it is fair to rely on constitutional devices. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore an under-investigated question concerning the class of formal models that aim at providing normative guidance. We call such models normative models. In particular, we examine the question of how normative models can successfully exert normative guidance. First, we highlight the absence of a discussion of this question – which is surprising given the extensive debate about the success conditions of descriptive models – and motivate its importance. Second, we introduce and discuss two potential accounts of (...) the success conditions of normative models. Our tentative conclusion is that the second account is more promising. (shrink)