Normative Models and Their Success

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (2):123-150 (2021)
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Abstract

In this paper, we explore an under-investigated question concerning the class of formal models that aim at providing normative guidance. We call such models normative models. In particular, we examine the question of how normative models can successfully exert normative guidance. First, we highlight the absence of a discussion of this question – which is surprising given the extensive debate about the success conditions of descriptive models – and motivate its importance. Second, we introduce and discuss two potential accounts of the success conditions of normative models. Our tentative conclusion is that the second account is more promising.

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Author Profiles

Marcel Jahn
Stockholm University
Lukas Beck
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):1-22.
Modelling in Normative Ethics.Joe Roussos - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (5):1-25.
Model Organisms as Scientific Representations.Lorenzo Sartori - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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