STAJDUHAR K, FUNK L, JAKOBSSON E and ÖHLÉN J. Nursing Inquiry 2010; 17: 221–230A critical analysis of health promotion and ‘empowerment’ in the context of palliative family care-givingTraditionally viewed as in opposition to palliative care, newer ideas about ‘health-promoting palliative care’ increasingly infuse the practices and philosophies of healthcare professionals, often invoking ideals of empowerment and participation in care and decision-making. The general tendency is to assume that empowerment, participation, and self-care are universally beneficial for and welcomed by all (...) individuals. But does this assumption hold for everyone, and do we fully understand the implications of health-promoting palliative care for family caregivers in particular? In this study, we draw on existing literature to highlight potential challenges arising from the application of ‘family empowerment’ strategies in palliative home-care nursing practice. In particular, there is a risk that empowerment may be operationalized as transferring technical and medical-care tasks to family caregivers at home. Yet, for some family caregivers, a sense of security and support, as well as trust in professionals, may be equally if not more important than empowerment. Relational and role concerns may also at times take precedence over a desire for empowerment. The potential implications of ‘family empowerment’ are explored in this regard. ‘Family empowerment’ approaches need to be accompanied by a strong understanding of how to best support individual palliative family caregivers. (shrink)

This paper presents results of a qualitative study focussed on reconstructingcurrent reception processes of Tibetan Buddhist teachings and practicesas well as its representatives by the Swiss public since the mid 1990’s. Byexamining public discourses on Tibetan Buddhism in Switzerland, the paperaddresses issues concerning the social construction, representation and (re-)production of cultural and religious difference. It is argued that public receptionand representation of Tibetan Buddhism in the media clearly – even if implicitly– reflects disputes about conceptions of one’s own religious, cultural (...) and nationalidentity as well as about collectively shared values. It is shown that publicdiscourse on Tibetan Buddhism in Switzerland is characterized by opposingtendencies: on the one hand, it is clearly dominated by well-known positiveimages and stereotypes, which might be regarded as elements of an establishedrepertoire of knowledge about Tibet, Tibetans and the “World Religion of Buddhism”and which are reproduced as a matter of course within public discussionson the topic. On the other hand, nevertheless, these dominant topoi arecurrently being questioned by various social actors and on various levels. Theseefforts at deconstructing popular images and perceptions of Tibetan cultural andreligious traditions, however, have relatively small impact on wider social processesof constructing religious and cultural alterity – not nearly as much, forexample, as the construction of an Islamic “Other” culminating in the minaretreferendum of 2009. (shrink)

I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.

Ideas about heredity and evolution are undergoing a revolutionary change. New findings in molecular biology challenge the gene-centered version of Darwinian theory according to which adaptation occurs only through natural selection of chance DNA variations. In Evolution in Four Dimensions, Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb argue that there is more to heredity than genes. They trace four "dimensions" in evolution -- four inheritance systems that play a role in evolution: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic. These systems, they argue, can all (...) provide variations on which natural selection can act. Evolution in Four Dimensions offers a richer, more complex view of evolution than the gene-based, one-dimensional view held by many today. The new synthesis advanced by Jablonka and Lamb makes clear that induced and acquired changes also play a role in evolution.After discussing each of the four inheritance systems in detail, Jablonka and Lamb "put Humpty Dumpty together again" by showing how all of these systems interact. They consider how each may have originated and guided evolutionary history and they discuss the social and philosophical implications of the four-dimensional view of evolution. Each chapter ends with a dialogue in which the authors engage the contrarieties of the fictional "I.M.," or Ifcha Mistabra -- Aramaic for "the opposite conjecture" -- refining their arguments against I.M.'s vigorous counterarguments. The lucid and accessible text is accompanied by artist-physician Anna Zeligowski's lively drawings, which humorously and effectively illustrate the authors' points. (shrink)

Little is known about the consequences of moral distress. The purpose of this study was to identify clinical situations that caused nurses to experience moral distress, to understand the consequences of those situations, and to determine whether nurses would change their practice based on their experiences. The investigation used a descriptive approach. Open-ended surveys were distributed to a convenience sample of 204 critical care nurses employed at a university medical center. The analysis of participants’ responses used an inductive approach and (...) a thematic analysis. Each line of the data was reviewed and coded, and the codes were collapsed into themes. Methodological rigor was established. Forty-nine nurses responded to the survey. The majority of nurses had experienced moral distress, and the majority of situations that caused nurses to experience moral distress were related to end of life. The nurses described negative consequences for themselves, patients, and families. (shrink)

We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain conditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H.

Perceptions of criminality and remorse are critical for legal decision-making. While faces perceived as criminal are more likely to be selected in police lineups and to receive guilty verdicts, faces perceived as remorseful are more likely to receive less severe punishment recommendations. To identify the information that makes a face appear criminal and/or remorseful, we successfully used two different data-driven computational approaches that led to convergent findings: one relying on the use of computer-generated faces, and the other on photographs of (...) people. In addition to visualising and validating the perceived looks of criminality and remorse, we report correlations with earlier face models of dominance, threat, trustworthiness, masculinity/femininity, and sadness. The new face models of criminal and remorseful appearance contribute to our understanding of perceived criminality and remorse. They can be used to study the effects of perceived criminality and remorse on decision-making; research that can ultimately inform legal policies. (shrink)

In 2009, Tennie et al. proposed the theory of the Zone of Latent Solutions, defined as the range of behaviors an individual of a species can invent independently, i.e., which it can acquire without any form of social learning. By definition, species limited to their ZLS are unable to innovate and/or transmit behavioral traits outside their ZLS, i.e., they lack traits which go beyond the level of the individual—traits resulting from a gradual cultural evolution over successive transmission events [“cumulative culture”, (...) Boyd and Richerson ]. However, this does not exclude an influence of social learning on the population frequency of these behaviors: social learning can facilitate the acquisition of latent solutions and thus speed up and consolidate their spread within a population. Cultures—defined as behaviors at least influenced by social learning—are therefore still possible. Here, we elaborate on the ZLS account and relate it to the theories of Vygotsky who studied the role of social learning in human culture. We argue that the ZLS is a missing phylogenetic “baseline” of Vygotsky’s Zone of Actual Development. Vygotsky’s neglect of a need for a human “baseline ZAD” may have been due to his interpretation of Köhler’s work on great ape behaviors: Köhler used his observations on individual chimpanzees to draw conclusions about the chimpanzee species as a whole, stating that chimpanzees can only copy what they could have invented themselves, thus coming close to the ZLS concept. Vygotsky—studying the range of behaviors individuals could achieve independently—seemingly did not see that Köhler was suggesting a species “baseline”, upon which Vygotsky’s idea of an individual’s ZAD could develop. As a result, Vygotsky also did not see the need for a ZLS for his own study subjects: humans. Yet, there is no reason to assume that humans lack a ZLS, and in fact we present evidence for a human ZLS for tool-use behaviors. (shrink)

Introduction to the special cluster of articles by feminists from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Language the Loaded Weapon by Dwight Bolinger. London and New York: Longman, 1980, 214 pp.

Title: Rethinking Democracy: Freedom, Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 0521386292 Author: Carol Gould Title: Democratic Theory and Socialism Publisher: Cambridge University Press ISBN: 0521335787 Author: Frank Cunningham.

Schupbach and Sprenger introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this variance. Though our account of explanatory power is less ambitious than Schupbach and Sprenger’s in (...) the sense that it is limited to causal explanatory power, it is also more ambitious because we do not limit its domain to cases where c genuinely explains e. Instead, we claim that c causally explains e if and only if our account says that c explains e with some positive amount of causal explanatory power. (shrink)

Does y obtain under the counterfactual supposition that x? The answer to this question is famously thought to depend on whether y obtains in the most similar world in which x obtains. What this notion of ‘similarity’ consists in is controversial, but in recent years, graphical causal models have proved incredibly useful in getting a handle on considerations of similarity between worlds. One limitation of the resulting conception of similarity is that it says nothing about what would obtain were the (...) causal structure to be different from what it actually is, or from what we believe it to be. In this paper, we explore the possibility of using graphical causal models to resolve counterfactual queries about causal structure by introducing a notion of similarity between causal graphs. Since there are multiple principled senses in which a graph G* can be more similar to a graph G than a graph G**, we introduce multiple similarity metrics, as well as multiple ways to prioritize the various metrics when settling counterfactual queries about causal structure. (shrink)

In the last couple of years, increased attention has been directed at the question of whether there is such a thing as a distinctively political normativity. With few exceptions, this question has so far only been explored by political realists. However, the discussion about a distinctively political normativity raises methodological and meta-theoretical questions of general importance for political theory. Although the terminology varies, it is a widely distributed phenomenon within political theory to rely on a normative source which is said (...) to be political rather than moral, or at least foremost political. In light of this concern, the present paper moves beyond political realism in the attempt to explore alternative ways of understanding distinctively political normativity, in a way which may be useful for political theorists. More specifically, we investigate two candidate views, here labelled the “domain view” and the “role view,” respectively. The former traces distinctness to the “domain,” that is, to the circumstances of politics. This view has gained a lot of support in the literature in recent years. The latter traces distinctness to “role,” that is, the role-specific demands that normative-political principles make. Our twofold claim in this paper is that the domain view is problematic but that the role view is promising. (shrink)

In these replies, I react to comments on my paper “Facts about Incoherence as Non-Evidential Epistemic Reasons”, provided by Aleks Knoks, Sebastian Schmidt, Keshav Singh, and Conor McHugh. I discuss potential counterexamples to my claim that the fact that the subject’s doxastic attitudes are incoherent is an epistemic reason for her to suspend; whether such incoherence-based reasons bear on individual attitudes or only on combinations of attitudes; the prospects of restricting evidentialism about epistemic reasons to reasons to believe; whether incoherence-based (...) reasons are truly epistemic; the alleged normative and motivational expendability of incoherence-based reasons; the possibility of incoherence-based reasons to suspend without actual belief in the incoherent propositions; the relationship between suspension, inquiry, and incoherence; and the nature of suspension of judgment. (shrink)

This article explores the role of the five “abodes” (or “intellectual powers” or “mental properties”) of the Light Realm in the narrative of Mani’s Living Gospel according to the Coptic Synaxeis codex. Far from being spared in the war effort (as it appears from Theodore bar Koni’s report on Mani’s doctrine), these five powers can be seen in Mani’s narrative to be active contributors not only to the generation of each divine persona newly called into being but also in the (...) actual fight against the forces of Darkness, securing their final defeat. (shrink)

Philosophy begins with wonder, according to Plato and Aristotle. Yet Plato and Aristotle did not expand a great deal on what precisely wonder is. Does this fact alone not raise curiosity in us as to why this passion or concept is important? What is wonder.

With regard to current debates on the ethical implementation of AI, especially two demands are linked: the call for explainability and for ultimate human responsibility. In the medical field, both are condensed into the role of one person: It is the physician to whom AI output should be explainable and who should thus bear ultimate responsibility for diagnostic or treatment decisions that are based on such AI output. In this article, we argue that a black box AI indeed creates a (...) rationally irresolvable epistemic situation for the physician involved. Specifically, strange errors that are occasionally made by AI sometimes detach its output from human reasoning. Within this article it is further argued that such an epistemic situation is problematic in the context of ultimate human responsibility. Since said strange errors limit the promises of explainability and the concept of explainability frequently appears irrelevant or insignificant when applied to a diverse set of medical applications, we deem it worthwhile to reconsider the call for ultimate human responsibility. (shrink)

This article analyses the drama surrounding the activism of female imams in North America. The image of Muslim women presiding over mixed congregational prayers evokes dramatically divergent responses among different Muslim constituencies, highlighting the disputed nature of fundamental issues pertaining to identity, community and authority. Provocative questions are raised: Can Islamic texts and communities of interpreters accommodate female religious authorities? Is it in the interest of Muslim women to seek empowerment within a domain of communal life in which male authority (...) has traditionally been dominant in all Sunni and most Shi'ite denominations? Do efforts to advance women within such contexts promise to help bridge the gap between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’, or merely underscore existing divisions and political motivations? In particular we explore two prominent figures, Amina Wadud and Asra Nomani, and each woman's understanding of basic textual debates, conception of Muslim women's needs, and perspective on themes pertaining to ‘Islamic—North American’ relations. Throughout this article, an attempt will also be made to clarify a central paradox of the North American imamah phenomenon: that it is both a highly contingent response to specific cultural and political circumstances and a manifestation of long-term negotiations within the larger Muslim community that favour the opening of new spaces for women within religious and social life. (shrink)

The technique of imaging was first introduced by Lewis, in order to provide a novel account of the probability of conditional propositions. In the intervening years, imaging has been the object of significant interest in both AI and philosophy, and has come to be seen as a philosophically important approach to probabilistic updating and belief revision. In this paper, we consider the possibility of generalising imaging to deal with uncertain evidence and partial belief revision. In particular, we introduce a new (...) logical criterion that any update rule should satisfy, and use it to evaluate a range of different approaches to generalising imaging to situations involving uncertain evidence. We show that none of the currently prevalent approaches to imaging allow for such a generalisation, although a lesser known version of imaging, introduced by Joyce, can be generalised in a way that mitigates these problems. (shrink)

In this critique of Michael Goodhart's "Human Rights and Global Democracy," Eva Erman argues that Goodhart has reconceptualized democracy and therefore does not offer a better understanding of the relationship between human rights and global democracy.

There is a long-standing debate regarding the nature of the relationship between emotions and consciousness. Majority of existing computational models of emotions largely avoid the issue, and generally do not explicitly address distinctions between the conscious and the unconscious components of emotions. This paper highlights the importance of developing an adequately differentiated vocabulary describing the mental states of interest, and their features and components, for the development of computational models of the relationships between emotions and consciousness. We discuss current psychological (...) theories of emotion, highlighting specific points in the affective processes where links exist with consciousness, and possible roles played by each. We discuss examples of models that are beginning to address components of the interface between emotions and consciousness: models of social emotions, requiring explicit representations of the self; models of affective biases on attention; models of emotion and metacognition; and models of emotion regulation. We conclude with a discussion of some of the challenges associated with modeling mental states whose core distinguishing characteristic is an awareness of affective feelings, and highlight the importance of integrating the diverse approaches to emotion research and modeling currently existing within psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Learning Music:Embodied Experience in the Life-WorldEva Alerby and Cecilia FermIn the present age, which is often signified as post-modern or knowledge-intensive, the calls for learning echo loud. Discussions of learning, as well as teaching, permeate almost all levels and arenas of our society, and have a sure place in every-day conversation as well as scientific debate. The concept of learning can be understood and explained in many different ways. (...) Our intention in this article is to make visible and discuss how learning music can be understood and explained from a life-world approach.By life-world approach we mean that learning is constituted by the experiences that we are having in the world. From that perspective it can be seen as a process which leads to some kind of change, whose utmost purpose is—consciously or unconsciously—to create meaning and make managing the world possible. In addition, we stress that learning does not arise nor is formed in a vacuum, but instead is found in complex contexts. In turn this creates the necessity of making learning situated and contextualized.1How one understands how music is learned is consequently influenced not only by what fundamental assumptions one holds about learning but also by prevailing views of music. Furthermore, how musical ability is regarded and whether musicality is accepted as an emotional or cognitive phenomenon is also [End Page 177] important. Other assumptions that need to be considered are whether or not it is possible to divide musicality into smaller parts and if that is the case, what is the relationship between these parts. One further question that has to be illuminated is the question about biological and social influences on musicality.2 According to Sture Brändström,3 musicality is sometimes divided into two categories—absolute contra relativistic musicality. The first category implies that musicality is regarded as a native ability, already existing within the human being, an ability that some people have and others lack. The second category reflects an approach that assumes that musicality is something everybody can acquire, it can be learned and appropriated. We will return later to this issue.These questions reveal a dualistic approach, specifically: whether musicality is an emotional or a cognitive phenomenon, or absolute or relative, which in turn leads to the question of whether or not learning music is constituted within or outside the human being. To expose problems related to this dualistic approach in music education, we will examine musical learning using life-world phenomenology as a theoretical framework, a brief description of which follows.Phenomenology: A Way of ThinkingAt the turn into the twentieth century, the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), named his philosophical approach phenomenology, and with that the development of modern phenomenology began. Phenomenology is both a method and a way of thought.4 He distinguished the fundamental principle of phenomenology as—'back to the things themselves.' According to Husserl it is through experiences that we gain access to things themselves. The concept of experience was essential to his formulation, and it became a key signature for the whole of phenomenology. His starting-point was how the world is experienced in a subjective way, and the aim was to find a way to describe the meaning of these subjective experiences. In other words, phenomenology has been summarized as a description of how the world is experienced by the person in the world.Various thinkers have interpreted phenomenology in different ways. Jan Bengtsson5 emphasized that phenomenological method should be named in the plural as methods. The phenomenology of the life-world, which was developed as an alternative to the so-called epoché, the special method of transcendental phenomenology, is a philosophy of the life-world without transcendental reduction. It is the life-world that constitutes the basis of our lives. It is the everyday world of our experiences, which we take for granted and where we live our lives. In other words it is the life-world that constitutes people's being-in-the-world.6 Through our existence we experience the concrete world in all its complexity, which is both historically and contextually dependent. Consequently... (shrink)

Cursory review of the reception of Adorno's unfinished Aesthetic Theory up to the present suggests that an introduction to the book's major concerns, its structure (or lack thereof), and its concepts is missing to this date. Going back to Fredric Jameson's watershed contribution Late Marxism: Adorno, Or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (1990), the article attempts to provide the introduction missing to date. It is organized around key concepts of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, beginning with the guiding juxtaposition of Kant's formalist (...) aesthetics vs. Hegel's content aesthetics and the various notions of the End of Art, followed by two sections on art and its respective others (from the culture industry and art appreciation to nature and natural beauty), and concluding with the axiom of suffering and its impact on the key notions of semblance, expression, and mimesis. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper I propose that examining Locke’s response to skepticism requires us to consider at least three distinct senses in which skepticism appears on the horizon of the Essay. Skepticism is addressed, directly or indirectly, (i) as a general outcome of philosophical inquiry, (ii) as a methodical decision to doubt, and also (iii) as the result of a particular problem that challenges the claim to knowledge. I think that by examining how Locke reacts to such issues, we get (...) a more accurate and nuanced picture of Locke’s relationship to skeptical philosophy. (shrink)