Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to 'go beyond' beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we (...) take seriously the fact that reactive attitudes are emotions. In this paper, we appeal to insights of the emotions literature to highlight one key way in which reactive attitudes go beyond beliefs: beliefs about a person and her morally significant conduct merely ascribe to the person the property of having performed a morally significant action, while reactive attitudes are ways of experiencing that person as having performed a morally significant action. We then suggest that appreciating this is a crucial first step toward understanding why reactive emotions play roles in our practices around responsibility that beliefs do not. (shrink)

The European Union and the International Criminal Court are two of the most original and interesting elements of the contemporary international situation. Both of them are the result of a delicate balance between ethical issues and political interests and, consequently, institute a complex relationship with states' sovereignty. Their common ground of values has brought the European Union to sustain the International Criminal Court since its preparatory works. Through the analysis of the most significant documents and the ways of the cooperation (...) between these two organisms, this essay focuses on the problems that face the international justice and the possible means of its affirmation. It seems to be drawn a new aspect of international relations, far from the traditional power politics and underpinned by the consent that international organisms can gain among the public opinion through their policy consistence with justice and peace values. (shrink)

Empathy has become a common point of debate in moral psychology. Recent developments in psychiatry, neurosciences and social psychology have led to the revival of sentimentalism, and the ‘empathy thesis’ has suggested that affective empathy, in particular, is a necessary criterion of moral agency. The case of psychopaths – individuals incapable of affective empathy and moral agency, yet capable of rationality – has been utilised in support of this case. Critics, however, have been vocal. They have asserted that the case (...) of autism proves the empathy thesis wrong; that psychopathy centres on rational rather than empathic limitations; that empathy is not relevant to many common normative behaviours; and that rationality is required when empathy fails. The present paper analyses these four criticisms. It will be claimed that they each face severe difficulties, and that moral agency ought to be approached via a multi-tier model, with affective empathy as a baseline. (shrink)

L’arte contemporanea è caleidoscopica: può catapultarci in ambienti complessi o minimali richiedendo la nostra attiva partecipazione, ancorarsi a luoghi particolari, porci di fronte a opere apparentemente indistinguibili da oggetti ed eventi della vita quotidiana, appropriarsi illegalmente degli spazi pubblici, e così via. Questo volume muove dalla premessa che uno dei compiti della filosofia dell’arte sia prestare attenzione a specifiche pratiche artistiche e a teorie sull’arte avanzate in altri ambiti di ricerca, per poi organizzare in maniera perspicua la molteplicità dei dati (...) raccolti. I filosofi possono così costruire teorie quanto più generali possibile per cercare di spiegare ciò che emerge da tali dati. Le ricerche qui presentate si concentrano su alcuni fenomeni, accuratamente scelti nell’ampio panorama dell’arte contemporanea: l’installation art e i suoi rapporti con l’installazione espositiva, l’arte sito-specifica e la sua appartenenza alla più ampia tradizione dell’arte situata, il ruolo delle idee nell’arte concettuale e il carattere sovversivo della street art. Sfruttando l’efficacia esplicativa del concetto di medium artistico, nonché della individuazione di forme e generi d’arte, le analisi qui presentate indagano le ragioni per cui in queste pratiche artistiche sono centrali l’esperienza dello spazio, l’interazione fra opere e pubblico, i luoghi d’installazione delle opere e gli oggetti come portatori di significati. (shrink)

Empathy is a term used increasingly both in moral theory and animal ethics. Yet, its precise meaning is often left unexplored. The book aims to tackle this by clarifying the different and even contradictory ways in which “empathy” can be defined.

Contemporary literature includes a wide variety of definitions of empathy. At the same time, the revival of sentimentalism has proposed that empathy serves as a necessary criterion of moral agency. The paper explores four common definitions in order to map out which of them best serves such agency. Historical figures are used as the backdrop against which contemporary literature is analysed. David Hume’s philosophy is linked to contemporary notions of affective and cognitive empathy, Adam Smith’s philosophy to projective empathy, and (...) Max Scheler’s account to embodied empathy. Whereas cognitive and projective empathy suffer from detachment and atomism, thereby providing poor support for the type of other-directedness and openness entailed by moral agency, embodied and affective empathy intrinsically facilitate these factors, and hence are viewed as fruitful candidates. However, the theory of affective empathy struggles to explain why the experience of empathy includes more than pure affective mimicry, whilst embodied empathy fails to take into account forms of empathy that do not include contextual, narrative information. In order to navigate through these difficulties, Edith Stein’s take on non-primordial experience is used as a base upon which a definition of affective empathy, inclusive of an embodied dimension, and founded on a movement between resonation and response, is sketched. It is argued that, of the four candidates, this new definition best facilitates moral agency. (shrink)

To date, 1.7 million US military service personnel have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, one in five are suffering from diagnosable combat-stress related psychological injuries including Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). All indications are that the mental health toll of the current conflicts on US troops and the medical systems that care for them will only increase. Against this backdrop, research suggesting that the common class of drugs known as beta-blockers might prevent the onset of PTSD is drawing (...) much interest. I urge caution against accepting too quickly the use of beta-blockers for dealing with the psychological injuries that combat experiences can wreak. Beta-blockers are thought to work by disrupting the formation of emotionally disturbing memories that typically occur in the wake of traumatic events and that in some people manifest as PTSD. Focusing on a single dimension of soldiers' experience in combat, namely, their perpetration of other-directed violence, I argue that some of the emotional memories blunted by beta-blockers play important roles in the recovery of moral aspects of soldiers' selves damaged by experiences of combat violence — specifically, in the achievement of a state of grace— and, therefore, that the use of beta-blockers may come with distinct moral costs. (shrink)

The supporter of vague objects has been long challenged by the following ‘Argument from Identity’: 1) if there are vague objects, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3) there are no vague objects. Some supporters of vague objects have argued that 1) is false. Noonan (Analysis 68: 174–176, 2008) grants that 1) does not hold in general, but claims that ontically indeterminate identity is indeed implied by the assumption that there are vague (...) objects of a certain special kind (i.e. vague objects*). One can therefore formulate a ‘New Argument from Identity’: 1′) if there are vague objects*, then there is ontically indeterminate identity; 2) there is no ontically indeterminate identity; therefore, 3′) there are no vague objects*. Noonan’s strategy is to argue that premiss 1′) is inescapable, and, as a consequence, that Evans’s alleged defence of 2) is a real challenge for any supporter of vague objects. I object that a supporter of vague objects who grants the validity of Evans’s argument allegedly in favour of 2) should reject premiss 1′). The threat of the New Argument from Identity is thus avoided. (shrink)

It is now a commonplace that emotions are not mere sensations but, rather, conceptually contentful states. In trying to expand on this insight, however, most theoretical approaches to emotions neglect central intuitions about what emotions are like. We therefore need a methodological shift in our thinking about emotions away from the standard accounts' attempts to reduce them to other mental states and toward an exploration of the distinctive work emotions do. I show that emotions' distinctive function is to engage us (...) with both objective and personal values. Attention to emotions' work reveals that it is precisely their “unruliness” that allows them to play meaningful roles in our lives. (shrink)

Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture explores the multifaceted moral meanings allocated to non-human suffering in contemporary Western culture.

This work is an investigation into the analytical debate on pictorial representation and the theory of pictorial art. My main concern are a critical exposition of the questions raised by the idea that it is resemblance to depicted objects that explains pictorial representation and the investigation of the phenomenon of abstract painting from an analytical point of view in relation to the debate on depiction. The first part is dedicated to a survey of the analytical debate on depiction, with special (...) attention to the fortunes and misfortunes of the resemblance theory of depiction. In the first chapter I give an outline of the main contemporary theories on offer, contextualised within an historical background that stretches from Plato to Descartes. I have decided to focus on the theory of resemblance more than on other approaches on depiction, because much of my research is dedicated to an analysis and implementation of one of the theories that have recently sought to re-discover the resemblance paradigm, although with certain important modifications. Namely, the second chapter is dedicated to the exposition of John Hyman’s basic resemblance theory of depiction, to the elucidation of its presuppositions and to the discussion of some criticisms and objections that the theory has raised. The third and the fourth chapter are dedicated to the implementation of Hyman’s theory in relation to the phenomenon of abstract painting. There are two peculiarities about Hyman’s theory: first, it is in counter-tendency in comparison with all the other accounts of depiction on offer, in that it does not need to conceive of pictorial representation as of representation of particulars or kinds of objects that we can easily identify. Second, it is a theory that gives art a prominent role: Hyman illustrates his claims with many examples taken from the history of figurative art. The second part of my work is inspired by the idea that the basic resemblance theory can be applied to abstract paintings as well. Developing an analysis of abstract painting from an analytical point of view is a task that very few authors have tried to accomplish so far – as far as I am aware. However, it is evident that the task abstract painters have set themselves is interestingly akin to the task philosophers try to accomplish when arguing about depiction. It is widely agreed that one of the main topics of contemporary art is art itself and that one of the main topics of abstract painting is the art of painting itself, the art of producing pictures, the exploration of its limits and its conventions. With these considerations in mind, I have sought to sketch my proposal for a basic resemblance theory of abstract painting, critically engaging with philosophers such as Richard Wollheim, Kendall Walton, Lambert Wiesing and with art-critics and historians such as Clement Greenberg and Ernst Gombrich. (shrink)

The book introduced in this text is based on the premise that the trade-off between privacy and security is both unsound and conceals important aspects of surveillance and control. Accordingly, the authors analyse the symbiotic relationship between liberty and security, and the emptiness of both concepts when considered in isolation. They explore and contextualise different notions of risk, surveillance practices and the value of the rights to private life and data protection. Thereby, they show that surveillance and control neither necessarily (...) attain security, nor always pose a threat to privacy and, conversely, that protecting privacy does not necessarily hamper security provision. Moreover, they appreciate how surveillance and control, mediated through technology, express and sustain specific power relationships. The book thus offers a kaleidoscope of perspectives, ranging from critical studies to international relations, law, philosophy and sociology, to rethink surveillance and control. (shrink)

As a technique of social control based on the collection of information, surveillance has been a central instrument of any administrative power since the modern era. Surveillance, however, can be carried out in different ways and these can provide important information on the basic features of a particular political system. Indeed, the introduction of surveillance measures has an impact on key relationships of a political system, such as liberty and security, autonomy and authority. When a political system is, like the (...) European Union (EU), in a dynamic and build-up phase, by analysing its surveillance practices one can even discern the trajectories of its developments. The paper analyses two surveillance measures in the EU: the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Directive 2006/24/EC on data retention. It puts forth the argument that the reference to security as a value enables the EU to compensate its legitimacy deficiencies and to develop into a power system characterised by a more supranational structure than before. (shrink)

The book is an introduction to key concepts of Indian Philosophy, seen from the perspective of the influential school of Pr?bh?kara M?m??s? (flourished from the 7th until the 20th c. AD). It includes the edition and translation of R?m?nuj?c?rya's ??straprameyapariccheda.

The climate crisis is an enormous challenge for contemporary societies. Yet, public discussions on it often lead to anger, mocking, denial and other defensive behaviours, one prominent example of which is the reception met by the climate advocate Greta Thunberg. The paper approaches this curious phenomenon via shame. It argues that the very idea of anthropogenic climate change invites feelings of human failure and thereby may also entice shame. The notion of “climate shame” is introduced and distinguished from “climate guilt”. (...) Whereas climate guilt prioritises the flourishing of the environment and is focused on actions and morality, climate shame is concerned with human identity and selfhood. The paper then explores whether shame is a morally destructive or constructive emotion. Making use of both psychological and philosophical literature on shame, it argues that although shame faces many challenges that question its usefulness in moral pedagogy, these challenges can be met with “moral maturity”—moreover, following a utilitarian approach, the overall benefits of climate shame can justify its costs to individuals. My argument is that climate shame holds the potential of being a highly effective moral psychological method of persuasion, capable of inviting wholesale critical reflection on current, environmentally damaging practices and cultivation of more virtuous ways of co-existing with the rest of the natural world and other species. (shrink)

The critical examination of current hypotheses is one of the key ways in which scientific fields develop and grow. Therefore, any critique, including Haidle and Schlaudt’s article, “Where Does Cumulative Culture Begin? A Plea for a Sociologically Informed Perspective,” represents a welcome addition to the literature. However, critiques must also be evaluated. In their article, Haidle and Schlaudt review some approaches to culture and cumulative culture in both human and nonhuman primates. H&S discuss the “zone of latent solutions” hypothesis as (...) applied to nonhuman primates and stone-toolmaking premodern hominins. Here, we will evaluate whether H&S’s critique addresses its target. (shrink)

I defend Hume's account of tragic pleasure against various objections. I examine his account of the emotions in order to clarify his "conversion theory". I also argue that Hume does not give us a theory of tragedy as an aesthetic genre, but rather elucidates the felt experience of a particular work of tragedy. I offer a partial reading of King Lear by way of illustration. Finally, I suggest that the experiences of aesthetic pleasure, and aesthetic sadness, share certain qualities. "Tragic (...) pleasure" is possible, in part, because the pity of tragedy is realised through the pleasure of the aesthetic. (shrink)

Esej poskuša izslediti pravni, reprezentativni in družbeni status migrantskih Drugih v ≫zaprti družbi≪ Nemške demokratične republike ali Vzhodne Nemčije (NDR) kot primer, kako je Nemčija imela dobiček od delovnih migracij na obeh straneh zidu. Opisuje, kako so bile od ponovne združitve Nemčije do danes migracije predstavljene kot nenadna in začasna težava, kar zakriva kolonialno in rasistično preteklost ter nekropolitično sedanjost. Esej preučuje proces družbene dediferenciacije v družbi, ki jo obvladuje država NDR, in kako so družbene tehnike ustvarjanja drugosti in etnizacije (...) v obliki zakonov za tujce spodbujale diskriminacijo in rasizem proti ≫tujcu≪ (Simmel), zlasti gastarbajterem. Ob pogledu na proces ≫dvojne transformacije≪ po padcu berlinskega zidu in poznejši ponovni združitvi esej preučuje, kako so prekrivajoči se procesi ustvarjanja drugosti kot sodobnega ekvivalenta izraza ≫orientalizem≪ (Edward Said) oblikovali in še naprej oblikujejo ponovno združeno Nemčijo. (shrink)

Il concetto di legittimità è al tempo stesso definito e indefinito, chiaro e sfuggente. Da un lato, esso evoca immediatamente e spontaneamente un sentimento di approvazione, perché chiaramente collegato nel linguaggio comune a un giudizio valutativo positivo. Dall’altro lato, se analizzato da vicino, il suo contenuto appare sfuggente, polisemico, controverso. Questo ne fa una categoria potente dal punto di vista politico ed estremamente affascinante da un punto di vista scientifico. Nelle pagine seguenti verranno analizzate le teorie di tre autori che (...) si sono confrontati con questo concetto indagando uno degli ambiti in cui la dicotomia sopra presentata è più evidente: quello internazionale. Si tratta della teoria di Ian Clark sulla legittimità nella società internazionale, della prospettiva interciviltà sul diritto internazionale proposta da Onuma Yasuaki e della riflessione di Antony Anghie sullo sviluppo dei principi fondamentali del diritto internazionale e il loro rapporto con il colonialismo. Come vedremo, si tratta di indagini tra loro fortemente eterogenee, e che non sempre fanno del concetto di legittimità internazionale l’oggetto principale o esplicito delle proprie ricerche. Nel confronto tra queste teorie che proporrò nelle mie pagine, il concetto di legittimità internazionale mostrerà tutta la sua complessità e tutto il suo ambiguo rapporto con elementi valutativi. (shrink)

A partire dal XX secolo si è fatta strada l’idea che l’istituzione di tribunali penali internazionali sia un fondamentale e necessario contributo al processo di ricostruzione della pace in contesti post-bellici. Attraverso l’imparzialità nell’individuazione delle colpe e nella distribuzione delle pene, i tribunali penali internazionali sarebbero in grado, secondo questa linea interpretativa, di sopire odi e divisioni, di scoraggiare la commissione di ulteriori crimini e di porre così le basi per una nuova convivenza pacifica. Questa fiducia nella funzione pacificatrice del (...) diritto internazionale penale ne ha sostenuto lo sviluppo storico. Sulla base di questa funzione il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha motivato la creazione di tribunali penali internazionali negli anni Novanta. L’atteggiamento del Consiglio di Sicurezza nei confronti del rapporto tra giurisdizioni penali internazionali e pace non si è però mantenuto lineare nel tempo. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha infatti mostrato successivamente di nutrire scarsa fiducia nella funzione pacificatrice del diritto internazionale penale e talvolta di ritenere che i procedimenti penali internazionali possano ostacolare il processo di pace. Il saggio indaga questo complesso rapporto e le ambiguità dell'atteggiamento del Consiglio di Sicurezza rispetto ai tribunali penali internazionali. (shrink)

Le politiche di sicurezza hanno assunto nel corso degli ultimi decenni un ruolo centrale all’interno dell’Unione Europea (UE) e ne costituiscono attualmente uno dei settori più controversi. Nel porsi come attore in grado di garantire sicurezza, l’Unione assume da un lato sempre più compiti e funzioni che sin dall’inizio dell’età moderna sono stati prerogativa del potere statale, senza poter direttamente avvalersi, dall’altro lato, dei principi di legittimazione propri dello Stato. Gli sviluppi recenti delle politiche di sicurezza UE, inoltre, sono fortemente (...) condizionati dai processi di digitalizzazione. Questi favoriscono l’emergere di nuovi modi di intenderle, caratterizzati da un approccio “preemptivo”. Questo denota un modo di affrontare la criminalità che si concentra sugli effetti piuttosto che sulle cause e, attraverso la formulazione di prognosi, mira a intervenire prima che determinati avvenimenti si manifestino al fine di evitarli. Il libro esplora questi sviluppi e discute se, alla luce di essi, i principi fondamentali di legittimità dell’UE siano in grado di esercitare effettivamente la propria funzione di limitazione del potere e tutela dei diritti fondamentali. Attraverso analisi di pratiche concrete quali l’utilizzo e il potenziamento di grosse banche dati, tra cui il sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS), l’analisi dei codici di prenotazione recentemente introdotti dalla Direttiva PNR e l’incremento dell’interoperabilità tra le banche dati europee, il volume mette in atto un approccio filosofico “critico-realistico”, che si ancora nella realtà ma non rinuncia alla normatività e all’elaborazione di proposte alternative. Nel far ciò, le ricerche qui esposte intendono offrire un contributo agli ambiti disciplinari della filosofia politica e della filosofia del diritto, e, più specificamente, dei Security Studies e degli European Studies. (shrink)

Surveillance, understood as the collection of information about populations for supervision purposes, is a critical technique of social control. As such, it can reveal important features of the power that exercises it. The article analyses two contemporary surveillance measures in Europe: the Schengen Information System and the Directive 2006/24/EC on data retention. The analysis aims to identify the structural characteristics of the changing power of the EU and the role security plays in it. The main thesis is that security is (...) a key element of the legitimacy claim of the expanding power of the EU. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the significance of mood for a philosophical approach to emotion. Are moods problematic because they constrain us in an affective cage? Or do they rather give us access to the world? The starting point for this investigation is the work of Martin Heidegger: I analyze what he defines as vorweltlich arguing that this term refers to the emotional dimension of human existence, in particular, to mood, or, in Heideggerian terms, Stimmung. Human existence is not just (...) a neutral being-there but a being-affected, a being-in-a-mood. I then move on to consider the role of mood in relation to the concept of transcendence, providing an analysis of two main source of inspiration in Heidegger’s thought: Augustine and Aristotle. This allows us to distinguish three aspects of Stimmung : Stimmung as openness to the world, Stimmung as teleological movement, and Stimmung as event of ontological difference. In the final section, I discuss the contribution of these aspects of Heidegger’s thought to the contemporary debate on emotions. (shrink)