As with other areas of the social world, academic research in the contemporary healthcare setting has undergone adaptation and change. For example, research methods are increasingly incorporating citizen participation in the research process, and there has been an increase in collaborative research that brings academic and industry partners together. There have been numerous positive outcomes associated with both of these growing methodological and collaborative processes; nonetheless, both bring with them ethical considerations that require careful thought and attention. This paper addresses (...) the ethical considerations that research teams must consider when using participatory methods and/or when working with industry and outlines a novel informed consent matrix designed to maintain the high ethical standard to which academic research in the healthcare arena has traditionally adhered. (shrink)

Any liberal democratic state must honour religious and cultural pluralism in its educational policies. To fail to honour them would betray ideals of freedom and toleration fundamental to liberal democracy. Yet if such ideals are to flourish from one generation to the next, allegiance to the distinctive values of liberal democracy is a necessary educational end, whose pursuit will constrain pluralism. The problem of political education is therefore to ensure the continuity across generations of the constitutive ideals of liberal democracy, (...) while remaining hospitable to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those very ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this crucial problem. In lucid and elegant prose, Professor Callan, one of the world's foremost philosophers of education, identifies both the principal ends of civic education, and the rights that limit their political pursuit. This timely new study sheds light on some of the most divisive educational controversies, such as state sponsorship and regulation of denominational schooling, as well as the role of non-denominational schools in the moral and political development of children. Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. The series editors are David Miller and Alan Ryan. (shrink)

Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the development of capacities for revision of conceptions of the good should be corrected by attention to the value of developing capacities permitting a rational adherence to a conception of the good. Exposing children to a diverse but shallow secular and consumer culture might not facilitate goodness‐enhancing (...) autonomy in a way that is superior to the more insular strategies of religious minorities whose child‐rearing practices are criticized by liberals. (shrink)

Popular filmic and literary stereotypes of teachers from Brodie and Chips to Keating and Schneebly have not only reflected a public desire for radically innovative and perverse teaching practices, but also created those paradigms in ways that are not always readily identifiable or traceable. This article seeks to analyse tensions between traditional institutional protocols and contemporary populist opinion on the role of the effective teacher. In doing so, the article takes Peter Weir’s Dead Poets Society (1989) as a primary example (...) of those tensions and argues for a perverse ‘foolosophical’ view of pedagogical performance and a new appreciation for the necessity of ignorance in the classroom. Since ignorance and understanding are not taken as unambiguous antonyms, the article proposes that effective teaching and learning occur most effectively in the interstices between humility and hospitality. (shrink)

Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate dimensions of phenomenal consciousness (...) are identified as the pre-reflective state, phenomenal experience, and reflective thought. Finally, the clinical implications of a deeper understanding of delirium through measurement of phenomenal consciousness is considered. (shrink)

How does teaching veer? In what ways can we tell if a literature lesson veers constructively or otherwise? How do we determine its limits and the correlations between success or failure in our teaching when — individually or collectively — we veer in a novel, a short story or a poem? If veering, as Nicholas Royle argues, can offer us a more dynamic critical vocabulary for reading literary works by developing singular responses to risk, failure, uncertainty and difficulty, then surely (...) it can also be a profitable way to determine the peripheries of pedagogical practice, what we can and cannot expect from the experience of education. Using the example of the short story ‘Powder’ by Tobias Wolff, and the responses from a given class in the specific context of reading this story, this article examines moments of veering and the difficulties of responding responsibly to the vicissitudes of what I will call moments of unlearning. The questions are, can we veer from theories of literature to theories of teaching? Have critique and difficulty (critique as an experience and practice of difficulty) run aground in our current context? Is it time, consequently, to veer away from difficulty as the purpose of teaching and learning? And if so, what would that veering look like as a practical pedagogical action? (shrink)

Suppose your friends had to ascribe a single vice to you in large measure, along with any virtues that could be coherently combined with that salient vice. Suppose further that the vice had to be either cowardice or impatience. Which would you choose? I believe almost everyone would choose impatience without hesitation. There are sound moral as well as purely self-regarding reasons for despising cowardice, and to that extent our preference would be reasonable. If we say that a man who (...) is a coward is also compassionate, we know that his compassion cannot be relied upon in any circumstances where it must contend with fear, and if he has a sense of justice, that will be useless if oppression has to be resisted. We cannot even expect him to pursue his own good whenever he perceives that to be hazardous, and so even the self-regarding virtues are corrupted by his dominating vice. On the other hand, a pronounced impatience may seem to be compossible with abundant virtue. Those who are just but cannot patiently endure tyranny are perhaps the most formidable threat to tyranny, and people who boldly go out to seize their own good often fare rather better than those who patiently await its arrival. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; McLaughlin on Parental Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 111–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467.

This paper is about how best to understand the notion of ‘public wrongs’ in the longstanding idea that crimes are public wrongs. By contrasting criminal law with the civil laws of torts and contracts, it argues that ‘public wrongs’ should not be understood merely as wrongs that properly concern the public, but more specifically as those which the state, as the public, ought to punish. It then briefly considers the implications that this has on criminalization.

Abstract‘Synod’ and ‘synodality’ have become synonymous with Pope Francis. Since Pope Paul VI instituted the Synod of Bishops as a permanent office in 1965, there hasn't been any pontificate that has given these matters as much profile and attention as his has. Why is this the case, and what is Pope Francis’ vision for a synodal Church? More fundamentally, what is synodality, according to tradition of the Church, and Pope Francis? Several years into both local and global synodal-type processes and (...) formation gatherings, it seems many people, even prominent Church leaders, readily admit that they still do not fully understand it. For this reason, this article sets out to provide a general overview and introduction. (shrink)

Electron redistribution is the cornerstone of our understanding of chemical reactivity. For the vast majority of organic reactions electrons are assumed to move in pairs providing explanatory mechanisms through the generation of intermediate structures. But for many transformations these discrete steps are idealized constructs, involving intermediates assumed but not empirically justified. This unitary perspective predicated on the curved arrow formalism has resulted in the scenario where for many organic transformations our supposed understanding far surpasses our growing knowledge. Reformulating organic mechanisms (...) to include single electron transfer as a component of, or an alternative to, the prevailing iconic descriptions can provide for a more empirically adequate mechanistic description. In addition using the language of SET presents an opportunity to unify mechanistic concepts under a common donor/acceptor framework. (shrink)

There are at least two ways to argue for the view that the outcome of one’s actions does not affect one’s blameworthiness. The first way appeals to the ‘Control Principle’ while the second way relies on what it means to be blameworthy. The focus of this paper is on a recent attempt at pursuing this second way that relies on an account of blameworthiness dubbed the ‘Engagement View’. This paper argues, however, that the Engagement View alone is insufficient to show (...) why the outcomes of one’s actions does not affect one’s blameworthiness. It argues that if blame is understood more robustly as involving reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation, then it turns out the Engagement View can also give us reasons for the contrary view. This paper ends by drawing out some general implications that this has on our understanding of blameworthiness. (shrink)

This research examines how the fit between employees moral development and the ethical work climate of their organization affects employee attitudes. Person-organization fit was assessed by matching individuals' level of cognitive moral development with the ethical climate of their organization. The influence of P-O fit on employee attitudes was assessed using a sample of 304 individuals from 73 organizations. In general, the findings support our predictions that fit between personal and organizational ethics is related to higher levels of commitment and (...) job satisfaction and lower levels of turnover intent. Ethical P-O fit was related to higher levels of affective commitment across all three ethical climate types. Job satisfaction was only associated with ethical P-O fit for one of the three P-O fit variables and turnover intentions were significantly associated with two of the ethical P-O fit variables. The most consistent effect was found for the Conventional - Caring fit variable, which was significantly related to all three attitudes assessed. The weakest effect was found for the Preconventional - Instrumental fit variable, which was only predictive of affective commitment. The pattern of findings and implications for practice and future research are discussed. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper critically appraises the arguments that have been offered for what can be called ‘the expressive function of punishment’. According to this view, what distinguishes punishment from other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment is that punishment conveys a censorial/reprobative message about what the punished has done, and that this expressive function should therefore be accepted as part of the nature and definition of punishment. Against this view, this papers argues that the standard account of punishment, according to which punishment (...) is a kind of hard treatment that is imposed on an alleged offender in response to her alleged wrongdoing, can already properly account for punishment and distinguish it from other kinds of hard treatment when it is properly clarified and understood. Thus there is no need to accept the expressive function of punishment in addition to the standard account when it comes to the nature and definition of punishment. (shrink)

Research on justice climate demonstrates a consistent effect on workgroup outcomes such as job satisfaction, commitment, and performance. However, little research considers how justice climate affects these outcomes and when the relationship is stronger or weaker. In an effort to extend the literature on justice climate, we draw on research on other types of organizational climate to suggest justice climate influences the fair behavior of coworkers. Specifically, we propose fair coworker behavior mediates the relationship between justice climate and outcomes. Further, (...) we examine the influence of workgroup structure on this mediated relationship. We examine these relationships in two studies and find support for the mediating effect of fair coworker behavior and the proposed moderated mediation model. Implications of these results for justice and climate research are considered. (shrink)

A liberal society is committed to respecting the rationality and autonomy of its individual members as well as the potential for those characteristics where they have not actually developed. This commitment has provided the basis for liberal criticism of educational practices which instil uncritical convictions in the minds of the young. But the perpetuation of a liberal society depends upon the perpetuation of a strong and widespread allegiance to the contestable values which shape societies of this kind. How can the (...) goal of socialization in a liberal society be achieved while maintaining a thorough respect for the individual learner's potential for rationality and independence of mind? A fashionable answer to this question has been derived from theories of moral reasoning such as R.M. Hare's. In this paper the author argues that the fashionable answer is inadequate and puts forward some positive suggestions about the true nature of a liberal moral education. (shrink)

Why Ayn Rand is important -- Rand's life and writings -- A timeline of Rand's life and work -- Outline of Rand's worldview -- Rand on the nature of reality -- How we understand the world -- Rand on morality -- Politics and economics -- Rand on public issues -- The nature and importance of art -- Rand's novels -- Rand's critics -- Quotations by and about Rand.

Educational practices which reinforce cultural diversity are often commended in the name of pluralism, though such practices may be condemned on the same grounds if they are seen as a threat to the fragile sense of political unity which holds a pluralistic society together. Therefore, the educational implications of pluralism as an ideal are often ambiguous, and the ambiguity cannot be resolved in the absence of a clear understanding of the particular civic virtues which a pluralistic society should engender. Two (...) influential conceptions of civic education which purport to affirm the ideal of pluralism are examined and both are found wanting. Liberal political theory proclaims the paramount importance of justice in public life, and justice can be construed in a way that accomodates diversity. However, the kind of civic education which liberalism entails does too little to restrain the centrifugal forces latent in cultural diversity. Communitarian political theory exalts civic friendship as the supreme public virtue, but the civic education it supports is compatible with only a highly attenuated cultural diversity. A third alternative is canvassed which combines the liberal stress on justice with a conception of patriotism distinct from civic friendship. The implications of this alternative for disputes about bias in public schools are briefly discussed. (shrink)

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes (...) using the intentional binding effect as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; Faith, Worship and Reason in Religious Upbringing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 183–193, https://do.

What does it mean to be un? This is not my question; it’s Jacques Rancière’s. In what follows I assign myself the simple task of explaining this turbulent little prefix and of recounting what this un connotes in Jacques Rancière’s work. More specifically, I tease out what it means in view of his prodigious writings on the politics and practice of education, of what it means to teach, to learn, and to fail to do either, of the aftermath of knowing (...) what it means to know that one does not know what one is doing when one conscientiously engages in teaching and learning, and how that uncertain knowledge can initiate an emancipatory awareness of what is often referred to in Rancière’s work as... (shrink)

Pity is an emotion which is intimately connected with virtue. If I were impervious to anger I could still be a paragon of rectitude. My emotional peculiarity might even be explained by moral saintliness. If I had a pitiless heart my entire life would surely be an abject moral failure. The imputation of an inability to pity strikes us as a damning moral criticism; it is one we are likely to make, for example, against those who commit acts of extreme (...) cruelty. Yet pity is hardly ever welcomed by its recipients, and for that reason it differs in a puzzling way from other emotions which are closely associated with virtue, such as gratitude or compassion. The prospect of becoming an object of pity is alarming, and not merely because we fear the misfortune that would evoke pity in others; it is alarming in part because we suspect that being on the receiving end of that emotion could seriously aggravate our plight. We also regard an aversion to being pitied as commendable, perhaps even morally commendable. There is something shameful in wanting to be pitied, just as there is in the indulgence of self-pity. The aged and the physically disabled do not want our pity, as a rule, and we think better of them for not wanting it. Finally, we know that those who give pity are frequently guilty of serious wrongdoing. A pitiless heart may be a terrible thing, but a fondness for dispensing pity is scarcely any better. (shrink)