Important marine mammal areas (IMMAs)—‘discrete habitat areas, important for one or more marine mammal species, that have the potential to be delineated and managed for conservation’ (IUCN Marine Mammal Protected Areas Task Force 2018, p. 3)—were introduced in 2014 by the IUCN Marine Mammal Protected Areas Task Force to support marine mammal and wider ocean conservation. IMMAs provide decision-makers with a user-friendly, actionable tool to inform them of the whereabouts of habitat important for marine mammal survival. However, in view of (...) their non-prescriptive, evidence-based and biocentric nature, the conservation effectiveness of IMMAs is strictly dependent on politicians’ willingness to make use of them. It has been the customary task of advocacy non-governmental organisations to lobby decision-makers to stimulate respect for environmental law, but the scientific community is increasingly joining this effort. Scientists can effectively strengthen a healthy relationship between scientific objectivity and political advocacy without damaging the credibility of conservation science. Thus, those undertaking the identification of IMMAs can be among those responsible for strongly advocating the implementation of IMMAs and other conservation initiatives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INSCRUTABILITY O:F MORAL EVIL IN KANT ((W:HENCE COMETH EVIL?" Late in his career, Immanuel Kant would turn his attention to this perennial question with an elaborate account of " radical evil " in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. His discussion produced consternation among his admirers, such as Goethe, and continues to produce puzzlement among his commentators. Among the chief difficulties facing the modern-day interpreter has been (...) the welter of complex terminology tossed up by Kant's attempts to tame his topic. The Kant specialist can justifiably suppose that if only he or she could un-scramble the terminology, grasp the intended interconnections among the terms, and set the discussion within the context of the entire critical philosophy, the result would be a reasonably clear view of Kant's theory of the nature and source of moral evil. There is of course some justification to this vaguely masochistic approach to the matter, yet such an approach, I fear, leads inevitably to frustration. This is because, despite all the appearances to the contrary, Kant never really explains moral evil in the discussion of radical evil in Religion. To be sure, he offers a definition of what moral evil is, by the terms of his philosophy. Nevertheless, he never really accounts for evil, nor does he offer anything remotely approaching an answer to my opening question. The deepest part of Kant's analysis is not a response to that question, but a link between moral evil and human freedom, and this link is utterly inexplicable, for the same reason that freedom itself is, for Kant, ultimately inexplicable. Thus, by this reading of the theory of radical evil, we are not finally led to comprehend Kant's view of evil. Instead, we are 246 THE INSCRUTABILITY OF MORAL EVIL IN KANT 247 reminded of the contingent nature of the exercise of freedom, the unfathomable quality of the process of character-building, and, finally, the sheer inscrutability of moral evil itself. Kant is theorizing about human nature in a way that gradually discloses the futility of domesticating this topic conceptually or rationally. This point is worth stressing, partly because of certain stereotypes that persist regarding the things Kant's philosophy supposedly renders in rational form. And, obviously, the point can be stressed in the present context by pursuing further the notion that moral evil is, for Kant, inscrutable. The inscrutability of moral evil does not pop into view all at once, for Kant's discussion in Religion is set in the context of a complex account of the structure of the will, the nature of the incentives capable of determining the will, and the issue of freedom. Consequently, in what follows I shall attempt to trace the Kantian line of thought lying behind his agnosticism regarding the source of moral evil. -IFor Kant, moral evil resides in a maxim.1 A maxim is for him a special kind of principle, one which guides or informs actionin effect, a "practical principle." The very idea of a maxim is a key element in Kant's efforts to determine how reason can be practical. Discourse about maxims is Kant's way of accounting for those practical principles by which we actually do act, instead of only those principles by which we ought ideally to act.2 In effect, a maxim is the guiding principle that I could state to myself were I to reflect upon the overall policy determining a given act (" I should enrich myself by whatever 1 Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 6*7. English translation, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 17. Hereafter referred to as Religion, followed by page numbers in both Weischedel and Greene/Hudson, with all translations taken from the latter. 2 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. trans. Lewis White Beeck, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), pp. 17 n.l, 38 n.9. Q48 GORDON E. MICHALSON means possible," " I should at all times tell the truth "). This distinction between guiding principles by which we actually do... (shrink)

Are there basic religious certainties? That is, are there any beliefs which religious people legitimately hold without the need for rational justification? The question has been tackled, in different ways, by both Hinge Epistemologists and by Reformed Epistemologists. For the former, discussion has revolved around very general religious beliefs such as ‘God exists’ (e.g. Pritchard, 2000; Helm, 2001; Hoyt, 2007; Ariso, 2020). Reformed Epistemologists, like Alvin Plantinga, argue that Christian theism and particular Christian beliefs are ‘properly basic’ in that (...) ‘I don’t believe them on the basis of any other propositions’ (Plantinga, 1981, p. 42). In this paper I want to do two things. First, I give an account of what basic religious certainty is from a Wittgensteinian, Hinge Epistemology point of view. On this account I will argue that the clearest examples of basic religious certainties are found in local, historical and more narrow expressions of religious belief, as opposed to the very general acontextual religious beliefs usually discussed. Secondly, I challenge the Reformed Epistemological notion that Christian doctrine can be ‘properly basic’, mainly by showing that the New Testament writers did not treat very general religious beliefs, such as ‘God exists’ or God is good’, as properly basic in either the Hinge or Reformed Epistemological ways. I will conclude by drawing out some implications for contemporary Christian epistemology. (shrink)

This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will--a "two-way" power which ...

Unhealthy lifestyle contributes significantly to the burden of disease. Scarce medical resources that could alternatively be spent on interventions to prevent or cure sufferings for which no one is to blame, are spent on prevention or treatment of disease that could be avoided through individual lifestyle changes. This may encourage policy makers and health care professionals to opt for a criterion of individual responsibility for medical suffering when setting priorities. The following article asks whether responsibility-based reasoning should be accepted as (...) relevant for fair and legitimate healthcare rationing. The luck-egalitarian argument that inequalities in health expectancies that derive from unchosen features of people’s circumstances are unjust and should be compensated, while inequalities that reflect personal choices of lifestyle may not, is discussed. It seems that while a backward-looking interpretation of individual responsibility cannot be relevant as a criterion of priority setting, a forward-looking conception of responsibility may be approved.Within all modern societies healthcare authorities are facing difficult priority setting problems. Various criteria for rationing medical intervention have been proposed due to scarcity of resources. Until now, individual responsibility for medical suffering has been given little attention in the public or in academic debate. This is about to change. As Alexander Cappelen and Ole Norheim have pointed out in a recent article in this journal, unhealthy lifestyle contributes increasingly to the burden of disease. A better understanding of the responsibility argument is important for the assessment of policies aimed at meeting this challenge.1 In this article the following question is addressed: should responsibility-based arguments be accepted as relevant to meeting healthcare rationing fairly and legitimately? I will argue that while a backward-looking conception of individual responsibility should not be endorsed, a forward-looking notion of responsibility may be approved. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe; Coinciding objects: in defence of the ‘standard account’, Analysis, Volume 55, Issue 3, 1 July 1995, Pages 171–178, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/5.

We analyse the system of ethical review of human research in the Baltic States by introducing the principle of equivalent stringency of ethical review, that is, research projects imposing equal risks and inconveniences on research participants should be subjected to equally stringent review procedures. We examine several examples of non-equivalence or asymmetry in the system of ethical review of human research: (1) the asymmetry between rather strict regulations of clinical drug trials and relatively weaker regulations of other types of clinical (...) biomedical research and (2) gaps in ethical review in the area of non-biomedical human research where some sensitive research projects are not reviewed by research ethics committees at all. We conclude that non-equivalent stringency of ethical review is at least partly linked to the differences in scope and binding character of various international legal instruments that have been shaping the system of ethical review in the Baltic States. Therefore, the Baltic example could also serve as an object lesson to other European countries which might be experiencing similar problems. (shrink)

In this paper, I first of all define various kinds of ontological dependence, motivating these definitions by appeal to examples. My contention is that whenever we need, in metaphysics, to appeal to some notion of existential or identity-dependence, one or other of these definitions will serve our needs adequately, which one depending on the case in hand. Then I respond to some objections to one of these proposed definitions in particular, namely, my definition of (what I call) essential identity-dependence. Finally, (...) I show how a similar approach can be applied in the theory of truthmaking, by offering an account of the truthmaking relation which defines it in terms of a type of essential dependence. I also say why I think that this approach is preferable to one which treats the truthmaking relation as primitive. More generally, my view is that accounts of dependence or ‘grounding’ which treat these notions as primitive are less satisfactory than my own position, which is that in all cases a suitable definition is forthcoming if we look hard enough. (shrink)

Background Informed consent is a requirement for all research. It is not, however, clear how much information is sufficient to make an informed decision about participation in research. Information on an online questionnaire about childhood development was provided through an unfolding electronic participant sheet in three levels of information. Methods 552 participants, who completed the web-based survey, accessed and spent time reading the participant information sheet (PIS) between July 2008 and November 2009. The information behaviour of the participants was investigated. (...) The first level contained less information than might be found on a standard PIS, the second level corresponded to a standard PIS, and the third contained more information than on a standard PIS. The actual time spent on reading the information provided in three incremental levels and the participants' evaluation of the information were calculated. Results 77% of the participants chose to access the first level of information, whereas 12% accessed the first two levels, 6% accessed all three levels of information and 23% participated without accessing information. The most accessed levels of information were those that corresponded to the average reading times. Conclusion The brief information provided in the first level was sufficient for participants to make informed decisions, while a sizeable minority of the participants chose not to access any information at all. This study adds to the debate about how much information is required to make a decision about participation in research and the results may help inform the future development of information sheets by providing data on participants' actual needs when deciding about questionnaire surveys. (shrink)

Clinical diagnostic medicine is an experimental science based on observation, hypothesis making, and testing. It is an use dynamic process that involves observation and summary, diagnostic conjectures, testing, review, observation and summary, new or revised conjectures, i.e. it is an iterative process. It can then be said that diagnostic hypotheses are also ‘observation-laden’. My aim is to enlarge on the strategies of medical diagnosis as these are meshed in training and clinical experience—that is, to describe the patterns of reasoning used (...) by experienced clinicians under different diagnostic circumstances and how these patterns of inquiry allow further insight into the evaluation and treatment of patients. I do not aim to present a theory and illustrate it with examples; I wish rather am to let a realistic example, similar to actual clinical scenarios, direct the exposition. To this end, I introduce an account of medical diagnosis—briefly comparing and contrasting it to other accounts—in order to focus on discussing the process of diagnosis through a detailed clinical case. (shrink)

This paper assesses several prominent recent attacks on the view that epistemic justification is conceptually prior to knowledge. I argue that this view—call it the Received View (RV)—emerges from these attacks unscathed. I start with Timothy Williamson’s two strongest arguments for the claim that all evidence is knowledge (E>K), which impugns RV when combined with the claim that justification depends on evidence. One of Williamson’s arguments assumes a false epistemic closure principle; the other misses some alternative (to E>K) explanations of (...) a putative fact about the evidence a particular subject has. Next, I neutralize each of Jonathan Sutton’s three recent arguments to the conclusion that any justified belief constitutes knowledge. Finally, I consider a recent analysis of justification due to Alexander Bird, according to which justified belief is possible knowledge. I argue that Bird’s analysis delivers neither a sufficient nor (more importantly) a necessary condition for justification. [Word count: 149]. (shrink)

"This comprehensive and illuminating collection of essays by Errol E. Harris covers the entire range of Hegel's philosophy, emphasizing Hegel's contemporary relevance, elucidating difficult and controversial questions, and revealing Hegel's insight into key philosophical problems. It presents Hegel's philosophy as consistent, credible, and prophetic in its anticipation of modern scientific developments." "Professor Harris concentrates on key points of controversy and attempts to resolve them by stressing the prevailing consistency of Hegel's thought, interpreted as realistic holism. In this context Harris explains (...) Hegel's idealism as objective, in a way that reconciles the earlier oppositions of idealism to realism, rationalism to empiricism, and reason to revelation." "Much space and discussion is given to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature as the crucial issue in judging whether Hegel is a pure idealist, or is a realist in the same sense and to the same degree as A. N. Whitehead. The final chapter compares the philosophies of Hegel and Whitehead to throw light on this question and to underline the book's two main purposes: to highlight Hegel's contemporary relevance and to insist on the essential realism of this thought." "Key questions, such as those of the body-mind relationship, political liberalism, international relations, and the so-called end of history, are addressed in the course of what amounts to a general presentation of the character and scope of Hegel's philosophy."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

David Ricardo was a hugely influential British political economist and stock trader. This volume, first published in 1923, contains five important pamphlets published by him, edited and with an overarching introductory essay by E. C. K. Gonner. Each essay relates either to monetary and financial subjects - including the high price of Bullion, monetary theory and the position of the Bank of England - or to the agricultural conditions of Britain and proposed solutions to the problems discussed. This is a (...) fascinating and detailed work, which will be of great value to those with an interest in Ricardo’s theories and British economic history. (shrink)

Tsc question of the date of Ctesibius has been much obscured of late years by those German scholars1 who assert that Ctesibius the pneumatic and hydraulic engineer mentioned by Vitruvius IX. 8. 2 is distinct and separate from Κτησίβιος Κτησίβιος μηΧανικός who is mentioned by Athenaeus Mechanicus , Philo of Byzantium , and Hedylus ap. Athenaeum Naucratitam Deipn. XI., p. 497, d-e = Anthologia Graeca ed. Cougny, Paris , 1890, Vol. III., p. 298, n. 67.

OBJECTIVES: To analyse the attitudes of medical personnel towards terminally ill patients and their right to be fully informed. DESIGN: Self-administered questionnaire composed of 56 closed questions. SETTING: Three general hospitals and eleven health centres in Granada (Spain). The sample comprised 168 doctors and 207 nurses. RESULTS: A high percentage of medical personnel (24.1%) do not think that informing the terminally ill would help them face their illness with greater serenity. Eighty-four per cent think the patient's own home is the (...) best place to die: 8.9% of the subjects questioned state that the would not like to be informed of an incurable illness. CONCLUSION: In our opinion any information given should depend on the patient's personality, the stage of the illness and family circumstances. Our study confirms that a hospital is not the ideal environment for attending to the needs of the terminally ill and their families. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage se propose de mener l'enquête tant sur les accusations de scepticisme et sur les modes de défenses spécifiques que ces dernières imposent de mettre en place, que sur la façon dont les mêmes arguments circulent et peuvent servir à des projets contraires. Cette perspective polémique permet ainsi de s'interroger sur les étiquettes philosophiques, sur la circulation des arguments, et sur leur force et leur portée, non seulement au sein du corpus sceptique, mais aussi à l'intérieur des systèmes sommés (...) de répondre aux questions qu'ils posent."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)