The semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce is irreducibly triadic, positing that a sign mediates between the object that determines it and the interpretant that it determines. He eventually holds that each sign has two objects and three interpretants, standardizing quickly on immediate and dynamical for the objects but experimenting with a variety of names for the interpretants. The two most prominent terminologies are immediate/dynamical/final and emotional/energetic/logical, and scholars have long debated how they are related to each other. This paper seeks (...) to shed new light on the matter by reviewing the numerous manuscript drafts where Peirce develops the latter nomenclature while attempting to introduce his pragmatism to a general audience. It then goes on to examine an additional set of interpretants, intentional/effectual/communicational, and shows that the three different trichotomies can be understood as complementary, rather than redundant or conflicting. (shrink)

Borderline personality disorder is a complex psychopathological phenomenon. It is usually thought to consist in a vast instability of different aspects that are central to our experience of the world, and to manifest as “a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity” [American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 663]. Typically, of the instability triad—instability in self, affect and emotion, and interpersonal relationships—only the first two are described, examined, and conceptualized from an experiential point of view. (...) In this context, disorders of self have often motivated analyses of self-experience and the sense of self, affective disorders have been frequently considered in the light of emotional experience and its phenomenological structure. Patterns in the phenomenology of social experience have found comparatively little traction when it comes to the conceptualization of the interpersonal disturbances in borderline. In this paper, I argue that interpersonal instability in borderline consists in much more than fragile and shifting relationships but, most importantly, also involves certain styles in experiencing others. These styles, I suggest, may play an explanatory role for the borderline-typical patterns of interpersonal turmoil and so deserve more attention. To better describe and understand these styles, I explore the phenomenological structure of borderline affective instability and discuss the implications it might have for how a person experiences and relates to other people. Considering core aspects of borderline affective instability, such as alexithymia, emotional contagion, emotion dysregulation, and chronic emptiness, I propose borderline can be interpreted as a disturbance of interaffective exchange, which gives rise to certain ways of experiencing others that imply a social impairment. (shrink)

Do non-human animals have an interest in sociopolitical freedom? Cochrane has recently taken up this important yet largely neglected quest ion. He argues that animal freedom is not a relevant moral concern in itself, because animals have a merely instrumental but not an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). This paper will argue that even if animals have a merely instrumental interest in freedom, animal freedom should nonetheless be an important goal for our relationships with animals. Drawing on recent (...) work on the value of freedom, it will be argued that freedom is non-specifically instrumentally valuable. Accordingly, freedom is a means to other goods, but often it is not possible to identify those goods in advance or aim for them directly. Some of the reasons that make freedom non-specifically valuable for human relationships, it will be argued, also apply to relationships between humans and animals. Amongst other implications, it will be shown how this argument provides a response to those who fear that stricter animal protection policies might undermine people’s freedom: A concern for freedom actually requires stricter protection policies rather than speak against them. (shrink)

This article investigates whether religious experience can be conceived in such a way that the perceiver's religious expertise (via cognitive penetration or perceptual learning) contributes to the justificatory power of the experience. It also considers what kind of content religious experience would have to have to be able to justify standard types of religious beliefs. It argues that, against first impressions, religious expertise cannot supplement perceptual justification. At the same time, to the extent that religious experience has singular contents or (...) Gestalt contents, it may well be able to justify religious belief in virtue of such contents. (shrink)

With an eye on the power of literary utopias that forever remain on the printed page, architects have struggled with the question of whether architecture in practice—real buildings—can be utopian. Many architectural utopias have been imagined—unbuilt and even unbuildable—but does the act of rendering one into physical form eliminate its utopian potential? Recent scholarship, breaking with a generation of postmodern cynicism, has suggested that it does not and has pointed architectural utopias in new directions. But the incongruity between the burden (...) of being both real and radically transformative remains daunting.Despite this threshold conundrum, the contemporary era is no less wanting of new utopias than ages... (shrink)

This specimen of a forthcoming book on the void in ancient natural philosophy by using an example illustrates the problems that confront the scholar. The term εὐτονία, used by Chrysippus, occurs in the Pneumatics of Hero of Alexandria in connection with empty pores. Has he borrowed the notion from Stoic philosophy, or was Strato of Lampsacus, older than Chrysippus, the first to use it? In all probability it was Ctesibius who independently of Stoic philosophy applied the term to account for (...) the kinetic qualities of the material used for his inventions, and Philo Byzantius took over the notion from him. Hero may have derived it from Ctesibius either directly or via Philo. (shrink)

Warum das Böse? Mit keiner geringeren Frage als der Rechtfertigung eines Gott genannten allmächtigen, allwissenden und allgütigen Wesens angesichts der unbestreitbaren Existenz der Übel in der Welt setzten sich G. W.

This edited collection is the first volume solely dedicated to research on Johann Gottfried Herder's understanding of history, time, and temporalities. Forms of Temporality and Historical Time in the Work of Johann Gottfried Herder is ideal for scholars, graduates, and postgraduates interested in Herder's metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of history, as well as any scholar concerned with 18th-century concepts of time and the emergence of the modern world at the beginning of the 19th century.

I. From Psychoanalysis to Political Christology In the wake of critical theory, Herbert Marcuse interprets the dialectic of enlightenment not only from a Marxist perspective, as the co-optation of the movements toward freedom by the capitalist regime. With Sigmund Freud, he also recognizes the cyclic logic of the civilizing process, which appears in the oedipal dramaturgy. Until now, the father's removal by the son has always been followed by a restoration of the ruling principle through the son, Marcuse writes in (...) Eros and Civilization.1 For Marcuse, enlightenment thus becomes transparent in its oedipal myth. The psychoanalytical insight…. (shrink)