In this essay, I first analyze the extension of hermeneutical interpretation in the Heideggerian sense to products of contemporary technology which are components of our “lifeworld”. Products of technology, such as airplanes, laptops, cellular phones, washing machines, or vacuum cleaners might be compared with what Heidegger calls the “Ready-to-hand” (das Zuhandene) with regard to utilitarian objects such as a hammer, planer, needle and door handle in Being and Time. Our life with our equipment, which represents the “Ready-to-hand” in Heidegger's sense (...) of the word, is determined by temporalization (Zeitigung) which cannot be separated and isolated from the wholeness of things in the world. In the second part of my paper, I explore the positive achievement of material hermeneutics (Don Ihde) with regard to its extension to technoscience and the discussion of how such hermeneutics can contribute to the preservation of our threatened lifeworld, but also to explore the possibilities of how technical inventions, medical innovations could improve our way of life. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s arguments against epistemic privacy. The main focus of the paper is to explore their views on this issue and examine the connections between their argumentation and that of Saul Kripke to see to what extent these views coincide. The reason for comparing the said authors is that they all oppose the received view of the argument against private language, which claims that the discussion of private language begins with (...) PI 243. In fact, these philosophers claim that Wittgenstein already discussed the issue of the impossibility of a private language in his rule–following reflections, especially in PI 201 and 202. We will also explore some drawbacks of the interpretation of Wittgenstein offered by the Hintikkas and attempt to provide an overall perspective of the viability of their position in relation to Wittgenstein’s argument against epistemic privacy. (shrink)

Ugledni mislitelji hermeneutičke filozofije Wilhelm Dilthey i Hans-Georg Gadamer okarakterizirali su Matiju Vlačića Ilirika kao klasika hermeneutičkog pristupa filozofiji. Taj sud dodatno dobiva na snazi jer su Dilthey i Gadamer okarakterizirani kao pristaše relativističke hermeneutike, dok je Vlačić inzistirao na adekvatnom razumijevanju i interpretiranju teksta. Uzevši u obzir da je za Vlačića ključno pravilo bilo da tekst treba tumačiti sukladno njegovu imanentnom smislu, razradio je dvije interpretacijske maksime, skop i hermeneutički krug, presudne za daljnji razvoj i konstituiranje hermeneutike kao metode (...) razumijevanja, dok ga se po našemu sudu istodobno može smatrati i anticipatorom načela blagonaklonosti. Za objašnjenje složenog hermeneutičkog odnosa cjeline i dijelova teksta, Vlačić je kombinirao induktivno-sintetičku i deduktivnu metodu. Taj odnos predstavlja zahtjevan proces provedbe hermeneutičkog kruga u kojem je na djelu primjena modela koherentnosti istine u heurističkom postupku razumijevanja. Drugim riječima, radi se o postupnoj rekonstrukciji smisla teksta. Tijekom tog eksplanativnoga procesa postaje razvidno da je značenje pojedinih dijelova i manjih tematskih cjelina razumljivo tek iz strukture i kompozicije cjeline teksta i da postupna induktivno-sintetička rekonstrukcija smisla teksta pretpostavlja primjenu deduktivne analize. Nadalje, u heurističkom procesu iščitavanja teksta nužno je provjeriti kako se konzistentnost pojedinih odlomaka i cjelina teksta koherentno uklapa u širu cjelinu, a interpretacijske maksime, skop i hermeneutički krug, pritom se ispostavljaju kao pouzdan organon u heurističkom procesu razumijevanja i objašnjenja teksta. U tom kontekstu je Vlačićev hermeneutički zahtjev za adekvatnom rekonstrukcijom smisla usporediv s načelom blagonaklonosti kako ga razumijeva Donald Davidson, postavljajući ga kao jedan od osnovnih pojmova svoje filozofije. Naime, Vlačić polazi od pretpostavke razložnosti govora i argumentacije, što podrazumijeva mogućnost hermeneutičke rekonstrukcije teksta i njegovog adekvatnog razumijevanja. Davidson je također, pomoću teorije triangulacije, pokušao pokazati kako objektivni svijet u jeziku komunikacije postaje intersubjektivni svijet razumijevanja i uvažavanja, čime zapravo želi pokazati da je naše razumijevanje izvanjskog svijeta uvjetovano zajedničkim sustavom znanja i modelom komuniciranja koji nikada ne može imati individualistička obilježja jer, jednostavno, participiramo u zajedničkom svijetu. Davidsonov koncept triangulacije na novi način je obilježio model hermeneutičke čestitosti koji je već zagovarao predstavnik prosvjetiteljske hermeneutike Georg Friedrich Meier. S obzirom na to da se problem antirealističkog pristupa ne može riješiti pozivanjem na kruti hermeneutički realizam ili objektivizam, ono što tekstom želimo pokazati jest da bi hermeneutiku, za razliku od npr. Rortyja, trebalo shvatiti kao interpretacijski konsenzus struke koji je uspostavljen u okvirima akademske zajednice. To je u skladu sa stavovima Paula Lorenzena, koje je u, pogledu akademskog konsenzusa s obzirom na interpretativnost, slijedio i Jürgen Habermas u izradi svoje teorije komunikativnog djelovanja. (shrink)

In its early development philosophy of science did not allow the possibility of a relativistic approach with regard to explanation of external phenomena. Relativism was seen as justified exclusively with regard to internal phenomena, for example, in the realm of moral and aesthetic judgment. In the realm of moral judgment, external realism functions as a necessary hypothesis, according to which our moral judgment and moral decisions have a real effect in the external world, for which we can be held responsible. (...) A paradigm shift in the theory of science, inaugurated by Th. S. Kuhn, led to the rise of relativism with regard to judgment in the realm of external phenomena and specifically with regard to the validity of scientific theories. Critics of relativism do not take into account that it is not enough to point out the logical inconsistency of relativism. Most arguments for scientific justification of external realism are doomed to failure, because they do not take into account the role of the judgmental subject. In this article I will show that the role of “second nature” is significant not only for the constitution of moral realism, but also for the implementation of scientific naturalism. (shrink)

In seiner Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes hat Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel die Grundlagen einer Anthropologie und Psychologie entwickelt, die den Menschen im Blick auf Vernunft und Freiheit bestimmt. Was auf den ersten Blick hoffnungslos antiquiert zu sein scheint, gewinnt Brisanz und Aktualität dadurch, dass Hegel seine Auffassung in eindringlichen Auseinandersetzungen mit scheinbar widersprechenden Phänomenen begründet und den subjektiven Geist im Zusammenhang seiner natürlichen, gesellschaftlichen sowie geschichtlichen Bestimmtheit reflektiert. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes gehen auf eine Tagung zurück, welche von der (...) Hegel-Gesellschaft Zadar in Verbindung mit der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft e.V. vom 23. bis 27. Februar 2011 an der Universität Zadar organisiert wurde. Auf der Grundlage einer historischen und systematischen Rekonstruktion der Hegelschen Anthropologie und Psychologie wird Hegels Konzept auch im Blick auf aktuelle philosophische Problematiken diskutiert, um Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes in ihrer thematischen Vielfalt für die gegenwärtigen Diskussionen zu erschließen. (shrink)

In our paper, we explore the question of what is wrong with Neurath’s “plank-by-plank” method, which Quine later also adopted with enthusiasm. Shipbuilding experts will confirm that plank-byplank replacement is only possible in the dock and never on the open sea. This is simply empty talk, flatus vocis, often attributed to philosophers. The main problem with Neurath’s ship metaphor is that it is completely alien to the seafarers’ way of life, or even in stark contradiction to it. If it is (...) the task of philosophy to bring order into the house of concepts, the use of metaphors should also be scrutinized. Any practical test of the plank-by-plank methodology would prove unsuccessful, for as soon as one would remove a plank from the ship, the ship would sink very quickly due to the onslaught of the water. If the philosophers argue for empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should not use such utopian metaphors in which the practical life world is completely ignored. When philosophers argue for an empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should be more careful in their use of metaphors that exclude empiricism, practice, and the practical world of life. It is rather a vivid example of abstract armchair philosophy to explain how science works. Finally, it remains a problem to elaborate a concept of epistemology by “philosophizing” abstractly about empiricism and empiricist epistemology without referring to concrete life experiences. Neurath’s boat metaphor, praised by Quine, is, unfortunately, an example of epistemology without reference to concrete forms of life, and it is still questionable whether we can achieve anything factually with such non-functional metaphors, let alone make the process of cognition scientifically plausible. The whole thing is reminiscent of the scholastic witty remark about how someone convincingly tries to talk about swimming without jumping into the water. Every sailor knows that a ship could only be serviced and repaired in a dock. Seafaring as a way of life, all the turbulence associated with this form of life, obviously remained unknown to Neurath, who spent most of his life in a continental, mountainous country, so it is fair to say that he used a very unusual metaphor not grounded in the practice of life, which, to make the paradox even greater, is meant to represent a naturalistic-empiricist concept of knowledge. (shrink)

In the following article, I will explain Hegel’s definition of modernity from the point of view of his understanding of “Bildung,” since this is a fundamental and newly relevant theme of Hegel’s philosophy nowadays. “Bildung” can be transliterated as education, but may also be interpreted as a general formative or developmental process, or cultivation. With the term “Bildung” Hegel also refers to the formative self-development of the mind, its coming to individual as well as collective flourishing. The objective spirit manifests (...) itself in the culture of humans. However, education in the sense of “Bildung” does not take place primarily through the transmission of information, values, norms, etc. by the teacher, but through “experience” [Erfahrung], which signifies the conflicting process by which a spiritual being discovers its own identity or self, while at the same time striving for self-consciousness, which is in the process of self-discovery. Through education, the human mind develops its capacity for understanding, reflection and judgment, and thus overcomes its natural intellectual, spiritual, normative, aesthetic, etc., poverty. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to give some reasons why we absolutely need a philosophical approach to tourism. Hegel understood philosophy as “its own time, comprehended in thoughts” (Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of the Right [1821] TWA 7: 26, cf. Hegel 1991, 21). We are presently living under conditions of constant uncertainty in a fluid, globalized society which lacks thoroughgoing and homogenous ethical norms, but which is nevertheless characterized by universal wants and needs. Tourism is one of the (...) crucial features of our global society of consumerism. Postmodern global citizens affirm their identity as tourists by hedonistically pursuing the fulfilment of their excessive desires at popular vacation resorts. Others increase their reputation by booking flights to elite or esoteric destinations and accommodation in expensive hotels. Travel, tourism, and leisure are considered basic human rights – although a large part of the world’s population has no access to these amenities and hardly any prospect of ever benefiting from them. These contradictory phenomena of our contemporary human existence require closer examination. If we want to grasp our time in thoughts or form an appropriate judgment about our epoch, then we need to reflect also on tourism, because it is one of the fundamental, inescapable determinants of our present life-world. (shrink)

Das "Hegel-Jahrbuch" ist das Jahrbuch der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft. die 1953 von Wilhelm Raimund Beyer in Nürnberg gegründet wurde. Es erscheint seit 1961und wurde bis 1984 von W. R. Beyer, seither vom jeweils amtierenden Vorstand der Gesellschaft herausgegeben. Seit 1994 erscheint das Jahrbuch im Akademie Verlag. Es dokumentiert die Beiträge der Internationalen Hegel-Kongresse, die alle zwei Jahre zu wechselnden Schwerpunktthemen stattfinden.

Concept and interpretation are key philosophical terms that have played a major part in shaping modern thinking from the beginning of the modern age through post-modernity. The papers in this volume examine the historical dimensions of concept and interpretation as an approach, method, and thinking process, and also inquire critically about their relevance today, thereby taking general inventory of thinking in the modern age.

At the heart of Hegel s Aesthetics is the idea of the beautiful as unity. This unity turns fragile once the mind's self-awareness becomes conceptual and extends beyond sensory illusion. Focusing the philosophy of art on the idea of the beautiful raises a set of systematic problems, which are discussed with regard to Hegel s Aesthetics, its historical contexts, and its reception.".

This article explores Hegels concept of education within the context of his idea of ‘second nature’. Hegel believes that institutional life forms, which have been formed through education, culture, technical and social progress, constitute the ‘second nature’ of human beings. The immediacy of institutional forms which act as humans’ ‘second nature’ is the product of social and cultural mediation. The phenomenon of morality is here of central importance, because through morality the natural arbitrariness of the will is transformed and the (...) substantial spirit of freedom prevails. In Hegel’s opinion, human individuals differ from animals on account of education ; only through education does the human being become that which he should be. Bildung is a ‘formatio’ of the personality, which transcends particular knowledge, because it enables one to make a judgment concerning relationships and objects of our experience. By education human beings achieve the ability to raise themselves up from the concrete to the universal. We become conscious thereby that we exist within the ‘realm of the spirit’ and educate ourselves from its abundance. (shrink)

In the present volume, the significance of judgment for the understanding and evaluation of the interpretandum is analyzed. It is a complex endeavor in which existing forms of interpretation are examined and improved from the standpoint of the current state of research. Subjective interpretative approaches are corrected by recourse to a commonly understood truth and are judged from the standpoint of the commitment and consensus of scholars. Even if a work or an interpretandum has been understood and interpreted differently and (...) pluralistically, this does not mean that all presented and existing interpretations are equally valid, acceptable, and defensible. Therefore, it is important and necessary in any process of understanding to strive for a proper assessment of the work or interpretandum. The contributions are from the conference held at the University of Zadar, Relevance of Hermeneutic Judgment. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the manner in which Dieter Henrich's theory of subjectivity has emerged from the fundamental questions of German Idealism, and in what manner and to what extent this theory effects a reinstatement of metaphysics. In so doing, I shall argue that Henrich's position represents a viable refutation of the attempt of the physicalist explanation of the world to prove the concept of the subject to be superfluous. Henrich's metaphysics of subjectivity is primarily focused on the 'ultimate (...) questions' which also compose "the deep levels of our subjectivity" and concern the factors that should promote stability in our emotional, moral and intellectual life. I argue with Henrich that the indisputable facticity of our conscious life is worthy of our special consideration and interpretation, explanation and clarification, just as the deeper meaning hidden beneath the layers of apparent comprehensibility calls for urgent investigation. Such interpretation and elucidation of life's meaning has a tripartite character: first, it consists of clarification of the totality of human experience together with the realities playing a part in it; second, it builds on the process by which the contents of experience are cognized, and the knowledge thereof which results; thirdly, it embraces the transcendental precondition enabling each and every one of us to consciously lead our lives—for life, in a human sense, does not merely happen to one. Henrich's metaphysical foundation of subjectivity is compared with Kolak's position, according to which individual consciousness is not insular, but integrated into the totality of overall unity that some have called "the Universal Self, "the Noumenal Self. (shrink)

Staat und Kultur treten erst zu Hegels Lebzeiten in ein Verhaltnis, das spater mit dem Begriff Kulturstaat bezeichnet werden wird. Auch gebraucht Hegel den Terminus Kultur, den Herder gerade erst im modernen Sinne gepragt hatte, so gut wie nicht. Dennoch gehort Hegel zweifellos zu denjenigen Denkern, die das Verhaltnis von Staat und Kultur der Sache nach verhandelt und neu bestimmt haben. Grundlage hierfur ist sein Begriff des Geistes, der alle Merkmale des modernen Kulturbegriffs in sich schliesst: die Umformung der Natur, (...) die Gesellschaftlichkeit und die Geschichtlichkeit. Der Staat ist zentrales Element des geistigen Prozesses und daher selbst Bestandteil von Kultur, aber nach Hegel auch deren elementare Voraussetzung. Hierdurch ist das Verhaltnis von Staat und Kultur bei Hegel hoch komplex gestaltet und mitunter im Einzelnen auch schwer zu bestimmen und spannungsreich.". (shrink)

This article explores the interplay between technê and hermeneutics within Platonic philosophy. It begins by delving into the origins of hermeneutics, stemming from the Greek term hermeneutikê technê, and how Plato’s dialogues serve as a model for philosophical hermeneutics. It discusses the practical nature of Socratic knowledge and the role of technê in Plato’s works, emphasizing the unity and diversity of virtues and the ethical implications of professional and virtuous knowledge. The article also examines the hermeneutical significance of technê in (...) Plato’s works and its influence on philosophers like Schleiermacher and Heidegger. Schleiermacher’s mistranslation of poiêsis as poetry instead of creation is highlighted, along with Heidegger’s interpretation of technê as a bringing-forth, revealing the deeper hermeneutical dimension of Platonic poiêsis. The article concludes by reflecting on the relevance of hermeneutics in our technological society, emphasizing the need to incorporate modern technology into our understanding of the world. (shrink)