Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is a paradoxical phenomenon. I here examine two of the most widespread ways of dealing with the paradoxical nature of forgiveness. One of these ways, emblematized by Aurel Kolnai, seeks to resolve the paradox by appealing to the idea of repentance. Somehow, if a wrongdoer repents, then forgiving her is no longer paradoxical. I argue that this influential position faces more problems than it solves. The other way to approach the paradox, exemplified here by the (...) work of Jacques Derrida, is just too obscure to be by itself helpful. Yet, I argue that what I take to be its spirit is on the right track. I recommend distinguishing between the definition and the justification of forgiveness, and also between forgiveness understood as a mental phenomenon and an overt, communicative act. These distinctions are not given their due in the specialized literature, and I expose the nefarious consequences of this neglect. By focusing on forgiveness as a mental phenomenon I seek to analyze the root of the talk of paradoxes which surrounds the discussion of forgiveness. Finally, I present an analysis of forgiveness as a pure mental phenomenon, and argue that this analysis is the most important step in understanding forgiveness in any other sense. While my analysis reveals interesting aspects of forgiveness, it reveals, too, that forgiveness is not quite as paradoxical after all. (shrink)

Recently, the concept of "gender identity" has enjoyed a great deal of attention in gender metaphysics. This seems to be motivated by the goal of creating trans-inclusive theory, by explaining trans people's genders. In this paper, we aim to unmotivate this project. Notions of "gender identity" serve important pragmatic purposes for trans people, such as satisfying the curiosity of non-trans people, and, relatedly, securing our access to important goods like legal rights and medical care. However, we argue that this does (...) not mean that "gender identity" is a metaphysically substantial thing that deserves extensive theoretical attention. There are reasons to be skeptical of such a concept. We trace the history of "gender identity," primarily to identify its roots in trans-antagonistic medical theory and its connections to the problematic "wrong-body" model--a legacy that has pathologized and flattened trans experience. Moreover, we argue that trans people primarily use "gender identity" to explain ourselves to non-trans people, rather than to discuss ourselves among ourselves. Thus, we urge theorists to resist the urge to substantiate gender identity. Instead, we encourage the development of new and better concepts, ones that attend to the lived realities of trans community and the flourishing gender terms and practices that are constructed there. If these lived realities are taken seriously, there is no need to “explain” trans people’s genders; we can simply see them as they are. (shrink)

Derek Parfit has recently defended the view that no one can ever deserve to suffer. Were this view correct, its implications for the thorny problem of the justification of punishment would be extraordinary: age-old debates between consequentialists and retributivists would simply vanish, as punishment would only—and simply—be justifiable along Benthamite utilitarian lines. I here suggest that Parfit’s view is linked to uncharacteristically weak arguments, and that it ought to be rejected.

This profound analysis of the nature of art is the culmination of a series of essays and polemics on issues of morality, social justice, and religion. Considering and rejecting the idea that art reveals and reinvents through beauty, Tolstoy perceives the question of the nature of art to be a religious one. Ultimately, he concludes, art must be a force for good, for the progress and improvement of mankind. For more than seventy years, Penguin has been the leading publisher of (...) classic literature in the English-speaking world. With more than 1,700 titles, Penguin Classics represents a global bookshelf of the best works throughout history and across genres and disciplines. Readers trust the series to provide authoritative texts enhanced by introductions and notes by distinguished scholars and contemporary authors, as well as up-to-date translations by award-winning translators. (shrink)

This book provides close examination of ontology and the work of Professor Barry Smith, one of the most prolific philosophers of the modern day. In this book numerous scholars who have collaborated with Smith explore the various disciplines in which the impact of his work has been felt over the breadth of his career, including biology, computer science and informatics, cognitive science, economics, genetics, geography, law, neurology, and philosophy itself. While offering in-depth perspectives on ontology, the book also expands upon (...) the breadth of Smith’s influence. With insights from renowned and influential scholars from many different countries, this book is an informative and enlightening celebration of all Smith has contributed to numerous academic schools of thought. (shrink)

In this classic analysis, Leo Strauss pinpoints what is original and innovative in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.

The appeal of the moral principle according to which we should treat like cases alike is so great that it verges on the axiomatic, or on the platitudinous. Recently, however, the principle has been challenged in deeply interesting ways. These ways are interesting because they do not invite skepticism about morality at large, but about the specific claim that what is good (or bad) for an agent in a given situation must be good (or bad) for any other similarly situated (...) agent. I here assess the post-challenge viability of the principle. In a sense, the principle survives, but this is neither an unqualified victory nor an inspiring result. The examination of these matters contains an important (and under-investigated) lesson about the nature of moral experience. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal Brandon Warmke argues against my account of forgiveness. I here offer answers to his objections, and suggest ways in which I think he has misinterpreted my views. This exchange with Warmke also gives me the opportunity to insist on my general thesis that it is advisable to study punishment and forgiveness together. It is precisely the conceptual proximity of these two phenomena which make my account of forgiveness uncommon, and which make it more (...) promising than other accounts. (shrink)

Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm is the most recent systematic attempt to defend the good old utilitarian justification of punishment. The attempt fails for a variety of reasons, which are here explored. First, the attempt presupposes an implausible account of human’s psychology. Second, the attempt confuses an attack on retributivism with an attack on certain criminal justice systems. Finally, Tadros admits that his justification of punishment is best seen as a mere step along the road to full-blown abolitionism – (...) and so he unwittingly admits the extraordinarily thin sense in which he could be said to be really attempting to justify punishment. (shrink)

El desarrollo de las ciencias sociales enfrenta retos complejos que incluyen elegir la metodología y desarrollo teórico adecuados para abordar sus objetos de estudio. Para contribuir a enfrentar estos retos, se toma como punto de partida el amplio reconocimiento de que un criterio para la aceptación o rechazo de teorías consiste en tomar en cuenta su capacidad para dar cuenta de los fenómenos sociales. Este trabajo se propone mostrar que el desarrollo de teorías que nos permitan comprender los fenómenos sociales (...) requiere de la incorporación de métodos deductivos. La incorporación de tales métodos permitirá fortalecer las teorías en las ciencias sociales y aportará herramientas para resolver algunos de sus problemas más apremiantes. Para ello, se muestra cómo incorporar derivaciones deductivas puede contribuir a solventar la crisis de la falta de desarrollo teórico en ciencias sociales. A continuación, se presentan argumentos desde la filosofía de la ciencia que muestran cómo la incorporación de métodos y relaciones deductivas en las teorías contribuye a su fortalecimiento. Reconociendo la necesidad de complementar estos métodos con enfoques epistemológicos pluralistas, se responde a varias críticas dirigidas al uso de métodos deductivos en las ciencias empíricas en general y en las ciencias sociales en particular. (shrink)

In this epistolary exploration, scholars delve into Spinozas profound observations, offering urgent insights for our contemporary crossroads. Illuminates Spinoza s relevance, emphasizing the need to prioritize love, generosity, and solidarity as the bedrock of an ethical responsibility. These letters, a beacon of wisdom nowadays, implore us to recognize our shared dependence and embrace a new ethical framework. Amidst societal disintegration, Spinoza s teachings serve as a guiding light, ushering us toward a profound transformation, where compassion and understanding shape a future (...) beyond our current precipice. (shrink)

Helvetius -- Die Sozietätsphilosophie Franz von Baaders -- Gewalt und Recht in der Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie Rousseaus und der deutschen idealistischen Philosophie -- Das Dämonische.

Today’s medical ethics involve two different viewpoints based on how we understand the role of conscience in medicine and the purpose of healthcare. The first view, called the health-directed model, sees medicine as a way to improve health and promote healing, while also respecting the values of both patients and doctors. In this model, doctors need some discretionary space to decide how to achieve the best health outcomes in their practice. On the other hand, the service-provider model sees the main (...) goal of medicine as providing a service, especially healthcare, with a strong focus on protecting patient autonomy. In this view, doctors are required to provide care even when it goes against their personal beliefs. The goal of this article is to explore the foundations and arguments of these two medical models. Understanding the key ideas behind these models is important for deciding whether to support or oppose conscientious objection in medical ethics. Additionally, the article aims to figure out which model makes a stronger case and to offer advice on how to engage with the opposing view from a virtue ethics perspective. (shrink)

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctioned investor-paid rating agency Egan-Jones for falsely stating that it did not know its clients’ investment positions. The SEC’s action against Egan-Jones raises the broad question whether knowledge of clients’ investment positions creates a conflict of interest for investor-paid ratings. In an experimental setting, we find that investor-paid rating agencies are likely to assign credit ratings that are biased in favor of their clients’ positions, and that this effect is attenuated when the rated company (...) has a sophisticated investor base that is expected to scrutinize ratings. The effect is not conditional on the risk profile of the rated companies. Taken together, our findings suggest that a conflict of interest stemming from investors’ preferences is likely to bias ratings under investor-pays business models, but scrutiny by the company’s investor base can counteract this bias. (shrink)