It is beyond serious dispute that post-war reflection upon and research into moral education and development has been well nigh dominated by an extensive and ambitious research programme influenced and initiated by the modem cognitive developmental theorist Lawrence Kohlberg — a programme which can also be seen, moreover, as standing in a tradition of philosophical reflection about the nature of moral life going back to such significant enlightenment thinkers as Kant and Rousseau. It will also be familiar, however, that (...) a powerful critique of this essentially liberal conception of the nature of moral life and values has lately gathered momentum under the influence of contemporary post-analytical and communitarian social and moral theorists variously under the spell of Aristotle. In the first place, then, this paper argues that a basically Kohlbergian approach to thinking about moral education is difficult — if not impossible — to sustain in the face of this neo-Aristotelian critique; secondly, however, it attempts to explore the possibilities of an alternative virtue-theoretical basis for understanding the nature of moral life and education. (shrink)

The article is combined of six chapters authored by these who voiced their experiences with social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemics in various contexts, but mostly centered on psychological, sociological, and ethical aspects. Authors, mostly psychologists and philosophers, were invited to describe their perspectives on the sense and practice of social distancing in times of pandemics. Their reflections seek to demonstrate various perspectives related to subjects’ novel self-experience, social situatedness, and their dealing with conventions and habits altered through the pandemics. (...) As “the owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering”, there is no conclusion in this article. It rather encourages other authors to reflect on the nearly global, still lasting phenomenon. (shrink)

Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988) developed a typology of ethical climates based upon the level of moral development of the work group (egoism, benevolence and principled a la Kohlberg, 1981) and the locus of analysis utilized in reaching decisions (individual, local, cosmopolitan). Building on this typology, data were obtained from a high technology company for the purpose of empirically extending the examination of the number of ethical climates that exist and portraying the relationship between ethical climates and the ethical (...) dimension of decisions.When faced with decisions posing various types of ethical dilemmas, most respondents indicated they would take the ethical path. The one exception involved bribery where respondents were about equally likely to make or withhold payment. One climate guided by laws/professional codes accounted for over half of the respondents. Several climates accounted for less than ten percent of the respondents. (shrink)

In a study that goes beyond the ego affirmed by Freudian psychology, David Levin offers an account of personal growth and self-fulfillment based on the development of our capacity for listening. Drawing on the work of Dewey, Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg, he uses the vocabulary of phenomenological psychology to distinguish four stages in this developmental process and brings us the significance of these stages for music, psychotherapy, ethics, politics, and ecology. This analysis substantiates his claim that the development (...) of our listening capacity is a process that fits Foucault's conception of a practice of the self, forming our character as social beings and moral agents. David Levin contends that our self- development as auditory beings is necessary for the achievement of a just and democratic society. (shrink)

In summary, the question of how to construe the procedure called reversibility cannot be given an absolute answer. No one moral interpretation of the principle is universally applicable, that is, applicable to all moral issues. The decision concerning which to apply cannot be made a priori, but only in context - that is, only when we are faced with a particular moral problem. Moreover, there appears to be no rule which would enable us to choose which version is correct in (...) a particular case. It is a matter of judgment.That the various versions represent a moral progression from lower to higher constructions is debatable. We have seen that the altruism of reversibility3 - the ethic of care - may recommend itself in some personal relations to the point of making either version of reversibility4 irrelevant. Similarly, it is not clear that reversibility3 is always higher than reversibility2. For example, parents in trying to decide what is morally best for a young child should often - in the spirit of the second construction - substitute the judgment of their mature selves for the judgment of the immature self of the child. Moreover, this substitution may not be justifiable in terms of either utility or autonomy.If I seem to have ignored reversibility1 in this discussion that is because I consider it outside morality: it is, if anything, a principle of self-interested calculation. If Baier is correct in holding that we teach children to think morally when we get them to take the standpoint of others, that requires, I believe, getting them beyond the stage of crude reciprocity. If Piaget and Kohlberg are correct in their developmental claims, we cannot immediately teach children reversibility4 but must help them progress through the other two versions. There is some basis for thinking that children can transcend egoism and sympathize with others much earlier than Kohlberg allows - an important consideration in the development of a system of moral education. That point has been pursued by Michael Pritchard in his critique of Kohlberg. Pritchard, p 44. My point is a different one: even granting Kohlberg's theory of development (which asserts, for example, that a particular cognitive ability is required to think like a Kantian), it does not follow that the moral thinking which accompanies the highest cognitive stage is morally superior to the moral thinking which accompanies the lesser cognitive stages. That it is cognitively easier to master reversibility3 than reversibility4 does not settle the question of which is morally superior. Rather than arguing about which moral version of reversibility is morally best- a pointless debate if the desirability of a version is understood as contingent upon appropriateness with respect to context - we should instead celebrate the richness of the concept of reversibility. In teaching students the moral point of view by getting them to put themselves in another's place, we would not be asking them to master a rigid formula, but rather to be sensitive to the decisional context and to make a thoughtful judgment about which version of reversibility is most appropriate to that context. We would not be teaching them either moral relativism or moral absolutism, but the complexity of trying to make a moral decision by applying an ancient and philosophically rich ethical principle. (shrink)

This paper discusses how to use cognitive developmental psychology to create a business ethics course that has philosophical integrity. It begins with the pedagogical problem to be overcome when students are not philosophy majors. To provide a context for the practical recommendations, Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory is summarized and then the relationship between Kohlberg's theory, normative philosophy, and teaching is analyzed. The conclusion recommends strategies that should help overcome some of the vexing pedagogical problems mentioned in the first (...) section. In particular, the approach is designed to teach an appreciation for the practical necessity of philosophy in a pluralistic society. (shrink)

This paper argues that Gareth Matthews’ writing on developmental psychology is both a central part of his philosophical legacy and a contribution of enduring interest. Although he engages with figures, such as Piaget and Kohlberg, who are no longer as influential as they once were, his critique of the ‘deficit conception of childhood’ retains its relevance today. While the deficit model holds that any capacity, aptitude, virtue, or skill that a child possesses is a deficient version of the same (...) capacity, aptitude, virtue, or skill, as possessed by adults, Matthews contends that there are some things adults do badly which children do well, and that children's curiosity, wonder, and imaginative insight is something we should respect—indeed envy—and try to learn from. The paper concludes by raising a number of questions and criticisms of Matthews’ approach that his contemporary followers might fruitfully seek to address. (shrink)

Moral reflection is the process through which persons come to perceive, analyze, judge, and decide moral problems, issues, and dilemmas. Because of its complex character, the process can be studied from a variety of perspectives. Psycho-genetic approaches, such as those of Lawrence Kohlberg, study the sequential stages through which individuals develop capacities for moral reasoning. Victor Turner, an anthropologist interested in the relationship between elements of structure and antistructure in society, considered the role of structured beliefs during periods of (...) social crises, while some sociologists have focused attention on the everyday structural roles played by norms in social life. Peter Berger's image of religion as a" sacred canopy" which provides a" nomizing" or stabilizing context for societies could be applied with equal justice to moral norms. Philosophers, in contrast to these considerations, have usually been concerned with the rational foundations for specific moral claims; with normative ethical theories and their applications, or with metaethical questions about the meaning and nature of moral utterances and the logic of moral reasoning. This restriction of philosophical interest to rational justification at various levels has led to an emphasis on two phases of the moral reflection process, analysis, and decision, at the expense of two other phases, of perception and resolution. Concentration on the universal and rational character of moral justification has also prevented attention from being given to some unique characteristics which distinguish moral reflection among persons involved in a crisis moral community, called into being by a breach in established social order from moral reflection among persons in everyday moral communities. The following remarks seek to (1) define the moral reflection process in an expanded sense, and then (2) discuss how that process works within crisis moral communities. (shrink)

Managers often face situations that challenge their ability to reason morally. Avariety of factors, including the issue itself and personal and organizational influences, may affect their responses. Using Kohlberg’s moral development theory and the Adapted Moral Judgment Interviewtechnique, we examine the influences of context, age, gender, type of work, and industry membership on 308 managers’ moral reasoning. No significant differences are found when considering age or gender. Differences are discovered when assessing the context of the dilemmas, managers’ type of (...) work (managerial vs. technical), and industry membership (manufacturing vs. service). Implications from our findings are discussed. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to understand ethical theory not just as a set of well-developed philosophical perspectives but as a range of moral capacities that human beings more or less grow into over the course of their lives. To this end, we explore the connection between formal ethical theories and stage developmental psychologies, showing how individuals mature morally, regarding their duties, responsibilities, ideals, goals, values, and interests. The primary method is to extract from the writings of Kohlberg and (...) his students the cues that help to flesh out a developmental picture of a wide range of ethical perspectives. Thus, developmental psychology benefits from gaining a broader understanding of “morality” and “ethics,” and ethical theory benefits from a richer understanding of how moral maturity arises from youthful beginnings in juvenile and adolescent thinking. Results of this study offer insight into the difficulty of teaching ethics and a refined ability to assess moral maturity in business activity. (shrink)

This contribution is a criticism of some points David Carr brings forward both in his 1991 book (Educating the Virtues) but even more so in his 1996 article in this journal (After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development). With the help of a virtue approach Carr tries to solve the moral objectivism-moral relativism dilemma and the deontologism-consequentialism dilemma in ethics. I will argue that his attempt, though very interesting, (...) suffers from some serious flaws and that, either, Carr's position is much closer to a Kantian approach than Carr thinks, or Carr's position needs a good deal of clarification. (shrink)

What does autonomy mean from a moral point of view? Throughout Western history, autonomy has had no less than four different meanings. The first is political: the capacity of old cities and modern states to give themselves their own laws. The second is metaphysical, and was introduced by Kant in the second half of the 18th century. In this meaning, autonomy is understood as an intrinsic characteristic of all rational beings. Opposed to this is the legal meaning, in which actions (...) are called autonomous when performed with due information and competency and without coercion. This last meaning, the most frequently used in bioethics, is primarily legal instead of moral. Is there a proper moral meaning of the word autonomy? If so, this would be a fourth meaning. Acts can only be called moral when they are postconventional (using the terminology coined by Lawrence Kohlberg), inner-directed (as expressed by David Riesman), and responsible (according to Hannah Arendt). Such acts are autonomous in this new, fourth, and to my mind, the only one proper, moral meaning. The goal of ethics cannot be other than forming human beings capable of making autonomous and responsible decisions, and doing so because they think this is their duty and not because of any other nonmoral motivation, like comfort, convenience, or satisfaction. The goal of ethics is to promote postconventional and mature human beings. This was what Socrates tried to do with the young people of Athens. And it is also the objective of every course of ethics and of any process of training. (shrink)

The Key Themes in Ancient Philosophy series provides concise books, written by major scholars and accessible to non-specialists, on important themes in ancient philosophy that remain of philosophical interest today. In this volume Professor Wolfsdorf undertakes the first exploration of ancient Greek philosophical conceptions of pleasure in relation to contemporary conceptions. He provides broad coverage of the ancient material, from pre-Platonic to Old Stoic treatments; and, in the contemporary period, from World War II to the present. Examination of the nature (...) of pleasure in ancient philosophy largely occurred within ethical contexts but in the contemporary period has, to a greater extent, been pursued within philosophy of mind and psychology. This divergence reflects the dominant philosophical preoccupations of the times. But Professor Wolfsdorf argues that the various treatments are complementary. Indeed, the Greeks' examinations of pleasure were incisive and their debates vigorous, and their results have enduring value for contemporary discussion. (shrink)

Evidence suggests that psychedelics bring about their therapeutic outcomes in part through the subjective or qualitative effects they engender and how the individual interprets the resulting experiences. However, psychedelics are contraindicated for individuals who have been diagnosed with certain mental illnesses, on the grounds that these subjective effects may be disturbing or otherwise counter-therapeutic. Substantial resources are therefore currently being devoted to creating psychedelic substances that produce many of the same biological changes as psychedelics, but without their characteristic subjective effects. (...) In this article, we consider ethical issues arising from the prospect of such potential “nonsubjective” psychedelics. We are broadly supportive of efforts to produce such substances for both scientific and clinical reasons. However, we argue that such nonsubjective psychedelics should be reserved for those special cases in which the subjective effects of psychedelics are specifically contraindicated, whereas classic psychedelics that affect subjective experience should be considered the default and standard of care. After reviewing evidence regarding the subjective effects of psychedelics, we raise a number of ethical concerns around the prospect of withholding such typically positive, meaningful, and therapeutic experiences from most patients. (shrink)

The central philosophical challenge of metaethics is to account for the normativity of moral judgment without abandoning or seriously compromising moral realism. In Morality in a Natural World, David Copp defends a version of naturalistic moral realism that can accommodate the normativity of morality. Moral naturalism is often thought to face special metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems as well as the difficulty in accounting for normativity. In the ten essays included in this volume, Copp defends solutions to these problems. (...) Three of the essays are new, while seven have previously been published. All of them are concerned with the viability of naturalistic and realistic accounts of the nature of morality, or, more generally, with the viability of naturalistic accounts of reasons. (shrink)

Books Reviewed in this Article: Theological Investigations, Vol. XVIII: God and Revelation. By Karl Rahner. Pp.vi, 304, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984, £18.50. Theological Investigations, Volume XIX: Faith and Ministry. By Karl Rahner. Pp.vi, 282, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984, £18.50. Theological Investigations: Volume XX: Concern for the Church. By Karl Rahner. Pp.vi, 191, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1981, £14.50. Concise Theological Dictionary. Edited by Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler. Pp.541, London, Burns & Oates, 1983, £12.50. A (...) New Dictionary of Christian Theology. Edited by Alan Richardson and John Bowden. Pp.xvii, 614, London, SCM Press, 1983, £19.50. The God of Forgiveness and Healing in the Theology of Karl Rahner. By J.N. King, Pp.93, Washington, University Press of America, 1982, $17.50, $6.75. In Search of Humanity, A Theological and Philosophical Approach. By John Macquarrie. Pp.vii, 280, London, SCM Press, 1982, £8.50. Faith and the Mystery of God. By Maurice Wiles. Pp.viii, 146, London, SCM Press, 1982, £4.50. Trinity and Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the Theology of Hope. By John J. O'Donnell. Pp.xii, 215, Oxford University Press, 1983, £15.00. The Cosmic Christ in Origen and Teilhard de Chardin: A comparative Study. By James A. Lyons and edited by Maurice Wiles. Pp.xii, 236, Oxford University Press, 1982, £13.50. Grounded in Love: Sacramental Theology in an Ecumenical Perspective. By Frans Josef van Beeck. Pp.x, 151, Washington, University Press of America, 1982, $19.50, $9.25. Justification: The Author's First Book reissued with a New Introductory Chapter and the Original Response of Karl Barth. By Hans Küng. Pp.xlvi, 332, London, Burns and Oates, 1982, no price given. Reality and Evangelical Theology. By T.F. Torrance. Pp.174, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1982, $8.95. The Quest for the Historical Israel: Reconstructing Israel's Early History. By George W. Ramsey. Pp.xiv, 193, London, SCM Press, 1982, £5.50. Cantico del Cantici: Interpretatio Ludica. By Enrica Salvaneschi. Pp.140. Genoa, II Melangolo, 1982, 15, 000 Lire. Love Lyrics from the Bible: A Translation and Literary Study of the Song of Songs. By Marcia Falk. Pp.142, Sheffield, Almond Press, 1982, £14.95, £5.95. Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction. By James L. Crenshaw. Pp.286, London, SCM Press, 1982, £5.95. The Sciences and Theology. Edited by A.R. Peacocke. Pp.xviii, 309, Stocksfield, Oriel Press, 1982, £14.00. Vision and Character: A Christian Educator's Alternative to Kohlberg. By C.R. Dykstra. Pp.viii, 160, Leominster, Fowler Wright Books, 1981, £4.45. Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II & III. Translated with a commentary by Michael Woods. Pp.xii, 234, Oxford, Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1982, £11.50. Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. By Karl Ameriks. Pp.ix, 314, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, £15.00. Heidegger's‘Being and Time’and the Possibility of Political Philosophy. By Mark Blitz. Pp.260, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1981, £13.75. Symbol as Sense: New Approaches to the Analysis of Meaning. Edited by Mary Le Cron Foster and Stanley H. Brandes. Pp.xvi, 416, New York, Academic Press, 1980, £19.60. The God Within. By Harry R. Klocker. Pp.x, 147, Washington, University Press of America, 1982, $19.00, $9.25. The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D.M. MacKinnon. Edited by Brian Hebblethwaite and Stewart Sutherland. Pp.ix, 252, Cambridge University Press, 1982, £17.50. Jews, Pagans and Christians in Conflict. By David Rokeah. Pp.232, Jerusalem, The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1982, 94 gld. Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150–1650. By Brian Tierney. Pp.xi, 114, Cambridge University Press, 1982, £12.50. St John of the Cross: The Life and Thought of a Christian Mystic. By Alain Cugno. Pp.vi, 153, London, Burns & Oates, 1982, £6.95. Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense. Translated by Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn. Pp.xviii, 360, London, SPCK, 1981, £8.50. Francisco de Osuna: the Third Spiritual Alphabet. Translated by May E. Giles. Pp.xvi, 624, London, SPCK, 1981, £12.50. Rome and the Anglicans. Edited with a Postscript by Wolfgang Haase. Pp.301, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1982, 138 DM. The Westminster Confession in the Church today: Papers Prepared for the Church of Scotland Panel on Doctrine. Edited by Alasdair I.C. Heron. Pp.vii, 154, Edinburgh, Saint Andrew Press, 1982, £4.00. Essaying Montaigne: A Study of the Renaissance Institution of Writing and Reading. By John O'Neill, Pp.ix, 244, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, £12.50. Rousseau after 200 years: Proceedings of the Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium. Edited by R.A. Leigh. Pp.xv, 299, Cambridge University Press, 1982, £30.00 An American Experience of God: The Spirituality of Isaac Hecker. By John Farina. Pp.xii, 217, New York, Paulist Press, 1981, $11.95. Hecker Studies: Essays on the Thought of Isaac Hecker. Edited by John Farina. Pp.vii, 243, New York, Paulist Press, 1983, $6.95. (shrink)

A Society of the Friends of Difference would have to include Heraclitus, Nietzsche, Saussure, Freud, Adorno, Heidegger, Levinas, Deleuze, and Lyotard among its most prominent members.

Novalis. Kant Studies (1797). Introduced, translated from the German, by David W. Wood. In: Philosophical Forum 32 (2001): 323-338.

The question I shall attempt to address in what follows is an essentially historical one, namely: Why did analytic philosophy emerge first in Cambridge, in the hands of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and as a direct consequence of their revolutionary rejection of the philosophical tenets that form the basis of British Idealism? And the answer that I shall try to defend is: it didn't. That is to say, the ‘analytic’ doctrines and methods which Moore and Russell embraced in (...) the very last years of the nineteenth century were not revolutionary, did not emerge first in Cambridge, were the creation of neither Russell nor Moore and cannot be explained by appeal to facts concerning British Idealism. The adoption of the doctrines and methods which characterised the earliest manifestations of British analytic philosophy are to be explained neither by reference to anything specifically British, nor by appeal to anything unproblematically philosophical. Or so I shall argue. (shrink)

Philosophy and anthropology need to integrate their accounts of what a morality is. I identify three desiderata that an account of morality should satisfy: (1) it should recognize significant diversity and variation in the major kinds of value, (2) it should specify a set of criteria for what counts as a morality, and (3) it should indicate the basis for distinguishing between more or less justifiable moralities, or true and false moralities. I will discuss why these three desiderata are hard (...) to satisfy at the same time, and why they are controversial. Anthropologists and philosophers will differ on which ones they are inclined to reject. I argue that all three should be accepted and can be satisfied. (shrink)

The view defended is one sense externalist on the relation between moral reasons and motivation: A's having a moral reason to do X does not necessarily imply that A has a motivation that would support A's doing X via some appropriate deliberative route. However, it is in another sense externalist in holding that there are the kind of moral reasons there are only if the relevant motivational capacities are generally present in human beings, if not in all individuals. The process (...) of socialization is an attempt to embed the recognition of what we have moral reason to do in the intentional content of one's feelings. E.g., learning that about others' suffering embeds their suffering as a reason to help in the intentional content of incipient compassionate feelings. This endows the reason with motivational efficacy while conferring further direction to the feelings in ways that shape us for social cooperation. (shrink)

Robert C. Hockett’s “franchise view” argues, convincingly, that the capacity of banks or quasi-bank financial entities to create money rests on the laws, regulations, and guarantees of the state under which they operate. Fred Block advocates the use of this insight as a beachhead for establishing the legitimacy of locally embedded, nonprofit lenders whose investments would be dedicated to public purposes. However, given the pervasive influence of “everyday libertarianism,” which fosters blindness to the public character of private economic power, this (...) commentary warns of possible counterproductive consequences of this proposal unless it is fused to the democratization of central banking. An end to central bank independence would highlight the ineliminable role of the state in the market and make that role easier to reshape. It would also end the dynamic whereby monetary easing provides political cover for damaging fiscal austerity and thus lead to better democratic deliberation on the contours of policy. (shrink)

Explores the ethical and political possibilities of philosophy after deconstruction.

In this paper, I present a new semantics for demonstratives. Now some may think that David Kaplan (1989a,b) has already given a more than satisfactory semantics for demonstratives, and that there is no need for a new one. But I argue below that Kaplan's theory fails to describe the linguistic meanings of 'that' and other true demonstratives. My argument for this conclusion has nothing to do with cognitive value, belief sentences, or other such contentious matters in semantics and the (...) philosophy of mind. Rather, it appeals to the obvious fact that there can be true utterances of certain sentences containing several occurrences of the same demonstrative (for instance, 'That is taller than that'). My argument can be answered by making a fairly modest revision in Kaplan's theory. But I believe that the resulting revised version of Kaplan's theory ignores or distorts various important semantic features of 'that'. Thus I ultimately argue in favor of a more substantial departure from Kaplan's theory. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the theory I favor is that it ascribes three distinct sorts of meanings to demonstratives. (shrink)

Much of the sustained attention on pandemic preparedness has focused on the ethical justification for plans for the “crisis” phase of a surge when, despite augmentation efforts, the demand for life...

Afterword, by David W. Wood, of: Novalis, Three Philosophical Poems: “Beginning”, “Know thy Self” and “When Numbers and Figures”. Translated from the German by David W. Wood. Afterword In: Philosophical Forum 33 (2002): 318-325, 359-364.

Scholars ubiquitously refer to the method εξ υποθεσεως, introduced at Meno 86e1-87d8, as a method of hypothesis. In contrast, this paper argues that the method εξ υποθεσεως in Meno is not a hypothetical method. On the contrary, in the Meno passage, υποθεσις means “postulate”, that is, cognitively secure proposition. Furthermore, the method εξ υποθεσεως is derived from the method of geometrical analysis. More precisely, it is derived from the use of geometrical analysis to achieve reduction, that is, reduction of a (...) less tractable problem to a more tractable problem. As such, the method εξ υποθεσεως does not by itself serve to solve problems. (shrink)

_Professionalism and Ethics in Teaching_ presents a thought-provoking and stimulating study of the moral dimensions of the teaching professions. After discussing the moral implications of professionalism, Carr explores the relationship of education theory to teaching practice and the impact of this relationship on professional expertise. He then identifies and examines some central ethical and moral issues in education and teaching. Finally David Carr gives a detailed analysis of a range of issues concerning the role of the teacher and the (...) managements of educational issues. _Professionalism and Ethics in Teaching_ presents a thought-provoking and stimulating study of the moral dimensions of the teaching professions. (shrink)

The issue of conceptual templates of Western philosophy has been prominently put forth by Kwong-loi Shun. This paper seeks to establish additional perspectives adopted in traditional concepts involving anger and compassion by both Confucianist and Western scholars to reconcile purported differences between Confucianist and Western interpretations of key concepts utilised in philosophical thought. Through reinforcing similarities between the different concepts, the author serves to highlight the inter-compatibility of Confucianist and Western interpretations of basic notions of anger and compassion and the (...) need to explore the relevance of both facets in the complex modern world. (shrink)

Why do gardens matter so much and mean so much to people? That is the intriguing question to which David Cooper seeks an answer in this book. Given the enthusiasm for gardens in human civilization ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, it is surprising that the question has been so long neglected by modern philosophy. Now at last there is a philosophy of gardens. David Cooper identifies garden appreciation as a special human phenomenon distinct from both from the (...) appreciation of art and the appreciation of nature. He discusses the contribution of gardening and other garden-related pursuits to "the good life." And he distinguishes the many kinds of meanings that gardens may have, from their representation of nature to their spiritual significance. A Philosophy of Gardens will open up this subject to students and scholars of aesthetics, ethics, and cultural and environmental studies, and to anyone with a reflective interest in things horticultural. (shrink)

The contemporary design practice known as data sonification allows us to experience information in data by listening. In doing so, we understand the source of the data in ways that support, and in some cases surpass, our ability to do so visually. -/- In order to assist us in negotiating our environments, our senses have evolved differently. Our hearing affords us unparalleled temporal and locational precision. Biological survival has determined that the ears lead the eyes. For all moving creatures, in (...) situations where sight is obscured, spatial auditory clarity plays a vital survival role in determining both from where the predator is approaching or to where the prey has escaped. So, when designing methods that enable listeners to extract information from data, both with and without visual support, different approaches are necessary. -/- A scholarly yet approachable work by one of the recognized leaders in the field of auditory design, this book will -/- - Lead you through some salient historical examples of how non-speech sounds have been used to inform and control people since ancient times. -/- - Comprehensively summarize the contemporary practice of Data Sonification. -/- - Provide a detailed overview of what information is and how our auditory perceptions can be used to enhance our knowledge of the source of data. -/- - Show the importance of the dynamic relationships between hearing, cognitive load, comprehension, embodied knowledge and perceptual truth. -/- - Discuss the role of aesthetics in the dynamic interplay between listenability and clarity. -/- - Provide a mature software framework that supports the practice of data sonification design, together with a detailed discussion of some of the design principles used in various examples. -/- David Worrall is an internationally recognized composer, sound artist and interdisciplinary researcher in the field of auditory design. He is Professor of Audio Arts and Acoustics at Columbia College Chicago and a former elected president of the International Community for Auditory Display (ICAD), the leading organization in the field since its inception over 25 years ago. -/- Code and audio examples for this book are available at -/- https:// github. com/david-worrall/springer/. (shrink)

In “Why Forgiving the Unrepentant is not Demeaning or Insulting: A Reply to Nicholas Wolterstorff,” David E. Wright argues against Wolterstorff’s view in Justice in Love that it is wrong or impossible to forgive the unrepentant wrongdoer. In response to Wolterstorff’s claim that it is impossible to forgive the unrepentant, Wright presents the case of Timothy and Hubert, which seems to show that one can forgive the unrepentant and take the wrong seriously. In response to Wolterstorff’s claim that it (...) is not morally permissible to forgive the unrepentant, Wright employs Trudy Govier and Colin Hirano’s invitational model of forgiveness, in which the act of forgiveness serves as the impetus or “invitation” for reconciliation. To illustrate this, Wright presents the case of Timothy and Jake, which seems to show that forgiving the unrepentant can be respectful of both the victim and the wrongdoer. (shrink)

John Locke famously claimed that our idea of substance is but a confused idea of “something we know not what.” However, he also thought that the idea of substance is a fundamental part of our ideas of ourselves and the objects surrounding us—of objects we do know. Interpreting this apparently ambivalent stance has long been a major challenge for Locke scholarship. In this article, I argue that the leading interpretations of Locke's conception of substance have failed to resolve this tension (...) because they have misconstrued the source of Locke's skepticism about our knowledge of what substance is. This skepticism, I argue, issues from an observation about the signification of the term “substance”: Locke maintained that the philosophical usage of the term is irremediably equivocal. This reading allows us to acknowledge that Locke could consistently hold that ordinary objects, such as persons, horses, or trees, are paradigmatic examples of substances. It also points to a better appreciation of how Locke's discussion of substance relates to the scholastic conceptions of substance he tried to overcome. (shrink)

I explore conceptions of happiness in classical Chinese philosophers Mengzi and Zhuangzi. In choosing to frame my question with the word ‘happiness’, I am guided by the desire to draw some comparative lessons for Western philosophy. ‘Happiness’ has been a central concept in Western ethics, and especially in Aristotelian and utilitarian ethics. The early Chinese concept most relevant to discussion of Mengzi and Zhuangzi concerns a specific form of happiness designated by the word le, which is best rendered as ‘contentment’. (...) For both Mengzi and Zhuangzi, there is a reflective dimension of happiness that consists in acceptance of the inevitable transformations of life and death, though these two thinkers chart very different paths to such acceptance. Mengzi holds that it liesin identification with a moral cause much larger than the self. Zhuangzi is profoundly skeptical about the viability of such a path to contentment. He instead offers identification with a world that transcends human good and evil, and a way to live in the present that can be deeply satisfying. One interesting outcome of both their discussions of achieving happiness is that both come to question the importance of happiness as a personal goal. (shrink)

David Chalmers uses Bayesian theories of credence to argue against referentialism about belief. This paper argues that Chalmers’s Bayesian objections to referentialism are similar to older, more familiar objections to referentialism. There are familiar responses to the old objections, and there is a predictable way to modify those old responses to meet Chalmers’s Bayesian objections. The new responses to the new objections are no less plausible than the old responses to the old objections. Chalmers’s positive theory of belief and (...) credence is structurally similar to typical referential theories of those objects, but his theory is more speculative and dubious. (shrink)

There are many people who think that deconstruction has run its course, has had its day, and that it is now time to return to the important business of philosophy, or perhaps to serious ethical, social and political questions. Derrida's work, it is said, leads nowhere but a sterile philosophy of difference that in its de-politicized, de-historicized abstractness is a form of conservatism little better than the kinds of identity thinking to which it seems to be so radically opposed. In (...) short, we must go ‘beyond’ deconstruction. (shrink)

According to a widespread contention, individuals are among the basic building blocks of the world. The contention, however, raises a perennial problem. If individuals are basic, they cannot be fully accounted for in terms of their empirically detectable qualities. But then, how can we detect, or know, or identify, individuals? Shamik Dasgupta has influentially argued that considerations along these lines, together with a lesson from the history of physics, should make us reject any picture on which individuals are basic constituents (...) of reality. In this paper, I defend such a picture against Dasgupta’s argument. (shrink)

David Johnson seeks to overthrow one of the widely accepted tenets of Anglo-American philosophy—that of the success of the Humean case against the rational credibility of reports of miracles. In a manner unattempted in any other single work, he meticulously examines all the main variants of Humean reasoning on the topic of miracles: Hume's own argument and its reconstructions by John Stuart Mill, J. L. Mackie, Antony Flew, Jordan Howard Sobel, and others. Hume's view, set forth in his essay (...) "Of Miracles," has been widely thought to be correct. Johnson reviews Hume's thesis with clarity and elegance and considers the arguments of some of the most prominent defenders of Hume's case against miracles. According to Johnson, the Humean argument on this topic is entirely without merit, its purported cogency being simply a philosophical myth. (shrink)