According to the free energy principle, life is an “inevitable and emergent property of any random dynamical system at non-equilibrium steady state that possesses a Markov blanket” :20130475, 2013). Formulating a principle for the life sciences in terms of concepts from statistical physics, such as random dynamical system, non-equilibrium steady state and ergodicity, places substantial constraints on the theoretical and empirical study of biological systems. Thus far, however, the physics foundations of the free energy principle have received hardly any attention. (...) Here, we start to fill this gap and analyse some of the challenges raised by applications of statistical physics for modelling biological targets. Based on our analysis, we conclude that model-building grounded in the free energy principle exacerbates a trade-off between generality and realism, because of a fundamental mismatch between its physics assumptions and the properties of actual biological targets. (shrink)

This article deals with the first Latin reception of Pseudo-Aristotle’s On Indivisible Lines and its impact on the medieval debate about the continuum. Robert Grosseteste’s and Albert the Great’s references to this pseudo-Aristotelian text show that it could be regarded as a source for where to find information about the indivisibilist tenet, as well as an expansion of Aristotle’s anti-atomistic critiques scattered throughout his authentic works. The use of On Indivisible Lines made by Henry of Harclay and Adam of Wodeham (...) confirms this trend: the reading of this text could be twofold according to the tenet defended. While Henry argues against Pseudo-Aristotle to defend indivisibilism, Adam expands on pseudo-Aristotelian arguments to show the incongruities implied by indivisibilism. (shrink)

The role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) in influencing creative thinking has been investigated by many researchers who, while succeeding in proving an effective involvement of PFC, reported suggestive but sometimes conflicting results. In order to better understand the relationships between creative thinking and brain activation in a more specific area of the PFC, we explored the role of dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC). We devised an experimental protocol using transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS). The study was based on a 3 (kind of stimulation: (...) anodal vs. cathodal vs. sham) × 2 (priming: divergent vs. convergent) design. Forty-five healthy adults were randomly assigned to one stimulation condition. Participants’ creativity skills were assessed using the Product Improvement subtest from the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT). After 20 min of tDCS stimulation, participants were presented with visual images of common objects. Half of the participants were instructed to visualize themselves using the object in an unusual way (divergent priming), whereas the other half were asked to visualize themselves while using the object in a common way (convergent priming). Priming was aimed at inducing participants to adopt different attitudes toward the creative task. Afterwards, participants were asked to describe all of the possible uses of the objects that were presented. Participants’ physiological activation was recorded using a biofeedback equipment. Results showed a significant effect of anodal stimulation that enhanced creative performance, but only after divergent priming. Participants showed lower skin temperature values after cathodal stimulation, a finding which is coherent with studies reporting that, when a task is not creative or creative thinking is not prompted, people show lower levels of arousal. Differences in individual levels of creativity as assessed by the Product Improvement test were not influential. The involvement of DLPFC in creativity has been supported, presumably in association to shift of attention modulated by priming. (shrink)

This essay represents an attempt to bring prostitutes’ and clients’ voices into the philosophical discourse about prostitution. We wish to add the voices of individual prostitutes and clients in order to expand the contemporary philosophical understanding of prostitution as a complex and problematic ethical concern. The first section of this essay explains the concepts of subjectivity, sexuality, and violence that underpin our analysis of prostitution. The second section scrutinizes the prostitute’s and client’s motivating goals and the means they use to (...) accomplish them. The third, and final, section presents a phenomenological description of prostituted sex from the prostitute’s and client’s respective viewpoints. (shrink)

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...) is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind. (shrink)

According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian (...) models in theoretical neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine? From actual practice in theoretical neuroscience, we argue for three claims. First, currently Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations; instead they are useful devices for predicting and systematizing observational statements about people's performances in a variety of perceptual tasks. That is, currently we should have an instrumentalist attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. Second, the inference typically drawn from Bayesian behavioural performance in a variety of perceptual tasks to underlying Bayesian mechanisms should be understood within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr ( [1982] ). Third, we can hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine to the extent that Bayesian models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects' perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. (shrink)

The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also (...) unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences. (shrink)

Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of ‘belief-less reasoning’, a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show (...) that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated meta-representation. (shrink)

Tácito fue uno de los escritores más reconocidos en los círculos intelectuales de la América revolucionaria. No se conservan muchas referencias explícitas en los escritos del periodo, pero su influencia es perceptible en los argumentos empleados para legitimar la independencia del Imperio británico. En el siguiente trabajo, se identificarán los elementos de la obra de Tácito que fueron recuperados por los padres fundadores durante la revolución. Las traducciones consultadas de clara ideología whig, modelaron la interpretación de la obra de Tácito (...) y su aplicación en la práctica política. Además, se analizará su empleo en el debate político de formas bien distintas, pero siempre por su utilidad en la construcción de la nueva república. (shrink)

Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, (...) we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory. (shrink)

Modularity is one of the most important concepts used to articulate a theory of cognitive architecture. Over the last 30 years, the debate in many areas of the cognitive sciences and in philosophy of psychology about what modules are, and to what extent our cognitive architecture is modular, has made little progress. After providing a diagnosis of this lack of progress, this article suggests a remedy. It argues that the theoretical framework of network science can be brought to bear on (...) the traditional modularity debate, facilitating our progress in articulating a good theory of the human cognitive architecture. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Reinforcement Learning modelling practice in psychiatry, in the context of alcohol use disorders. I argue that the epistemic roles RL currently plays in the development of psychiatric classification and search for explanations of clinically relevant phenomena are best appreciated in terms of Chang’s account of epistemic iteration, and by distinguishing mechanistic and aetiological modes of computational explanation.

What is the relationship between the concepts of the predictive processing theory of brain functioning and the everyday concepts with which people conduct and explain their mental lives? To answer this question, we focus on predictive processing explanations of mental disorder that appeal to false inference. After distinguishing two concepts of false inference, we survey four ways of understanding the relationship between explanations of mental phenomena at the personal and sub-personal level. We then argue that if predictive processing accurately accounts (...) for psychological and socio-cultural dynamics, then personal and sub-personal concepts must display a looping relationship that can impact the nature of at least some mental phenomena. In particular, explaining the phenomenon of delusion in terms of the sub-personal concept of false inference should change the nature of delusional experiences themselves. (shrink)

Abductive reasoning assigns special status to the explanatory power of a hypothesis. But how do people make explanatory judgments? Our study clarifies this issue by asking: How does the explanatory power of a hypothesis cohere with other cognitive factors? How does probabilistic information affect explanatory judgments? In order to answer these questions, we conducted an experiment with 671 participants. Their task was to make judgments about a potentially explanatory hypothesis and its cognitive virtues. In the responses, we isolated three constructs: (...) Explanatory Value, Rational Acceptability, and Entailment. Explanatory judgments strongly cohered with judgments of causal relevance and with a sense of understanding. Furthermore, we found that Explanatory Value was sensitive to manipulations of statistical relevance relations between hypothesis and evidence, but not to explicit information about the prior probability of the hypothesis. These results indicate that probabilistic information about statistical relevance is a strong determinant of Explanatory Value. More generally, our study suggests that abductive and probabilistic reasoning are two distinct modes of inference. (shrink)

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best (...) explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches. (shrink)

Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...) After having distinguished between enabling and constitutive relevance, I defend the claim that at least some facts about subpersonal states and events are constitutively relevant to some personal-level phenomenon, and therefore can, and sometimes should, inform personal-level explanations. I draw some of the possible consequences of my claim for our understanding of personal-level behavior by focusing on the phenomenon of addiction. (shrink)

Despite the impressive amount of financial resources invested in carrying out large-scale brain simulations, it is controversial what the payoffs are of pursuing this project. The present paper argues that in some cases, from designing, building, and running a large-scale neural simulation, scientists acquire useful knowledge about the computational performance of the simulating system, rather than about the neurobiological system represented in the simulation. What this means, why it is not a trivial lesson, and how it advances the literature on (...) the epistemology of computer simulation are the three preoccupations addressed by the paper. (shrink)

This article deals with Robert Grosseteste’s account of ‘spatial differences’, such as ‘up’, ‘down’, ‘right’, ‘left’, ‘before’, and ‘behind’. More specifically, attention is focused on Grosseteste’s De differentiis localibus, which is a concise scientific treatise arguing for the objectiveness of the differences of place pertaining to all living bodies, including heavenly ones. The article has a two-fold goal: to present the contents of such an understudied opuscule, and to check if there is some compelling reliance on any of the Latin (...) versions of Aristotle’s On the Heavens. Such an analysis reveals that Grosseteste’s reading of Aristotle’s On the Heavens is angled by Averroes’ Long Commentary on the Physics, on which Grosseteste relies as well to build his conception of mathematical and natural differences. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the exegetical proposal of the Tractatus de sex dierum operibus by Thierry of Chartres and it is tasked with analyzing the twofold interpretative framework adopted by the Cancelor: first, the accordance between the narration of Genesis and the heuristic models of physical and cosmological causality; second, the mathematical theology, which revises the work of creation according to an arithmological approach. The study is divided into two parts which follow the structure of the Tractatus. In the first (...) part, I analyse the physical plausibility of Christian cosmogony and subsequently the conception of matter with regard to both William of Conches’ inordinatum and the hermetic locus mundi. In the second part, I examine how the numerical discourse interprets the creatural unfolding and dependence on God, as well as the creation per verbum and the individuality of each created being. My purpose is threefold: first, to test the inner philosophical coherence of the Tractatus; second, to interpret specific theoretical points at the light of Thierry’s commentaries on Boethius’ De Trinitate, and finally, to relate the arithmetical issues of the Tractatus to Thierry's Commentum super Arithmeticam Boethii. (shrink)

O livro de Kant Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático, até nossos dias, ainda tem indefinido seu papel diante da filosofia transcedental. Por não haver, na obra de Kant, uma delimitação clara entre as várias antropologias, a saber, a empírica e a prática, e a devido a algumas afirmações não claras do próprio autor, percebe-se que aquele livro ainda é motivo de interpretações controvertidas por parte daqueles que o analisaram. Este texto representa um esforço no sentido de apreende o (...) papel e a posição que o livro em referência tem na totalidade da produção de Kant. (shrink)

The collective works edited by Emmanuel Alloa and Adnen Jdey, Du sensible à l’oeuvre, and by Mauro Carbone, L’empreinte du visuel, meet the dual requirementimposed by reading the work of Merleau-Ponty today: on one hand, they extend the philosopher’s thought and highlight its obvious necessity in reading the mostcontemporary art; and, on the other hand, by not allowing themselves to be lulled by the gentle seduction of the writing, they emphasize the coherence of his thought andthe rigor of certain of (...) his key concepts such as style, resumption, flesh or individuation, which are the object of precise and unpublished studies. (shrink)

This paper presents a taxonomy of divisibilism, a philosophical perspective advocating for the infinite divisibility of continua. The taxonomy is founded on various conceptualizations of indivisibles, enabling the identification of two types of divisibilism: ‘moderate’ and ‘strong’. The former denies indivisibles as constituent parts of magnitudes, whereas the latter rejects indivisibles as even intrinsic elements (such as limits or junctions) of magnitudes. The paper proceeds to demonstrate how Gregory of Rimini falls into the second category, utilizing geometry and non-entitism as (...) primary tools to dismiss the very possibility of the existence of indivisibles. Within the framework of this ‘strong divisibilism’, the paper also examines Gregory’s interpretation of mathematical items (e.g. points, lines, surfaces) against the backdrop of one of his main sources, that is, Augustine. Lastly, the paper delves into Gregory’s interpretation of the fundamental Aristotelian divisibilist claim, namely, that a continuum is infinitely divisible. It highlights how Gregory’s stance ultimately conflicts with Aristotelian premises, particularly concerning his assertion that the division of all continua is made into infinitely many actual parts. (shrink)

How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often (...) necessary to adequately explain behaviour. After having canvassed one promising way to understand what neural representations could be, I argue that the appeal to beliefs and preferences in explanations of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance should be understood as an appeal to neural representations. (shrink)

Cognitive science began as a multidisciplinary endeavor to understand how the mind works. Since the beginning, cognitive scientists have been asking questions about the right methodologies and levels of explanation to pursue this goal, and make cognitive science a coherent science of the mind. Key questions include: Is there a privileged level of explanation in cognitive science? How do different levels of explanation fit together, or relate to one another? How should explanations at one level inform or constrain explanations at (...) some other level? Can the different approaches to the mind, brain, and culture be unified? The aim of this issue of topiCS is to provide a platform for discussing different answers to such questions and to facilitate a better understanding between the different strands of thinking about the right levels of explanation in cognitive science. (shrink)

Agustín Colombo Aux yeux de Foucault, la spiritualité évoque une instance de modification des individus. De ce fait, elle garde une parenté intime avec la manière dont il conçoit les dynamiques de transformation et de constitution de la subjectivité. Mais qu’est-ce que Foucault veut dire lorsqu’il affirme que la spiritualité implique une modification de soi? Et comment construit-il cette approche de la spiritualité? Notre hypothèse est que la conception foucaldienne de la spiritualité s’inspire de l’approche de l’expérience élaborée par (...) Georges Bataille tout en la modifiant : pour Foucault, l’expérience n’est pas une instance passive de supplice ou d’extase, mais elle se définit par l’action de l’individu. Cette différence radicale entre la passivité et l’action devient plus claire lorsque nous contrastons la mystique, référence de Bataille pour penser l’expérience, et l’ascèse, activité spirituelle par excellence selon Foucault. Ainsi, nous mettons en évidence le fait que chez le dernier Foucault, la réflexion sur la spiritualité suppose une problématisation de l’action et de l’activité qui constitue une coordonnée clé pour comprendre la manière dont il conçoit la mise en pratique de la liberté. (shrink)

The Cognitive Reserve (CR) hypothesis suggests that the brain actively attempts to cope with neural damages by using pre-existing cognitive processing approaches or by enlisting compensatory approaches. This would allow an individual with high CR to better cope with aging than an individual with lower CR. Many of the proxies used to assess CR indirectly refer to the flexibility of thought. The present paper aims at directly exploring the relationships between CR and creativity, a skill that includes flexible thinking. We (...) tested a sample of 72 adults (aged between 45 and 78) assessing both their level of CR and their creativity. To evaluate CR we used the proxies commonly used in literature, namely, three subtests from the WAIS (vocabulary, similarities, and digit span) and the years of education. We also used an ad-hoc test asking people to report how frequently they tend to perform activities that are believed to increase CR. We used verbal creativity tasks (alternative uses and generation of acronyms) to assess individual levels of creativity. We asked participants to describe their main occupation (present or past) and coded each occupation as creative or not creative. Results (controlling for age-related differences) showed that scores from the WAIS correlated positively with creativity performance, even though correlations varied across the subtests. Focusing on the frequency and type of activities that people perform, and comparing individuals who have or had a creative job to those with a routine job, a clear relationship between creativity and CR emerged. This effect was more relevant than the level of job complexity. Implications for the study of CR and aging are discussed. (shrink)

The present work refers to the doctorship research that implemented the Free-Expression Painting Studio technique to assist university students who had suicidal ideations or attempts. This technique was developed in France by the psychologist Michel Ternoy, based on Minkowski’s structural-phenomenon analysis method. A group session will be presented and discussed from Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life. Psychology and phenomenology can create spaces for belonging and support, which allow the transformation of suffering from experiences in the community. The Painting Studio makes (...) it possible to experience the affection of the other as a potential of one’s own possibilities, mobilizing the affective dialectical relationship, through which one can go from unbearable suffering to original fruition. We seek to show that art can be part of the therapeutic process as an alternative to the passage to the act of suicide before it becomes unbearable. (shrink)

This book will gather contributions from international scholars with the aim of exploring the political reflection of Deleuze-Guattari’s and Foucault’s critical encounter with psychoanalytic thought: their possible connections, their divergences and the fields of reflection that this encounter opens, the problems and debates that lead Foucault and Deleuze to engage with psychoanalysis.

In this volume, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new discussions, debates and (...) directions in the discipline. (shrink)

Does language make moral cognition possible? Some authors like Andy Clark have argued for a positive answer whereby language and the ways people use it mark a fundamental divide between humans and all other animals with respect to moral thinking (Clark, Mind and morals: essays on cognitive science and ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996; Moral Epistemol Nat Can J Philos Suppl XXVI, 2000a; Moral Epistemol Nat Can J Philos Suppl XXVI, 2000b; Philosophy of mental representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, (...) pp 37–43 and discussion, 44–61, 2002). I take issue with Clark’s view and argue that language is probably unnecessary for the emergence of moral cognition. I acknowledge, however, that humans unlike other animals seem to posses what Haugeland in Philosophy of mental representation. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002) terms ‘norm-hungriness’: an idiosyncratic need or desire to create and abide by a multitude of norms. Our peculiar norm-hungriness, I suggest, depends on what can be called florid control rather than on language. (shrink)

The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk (...) precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought. (shrink)

Habermas entende os direitos humanos como produtos do mundo da vida; e é no interior do debate público, com a participação efetiva dos cidadãos, que deve ocorrer a produção deles como normas e princípios. A questão central abordada inicialmente no texto concerne ao status dessas normas e ao seu modo de instituição, dependente das relações de reciprocidade entre os sujeitos. Uma vez que, em sociedades complexas, apenas idealmente parece ser possível sustentar a participação de todos os sujeitos no processo de (...) elaboração de normas, o texto procura analisar a viabilidade da concepção de Habermas. Ao considerar os elementos conceituais que orbitam essa questão, processa-se no curso do texto um deslocamento para outra, a saber, a relativa ao quanto o modo de sustentação da normatividade jurídica de um ordenamento social o determina como democrático ou não. Este é o ponto decisivo ao tratamento das normas relativas aos direitos humanos: a análise de Habermas é ideal, mas o pêndulo entre moral e empiria se mantém sempre, de modo que, pelo escopo conceitual, se não há como confirmar a identificação entre legitimidade dos direitos humanos e direitos humanos produzidos democraticamente, torna-se impossível querer negá-la. Habermas understands human rights as products of the lifeworld, and it is within the public debate, with the effective participation of citizens, that their production must occur as norms and principles. The initial focus of the text concerns the status of these norms and how they are instituted, which depends on the reciprocal relationships between subjects. Given that in complex societies it seems to be only ideally possible to sustain the participation of all those involved in the elaboration of norms, this article seeks to analyze the feasibility of Habermas' conception. In considering the conceptual elements related to this issue, there takes place in the course of the text a shift to another issue, namely, that of how the mode of support of the juridical normativity of a legal order determines it as being democratic or not. This is the turning point in the treatment of norms relative to human rights: Habermas' analysis is ideal, but the oscillation between the moral and the empirical is always remains, such that, within the conceptual scope, if there is no way to confirm the legitimacy of the identification of human rights with democratically produced human rights, this oscillation becomes impossible deny. (shrink)

Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks (...) of general interest concerning what Hutto and Myin have dubbed “the Hard Problem of Content.”. (shrink)

Este trabalho é uma análise do perfil da ONU, no que diz respeito à sua defesa de uma ética universal. A ONU deve representar a comunidade internacional como um todo, na sua multiplicidade de civilizações e culturas, no entanto, toda a sua existência está permeada por crises, cujo estopim é a sua ocidentalização, pois na interacção entre as múltiplas soberanias, a anarquia dos significados é frequentemente equacionada com base no que os mais fortes pensam. Complementando tal quadro, o artigo salienta (...) ainda o facto de o desenvolvimento de uma ética centrada na tolerância e na razão parecer esbarrar na transnacionalização e preponderância das forças económicas sobre as forças sociais e políticas no interior da ONU. Procura-se, com isso, resposta à questão: quais os limites de uma instituição como a ONU de dar rumo à correcção dos desequilíbrios mais graves no mundo decorrentes do predominio das forças económicas sobre os princípios éticos? A autora do artigo defende ser função da ONU assegurar, disseminar e criar mecanismos para a manutenção em cada Estado-Nação de uma ética universalista, a qual deve ser reconhecida pelos Estados como base para regimes fundados no respeito ao ser humano em sua dignidade e singularidade e aos direitos humanos em geral. /// This article constitutes an analysis of UN'S defense of Universal Ethics. The UN must represent the international community as a whole, in its multiplicity of civilizations and cultures. However, it has undergone many periods of crisis caused by its occidentalization, then in the interaction of multiple nations, the conflit caused by so many divergent meanings is often solved on the basis of the positions defended by the strongest ones'. Complementing this picture, the author of the article also takes into account the fact that the development of an ethical attitude based on tolerance and reason finds an obstacle in transnationalization and in the preponderance of economic forces over the social and political ones within the UN. It is thus aim of the article to search for answers to the following question: which are the limitations of an institution such as the UN in finding a solution for the problem of the social imbalances that exist in this world, which are due to the predominance of economic forces over the ethical principles? The author takes for granted that the function of the UN is to ensure, to disseminate and to create devices for the maintenance of a universalist ethics within each State-Nation, which must be recognized by all of them as a basis for a regime that is grounded on respect for human dignity and individuality and for human rights in general. (shrink)

We raise three issues concerning the Eichenbaum, Otto & Cohen (1994) model. (1) We argue against the strict division of labor that Eichenbaum et al. attribute to neocortical and limbic regions. (2) We raise the possibility that the anterior and posterior portions of the hippocampus may be important for different types of information processing. (3) We argue that, rather than reflecting relational processing, different neural responses to “match” and “nonmatch” trials may relate to different required spatial responses.

Pete Mandik’s This is Philosophy of Mind is the latest addition to the “introduction to the philosophy of mind textbook” literature. It is a welcome addition, as Mandik offers readers an encompassing, up-to-date and engagingly written textbook. The objective of This is Philosophy of Mind is to communicate to a wider audience the fascinating and challenging ideas discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is intended as a resource useful for both students taking a course and for anybody else who (...) desires a painless tour through the philosophy of mind zoo.What’s on offer? The book’s 15 chapters breeze through all the traditional topics one would expect in a philosophy of mind course: the mind-body problem and the nature of mental properties, mental representation and intentionality, consciousness and qualitative experience. The chapters cover recent advances too, including contemporary work on perception, imagination and emotion, and less canonical topics like immortality and life a .. (shrink)