Limitations on reproductive decision making, including forced sterilization and involuntary birth control, raise significant ethical challenges. In the United States, these issues are further complicated by a disturbing history of the abuse and victimization of vulnerable populations. One particularly fraught challenge is the risk of teratogenicity posed by moodstabilizing psychiatric medications in patients who are incapable of appreciating such dangers. Long-acting reversible contraception (LARC) offers an intervention to prevent pregnancy among individuals who receive such treatments, but at a cost to (...) their reproductive autonomy. This article examines the ethical issues involved in the use of involuntary LARC for patients on teratogenic psychiatric medications (TPMs) and argues that such an approach can only be justified as a last resort after a careful consideration of the alternatives and an assessment of potential risks and benefits. (shrink)

How can persons shaped by oppression grow into members of what Martin Luther King Jr.’s1 envisioned as “beloved community”2? We may be shaped – or even constituted -- by relations of domination (and/or resistance to domination), regardless of our explicit values about the value about all human beings. Given how legacies of oppression that can leave deep traces upon us, how can we learn to build and embody “beloved community“? To borrow Sara Ahmed’s words, how can we learn “not (...) to reproduce what we inherit?”3 in the way of oppressive “forms of life.”4 In what follows, I consider these issues in relation to character (though not in a strictly Aristotelian moral framework), showing how issues of oppression (focusing upon racism in particular) may be thus framed. I relate work on “attention”- derived in part by Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil, drawing upon Bridget Clarke’s framing of this idea. I read Minnie Bruce Pratt’s auto-biographical narrative on racism in terms of such “moral attention,” pointing toward what I call “critical moral attention” as embodying the sort of development of “white self-criticality”5 that can inform ongoing reflection and practices from oppressive to liberatory ones. However, as Pratt’s account shows, there is no simple “before” and “after” or triumphant arrival of a once-and-done or new-and-improved anti-racist self. As Chandra Mohanty and Biddy Martin write (reflecting on this same essay by Pratt) “There is no linear progression based on ‘that old view,’ no developmental notion of her own identity or self.”6 I suggest this notion of “critical moral attention” highlights the process orientation of such work. It is not, however, merely an individual effort. It requires critical interaction with others, specifically in working for social change along these lines. Further, such work consists of “immanent critique” (done from within the messy world in which one lives, without recourse to an external standard by which one may assess and guide one’s development).7. (shrink)

Some contextually sensitive expressions are such that their context independent conventional meanings need to be in some way supplemented in context for the expressions to secure semantic values in those contexts. As we’ll see, it is not clear that there is a paradigm here, but ‘he’ used demonstratively is a clear example of such an expression. Call expressions of this sort supplementives in order to highlight the fact that their context independent meanings need to be supplemented in context for them (...) to have semantic values relative to the context. Many philosophers and linguists think that there is a lot of contextual sensitivity in natural language that goes well beyond the pure indexicals and supplementives like ‘he’. Constructions/expressions that are good candidates for being contextually sensitive include: quantifiers, gradable adjectives including “predicates of personal taste”, modals, conditionals, possessives and relational expressions taking implicit arguments. It would appear that in none of these cases does the expression/construction in question have a context independent meaning that when placed in context suffices to secure a semantic value for the expression/construction in the context. In each case, some sort of supplementation is required to do this. Hence, all these expressions are supplementives in my sense. For a given supplementive, the question arises as to what the mechanism is for supplementing its conventional meanings in context so as to secure a semantic value for it in context. That is, what form does the supplementation take? The question also arises as to whether different supplementives require different kinds of supplementation. Let us call an account of what, in addition to its conventional meaning, secures a semantic value for a supplementive in context a metasemantics for that supplementive. So we can put our two questions thus: what is the proper metasemantics for a given supplementive; and do all supplementives have the same metasemantics? In the present work, I sketch the metasemantics I formulated for demonstratives in earlier work. Next, I briefly consider a number of other supplementives that I think the metasemantics I propose plausibly applies to and explain why I think that. Finally, I consider the prospects for extending the account to all supplementives. In so doing, I take up arguments due to Michael Glanzberg to the effect that supplementives are governed by two different metasemantics and attempt to respond to them. (shrink)

Does having a mental disorder, in general, affect whether someone is morally responsible for an action? Many people seem to think so, holding that mental disorders nearly always mitigate responsibility. Against this Naïve view, we argue for a Nuanced account. The problem is not just that different theories of responsibility yield different verdicts about particular cases. Even when all reasonable theories agree about what's relevant to responsibility, the ways mental illness can affect behavior are so varied that a more nuanced (...) approach is needed. (shrink)

The majority of recent work on the moral standing to blame (the idea that A may be unable to legitimately blame B despite B being blameworthy) has focused on blamers who themselves are blameworthy. This is unfortunate, for there is much to learn about the standing to blame once we consider a broader range of cases. Doing so reveals that challenged standing is more expansive than previously acknowledged, and accounts that have privileged the fact that the blamers are themselves morally (...) culpable likely require revision. One such account figures in Patrick Todd’s (2012) argument for incompatibilism, which ostensibly depends on considerations involving the standing to blame. I believe this argument fails. But its failure is instructive, for it allows us to appreciate the numerous ways in which one’s blame can be morally problematic, and hence ways in which one’s standing to blame can be challenged. Thus, while one objective of this paper is to show why Todd’s argument fails, the larger aim is to use that argument to frame discussion of some important (and novel) ways in which the standing to blame can be compromised. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion of sustainability behaviors by introducing the construct of perceived organizational support toward the environment. We propose and empirically test an integrated model whereby we test the association of POS-E with employees’ organizational citizenship behaviors toward the environment as well as to job attitudes. Results indicated that POS-E was positively related to OCB-E, job satisfaction, organizational identification, and psychological empowerment, and negatively related to turnover intentions. We also found that psychological empowerment partially mediated the (...) relationship between POS-E and the dependent variables. We discuss the theoretical implications as well as practical implications for managers seeking to encourage sustainability in their organizations. (shrink)

A school of thought traceable to the political writings of Bodin and Hobbes believes that "order" is the cardinal principle which takes precedence over "justice" - which is reduced to conformity. The main concern of this book is to analyse this tradition through study of its progenitors.

"This collection of essays owes its inception to a symposium held in Munich 8-10th September 2003"--P. [i].

One way in which fact finders are supposed to determine the reasonableness of a defendant is via a counterfactual test that personifies the reasonable person. We are to imagine the reasonable person being in the defendant’s circumstances. Then we are to determine whether the reasonable person would have done as the defendant did. This paper argues that, despite its prevalence, the counterfactual test is a hopeless guide to determining defendant reasonability. In brief, the test is of the wrong sort to (...) give fact finders the requisite guidance. What we are after is not a counterfactual judgment but instead is a question of possibility. However, since the only thing impossible of the reasonable person is being unreasonable, personifying the reasonable person cannot offer any useful guidance on this question. (shrink)

The ‘perfection account’ of atonement is discussed,under which Christ, on the cross,completed the perfection of human nature,establishing the full perfection of loving filial obedience, offering to the Father a perfected humanity, where these features were fundamental to the atonement. A basic perfection account is first set out. Two additional elements of the perfection account are then discussed: first, that Christ established a perfect victory over evil in our humanity; second, that on the cross Christ put to death the pull to (...) the self-life in our humanity. Reparation is then discussed. Finally,some critical questions are addressed. (shrink)

In Menciusiia6 all humans are said to have ‘a heart that does not bear the suffering of others’. I argue that this statement is illustrated, rather than proven, by the example of our reaction to a child about to fall into a well. This illustration can be located at the most basic level of ethical universals : basic ethical training; further steps in a ladder of reflection are universal reflection on ethical norms themselves, which may finally be related universally to (...) non‐ethical concerns. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems and its Criticisms” by Hugo Cadenas & Marcelo Arnold. Upshot: The authors claim that it is justified to extend the concept of autopoiesis from its biological origin to other disciplines, predominately those that have a social character. However, the authors do not lay strong enough conceptual grounds to justify this extension of autopoiesis because it is unclear what concept of autopoiesis it is that would achieve this objective, or why (...) the concept of autopoiesis itself should be crucial to this endeavor. (shrink)

This text introduces a symposium on the thought and legacy of the French Marxist, Daniel Bensaïd. The authors consider Bensaïd’s theoretical contributions to Marxism, especially the concepts of temporality, political strategy, and revolutionary organisation, as well as his ability to fuse militant activism and intellectual work. This is followed by brief summaries of the articles gathered in the symposium, and a reflection on Bensaïd’s relevance for future Marxist research.

Irish literature after Yeats and Joyce, from the 1920s onwards, includes texts that have been the subject of much contention. For a start, how should Irish literature be defined: as works which have been written in Irish or as works written in English by the Irish? It is a period in which ideas of Ireland--of people, community, and nation--have been both created and reflected, and in which conceptions of a distinct Irish identity have been articulated, defended, and challenged; a period (...) which has its origins in a time of intense political turmoil. Corcoran focuses his chapters on various themes such as "the Big House," and the rural and the provincial and offers discussions of authors ranging from Kinsella and Beckett to William Trevor, Seamus Heaney, and Mary Lavin, to provide a lucid and far-reaching introduction to modern Irish writing. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article shows how the “problem of moral luck” and Sartre's concept of “bad faith” are mutually illuminating, since both have to do with confusions about how much we control, or are controlled by, our situations. I agree with three recent proposals that the problem of moral luck results from certain epistemic malfunctions. However, I argue that the problem cannot be dissolved by overcoming these malfunctions because they are rooted in bad faith. Against the currently dominant interpretation, I argue (...) that bad faith is an inescapable condition of human being because, while we are both free and factical, we can only exist as one or the other at once, thus always keeping an aspect of our nature hidden from ourselves. (shrink)