Accidentally Doing the Right Thing

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):186-206 (2018)
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2020

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10.1111/phpr.12535

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Zoë Johnson King
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Moral Worth: You Can't Have it Both Ways.Nomy Arpaly - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.
The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.
Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.
Praiseworthy Motivations.Zoë A. Johnson King - 2019 - Noûs 54 (2):408-430.

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References found in this work

Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge.
Unprincipled virtue—synopsis.Nomy Arpaly - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):429-431.

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