The increasing use of information and communication technologies (ICT) to help facilitate neuroscience adds a new level of complexity to the question of how ethical issues of such research can be identified and addressed. Current research ethics practice, based on ethics reviews by institutional review boards (IRB) and underpinned by ethical principalism, has been widely criticised and even called ‘imperialist’. In this paper, we develop an alternative way of approaching ethics in neuro-ICT research, based on discourse ethics, which implements responsible (...) research and innovation through dialogues. We draw on our work in Ethics Support, using the Human Brain Project as empirical evidence of the viability of this approach. (shrink)

This open access collection of AI ethics case studies is the first book to present real-life case studies combined with commentaries and strategies for overcoming ethical challenges. Case studies are one of the best ways to learn about ethical dilemmas and to achieve insights into various complexities and stakeholder perspectives. Given the omnipresence of AI ethics in academic, policy and media debates, the book will be suitable for a wide range of audiences, from scholars of different disciplines (e.g. AI science, (...) ethics, politics, philosophy, economics) to policy-makers, lobbying NGOs, teachers and the educated public. (shrink)

There has been much debate whether computers can be responsible. This question is usually discussed in terms of personhood and personal characteristics, which a computer may or may not possess. If a computer fulfils the conditions required for agency or personhood, then it can be responsible; otherwise not. This paper suggests a different approach. An analysis of the concept of responsibility shows that it is a social construct of ascription which is only viable in certain social contexts and which serves (...) particular social aims. If this is the main aspect of responsibility then the question whether computers can be responsible no longer hinges on the difficult problem of agency but on the possibly simpler question whether responsibility ascriptions to computers can fulfil social goals. The suggested solution to the question whether computers can be subjects of responsibility is the introduction of a new concept, called “quasi-responsibility” which will emphasise the social aim of responsibility ascription and which can be applied to computers. (shrink)

Increasingly used in social and behavioral science research, implicit measures aim to assess attitudes that respondents may not be willing to report directly, or of which they may not even be aware. This timely book brings together leading investigators to review currently available procedures and offer practical recommendations for their implementation and interpretation. The theoretical bases of the various approaches are explored and their respective strengths and limitations are critically examined. The volume also discusses current controversies facing the field and (...) highlights promising avenues for future research. (shrink)

Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some (...) general pattern in the way the world or some part of the world is perceived by an individual. Trust may be characterized by such a pattern. I shall focus on two central features of a trusting attitude. First, trust involves a participant attitude (Strawson) toward the person being trusted. Second, a situation of trust is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person being trusted. As an emotional attitude, trust is, to some extent, independent of objective information. It determines what a trusting person will believe and how various outcomes are evaluated. Hence, trust is quite different from rational belief and the problem with trust is not adequately met in minimizing risk by supplying extensive information or some mechanism of sanctioning. Trust is an attitude that enables us to cope with risk in a certain way. If we want to promote trustful interaction, we must form our institutions in ways that allow individuals to experience their interest and values as shared and, thus, to develop a trusting attitude. (shrink)

In this essay I examine Henry of Ghent’s views on our mind’s ability to think and to understand something, and to reflect on its own acts and their contents. Henry explains our acquisition of mental content as a sequence of receptive and productive stages. He identifies a general principle of cognitive presence: for an object to be actually intelligible it must be actually separated from matter and cognitively present to a thinker or cognizer. Sensible, material objects that cannot be immediately (...) present in this way must be represented via functional intermediaries in our cognitive capacities. The two main capacities of the mind are intellect and will, and in Henry’s view each of these mental powers has a reflexive ability. Henry discusses our intellect’s ability to reflect on its acts and their contents in his analysis of mental words. A complete mental word is the product of our inquiry into a thing’s essence. The inquiry is driven by our rational desire for complete cognition and based on intellect’s reflection on a first-order act and its conceptual content. This higher-order awareness of ourselves as cognitive agents enables us to assess the progression of our intellectual inquiry. Henry stresses that our natural cognitive powers are strengthened through divine exemplary standards, which continually correct the concepts we form and complete their structural resemblance with the objects of cognition in extramental reality. (shrink)

The question of specific properties of life compared to nonliving things accompanied biology throughout its history. At times this question generated major controversies with largely diverging opinions. Basically, mechanistic thinkers, who tried to understand organismic functions in terms of nonliving machines, were opposed by those who tried to describe specific properties or even special forces being active within living entities. As this question included the human body, these controversies always have been of special relevance to our self-image and also touched (...) practical issues of medicine. During the second half of the twentieth century, it seemed to be resolved that organisms are explainable basically as physicochemical machines. Especially from the perspective of molecular biology, it seemed to be clear that organisms need to be explained solely by the chemical functions of their component parts, although some resistance to this view never ceased. This research program has been working quite successfully, so that science today knows a lot about the physiological and chemical processes within organisms. However, again new doubts arise questioning whether the mere continuation of this analytical approach will finally generate a fundamental understanding of living entities. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the quest for a new synthesis actually comes from analytical empiricists themselves. The hypothesis of the present paper is that empirical research has been developed far enough today, that it reveals by itself the materials and the prerequisites to understand more of the specific properties of life. Without recourse to mysterious forces, it is possible to generate answers to this age-old question, just using recent, empirically generated knowledge. This view does not contradict the results of reductionistic research, but rather grants them meaning within the context of organismic systems and also may increase their practical usefulness. Although several of these properties have been discussed before, different authors usually concentrated on a single one or some of them. The paper describes ten specific properties of living entities as they can be deduced from contemporary science. The aim is to demonstrate that the results of empirical research show both the necessity as well as the possibility of the development of a new conception of life to build a coherent understanding of organismic functions. (shrink)

THIS paper consists essentially of three parts. The first part argues the case for construing Nietzsche's remarks about Übermenschlichkeit as endorsing some specific set of character traits, of "virtues" if you like. To be an Übermensch, on this reading, is to possess or exhibit certain traits of character, traits which in the typical case are associated with notions of self-overcoming, sublimation, creativity, and self-perfection. An Übermensch, construed in this way, expresses Nietzsche's vision of the human ideal, of what human beings (...) should or might be like. In this sense Nietzsche merely continues the ancient project of articulating the human ideal, the conception of human perfectibility. Although Nietzsche's answer may appear to be shockingly different, the project of articulating a human ideal is scarcely radical. The project qua project is no different than that of Plato or Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza or Kant. For Plato, the philosopher-king represents the ideal of human self-perfection; for Aristotle megalopsychic man conjoined with the life of contemplation; for the Stoics apatheia and right reason; for Spinoza the intellectual amor dei was a necessary and perhaps a sufficient condition for human liberation; for Kant, the genuinely moral person qualifies as the human ideal, the person whose actions are always and only governed by the categorical imperative, although Kant would probably have called such a will a "holy" will rather than a human one. (shrink)

Trust is generally held to have three different dimensions or aspects: a behavioral aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an affective aspect. While t here is hardly any disagreement about trusting behavior, there is some disagreement as to which of the two other aspects is more fundamental. After presenting some of the main ideas concerning the concept of trust as used in the analysis of social cooperation. I will argue that affective aspects of trust must be included in any adequate account (...) of the role of trust in social dilemma situations involving multiple equilibria. Cooperation in such situations requires coordination even though information on what another player might do is not available. A trusting person can handle such problems of cooperation by framing the situation in a way that goes beyond cognitive trust and solves what I shall call the problem of normative consent. I will conclude with some remarks ab out the design of institutions that foster trustful cooperation, especially in the context of the Internet. (shrink)

The reader will be familiarized with some inconspicuous additions to the theory of relativity and quantum theory, which concern the energy density in cosmic and sub-nuclear domains. These are seemingly technical details, but they make the extreme vividness of light and its speed understandable. We will also ask anew some questions that concern that apparently objective world, whose objectivity is not just a matter of self-evidence but is constantly being reconstituted in intelligent awareness. Thus, the vibrancy of the presence of (...) the world emerges as a most suitable basis for physical knowledge. Finally, we will discuss the sociological conditions, which, especially in the light of the increasing global epidemics, point to an impending disintegration, even to a collapse of civil society. While new strands of human, artificial and hybrid life forms are emerging, new aviation and nuclear time travel appear in a new light. Time as we knew it is gone forever. We experience both a time-out of time and time out of time. Only the happiest of us will keep our original shape and make our way across the galaxy. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to give an introduction to the special issue by providing background on the ETHICOMP conference series and a discussion of its role in the academic debate on ethics and computing. It provides the context that influenced the launch of the conference series and highlights its unique features. Finally, it provides an overview of the papers in the special issues. Design/methodology/approach – The paper combines an historical account of ETHICOMP and a review of (...) the existing papers. Findings – ETHICOMP is one of the well-established conference series focused on ethical issues of information and computing. Its special features include: multidisciplinary and diversity of contributors and contributions; explicit outreach to professionals whose work is to design, build, deploy and maintain specific computing applications in the world at large; creation of knowledge that is accessible and relevant across fields and disciplines; intention of making a practical difference to development, use and policy of computing principles and artefacts; and creation of an inclusive, supportive and nurturing community across traditional knowledge silos. Originality/value – The paper is the first one to explicitly define the nature of ETHICOMP which is an important building block in the future development of the conference series and will contribute to the further self-definition of the ETHICOMP community. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is clearly illustrate this convergence and the prescriptive recommendations that such documents entail. There is a significant amount of research into the ethical consequences of artificial intelligence. This is reflected by many outputs across academia, policy and the media. Many of these outputs aim to provide guidance to particular stakeholder groups. It has recently been shown that there is a large degree of convergence in terms of the principles upon which these guidance documents are (...) based. Despite this convergence, it is not always clear how these principles are to be translated into practice. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the authors move beyond the high-level ethical principles that are common across the AI ethics guidance literature and provide a description of the normative content that is covered by these principles. The outcome is a comprehensive compilation of normative requirements arising from existing guidance documents. This is not only required for a deeper theoretical understanding of AI ethics discussions but also for the creation of practical and implementable guidance for developers and users of AI. Findings In this paper, the authors therefore provide a detailed explanation of the normative implications of existing AI ethics guidelines but directed towards developers and organisational users of AI. The authors believe that the paper provides the most comprehensive account of ethical requirements in AI currently available, which is of interest not only to the research and policy communities engaged in the topic but also to the user communities that require guidance when developing or deploying AI systems. Originality/value The authors believe that they have managed to compile the most comprehensive document collecting existing guidance which can guide practical action but will hopefully also support the consolidation of the guidelines landscape. The authors’ findings should also be of academic interest and inspire philosophical research on the consistency and justification of the various normative statements that can be found in the literature. (shrink)

States are believed to be the paradigmatic instances of legitimate political authority. But is their prominence justified? The classic concept of state sovereignty predicts the danger of a fatal deadlock among conflicting authorities unless there is an ultimate authority within a given jurisdiction. This scenario is misguided because the notion of an ultimate authority is conceptually unclear. The exercise of authority is multidimensional and multiattributive, and to understand the relations among authorities we need to analyse this complexity into its different (...) aspects. Instead of ultimate authorities we can have actors endowed with superior authority over others in one regard, but not necessarily in another. And this limited superiority is sufficient for resolving conflicts. There is no need for ultimate authorities. Having discarded the notion of sovereignty we can embrace a different conception of legitimate authority, one that is not interested in the pedigree of actors, but in their capacity to serve its subjects. If states wish to retain their central role in the domain of political authority, they will have to earn it. (shrink)

Medieval literature inherited from the Latin pastoral tradition exemplified by Virgil and others the motif of an ideal landscape, a paradise of shepherds. The Arcadia of classical tradition, inhabited by nymphs, satyrs and the heathen gods, became for the medieval mind a garden of love, where Amor held council (as developed by the French allegorists, for example), or a philosophical paradise, where man was recreated and restored. At the same time, medieval historians and theologians found themselves confronted by a different (...) kind of pagan paradise, namely the famous fairy hill of Romano-Celtic origin, which was inhabited not by fictional, but by real creatures such as elves and fairies. The Church Fathers condemned the fairy hill as a demonic illusion and the fairies as diabolical phantasms. This article will demonstrate that the literary description of the fairy hill in Latin tradition was strongly influenced by the idea of bucolic landscape, although it changed its character significantly: what once had been a literary model, now became a metaphysical reality and a concrete alternative to the contemporary world. (shrink)

Unlike the supergame model assumes agents in exchange situations will normally not be perfectly informed on past behaviour of their partners. Also, they will be able to choose their partners to a certain extend. A formal model is presented that attempts to take account of these facts. It is supposed that for any actor the probability of finding a partner for a lucrative exchange depends on his past behaviour. A model of reputation formation is presented as a formal description of (...) this interdependency. Based on this model it is shown that under certain conditions only co-operative conduct will pay in the long run. Thus it is confirmed that - given the mechanism of trust - rational agents may act trustworthy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 47-71.

Communication is an inherently strategic matter. This paper introduces simple game theoretic models of information transmission to identify different forms of uncertainty which may pose a problem of trust in testimony. Strategic analysis suggests discriminating between trust in integrity, trust in competence, trust in (the will to invest) effort and trust in honesty. Whereas uncertainty about the sender's honesty or integrity may directly influence a rational receiver's readiness to rely on sender's statements, neither uncertainty about the competence of a sender (...) nor uncertainty about his willingness to invest effort has any direct impact on rational reliance on its own. In this regard, trust in honesty and trust in integrity appear to be more basic than trust in competence or effort. (shrink)

Der Liberalismus legt größten Wert auf die Freiheit des individuellen Menschen, die er darum rechtlich gewährleistet wissen will. Subjektive Rechte sind die Form, in der die Freiheit des Einzelnen Schutz und Anerkennung erfährt. Und da jeder individuelle Mensch ein Recht auf Freiheit hat, ist diese ein Menschenrecht.

Faith in the sense of trust in God is discussed as a somewhat extreme case of trust. Trust in general is understood as an emotional attitude and determined by the way a trusting person perceives the world and the person trusted. Interpersonal trust as the most common form of trust is characterized by connectedness - the trusted person is perceived as acting according to norms, values or goals shared by the trusting person - and by a participant attitude in the (...) sense of Strawson. Trust in God differs essentially from ordinary interpersonal trust, as the asymmetrical relationship between God and a faithful person does not allow for sharing a normative basis of conduct in the strict sense of „sharing“. Therefore, trust in God is ‚categorical‘ in character: the faithful person acknowledges God’s will as the ultimate and binding standard of normative value. Whatever happens, the faithful person perceives it as an expression of God’s will, and, thus, as ‚good‘. (shrink)

By analyzing legacies in California from 1890 to 1984 Judge and Hrdy (1992) detected a gender-related difference: Men with children were statistically more likely to leave all of their property to a wife than were mothers to a husband. The authors argue that men were more likely than women to remarry and have additional children. Thus, in order to transfer their wealth to their mutual children, men can leave it to their wives but women can avoid risks by giving it (...) to the children directly. This hypothesis was tested by two experiments in which subjects were asked to put themselves in the position of a person writing a will and allocate the wealth to the surviving spouse and the children. Age and sex of the heir/heiress were experimentally varied. The results support the inclusive fitness interpretation. (shrink)

In his 1956 essay “Die Welt als Phantom und Matrize”, Günther Anders provided a thorough interpretation of radio and television. Far from just being a time-specific document of early electronic mass media, it still continues to provide insights into how human experience is changed through each new technical medium. This will be illustrated via three critical concepts proposed by Anders. He coined the term “iconomania” to conceptualise the ongoing medial shift from a writing-based to a primarily visual culture. “A priori (...) conditional forms” is Anders’ way of getting a grasp on the structural influence of mass production and mass media on human perception and behaviour. The term “psychotechnics” was originally introduced by Anders’ father, William Stern, for early forms of applied psychology. Anders adopted it in a critical fashion in his warnings of an all-encompassing power of reshaping psychical functions that proves especially fruitful when applied to contemporary design principles. Finally, Anders’ media theory will be briefly compared to Shane Denson’s recent work on “discorrelation” between human perception and digital images. (shrink)

A broad sketch for a model of speech production is outlined which describes developmental aspects of its cognitive-linguistic and sensorimotor components. A description of the emergence of phonological knowledge is a central point in our model sketch. It will be shown that the phonological form level emerges during speech acquisition and becomes an important representation at the interface between cognitive-linguistic and sensorimotor processes. Motor planning as well as motor programming are defined as separate processes in our model sketch and it (...) will be shown that both processes revert to the phonological information. Two computational simulation experiments based on quantitative implementations are undertaken to show proof of principle of key ideas of the model sketch: the emergence of phonological information over developmental stages, the adaptation process for generating new motor programs, and the importance of various forms of phonological representation in that process. Based on the ideas developed within our sketch of a production model and its quantitative spell-out within the simulation models, motor planning can be defined here as the process of identifying a succession of executable chunks from a currently activated phoneme sequence and of coding them as raw gesture scores. Motor programming can be defined as the process of building up the complete set of motor commands by specifying all gestures in detail. This full specification of gesture scores is achieved in our model by adapting motor information from phonologically similar syllables or by assembling motor programs from sub-syllabic units. (shrink)

Immanuel Kants "Grundlegung" ist ohne Zweifel einer der bedeutendsten Texte der abendlandischen Moralphilosophie. Sie gilt mitunter allerdings auch als einer der "dunkelsten" Texte Kants - wenn nicht sogar der abendlandischen Philosophie uberhaupt. Der Kommentar macht deutlich, dass die vorgebliche Dunkelheit im Wesentlichen der Tatsache geschuldet ist, dass der Text seit langem im Schatten der falschen Annahme gelesen wird, Kant wolle eine Begrundung (oder Rechtfertigung) des Sittengesetzes liefern, um damit den moralischen Skeptizismus abzuwehren. Liest man ihn stattdessen unter der (auch historisch (...) angemesseneren) Perspektive, dass Kant mit dem kategorischen Imperativ 'nur' eine neue Formel fur das Prinzip der allgemein im Schwange gehenden Sittlichkeit 'angeben und rechtfertigen' will, um so den moralischen Eudaimonismus durch eine Moral der Autonomie zu ersetzen - dann zeigt sich, dass der Text nicht bloss ein philosophisches, sondern zugleich ein schriftstellerisches Meisterwerk ist. (shrink)

A careful examination of the concept of a "physical law" in modern experimental science reveals that "cause" is a purely metatheoretical term in physics: Causal knowledge is merely pre-nomological knowledge about the explanatory and predictive relevance of our nomological knowledge, and that is: of our theories. While effects are facts, that is, events under a certain (theory-dependent) description, causes are just events. Causal talk comes into play only when physical explanations of certain facts fail or are (at the time being) (...) incomplete, that is, when there is a difference between the very fact on the one hand side and the explanandum of a given explanation on the other. Whenever explanations are adequate, talking about causes becomes void. "Mental causes" will hence never collide with physical explanations. As long as physical explanations are still incomplete, "mental causes" or "physical causes" will both guide the application of our physical knowledge (by means of so called "generic causal statements"). And if physics will ever be able to give a complete explanation of certain phenomena, then there will be no reason to talk about causes anymore—neither about mental causes nor about physical causes. (shrink)

A famous passage in the first Critique (A 557 f.) often gives rise to the belief that Kant had not yet delivered a full treatment of freedom in 1781 and intended to shift this treatment to future writings. However, a closer inspection of the passage reveals that, to the contrary, Kant claims that due to the limitations of human reason his critical account of freedom given thus far must be considered complete. And indeed, this account reappears unchanged in the Groundwork. (...) When considered in this light, not only do the exact achievements of the first Critique concerning Kant’s doctrine of freedom become evident, but so too does the further development of this doctrine. In 1785, the Groundwork supplies a new conceptual link between freedom and the moral law (and with it an explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives). And thanks to this very link, Kant is able, in the second Critique (1787/88), to remedy a ‘dogmatic’ mistake (discovered by a reviewer in 1786) in his 1781/85 account of freedom. (shrink)

Within the rational choice approach trust is usually analysed as a problem of choice under uncertainty. In a standard social situation in which trust plays a role a trustor A has to choose between trusting or mistrusting a trustee B. If he chooses to trust, B can either honour the trust given which will be of some advantage to both or exploit it no matter what the consequences for A are. A can in general protect himself against being exploited by (...) choosing not to trust. But then he forgoes the possible advantages of trustful co-operation. A´s problem typically is that he is not sufficiently informed about B´s incentives or motivation. He may, for instance, not know whether B possesses some favourable character traits or not. The paper uses the well known game of trust with imperfect information to illustrate the core of the problem. From a rational choice point of view the possibility of a trustful decision is determined by the beliefs of A concerning B´s preferences. Thus the crucial parameter in the model is a probability measure p that measures A´s subjective expectations that a rational B will co-operate. According to the standard rational choice account trust is either a consequence or simply the expression of the expectations of a trustee represented by p. I refer to this account of trust as the theory of trust as rational expectancy. I shall criticise this solely cognitive view of trust for neglecting some central aspects of trusting relationships. My argument draws on the distinction between trust and reliance. It will be based on some simple observations, in particular: 1. The perception of the choice problem by the trustor as well as his perception of the trustee and the trustee´s characteristics may depend on wether or not the trustor is in fact trusting or mistrusting. 2. The trustor´s evaluation of the possible outcomes may depend on wether or not the trustor is in fact trusting or mistrusting. 3. The motivation of the trustee will often depend on whether he is trusted or not. If my argument is sound, then - to some considerable extend - it is impossible to analyse trust problems solely in terms of options, preferences and believes. There simply are no preferences and believes of the interacting individuals which are prior to and independent of trust. Trust then must be understood as a cause or basis of a trustor´s expectations, and not as their consequence. I shall finish my considerations by pointing to some general implications for an account of trust as social capital. (shrink)

Frank Quinn of Jaffe-Quinn fame worked out the basics of his own account of how mathematical practice should be described and analyzed, partly by historical comparisons with 19th century mathematics, partly by an analysis of contemporary mathematics and its pedagogy. Despite his claim that for this task, "professional philosophers seem as irrelevant as Aristotle is to modern physics," this philosophy talk will provide a critical summary of his main observations and arguments. The goal is to inject some of Quinns remarks (...) to the current conversation on mathematical practice. [1] Jaffe, Arthur, Quinn, Frank. "Theoretical Mathematics: Towards a synthesis of mathematics and theoretical physics," Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society NS 29:1, 113. [2] Quinn, Frank. Contributions to a Science of Mathematics, manuscript, 98pp. [3] Quinn, Frank. "A revolution in mathematics? What really happened a century ago and why it matters today," Notices American Mathematical Society 59:1 31-37. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this paper it will be shown that Newton'sPrincipiagives an explication of and an argument for the first Law of Motion, that seems to be outside the scope of today's philosophy of science but was familiar to seventeenth-century commentators: The foundation of classical mechanics is possible only by recurrence to results of a successful technical practice. Laws of classical mechanics gain their meaning as well as their claims to validity only when considered as statements about artifacts whose production belongs (...) to the shared know-how of a scientific community. (shrink)

The article explains the essential features of a theory of global justice that combines justice for individuals with justice for political communities. It holds that arguing within the justificatory framework of cosmopolitanism is compatible with a conditional justification of states that are basically just. The justification rests on an argument I will name ‘the moral path dependency argument’. The article follows its normative consequences into the fields of a justly ordered community of legitimate states and of cosmopolitan principles of distributive (...) justice. Thus, it reconciles the latter with claims to political autonomy of particular communities and with the fact of reasonable disagreement between them. (shrink)

Politische Theorien der Tierrechte handeln davon, was wir individuellen Tieren in den öffentlichen Kontexten unserer Zuständigkeit schulden. Wir verantworten zwangsbewehrte Normen des Zusammenlebens, die schwerwiegende Folgen für ungezählte Tiere haben. Milliarden Haustiere, ›Nutztiere‹ und auch Wildtiere sind von den Grundsätzen und Regeln menschlicher Gemeinwesen und Gesellschaften tiefgreifend, umfassend und unentrinnbar betroffen. Der kleinste gemeinsame Nenner politischer Theorien der Tierrechte ist, dass das Wohlergehen individueller Tiere ein eigenes Kriterium politischer Legitimität bildet. Manche Autorinnen und Autoren treten überdies dafür ein, zumindest gezähmte (...) und gezüchtete Tiere als gleichberechtigte Mitglieder unserer Gemeinwesen anzuerkennen. Noch weiter geht der Vorschlag, Tiere als politische Akteure in Betracht zu ziehen, die aktiv an der Ausgestaltung unserer – und ihrer – Gemeinwesen mitwirken. Zu den Verfechterinnen und Verfechter eines ›political turn‹ des Tierrechtsdenkens zählen Alasdair Cochrane, Laura Valentini, Martha C. Nussbaum sowie insbesondere Robert Garner, Sue Donaldson und Will Kymlicka. (shrink)

The title of this special topic in RMM is borrowed from a 1978 paper of Hillel Steiner in which he argues against Robert Nozick's invisible hand conception of the emergence of the state. Steiner believes that central institutions of social order such as money and government need some form of conscious endorsement by individuals to emerge and to persist over time. -/- Tony de Jasay's critique (in Philosophy 85, 2010) of Bob Sugden's plea for a Humean version of contractarianism (see (...) RMM, Vol 0) motivated us, to take this old – but still central – theme of the debate on the origin of social order as one starting point in a new attempt to evaluate the idea of a social contract). -/- Within the 35 years since the publication of Hillel Steiner's paper different advances have been made in economics and philosophy that may well shed some new light on some of the fundamental issues in the debate about a contractarian conception of social order. These make us confident that a new attempt to explore the contractarian idea is well worthwhile. -/- Those who first motivated this project, Hillel Steiner, Anthony de Jasay, and Robert Sugden, as well as a number of other renowned scholars confirmed to contribute. The special topic will actually start with a previously unpublished paper by Hillel Steiner, originally written in 1986, in which he extends and elaborates on his argument about money from the 1978 paper, and with an original article by Anthony de Jasay, in which he further clarifies his worries. A response by Robert Sugden will follow. Further contributions will discuss the matter by reference to the roots of the debate in seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy or to recent advancements in economics, the behavioral sciences or in social philosophy. Some of the contributions confirmed are already in a very elaborated stage and ready to be published soon. They are announced here right from the start and – for the time being – marked as 'to appear'. -/- As always, the special topic is an open ended project and further contributions will be considered; please send your submission to rmm@frankfurt-school.de (see 'How to Submit' for details). Also, readers are invited to submit shorter comments for the discussion section, which may be published after an abridged refereeing process. (shrink)

It is first Kant who makes "practical reason" a central term in moral philosophy. He departs from a tradition which assigned clearly distinct roles within the theory of moral obligation to "ratio" on the one hand, and "voluntas" on the other. Using an example of a Christian natural law approach employed before Kant, the article isolates and portrays each of these roles. Against this background it shows that Kant transforms a theological argument for God's self-obligation though His own will to (...) create a "kingdom of nature" into a philosophical argument for human self-obligation through human creation of a "kingdom of freedom". The rational and voluntary moments of this "act of creation" are expressed in the concept of "practical reason". This concept thus articulates human understanding of self as a self-legislating and free being. 'Praktische Vernunft' wird erst mit Kant zu einem zentralen Terminus der Moral. Er steht quer zu jener Tradition, welche bis dahin der 'ratio' einerseits und der 'voluntas' andererseits wohlunterschiedene Aufgaben im Rahmen der Theorie moralischer Verbindlichkeit zuwies. Am Beispiel einer christlich-naturrechtlichen Argumentationsweise vor Kant werden die beiden genannten Aufgaben herausgearbeitet. Es zeigt sich vor diesem Hintergrund, daß Kant ein theologisches Argument für die Selbstbindung Gottes durch dessen eigenen Willen zur Schöpfung eines 'Reiches der Natur' in das philosophische Argument einer Selbstbindung des Menschen durch die Schöpfung eines 'Reiches der Freiheit' transformiert. Vernunft- und Willensmoment ebendieses 'Schöpfungsaktes' finden Ausdruck in dem Begriff einer 'praktischen Vernunft'. Dieser artikuliert somit das Selbstverständnis des Menschen als eines sich selbst das Gesetz gebenden, freien Wesens. (shrink)

In a famous passage in Perpetual Peace , Kant discusses a “natural guarantee“ of perpetual peace. Basically, this natural guarantee relieves human beings of the obligation to actively promote the development of law in the world, because one can expect it to develop anyway. Yet Kant calls the guarantee practical, meaning the guarantee has no direct prognostic value. One can see that this guarantee is merely a guarantee of success, which ensures that human conduct aimed toward attaining perpetual peace will (...) always meet with natural conditions that do not rule out success from the start. Furthermore, this guarantee gives human beings the means of establishing external legal relationships within which even those persons who only follow their own interests will act externally in accordance with the law. In this way, the “natural guarantee“ prevents political leaders from escaping responsibility by claiming that attaining perpetual peace is impossible. (shrink)

An important question one can ask of ethical theories is whether and how they aim to raise claims to universality. This refers to the subject area that they intend to describe or govern and also to the question whether they claim to be binding for all (moral) agents. This paper discusses the question of universality of Luciano Floridi’s information ethics (IE). This is done by introducing the theory and discussing its conceptual foundations and applications. The emphasis will be placed on (...) the ontological grounding of IE. IE’s claims to universality will be contrasted with those raised by discourse ethics. This comparison of two pertinent ethical theories allows for a critical discussion of areas where IE currently has room for elaboration and development. (shrink)

Critical research is becoming increasingly accepted as a valid approach to research in information systems. It is deemed to be particularly suitable for situations where researchers want to address conspicuous injustice, such as in areas of development or the digital divide. Critical research in information systems (CRIS), I will argue, is a possible approach to some of the ethical problems arising in the context of information and communication technology (ICT). It can be sensitive to the question of culture and therefore (...) suitable for researching cross-cultural ethical questions in ICT. It is often unclear, however, what exactly critical research stands for and to what extent critical approaches are applicable across cultural boundaries. This paper will address these problems by proposing a definition of critical research as focused on changing the status quo and aiming for emancipation. It will then look at the question whether different cultures are compatible and comparable and what the role of culture in research on information systems is. The paper will then return to the question whether the critical intention to emancipate and empower humans is an expression of cultural imperialism or whether there are valid ways of promoting emancipation across cultural divides. (shrink)

The significance of Friedrich Nietzsche for twentieth century culture is now no longer a matter of dispute. He was quite simply one of the most influential of modern thinkers. The opening essay of this 1996 Companion provides a chronologically organised introduction to and summary of Nietzsche's published works, while also providing an overview of their basic themes and concerns. It is followed by three essays on the appropriation and misappropriation of his writings, and a group of essays exploring the nature (...) of Nietzsche's philosophy and its relation to the modern and post-modern world. The final contributions consider Nietzsche's influence on the twentieth century in Europe, the USA, and Asia. New readers and non-specialists will find this the most convenient, accessible guide to Nietzsche currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Nietzsche. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Despotie der Vernunft? Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant HegelBernd LudwigArmin Adam. Despotie der Vernunft? Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant Hegel. Reihe praktische Philosophie. Műnchen: Karl Alber Verlag, 1999. Pp. 304. Cloth, DM 74.00.Eine Philosophie der Vernunft bedroht die Freiheit, weil der Versuch einer konsequenten Begründung der politischen Institutionen aus Freiheit und Vernunft den Absolutismus ebendieser Institutionen begünstigt (285). Das ist die These, die Armin Adams politikwissenschaftliche Habilitationsschrift anhand einer Analyse der politischen (...) Philosophie der Aufklärung, genauer, anhand der Lektüre von Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant und Hegel expliziert: Hobbes' individualistische Revolution des Naturrechts führt zum Absolutismus des Leviathan, Rousseaus Ideal der Volkssouveränität [End Page 591] zur Mystik der volonté générale, Kants Verrechtlichung des Politischen zur Leugnung des Widerstandsrechts und Hegels Pathos der Freiheit schließlich zum Mythos des Staates. Bei allen vier Autoren wird der aus der Freiheit geborene Staat vor den Gerichtshof der Vernunft zitiert und am Ende steht die Aufhebung (Hobbes) oder die radikale Umdeutung (Rousseau bis Hegel) des Begriffs der Freiheit, welche die ursprünglichen Freiheits-Intuitionen vergessen macht.Deutungen, welche die Aufklärung an ihren befreienden Leistungen messen, sind für Adam zwar genauso berechtigt wie jene, die ihre "dunkle Seite" (288) thematisieren. Ihm geht es gleichwohl darum, gerade die letztere nicht als bloß-akzidentell zu begreifen, sondern vielmehr die Kritik der philosophischen Aufklärung "aus dem Inneren der philosophischen Arbeit" zu leisten (288) und so der Apologie der Aufklärung eine "zweite Geschichte" zur Seite zu stellen.]Ausgangspunkt für die Politische Philosophie der Aufklärung wie auch für Adams Auseinandersetzung mit ihr ist die Vertragstheorie des Staates (22 ff.). Bei Hobbes und Rousseau findet die politische Gegenwart in der "Urszene des Vertrages" ihre Legitimitätsquelle (288). Erst mit Kant (und Hegel) wird der Vertrag verpflichtungstheoretisch entlastet, als Scharnierstück zwischen Motivation und Obligation entbehrlich, weil eine reichere praktische Philosophie die Rede von der Pflicht zum Staat rechtfertigen kann (159 ff.). Hobbes setzt noch auf die individuelle ökonomische Rationalität als movens zum Staat. Die Freiheit ist aber nur das Prinzip der Herrschaftsbegründung, sie wird durch das Prinzip der Souveränität in die Vorgeschichte des politischen Körpers verbannt (44, 70). Rousseau behält die Hobbessche Interessenlogik bei, doch durch die Konstitution der volonté générale wird der Selbsterhaltungswille des Einzelnen in den Willen zur Erhaltung des Gemeinwesens transformiert (94). Von der Herrschaftsbegründung verschiebt sich der Blick auf die Herrschaftspraxis (98). Entsprechend schwankt Rousseau zwischen einer Interpretation seiner volonté générale als bien commun(Économie Politique) und als volonté de tous (Du Contrat social). (104 ff.) Die Freiheit im Staat wird mit der Vernunft identifiziert und so der bloßen Willkür entgegengesetzt, der Gesellschaftsvertrag ist nicht mehr nur die Legitimationsgrundlage der Herrschaft, sondern "die Stunde Null" des Projekts der politischen Volkserziehung durch Institutionen. (133) Kant endlich löst die Pflicht vom Nutzen (168) und kann so auf die individuelle Freiwilligkeit, d. i. auf jegliche kontraktualistische Herrschaftslegitimation verzichten: Das "exeundum e statu naturali" wird zur Pflicht und der Vertrag degeneriert zur (moralphilosophischen) Idee (175): "Die Abkehr vom Prinzip empirischer Freiwilligkeit zugunsten des moralphilosophischen Prinzips der Universalisierung von Freiheit ersetzt auch die empirischen Subjekte der Staatsbegründung durch die Vernunft selbst" (178). Hegel verabschiedet dann endgültig die "epistemische und moralische Priorität des Individuums" (246) indem sein Konzept der Sittlichkeit es ihm erlaubt, die Freiwilligkeit in der "substanziellen Freiheit" aufgehoben zu sehen (241). Der "fundamentalistisch-kritische Gestus" der Aufklärung wird durch das Vertrauen in die Wirklichwerdung des Vernünftigen ersetzt. Indem Hegel das Recht als entwickelte Idee der Freiheit versteht, bildet seine Rechtsphilosophie den Gipfel einer politischen Philosophie der Aufklärung (252). [End Page 592]Adams Buch will ein Korrektiv für jenen Aufklärungsoptimismus liefern, der mit dem Zeitalter der Vernunft das Ende der Geschichte eingeläutet sieht. Ohne Frage: Das Ideal einer "vollendeten Herrschaft der Vernunft" (289), wie es Adam als Leitmotiv bei dem von ihm behandelten "Quartetts" entdecken will, überforderte jede menschliche Form der Politik. Aber möglicherweise wird man zumindest einigen dieser Autoren eher gerecht, wenn man ihr Unternehmen gerade umgekehrt als den kritischen Versuch begreift, menschliche Herrschaft vom Glorienschein arkaner Wahrheiten zu entkleiden... (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the emancipatory promises and realities of information and communication technology in Egypt.Design/methodology/approachThe combination of Habermasian and Foucauldian ideas implemented by a critical discourse analysis of the Egyptian Information Society Policy and interviews with employees of local decision support systems employees. Promises and rhetoric are contrasted with findings and questioned with regards to their validity.FindingsOn the policy level, analysis shows that the emancipating rhetoric of ICT is not followed through. ICT is mostly seen (...) as a means of attracting foreign direct investment. Neither political participation nor educational benefits are promoted seriously. On the local level, culture and organisational realities prevent individuals from exploiting the emancipatory potential of the technology.Originality/valueThe combination of the Habermasian and Foucauldian approach exposes the problems of ICT use in developing countries. It shows that emancipation is used to legitimise ICT policies but is not taken seriously on a policy level in Egypt. Local implementations also fail to deliver on their promise. In order to have emancipatory effects, ICT policy and use will need to be reconsidered. (shrink)

This collection of essays fairly exhibits the diversity of opinions about and approaches to the study of Nietzsche within the contemporary academy’s influential and far flung Nietzsche establishment. Notwithstanding the absence of feminist interpretations of Nietzsche and despite the omission of chapters that take seriously Nietzsche’s debt to the ancients, critique of the spirit of democracy, defense of a rank order of desires and souls, recurring articulations of an aristocratic politics, attack on the morally and politically debilitating effects of professional (...) scholarship, and persistent celebration of the philosopher as the highest human type, this book will prove useful to amateurs and professionals alike. (shrink)

Advances in neuroscience and other disciplines are producing large-scale brain data consisting of datasets from multiple organisms, disciplines, and jurisdictions in different formats. However, due to the lack of an international data governance framework brain data is currently being produced under various contextual ethical and legal principles which may influence key stakeholders involved in the generation, collection, processing and sharing of brain data thereby raising ethical and legal challenges. In addition, despite the demand for a brain data governance framework that (...) accounts for culture, there is a gap in empirical research and actions to understand how key stakeholders around the world view these issues using neuroscientists who are affected by these ethical and legal principles. Therefore, using the research question how do ethical and legal principles influence data governance in neuroscience? we attempt to understand the perceptions of key actors on the principles, issues and concerns that can arise from brain data research. We carried out interviews with 21 leading international neuroscientists. The analytical insights revealed key ethical and legal principles, areas of convergence, visibility, and the contextual issues and concerns that arise in brain data research around these principles. These issues and concerns circulate around intimately connected areas which include ethics, human rights, regulations, policies and guidelines, and participatory governance. Also, key contextual insights around animal research and ethics were identified. The research identifies key principles, issues, and concerns that need to be addressed in advancing the development of a framework for global brain data governance. By presenting contextual insights from neuroscientists across regions, the study contributes to informing discussions and shaping policies aimed at promoting responsible and ethical practices in brain data research. The research answers the call for a cross cultural study of global brain data governance and the results of the study will assist in understanding the issues and concerns that arise in brain data governance. (shrink)

Es ist schwierig, Kant in der Frage der Willensfreiheit eine der heute üblichen philosophischen Sichtweisen zuzuordnen. Mithilfe des »transzendentalen Idealismus« meint Kant im Ergebnis die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Naturnotwendigkeit begründen zu können. Zugleich hält er an einem Verständnis von Freiheit fest, demzufolge Freiheit »absolute Spontaneität« verlangt und deshalb nicht im Naturnotwendigen aufgehen kann. Seine Antwort verweist mit der Unterscheidung von »Ding an sich« und »Erscheinung« auf zwei verschiedene »Welten« oder »Standpunkte«, von denen aus unser Handeln beschrieben werden kann – (...) einerseits als absolut frei, andererseits als naturnotwendig. Wie wichtig Kant gerade dieses Ergebnis seiner Kritik war, wurde von ihm wiederholt unterstrichen und in der Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft sogar zum eigentlichen Ziel des kritischen Projekts erhoben. Doch obwohl die kantische Philosophie sich einer verbreiteten Anerkennung erfreut, sind heutzutage die wenigsten bereit, Freiheit in einer Welt der »Dinge an sich« zu verorten. Die Gründe dafür liegen zum Teil in einer Neigung zum philosophischen Naturalismus, zum Teil in einem veränderten Verständnis von Freiheit, vor allem aber in einer grundsätzlichen Skepsis im Hinblick auf ehrgeizige metaphysische Theorien. Der vorliegende Band diskutiert Kants Freiheitstheorie in exegetischer und systematischer Hinsicht. Die Autoren stellen unter anderem folgende Fragen: Was genau hat Kant mit der Unterscheidung von »Ding an sich« und »Erscheinung« im Sinn? Wie soll sie die Möglichkeit transzendentaler Freiheit sichern? Gelingt das, wenn man die Unterscheidung akzeptiert? Ist der transzendentale Idealismus überhaupt eine kohärente Theorie? Was bleibt von Kants Freiheitstheorie und seiner Metaphysik des transzendentalen Idealismus? Inhaltsübersicht: Mario Brandhorst, Andree Hahmann, Bernd Ludwig: Einleitung - Dietmar H. Heidemann: Über Kants These: »Denn, sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten« - Tobias Rosefeldt: Kants Kompatibilismus –Jochen Bojanowski: Ist Kant ein Kompatibilist? - Andree Hahmann: Ist Freiheit die »Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit«? Das Ding an sich als Grund der Erscheinung bei Kant – Geert Keil: Kann man nichtzeitliche Verursachung verstehen? Kausalitätstheoretische Anmerkungen zu Kants Freiheitsantinomie – Mario Brandhorst: Woran scheitert Kants Freiheitstheorie? – Kenneth Westphal: Kants positive Verteidigung der Urteils- und Handlungsfreiheit, und zwar ohne transzendentalen Idealismus - Heiner Klemme: Spontaneität und Selbsterkenntnis. Kant über die ursprüngliche Einheit von Natur und Freiheit im Aktus des Denkens – Bernd Ludwig: Was weiß ich vom Ich? Kants Lehre vom Faktum der reinen praktischen Vernunft, seine Neufassung der Paralogismen und die verborgenen Fortschritte der Kritischen Metaphysik im Jahre 1786 – Reinhard Brandt: »Sei ein rechtlicher Mensch « – wie das? - Dieter Schönecker: Kants Grundlegung über den bösen Willen. Eine kommentarische Interpretation von GMS III 457,25-458,5 – Susanne Brauer: Alternative zu Kant? Freiheit nach Hegel in den Grundlinien zur Philosophie des Rechts. (shrink)

In recent years, the rights of patients have assumed a more pivotal role in international discussion. Stricter laws on the protection of patients place greater priority on the perspective and the status of patients. The purpose of this study is to emphasize ethical aspects in communication, the role of patient advocates as contacts for the concerns and suggestions of patients, and how many problems of ethics disappear when communication is highlighted. We reviewed 680 documented cases of consultation in a 10-year (...) period of patient advocates’ activity at a big German university hospital with 1,300 beds. On the basis of this extensive material, the article will focus on the intersection of the advocate’s work with the problems of patients in hospitals. Deficits in the level of communication between health care professionals and patients were frequently uncovered. Patients primarily complain about the lack of dialogue and empathy. Middle-aged patients consulted the patients’ advocate disproportionately more often. Measured against this baseline, the group of 65 and older complained less frequently. Besides complaints the advocate was asked in more than one-third of all cases for information about medical matters, hospital regulations or administrative problems. Patients obviously see the advocate as a well-connected and ideally unbiased contact person for uncertainties concerning their malady or a potential stay in hospital. Those seeking help often set hope in the information given by the voluntary patient representative. It should be highly recommended for every German hospital to establish the position of a patient advocate. Furthermore, patients can profit from regular exchange between the advocate and the Ethics Committee, also, to help ensure that their rights are taken into account and implemented in an ethically desirable context. (shrink)