This article aims at showing the need for a sound ethical and anthropological foundation of economics and business, and argues the importance of a correct understanding of human values and human nature for the sake of economics and of businesses themselves. It is suggested that the ethical-anthropological side of economics and business can be grasped by taking Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA) as major reference points. We hold that an “Aristotelian economics of virtues”, connected with the (...) CA’s notion of human richness, can promote the shift to the concept of personhood, and can lead to a more “humanized” business, by fostering human flourishing, the enhancement of human capabilities, and the pursuit of a more humane development for each and every person. (shrink)

Most theories of justice rest on the idea that emotions need to be contained or set aside and that rationality serves as the best, if not exclusive, criterion for identifying the principles of a fair distribution. In recent years, however, two important claims have been made. One is that rationality and emotions are not in conflict with one another, but should be conceived of as strictly interconnected; the other is that social justice is not just about distribution, but also – (...) or especially – about social relations. This paper aims to bridge these claims and argues that (a) the role of emotions should be recognised by theories of justice, as it is compatible with the importance such theories attribute to rationality, and (b) an inquiry into emotions is particularly important to investigate the socio-relational dimension of justice. Moreover, the paper claims that (c) in order to adequately investigate the role of emotions in social justice, it is important to acknowledge that emotions are structurally mediated and shaped by powerful transformative forces, among which technologies – especially so-called socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) – prove to be particularly relevant. The paper argues that SDTs have a fundamental role in shaping social relations, shared commitments, and the emotions that follow from them or enable them. (shrink)

We are repeatedly told that AI will help us to solve some of the world's biggest challenges, from treating chronic diseases and reducing fatality rates in traffic accidents to fighting climate change and anticipating cybersecurity threats. However, the article contends that public discourse on AI systematically avoids considering AI’s environmental costs. Artificial Intelligence- Brevini argues- runs on technology, machines, and infrastructures that deplete scarce resources in their production, consumption, and disposal, thus increasing the amounts of energy in their use, and (...) exacerbate problems of waste and pollution. It also relies on data centers, that demands impressive amounts of energy to compute, analyse, categorize. If we want to stand a chance at tackling the Climate Emergency, then we have to stop avoiding addressing the environmental problems generated by AI. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 9, Page 1226-1246, November 2022. In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, (...) we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society. (shrink)

This review article puts two recent publications —Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophies by Tsenay Serequeberhan and What Fanon Said. A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought by Lewis R. Gordon—in conversation with Achille Mbembe’s renowned On the Postcolony, first published in French in 2000, in English in 2001, and here reviewed in the 2015 Wits University Press edition. The opportunity for such a literary dialogue to take place across fifteen years is occasioned both by (...) the latest South African edition of On the Postcolony, which in itself invites a fresh reading of Mbembe’s manifesto on postcolonial authoritarianism in Africa, as well as by the different potential outcome of the postcolonial condition that Gordon and Serequeberhan envision and propose with respect to Mbembe. I argue that while Mbembe’s pessimistic portrayal of the postcolonial present is one whereby it is difficult to envision transformation, both Serequeberhan and Gordon’s books offer a rich philosophical terrain from which to imagine possible futures, grounded in notions of dialogue and solidarity, that, however, vary significantly for each author. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on Cassirer’s functionalist theory of truth in order to argue that the Positivistic theory of knowledge fails to explain how it is that physics provides us with truth-evaluable and reliably objective descriptions of the world. This argument is based on Cassirer’s idea that what the Positivistic theory of knowledge normally considers as the “factual” of physics is, in fact, unachievable and falsely conceived. I show that Cassirer’s focus on how measurement is made possible, as well (...) as how technological instruments are put to use in physical research, enables him to offer an alternative account of truth, i.e., a functionalist theory of truth, which is philosophically attractive and rationally plausible. (shrink)

The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not yet been sufficiently (...) explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society. (shrink)

This article is a response to the new book by Bruce Janz, African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought, published in 2023 in the Bloomsbury Studies in World Philosophies series. Enactivist Cognition opens up a new space of conversation in the field of African philosophy—and world philosophies more broadly—through an innovative approach that applies insights from the cognitive sciences to the humanities in order to highlight the relationship between thought and context, between theorization and experience. Through the interpretive (...) lens of enactivism, Janz ventures into new readings of well-known themes and personalities in African philosophy and also introduces interesting new themes and personalities to the African philosophical conversation. Janz also intentionally bridges African and Africana thought. While this article contests the application of enactivism to all the philosophers treated in Enactivist Cognition, it applauds Janz’s search for new, creative, and productive spaces for and of philosophy. (shrink)

Jo-Anne McArthur est l’une des photojournalistes majeures de la condition animale dans le monde. Elle a documenté les conditions de vie et d’exploitation des animaux dans plus de soixante pays différents, et ses images sont utilisées par les mouvements animalistes dans le monde entier. Elle vit à Toronto et dirige l’agence multi-média We animals Media dont elle est la fondatrice. En vingt ans de travail, elle a accumulé une énorme documentation, et multiplié les projets de collaboration avec...

Sulla base degli studi di Mircea Eliade, l’Autore evidenzia, nel lai antico francese Yonec e in due racconti popolari riconducibili al tipo AT 432, «The Prince as bird», tracce di scenari iniziatici femminili e del viaggio oltremondano sciamanico. Sur la base des études de Mircea Eliade, l’auteur met en évidence, dans le Lai de Yonec de Marie de France et dans deux contes de fées liés au conte-type AT 432 « L’Oiseau bleu », des traces des rites initiatiques féminins et (...) du voyage chamanique vers l’Autre Monde. On the ground of Mircea Eliade studies, the author analyses the Ancient French Lay of Yonec and two folk tales, connected to the type AT 432 “The Prince as bird”, focusing on the presence of hints of ancient initiatory female rites and shamanic female otherworld voyages. (shrink)

Sensibilité is in Valéry’s theory the name of a large grasp of functions, involving both perception and creation, and involved both in art and in experience. So far, this key word of Valéry’s aesthetics can be read as the bridge between his conceptions of art and his idea of the self in order to understand the way this author writes and conceives what philosophy can aim to.

In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground evaluative knowledge about political facts, they can do so within a network of further coherent epistemic attitudes about those facts. With regards to the political part, (...) I argue that the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge about political facts, is indeed politically valuable. To develop my argument, I show first that an evaluative kind of knowledge is relevant for reaching a sophisticated level of political cognition, and second that emotions contribute distinctively to this kind of knowledge. I conclude that, when emotional experiences towards political events are coupled with an adequate factual knowledge about those events, they can ground a distinctive evaluative knowledge about those events, and such knowledge is relevant both from an epistemic and a political perspective. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo central apresentar a leitura da pesquisadora Benedetta Bisol sobre a noção de corpo em Fichte, no sentido de mostra-lhe a pertinência e mesmo a atualidade, frente às pesquisas contemporâneas da neurociência.

Geometrical intuitions spontaneously drive visuo-spatial reasoning in human adults, children and animals. Is their emergence intrinsically linked to visual experience, or does it reflect a core property of cognition shared across sensory modalities? To address this question, we tested the sensitivity of blind-from-birth adults to geometrical-invariants using a haptic deviant-figure detection task. Blind participants spontaneously used many geometric concepts such as parallelism, right angles and geometrical shapes to detect intruders in haptic displays, but experienced difficulties with symmetry and complex spatial (...) transformations. Across items, their performance was highly correlated with that of sighted adults performing the same task in touch (blindfolded) and in vision, as well as with the performances of uneducated preschoolers and Amazonian adults. Our results support the existence of an amodal core-system of geometry that arises independently of visual experience. However, performance at selecting geometric intruders was generally higher in the visual compared to the haptic modality, suggesting that sensory-specific spatial experience may play a role in refining the properties of this core-system of geometry. (shrink)

In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness (...) and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society. (shrink)

Un saggio in memoria di Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd , filosofo e teologo egiziano che ha contribuito in modo fondamentale alla diffusione dell’approccio letterario applicato al testo sacro dell’islam e al successivo sviluppo di un’ermeneutica di tipo umanistico in grado di affermare la portata rivoluzionaria e antidogmatica del concetto di Corano come insieme di discorsi. Nominato professore onorario all’Università di Leida, dove insegna a partire dal 2000, il professor Abu Zayd è costretto all’esilio nel 1995, dopo la condanna per apostasia (...) che gli viene mossa in ambito giudiziario proprio a causa del suo interesse per un terreno di studio così delicato.An essay written in memory of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd , Egyptian philosopher and theologian who substantially contributed to the spread of the literary approach to the sacred text of Islam and to the subsequent development of a humanistic hermeneutics being able to affirm the revolutionary and anti-dogmatic significance of the concept of the Qur’an asset of discourses. Appointed honorary professor at Leiden University, where he began teaching in 2000, the professor Abu Zayd is obliged to go into exile in 1995, after his judicial conviction for apostasy due to his interest in such a delicate field of study. (shrink)

The paper discuses topics related to individuality, human corporeality and gender in Foundations of Natural Right (1796) within a systematic point of view. According to Fichte, the notion of human corporeality is crucial to achieving the foundations of right. In this context Fichte applies a gender-neutral notion of the human body: all individuals are equal despite their gender differences, because reason is neither masculine nor feminine. Besides the male/female binary, Fichte does not discuss issues of sexual identity or orientation. Furthermore, (...) it seems no longer plausible nowadays to defend his position on the social role of women. Nevertheless, Fichte’s conception provides fruitful hints for the analysis of relevant issues in current debates on human corporeality and gender. Die Arbeit untersucht unter einem systematischen Gesichtspunkt Fragen der Individualität, der Körperlichkeit und der Sexualität in der Grundlage des Naturrechts. Das Spezifikum des Ansatzes Fichtes besteht dort erstens darin, die Relevanz der Körperlichkeit für die Grundlegung des Rechts zu zeigen und zweitens, die Auffassung dieser im Sinne der Geschlechtsneutralität zu bestimmen. Fichte argumentiert im Sinne der Gleichberechtigung aller Individuen innerhalb der Rechtsgemeinschaft. Die Kraft seiner Position liegt in der Formulierung eines konsistenten Körperbegriffs, der erreicht wird, ohne auf anthropologische Bestimmungen rekurrieren zu müssen. Die geschlechtliche Bestimmung zählt zu den Unterschieden unter Individuen, die die Konstituierung einer Gemeinschaft von gleichberechtigten Individuen nicht beeinflussen, da die Vernunft weder männlich noch weiblich ist. Obwohl man bei Fichte keine Hinweise auf eine Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen der sexuellen Identität und Orientierung findet, die über das binäre Verständnis des Männlichen und des Weiblichen hinausgeht, und generell seine Position, was die gesellschaftliche Rolle der Frau angeht, heutzutage nicht mehr plausibel erscheint, wird in der Arbeit aus den oben zusammengefassten Gründen die These vertreten, dass Fichtes Konzeption fruchtbare Impulse zur Reflexion für Fragen bietet, die heute noch im Zentrum der Debatte zur Körperlichkeit und Sexualität stehen und als offene Probleme gelten. (shrink)

In the contemporary media landscape determined by the pervasive and ubiquitous use of computational media, the figure of ekphrasis is experiencing a moment of renewed interest, which contributes to broadening its field of action traditionally limited to literature. Following this line of interpretation, this article aims to show how precisely the concept of ekphrasis, understood in its processual and performative dimension, can be fruitfully engaged in an analysis of the aesthetic and visual experience that characterises the daily use of our (...) digital devices. By examining Juran Landt's drawing "I just want fruits on a plate", this article explores the tension between text and image in digitally inspired aesthetics. It analyses the disorienting yet productive experiences induced by Landt's artwork, which are reminiscent of our daily encounters with digital media. Finally, this article proposes that the ekphrastic process may represent a moment of unexpected rupture in the otherwise smooth and hypnotic consumption of the digital media. (shrink)

La pace non e un argomento ma un sogno evolutivo della coscienza umana. Un sogno timido che sopravvive al dramma della storia e alle sue smentite piu derisorie. Un sogno che e cruciale custodire, dunque, come gesto di resistenza a fronte del cinismo di ogni epoca e in particolar modo davanti alle derive piu subdole e inquietanti della contemporaneita. Un'esplorazione evocativa dei quattro modi in cui l'umanita, da sempre e non senza contraddizioni, prova a sognare la pace: attraverso la natura (...) (phusis), il pensiero (logos), la legge (nomos), l'amore (eros). Quattro dimensioni esistenziali che l'autrice sorvola in compagnia di alcune figure della filosofia, del mito, della letteratura, della poesia, della psicoanalisi e della storia che hanno rappresentato, nella sua esperienza autobiografica, una fonte generosa di fiducia e orientamento. Muovendo dall'intuizione comune a tante saggezze secondo cui la vera pace non elude la tragedia umana ma la denuncia e la interroga, il libro ci conduce in un viaggio meditativo che costeggia, senza negarlo, l'abisso della distruttivita, sia sul piano individuale sia su quello sociale e collettivo. L'abisso nel quale ripetutamente sprofonda il sogno di vivere insieme e amichevolmente su questa Terra. Ma proprio a partire da questa confidenza con la tragicita della vicenda umana si dipana quel filo sottile dell'etica che e risorsa elettiva della sensibilita femminile e che riconduce l'intelligenza all'intimita con la vita. E il sogno desto della pace, per desiderare ancora.". (shrink)

In den Jahren 1872-1874, 1876-1878 und schließlich erneut in der zweiten Hälfte det achtziger Jahre benutzte Nietzsche die Sprachanalyse als Waffe gegen die Mataphysik. Indem er verdeulichte, dass die Sprache als historisches Apriori des Denkens eine grundlegende Rolle innerhalb der Erkenntnissynthese spielt, kritisierte er die vermeintlich 'Reinheit' der Vernunft und folglich die Idee, dass diese zu allgemeingültigen, notwendigen Wahrheiten gelangen könne. Bei der Darlegung seiner Position knüpfte Nietzshe an einige Sprachphilosophen der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts an, die im Rahmen (...) ihrer Erörterung der eziehung zwischen Denken und Sprach im Lichte der Lehre Kants und Humboldts die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Tatsach gelenkt hatten, dass sich in der Sprach eine wahre Mythologie verbigt. In beträchtlichem Maße beeinflusse diese unbewusst nicht allein unsere Wirklichkeitsauffassung, sondern auch die Instrumente, die einer kritischen Wirklichkeisreflexion dienen müssten - wie Missenschaft und Philosophie.In 1872-74, in 1876-78, and once again in the second half of the eighteen-eighties, Nietzsche used linguistic analysis as a weapon against metaphysics. Emphasising the fact that language, as a historical apriori structure of thinking, plays a fundamental role in cognitive synthesis, he criticised the expected 'purity' of reason and, consequently, the idea that this may result in universal and necessary truths. In sustaining his position Nietzsche referred to certain linguistic philosophers of the second half of the nineteenth century who, when discussing the thought-language relationship in view of teh lessons from Kant and Humboldt, called attention to the fact that language hides, if unconsciously, unadulterated mythology which powerfully conditions not only our vision of reality, but also the tools - such as science and philosophy - on which is thought critically ponder. (shrink)

Fairness is one of the most prominent values in the Ethics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and, specifically, in the discussion on algorithmic decision-making (ADM). However, while the need for fairness in ADM is widely acknowledged, the very concept of fairness has not been sufficiently explored so far. Our paper aims to fill this gap and claims that an ethically informed re-definition of fairness is needed to adequately investigate fairness in ADM. To achieve our goal, after an introductory section aimed (...) at clarifying the aim and structure of the paper, in section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making” we provide an overview of the state of the art of the discussion on fairness in ADM and show its shortcomings; in section “Fairness as an ethical value”, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness, drawing insights from accounts of fairness developed in moral philosophy, and define fairness as an ethical value. In particular, we argue that fairness is articulated in a distributive and socio-relational dimension; it comprises three main components: fair equality of opportunity, equal right to justification, and fair equality of relationship; these components are grounded in the need to respect persons both as persons and as particular individuals. In section “Fairness in algorithmic decision-making revised”, we analyze the implications of our redefinition of fairness as an ethical value on the discussion of fairness in ADM and show that each component of fairness has profound effects on the criteria that ADM ought to meet. Finally, in section “Concluding remarks”, we sketch some broader implications and conclude. (shrink)