This essay introduces a running symposium on the work of Richard Rorty and its legacy fifteen years after his passing. The arc of Rorty's thought defines a trajectory through American pragmatism, tracing a variation unimagined until he expressed it. His work raised Anglophone philosophers’ interest in American pragmatism as never before and also focused the interest of the whole world on American pragmatism as never before, even though the result was to define a pragmatism saturated with nominalism and suppressing the (...) most original qualities of the sources that he celebrated. (shrink)

There is no cure or vaccine for HIV/AIDS. The only life-prolonging treatment available is antiretroviral (ARV) therapy. WHO estimates, however, that less than 5 percent of those who require treatment in developing countries currently enjoy access to these medicines. In Africa fewer than 50,000 people–less than 2 percent of the people in need–currently receive ARV therapy. These facts have elicited strongly divergent reactions, and views about the appropriate response to this crisis have varied widely.The intensity of the debate concerning access (...) to life-prolonging medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, and the heated rhetoric with which they are often conducted, suggest that these disagreements may be rooted in deeper disagreements of value. It is not obvious, however, what disagreements of value are at stake in this debate. By analyzing the statements of scholars, public officials, activist organizations, and private sector representatives, each of whom may endorse very different policy recommendations on access to HIV/AIDS drugs, we have identified and created a typology of the different sources of disagreement in the debate. We conclude that the central disagreements concerning access to medicines arise from competing understandings of how responsibilities for bringing remedy to hardships should be allocated to different agents and institutions. A central lesson that emerges from our analysis is that thinking about “health equity” must extend beyond the explanation and justification of goals, values, and ideals, and engage more honestly with the difficult question of how responsibilities for bringing remedy to health crises should be allocated in complex social contexts. (shrink)

Knowledge and Civilization advances detailed criticism of philosophy's usual approach to knowledge and describes a redirection, away from textbook problems of epistemology, toward an ecological philosophy of technology and civilization. Rejecting theories that confine knowledge to language or discourse, Allen situates knowledge in the greater field of artifacts, technical performance, and human evolution. His wide ranging considerations draw on ideas from evolutionary biology, archaeology, anthropology, and the history of cities, art, and technology.

Samuel Butler is usually remembered for Erewhon, widely considered among the best English satires. He also contributed to philosophical biology in works that collectively compose the nineteenth century's finest statement of the evolutionary argument associated with the name of Lamarck. In writing on evolution, Butler was not presenting science for a popular audience but deliberately intervening in the scientific argument about Darwinism. Surprised by the success of his first venture in philosophical biology, Life and Habit, Butler committed himself to the (...) project of developing an alternative to Darwinism, which he did in three additional volumes, and these are the works canvassed in this “delayed book review.”. (shrink)

The idea that truth is eternal is an old one in philosophy, and I do not propose to survey its history here. Yet a sketch of the historical context is useful for my main purpose, which is to discuss the theme of truth and temporality in Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty. Although both philosophers repudiate eternal truth, their reasons for doing so are different, and this difference reveals a probably irreconcilable opposition between Heidegger and the Pragmatist.

What Nietzsche calls “the problem of science” concerns the place or value of science in the wider culture, what science does for or to culture, and to people who believe in its "truth." In framing this question, Nietzsche’s thought becomes a counterweight to a positivism that the philosophy of science has never entirely eliminated from its thinking. Not only is there is important continuity between Comte's original positivism and the later logical positivists; the assumptions about science which they share are (...) precisely those Nietzsche questions. (shrink)

Carnap apparently never mentions August Comte’s name in his writings. Not that that is unusual. He seldom discusses individuals, or historical references of any sort. But you cannot evade context, and nothing comes from nothing. Merely allowing the name of “logical positivist” makes Comte a context for Carnap, which is hardly inappropriate, since Comte practically invented the idea of a “philosophy of science.” We can learn about the positivist mentality (for instance, how it is still with us) by searching out (...) the commonalities of positivism from Comte to Carnap. -/- Nietzsche and Heidegger are more explicit contexts for Carnap, as he refers to them and passes judgment on their work, especially in his 1931 paper, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache.” Appearing in the logical-positivist organ Erkenntnis, it announces the “elimination” or “overcoming” of metaphysics by logical analysis, and became a foundational metaphilosophical text for what has come to be called “analytic” philosophy. -/- By setting Carnap in these three contexts—his positivism, his polemic with Heidegger, his reading of Nietzsche—I shall expose the presuppositions and intellectual limitations of Carnap’s approach to philosophy. Misreadings abound whenever he mentions Nietzsche or Heidegger, misreadings used to support the metaphilosophical myth of a woolly “continental” tradition in philosophy, distinct from the austere precision of “analysis.” The latter (the ur-form of “analytic” philosophy) is not just different from the “continental” metaphysics Carnap excoriates. It is better, more serious, intellectually clearer and cleaner. (shrink)

Introducing the sixth and final installment of the Common Knowledge symposium “Apology for Quietism,” Allen looks at the symposium retrospectively and concludes that it has mainly concerned “sage knowledge,” defined as foresight into the development of situations. The sagacious knower sees the disposition of things in an early, incipient form and knows how to intervene with nearly effortless and undetectable (quiet) effectiveness. Whatever the circumstance, the sage handles it with finesse, never doing too much but also never leaving anything undone (...) that must be accomplished. Quiet, when it is knowingly and effectively quiet (not pusillanimous or poor in spirit), is about what not to do, how not to approach a problem, what not to decide, what is not known, what will not work. Allen explains these principles in terms of traditional Chinese thought, Daoist and Confucian: wei we wei, or “doing-not-doing,” means effective inaction. What makes such wisdom possible is not mystical insight, he argues, but discipline in a certain kind of art. The sage has no need of reasons (let alone doctrines), only effectiveness; and he does not need truth or justice, only subtlety. The detachment of a quietist has little, if anything, to do with transcending perspectives. Detachment is good as a means to flexibility, and instead of transcending perspectives, a sage is skilled in the quiet art of never getting stuck in one. To be effectively quiet is not so much to be silent as to be inaudible, invisible; the sage “vanishes into things.”. (shrink)

In this monograph-length article, which inaugurates a multipart symposium titled “Fuzzy Studies,” the significance and virtues of blur are investigated through the whole history of Chinese intellectual tradition. In the Western tradition, the blur of becoming seems to disqualify an object for knowledge; nothing can be an object of knowledge until the blur is resolved and clarity attained. Chinese tradition offers suggestive examples of the thought that blur, so far from being incompatible with knowledge, might be its condition of possibility (...) and the explanation of its value. This article traces the development of this thought (the compatibility of knowledge and original becoming) in the work of the classical Confucian and Daoist thinkers, the art-of-war literature, Chan Buddhism, and medieval Neoconfucianism, with an eye to its usefulness for Western philosophy of knowledge. (shrink)

In order to make sense of the relationship between evil and enmity, I make an excursion into moral theory, and discuss ideas on the origin of evil in two very different moral philosophers: Kant and Darwin. Thinking about evil the way Kant does leads to a theoretical impasse Darwin’s evolutionary natural history of morality readily overcomes. Today enmity is more consequential, and potentially more dangerous, than at any time in our 100,000 years on the earth. An enemy may force us (...) to fight, as we have forced our enemies to fight. Reconciliation is not always to be desired at any price. But we will have a clearer view of precisely what the price of enmity is if we refrain from imagining a confrontation between evil and avenging righteousness. (shrink)

In Recovering Hegel from the Critique of Leo Strauss, Sara MacDonald and Barry Craig provide a study unique in its focus on Leo Strauss’s reading of Hegel. While MacDonald and Craig find value in Strauss’s thought, they argue that his pessimism concerning modernity lies in a misunderstanding of both modernity’s greatest philosophical advocate, G.W.F. Hegel, and modernity’s virtues.

When can we say that a debt crisis has been resolved fairly? An often overlooked but very important effect of financial crises and the debts that often engender them is that they can lead the crisis countries to increased dependence on international institutions and the policy conditionality they require in return for their continued support, limiting their capabilities and those of their citizens to exercise meaningful control over their policies and institutions. These outcomes have been viewed by many not merely (...) as extremely unfortunate and regrettable, but also as deeply unfair. And indeed, increasingly potent popular movements have pressured governments, financial institutions, and the financial community to seek what they take to be fairer solutions to debt crises. The merits of these programs and proposals for dealing more fairly with sovereign debt remain hotly disputed. In this essay, we try to take a step back from the political fray and examine some more fundamental considerations that seem relevant to assessing the fairness of current arrangements governing economic exchanges related to debt contracts and alternatives that have been proposed to them.Our discussion is organized into seven sections. First, we characterize briefly the concept of fairness and its role in social evaluation. Second, we clarify what sovereign debt is, and, third, the ethical statuses that particular sovereign debts can have. Fourth, we identify and describe the main features of current practices related to sovereign debt. Fifth, we describe an "ideal picture" of creditor/debtor relations. We argue that in such a scenario a broad range of ethical considerations can plausibly be invoked in support of practices that closely resemble those presently governing sovereign debt. Sixth, we draw attention to the many ways in which in reality the relations between sovereign debtors and their creditors differ markedly from the relationships between the creditor and debtor in the ideal picture. Because of this, many of the ethical considerations that would support present practices were relations between sovereign debtors and their creditors to resemble more closely those depicted in the ideal picture fail to do so under present circumstances. We conclude, moreover, that the remaining ethical considerations that might be advanced in support of the present system are at best quite inconclusive. Finally, we describe briefly specific reform proposals to current practices. While we will not attempt to show that these proposals would necessarily make the rules governing economic exchanges relevant to sovereign debt more fair, we conclude, in light of our earlier analysis, that they must be given much more serious consideration than they have so far received in policy circles. Indeed, there are strong prima facie reasons to believe that some combination of these proposed policies might prevent or mitigate some of the most ethically regrettable outcomes of present practices and norms by changing the incentives of sovereign borrowers and those who lend to them. (shrink)

Richard Rorty transforms classical American philosophy in a way that overcomes some ideological limitations of the first Pragmatists, and responds to international currents of contemporary thought. The result is a Pragmatism that has for the first time attracted world attention. Rorty skillfully brought together Pragmatism with postmodern European philosophy. In doing so he inevitably accentuates certain aspects of the American tradition at the expense of others. His new Pragmatism “overcomes” most of what distinguishes the first Pragmatism from Nietzsche and European (...) thought influenced by him. Instead of an alternative to continental postmodernism Rorty creates a postmodern Pragmatism. (shrink)

Perhaps the most problematic dimension of the ‘triple bottom line’ understanding of sustainable development has been the ‘economic’ dimension. Much of the thinking about the appropriate ‘political economy’ to underpin or frame sustainable development has been either utopian (as in some ‘green’ political views) or an attempt to make peace with ‘business as usual’ approaches. This article suggests that ‘ecological modernisation’ is the dominant conceptualisation of ‘sustainable development’ within the UK, and illustrates this by looking at some key ‘sustainable development’ (...) policy documents from the UK Government. We take the view that the discourse of ‘ecological modernisation’ has provided discursive terrain for both pragmatic policy makers and a range of views on sustainable development, from weak to strong. In particular, the article suggests that the discourse of ‘economic security’ and ‘sufficiency’ can be used as a way of articulating a radical, robust and principled understanding of sustainable development, which offers a normatively compelling and policy-relevant path to outlining a ‘green political economy’ to underpin sustainable development. (shrink)

This paper discusses arguments from my recent book, Empiricisms: Experience and Experiment from Antiquity to the Anthropocene (2021). I discuss the origin of empiricism in ancient Greek medicine, and its merger with experimental research in the modern period. I also discuss the arguments of recent critics of empiricism, including W. V. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Richard Rorty. I introduce a distinction between theorematic and problematic empiricism and show how this difference divides the various empiricisms of history. My conclusions are: 1. (...) Knowledge requires experience; results have to be tested, which takes experience. 2. The “experience” of empirical philosophy is the experience from which we learn. 3. Experimental values are many, but truth is not one of them. 4. Empiricism began as an antidote to rationalism, and that remains its vocation today. (shrink)

Derrida proposes "to restore the original and non-derivative character of signs, in opposition to classical metaphysics." One effect is "to eliminate a concept of signs whose whole history and meaning belongs to the adventure of the metaphysics of presence." The formula "nothing outside the text" registers this effect. "Nothing outside the text" does not mean "prison-house of language." Neither does it mean that everything is a sign. But to differentiate signs ontologically from something which is emphatically not itself a sign, (...) something which would have a being of its own, a self-identity or nature unconditioned by the artificial contrivances of nomenclature, is untenable, or at least arbitrary. It has no obvious, self-evident basis in uncontroversial facts about the phenomena of verbal meaning. (shrink)

Locke's introduction of the word semeiotikē is well known. His claim that what he calls ideas are "signs or representations" of things outside of the mind has been interpreted as an early insight into the original cognitive role of signs. But the most unexpected claim to be made about Locke by a contemporary semiotician is that his Essay Concerning Human Understanding is formally inconsistent in what it says of ideas as signs, the claim of John Deely in several writings. For (...) Locke, ideas are the first or direct objects of understanding, thought, and perception. What makes this inconsistent, Deely thinks, is that Locke also says ideas are signs. According to Deely, that is a contradiction and cannot be true. However, it is a reasonable principle that outright contradiction in a text is less likely than misinterpretation. This need not always be the case, of course, but the principle is sound, and there is a presumption against Deely's claim. I shall show that the presumption is not discharged by his arguments, and that the allegation of inconsistency in Locke's semiotic is implausible and unproven. (shrink)

Seeing art is not as easy as it looks, because there is more to seeing art than meets the eye. This essay examines some of the presuppositions involved in seeing something as art. In opposition to the view of A.C. Danto that to see something as art is merely to identify it as art, I shall suggest that to see something as art is to appreciate it in a specifiable way. In addition, I shall argue that considerations sometimes deemed adventitious (...) are in fact inescapably involved in the appreciation of all works of art, and in particular, that it is impossible to entirely eliminate intentional and genetic considerations from our critical Judgments. (shrink)

The concept of determinism proves to be a persistent stumbling block to student comprehension of issues surrounding free will. Students tend to commit two main errors. First, they often confuse determinism with the related but importantly different idea of fatalism. Second, students often do not adequately understand that mental states, such as desires or beliefs, can function as deterministic causes. This paper outlines a straightforward in-class exercise modeled after John Horton Conway’s “Game of Life” computer simulation. The exercise aims to (...) address the two main obstacles to understanding determinism and, as a result, improve student understanding of free will topics. (shrink)

Modern Western society has framed fashion in opposition to hegemonic masculinity. However, fashion functions as a principal means by which men’s visible gender identities are established as not only different from women but also from other men. This article draws on the concept of hybrid masculinities and on wardrobe interviews with Canadian men across social identities to explore how men enact masculinities through dress. I illustrate three ways men do hybrid masculinities by selecting, styling, and wearing clothing in their everyday (...) lives. The differences between these three hybrid masculine configurations of practice are based on the extent to which men’s personal and professional social identities were associated with hegemonic masculine ideals as well as the extent to which those ideals shaped the settings in which they were situated. Although participants had different constellations of gender privilege, they all used dress to reinforce hegemonic masculinity, gain social advantages, and subsequently preserve the gender order. Failing to do so could put them personally and professionally at risk. My research nuances the hybrid masculinities framework by demonstrating how its enactment is shaped by the intersection between men’s social identities and social contexts. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 9, September 2020, Page 78-80.

This paper focuses on what could be learned about statuses and status groups from the work of Randall Collins in the 1980s, and in particular from Weberian Sociological Theory (1986). I mention how I myself found this book useful at that time to further my own work in the sociology of science and in sociological theory, and emphasise its value in appreciating the fundamental and irremediable deficiencies of individualistic rational choice theory in both contexts. I go on to note how (...) Collins, a ‘macro’ sociologist in the 1980s, was nonetheless well aware of the indispensable role of micro-sociology in advancing the fundamental understanding of the field as a whole, and his singling out of Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel as primus inter pares for their special theoretical importance at this time. I say a little about why these two did indeed have much to contribute to an understanding of statuses and of status groups and still do even today, and end by noting how effectively Collins has used and built upon the work of Goffman in particular since the 1980s. (shrink)