The endangered species Tokudaia osimensis has the unique chromosome constitution of 2n = 25, with an XO/XO sex chromosome configuration (2n = 25; XO). There is urgency to preserve this species and to elucidate the regulator(s) that can discriminate the males and females arising from the indistinguishable sex chromosome constitution. However, it is not realistic to examine this rare animal species by sacrificing individuals. Recently, true naïve induced pluripotent stem cells were successfully generated from a female T. osimensis, and the (...) sexual plasticity of its germ cells was elucidated. This achievement constitutes the basis of an attractive research area, including embryonic fate determination, sex determination, and factor(s) that can replace the Y chromosome. In this essay, concrete strategies to conserve rare animal species and to reveal their specific characteristics using other compatible and abundant animals are proposed. -/- . (shrink)

In his early essay, “Must We Mean What We Say”, Cavell argues that the claims of ordinary language philosophers regarding “what we say when” are not empirical generalizations about a given group of speakers but are rather to be understood as measuring the limits of what counts as a coherent act of thinking and speaking. Cavell’s charge against the skeptic about the external world is that he seeks to think and speak beyond these limits. In this paper I compare Cavell’s (...) response to the skeptic to Davidson’s. Both base their responses on a broadly Kantian approach that appeals to the conditions under which thinking or speaking about objects is possible. On this approach the skeptic isn’t giving a false answer to an intelligible question, but rather, the question to which the skeptic is giving an answer is shown to be in some way unintelligible. But while Davidson’s critique of the skeptic is based on the conditions of ascribing meaning to one’s words, and contents to one’s beliefs, Cavell’s critique is based on the failure of the skeptic to mean the words he uses in the way that he needs. This difference expresses an underlying disagreement about the meaning of “meaning”: for Davidson the world comes into view through the meaning of our words and concepts, through the contents of our beliefs; for Cavell, the world comes into view through the agreement in “criteria” that are a condition of applying words and concepts to the world. This difference illuminates what Cavell calls “the truth of skepticism”: the idea that “my relation to the world and to others in general is not one of knowing”. (shrink)

The point of departure of this paper is the striking similarities between the dispositions critical media literacy education aims to cultivate and the characteristics conspiracy theorists claim to embody. The golden question of critical literacy, “who benefits?” is in fact the central question of conspiracy theorists: “cui bono?” While critical media literacy educators teach learners to disrupt the common sense, to interrogate multiple viewpoints, to focus on sociopolitical issues, and to take actions and promote social justice, conspiracy theorists claim that (...) they do exactly those things. What I wish to illuminate through this juxtaposition, however, is not a way to clearly demarcate “critical” from “conspiratorial” theorizing, but is a question of educational desirability of skepticism. Skepticism in this paper is not understood as a classical epistemological question of the possibility of knowledge attainment, but as a form of vigilance toward epistemic authorities like the government, media, and academic institutions. Drawing on philosophy of conspiracy theories and political epistemology, I illuminate the problem of radical skepticism that characterizes some conspiracy theories and discuss the pivotal epistemic role of trust. Through this, I claim that critical media literacy education for democratic citizenship must strike a balance between cultivation of skepticism and building of trust toward epistemic authorities. (shrink)

The propositional fragment L 1 of Leniewski's ontology is the smallest class (of formulas) containing besides all the instances of tautology the formulas of the forms: (a, b) (a, a), (a, b) (b,). (a, c) and (a, b) (b, c). (b, a) being closed under detachment. The purpose of this paper is to furnish another more constructive proof than that given earlier by one of us for: Theorem A is provable in L 1 iff TA is a thesis of first-order (...) predicate logic with equality, where T is a translation of the formulas of L 1 into those of first-order predicate logic with equality such that T(a, b) = FblxFax (Russeltian-type definite description), TA B = TA TB, T A = TA, etc. (shrink)

TOPOLOGIE DES LOGOS UND KANT-INTERPRET A TION § I. Topologie des Logos Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist die Geschichte der Entwicklung des Logos. Jedes System der Philosophie hat seinen Logos. Jedes System der Philosophie, welches seinen Logos hat, ist vom Standpunkte der Entwicklung der Philosophie als Ganzem gesehen eine notwendige Entwicklung des Logos. Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist, wie Hegel sagte, eine Entwicklung des absoluten Geistes. Aber diese Entwicklung des Logos soll man nicht als dialektische Entwicklung, wie Hegel sie sah, (...) bezeichnen. Vielmehr befindet sich das System der Hegelschen Philosophie selber an einer besonderen Stelle der Entwicklung des Logos. Die Entwicklung des Logos ist nicht immer dialektisch-formelle Entwicklung und wird nicht in Dialektik bis zum Äußersten getrieben. Wir müssen uns davor hüten, die Entwicklung des Logos formell dialek tisch zu sehen. Vielmehr müssen wir die Entwicklung des Logos - in der Phase der notwendigen Entwicklung, in der er sich befinde- positiv betrachten. Dialektische Konstruktion der Geschichte der Philosophie auf Kosten der Tatsachen, wie Hegel sie trieb, ist dogma tisch-idealitisches Verhalten, und unser Verhalten soll nicht solches sein. Betrachten wir positiv die Entwicklung des Logos in der Geschich te der Philosophie, so entsteht nicht dialektische Geschichtsauffassung, sondern Topologie der Entwicklung des Logos: kurz, die Topologie des Logo::. Nach der Topologie des Logos wird jedem System der Philoso phie sein Topos in der Entwicklung des Logos als Ganzem gegeben. (shrink)