Many great authors claim that reading literature can expand your phenomenal imagination and allow you to imagine experiences you have never had. How is this possible? Your phenomenal imagination is constrained by your phenomenal concepts, which are in turn constrained by the phenomenology of your own actual past experiences. Literature could expand your phenomenal imagination, then, by giving you new phenomenal concepts. This paper explains how this can happen. Literature can direct your attention to previously unnoticed phenomenal properties of your (...) own past experiences, as brought to mind by involuntary memory. This process gives you the opportunity to notice those phenomenal properties for the first time, and so also to form phenomenal concepts of those properties. Forming a new phenomenal concept strictly expands the range of your phenomenal imagination. It gives you the capacity to imagine more than you could have before, including certain specific kinds of experience that you yourself have never enjoyed firsthand. Literature’s capacity to expand your phenomenal imagination in this way is central to its social, moral, and epistemic value. (shrink)

Just as bodily actions are things you do with your body, mental actions are things you do with your mind. Both are different from things that merely happen to you. Where does the idea of mental action come from? What are mental actions? And why do they matter in philosophy? These are the three main questions answered in this paper. Section 1 introduces mental action through a brief history of the topic in philosophy. Section 2 explains what it is to (...) be a mental action in terms of intentional action. Section 3 argues that the fact that we can perform mental actions has some striking consequences concerning mental content. Section 4 shows how mental action helps to explain some important facts about self-knowledge and the normativity of thought. The conclusion mentions two further fruitful avenues for philosophical research on mental action. (shrink)

This article offers a response to massive environmental destabilization by linking the promising accounts of intergenerational justice as turn-taking with the proposals for a geokinetic view of earth and the idea of a second Copernican revolution. The argument will proceed in four steps. First, I suggest that recent proposals calling on us to respond to the Anthropocene by ‘being geologically human’, that is, by situating lived human time in geological time, should be supplemented by generational time, and thus, by the (...) ethics of human generations following one another. To conceptualize intergenerational justice, I review the proposals for human generations taking turns with the earth. I then suggest that, however, the earth is not an external, exchangeable object of turn-taking (as e.g. a bicycle would be). Rather than being an object that we may choose to use or not, earth is constitutive of generations being able to come about and take turns in the first place. In this constitutive sense, earth also takes turns with us. To further specify this idea, I discuss the so-called ‘second Copernican revolution’, according to which the earth not only moves around the sun, but is internally on the move, its geokinetic processes co-constituting human generations. If the argument goes through, the environmental crises in our very midst should be understood as demanding a reconceptualization of time as always already intergenerational and space as counter-Copernican. (shrink)

Teaching and learning in a virtual learning environment poses some difficulties, but also challenges and opportunities to rethink the whole learning process, particularly in abstract subjects like logic or high level mathematics. On the other hand, resources and ways to work, now available in VLEs, might soon extend to all kinds of environments. In this paper, we will present experiences at the Open University of Catalonia , a particular VLE, concerning the whole process of teaching logic and mathematics. In addition, (...) we will discuss some challenges and we will present some innovation projects allowed by the present and near future technologies. (shrink)

Devant une relation d'incompatibilité entre couleurs, nous posons la question de savoir quelle solution le phénoménologue husserlien et le philosophe wittgensteinien de la grammaire apportent respectivement au problème que pose le vécu d'incompatibilité correspondant. Il est frappant de constater qu'à un même problème chacun répond par une conception différente du « grammatical ». A l'encontre d'une troisième voie - en réalité ineffectuable et purement métaphorique - impliquant une soi-disant pénétration de lois d'essence, l'issue wittgensteinienne est celle de la saisie d'un (...) a priori dans le langage, en bref une sorte d'intuition sémantique. The philosophically well-known conflictual case of incompatible colours confronts us with two kinds of solutions : the phenomenological issue which is Husserl's one leads to a sort of intuitive and unique grasp of laws of relations of possibility and impossibility underlying language with the help of which one can ultimately justify his awareness of an « intuitive conflict » . This solution calls for a conception of the grammatical to which Wittgensteins own conception is opposed. Our contention here is to elicit Wittgenstein i « semantic intuition » of an a priori in language. (shrink)

Les origines grecques de la conception d'harmonie (H. Dufourt) - Du monde au matériau : le devenir-musical du timbre (A. Soulez) - La musique est-elle un langage? (R. Casati et J. Dokic) - Le devenir du matériau musical au XXe siècle (M. Solomos) - Hauteur, timbre, harmonie, synthèse (J.C. Risset) et d'autres articles...

Aesthetic value empiricism claims that the aesthetic value of an object is grounded in the value of a certain kind of experience of it. The most popular version of value empiricism, and a dominant view in contemporary philosophical aesthetics more generally, is aesthetic hedonism. Hedonism restricts the grounds of aesthetic value to the pleasure enjoyed in the right kind of experience. But hedonism does not enjoy any clear advantage over a more permissive alternative version of value empiricism. This alternative is (...) aesthetic liberalism. On this view, an object’s aesthetic value is fully grounded in any value—not just the hedonic value—of a correct and complete experience of its sensory features. To demonstrate the advantages of liberalism over hedonism, I apply both views to analyze the aesthetic value of the Spring Temple Buddha and Anselm Kiefer’s Seraphim. I detail four advantages of liberalism over hedonism, and I conclude by defending liberalism from two kinds of objection. (shrink)

Vignettes of early modern Epicureanism Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9566-9 Authors Antonia LoLordo, Department of Philosophy, 122 Cocke Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue E-rea [En ligne], 13.1 | 2015. Nous remercions Antonia Rigaud et la revue E-rea de nous avoir autorisé à en reproduire le début ici. Représentant une journée dans la vie d'une ville, Manhatta oscille entre un traitement narratif nous invitant à suivre le quotidien de la ville et un traitement beaucoup plus abstrait, cherchant à capter une atmosphère beaucoup plus qu'à produire un document exact. Tourné en 1921, le film est resté (...) dans l'histoire comme le premier film - Cinéma, animation et vidéo – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Antonia Lolordo presents an original interpretation of John Locke's metaphysics of moral agency, in which to be a moral agent is simply to be free, rational, and a person.

Paulo Friere is considered to be one of the most influential educational philosophers of the twentieth century. Within many progressive circles, he would be considered the most important radical educational philosopher of our times, given his contribution to a revolutionary understanding of education and his certainty and faith that education can function as one of the most significant empowering and democratizing forces in the lives of the disenfranchised. In this deeply personal introduction to the man,and his ideas and their contribution (...) to ideas of progressive schooling, Antonia Darder reflects on her personal memories of time spent with Freire and his influence on her own work. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the philosophical system of the seventeenth-century philosopher Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi's importance is widely recognized and is essential for understanding early modern philosophers and scientists such as Locke, Leibniz and Newton. Offering a systematic overview of his contributions, LoLordo situates Gassendi's views within the context of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century natural philosophy as represented by a variety of intellectual traditions, including scholastic Aristotelianism, Renaissance Neo-Platonism, and the emerging mechanical philosophy. LoLordo's work will be essential (...) reading for historians of early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

Progress in transplantation outcomes depends on continuing research into both donor and recipient factors that may enhance graft and patient survival. A system of licencing for transplantation research, introduced by the Human Tissue Act 2004, which separates it from the transplantation process (then exempt from licencing), has damaged this vital activity by a combination of inflexible interpretation of the 2004 Act and fear of criminal liability on the part of researchers. Now, following the European Union (EU) Directive (2010) on standards (...) of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation, new UK Regulations have been drafted, which are intended to implement it. These Regulations impose a compulsory licencing system, similar to that for research, on the whole transplantation process. This goes beyond what is required by the Directive and may even have an inhibitory effect similar to that already seen in research. Initial draft Regulations went further, imposing criminal sanctions for breaches. However, following a public consultation process, the Department of Health (DH) has recently stated that, as a result of the overwhelming view of respondents that the proposed licencing system was unnecessary, all sanctions under the final Regulations are now decriminalised, with the sole exception of operating without a licence. While this does not eliminate the negative effect of licencing, it does suggest an awareness of the DH that excessive regulation unnecessarily harms the transplantation process. An opportunity thus arises for the Human Tissue Authority (the regulatory body for both the new licences and research licences under the 2004 Act) to end the current illogical and harmful separation of transplantation and transplantation research by ensuring that all centres licenced for organ donation, retrieval and transplantation are also fully licenced for related research. (shrink)

This essay will consider the dispute between Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the nature and validity of the theory/practice distinction. Their dispute concerns whether a strong affirmation of this distinction enables scientific inquiry or disables it. Inherent in this issue are two related questions, namely whether tmth can be pursued for its own sake, and, as a subset of this question, whether there is an evidence proper to the consideration of pure possibilities. I will argue that there is (...) a common ground between the logic of inquiry which Dewey is determined will have practical effect, and the logic of inquiry which Peirce is concemed will discover the truth promised by correct investigation. This compromise is found in the philosophy of Bemard Lonergan, whose critical realism includes an account of concrete judgement strikingly similar to that of John Dewey, but whose account of the normative stmcture of cognition, emanating from the individual's radical desire to know, also incorporates Peirce's emphasis on the pursuit of truth and on the validity of the scientist's consideration of pure logical possibilities. I will present these similarities, and will consider the stmcture of Einstein's 1905 paper, "On The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies," as a case study which supports Lonergan's (and Peirce's) account of cognitional stmcture, but which poses problems for Dewe/s instrumentalism. The essay concludes that Lonergan offers a critical realism which successfully renounces the 'spectator' theory of knowledge without underestimating the importance of the normative element of understanding in the human desire to know. (shrink)

Antonia LoLordo - Malebranche - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 124-125 Andrew Pyle. Malebranche. London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. xiii + 289. Cloth, $80.00. Despite Malebranche's widely recognized importance, no comprehensive overview of his system was available before Pyle's excellent and wide-ranging study. Pyle agrees with scholarly consensus that occasionalism and the vision in God are Malebranche's two most significant doctrines, but his scope extends well beyond those to matters of theology, (...) physics and biology. In the first half of the book, Pyle lays out Malebranche's two key doctrines as responses to tensions within the Cartesian accounts of causation and of ideas. He details how Malebranche's theory of ideas is involved.. (shrink)

You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...) action is both a judgment that p and a self-attribution of a belief that p. The notion of embedded mental action is introduced here to explain how this can be so and to provide a full epistemic explanation of the transparency method. That explanation makes sense of first-person authority and immediacy in transparent self-knowledge. In generalized form, it gives sufficient conditions on an attitude’s being known transparently. (shrink)

In his fascinating new book Games: Agency as Art, Nguyen endorses an experiential requirement on aesthetic judgment: apt aesthetic judgment requires phenomenal experience. His own aesthetics of agency captures three phenomenally manifest and aesthetically significant harmonies (and corresponding disharmonies). But his view can be significantly extended to capture much more of the rich texture of human agency. In this discussion, I argue that emotions of agency, patterns of attention, and affordances all can be phenomenally experienced as aspects of agency, and (...) that each has genuine aesthetic significance. (shrink)

Basic actions are those intentional actions performed not by doing any other kind of thing intentionally. Complex actions involve doing one kind of thing intentionally by doing another kind of thing intentionally. There are both basic and complex mental actions. Some complex mental actions have a striking feature that has not been previously discussed: they have several distinct contents at once. This chapter introduces and explains this feature, here called “content plurality.” This chapter also argues for the philosophical significance of (...) this feature. The existence of content plurality offers a new explanation of transparent self-knowledge and suggests a new theory of inference. It also opens up a new conception of the relation between decisions to act and judgments about what ought to be done. (shrink)

In _Epistemic Explanations_, Sosa continues to defend a model of judgment he has long endorsed. On this complex model of judgment, judgment aims not only at correctness but also at aptness of a kind of alethic affirmation. He offers three arguments for the claim that we need this model of judgment instead of a simpler model, on which judgment aims only at correctness. The first argument cites the need to exclude knowledge-spoiling luck from apt judgment. The second argument uses the (...) complex model to distinguish judgment from mere guessing. The third argument involves the assessment of suspension of judgment as a performance. This paper shows why none of these arguments succeeds, and so recommends adopting the simpler model of judgment. (shrink)

Why talk about communism today?* A first point everybody will be agreed upon: the spectre of communism is not haunting Europe, nor for that matter any other region of the world. The only place where ‘communism’ is a positive name for anything is China, where it designates the ruling party of one of the most powerful capitalist nations of the world. In the immediate conjuncture, there are no real forces or conflicts that directly call for a reappraisal of communism. However, (...) certain questions linked to its reappraisal do appear to be at stake in conflicts that are taking place. (shrink)

This paper draws out what Derrida’s work—in particular as concerns law, democracy, and intergenerational justice in the context of the European heritage—can contribute to constitutionalism and the legal relation to future people, at the national level and the supranational one of the European Union. The first section outlines some of Derrida’s contributions to legal scholarship and European identity, and then, in the following two sections, argue for two main points. First, Derrida can help us understand the much-discussed double bind of (...) the constitutional relation to future people as merely an instance of a more general aporia. The double bind consists in the fact that the constitutional promise to safeguard future freedom also limits and binds future people. I will show how this aporia results from the temporal structure of the constitutional founding of law. Accordingly, the double bind cannot be resolved, either conceptually or in constitutional practice, but only be negotiated with greater awareness. Second, the same aporia of time entails that future generations are already implicated in the founding and re-founding of law here and now. Because the present moment is constitutively related to the past and the future, the meaning of a constitutional founding can become legible only from the future. Hence, the present generation, whose unity is never given, cannot but draw an advance credit on the future whose cooperation it anticipates. As a result, the political promise of Europe depends on its relation to its geographical, but also to its temporal others. (shrink)

One of the common denominators linking the many different strands and schools of philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century is an appreciation of, and reflection on, difference and translation. Each translation is a unique challenge. It is difficult to translate one theory into the conceptual framework of another, or to translate one performative game or text from one language into another. Heidegger provides a striking example of some of the problems associated with translation. His extensive use of (...) abstract nouns as subjects of sentences, his reference to idiomatic, or more or less archaic, words, his ability to unfold the meanings supposedly implicit in a word through the addition of various prefixes and suffixes, or, conversely, his penchant for tracing back different words to the same root, combined with his complicated, often somewhat convoluted, syntax and grammar, make it difficult to translate his texts. The wealth of possible connotations, associations, and references to other words and passages in his work and in everyday language simply cannot be preserved in any translation. In this paper, I will present an example of these problems in relation to four passages in the German texts and the English translations respectively. In the first section I will take my example from Being and Time, and in the second section from “The Question Concerning Technology” and “Building Dwelling Thinking.” In the third section this will be followed by a note on Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit which will draw together the preceding three passages. Thereafter, in the fourth section I will comment on some notions in “The Question Concerning Technology,” and in the fifth section I will discuss the passage from “The Question Concerning Technology” in the context of the entire essay. In these two sections, i.e. the fourth and the fifth, I will make a suggestion concerning the notorious question of “Heidegger and Auschwitz,” which in some sense is my only concern in the entire paper. Following this, in the sixth section I will address a passage in An Introduction to Metaphysics. In the seventh section, I will present a passage in the as yet untranslated lecture course on Hölderlin, given in the summer semester of 1942, and a short text of Heidegger’s, Der Feldweg, published in 1953, concluding with some summarizing remarks in the eighth and final section. (shrink)

There is a Wittgensteinian use of "phenomenology" which is the grammar of the apriori possibility of facts, in contradistinction to an hermeneutical conception of language in the spirit of German phenomenology. Not only does Wittgenstein refer, as early as 1929, to such a "language" as opposed to a Husserlian "doctrine" of intuiting the phenomenal apriori, but he keeps using the term in a positive manner which does not allow us to declare that from the Tractatus to the early thirties Wittgenstein (...) shifted from a kind of ineffabilist phenomenalism to physicalism. Rather the author of the Philosophical Remarks aims at freeing "phenomenology" from the earlier assumption of an atomistic basis providing a "primary language". Yet, Wittgenstein says in the same period that there is and there is not any confrontation with the given. Two ways of speaking about the connection between language and reality according to what is to be understood by "verifying" a sentence make Wittgenstein remain the same from one conception to the other. (shrink)

In October 2013, the Declaration of Helsinki was revised a seventh time in its 50 year history. While it is the most widely accepted set of ethical principles for the protection of patients participating in medical research, the Declaration of Helsinki has also been subject of constant controversy. In particular, its paragraph on the use of placebo controls in clinical trials divides the research community into active-control and placebo orthodox proponents, both continuously demanding revisions of the Declaration of Helsinki in (...) favour of their position. The goal of the present project is to compare the mainly theoretical controversy with regulatory implementation. We distributed a questionnaire to national drug regulatory authorities from different countries to collect information on the authorities’ respective approaches to interpretation and implementation of the Declarations’ placebo paragraph in the conduct of medical research. Our findings suggest that the majority of drug regulatory authorities have established a practice of a middle ground, allowing placebo controls in some instances. Various interpretations of “serious harm” and “methodological reasons” are proposed as well as safeguards to avoid abuse of the option to use placebo-controls. Leaving the placebo paragraph open to various interpretation is a result of the Declaration of Helsinki’s character as a guidance document. With the current version controversy will continue. The Declaration should be continued to be strengthened to enforce the appreciation of conducting medical research with the highest ethical standard. (shrink)