Habituellement le processus de deuil suite à la mort d’une personne significative évolue favorablement vers une fin, marquée par la réorganisation de la vie et la capacité de réinvestissement chez l’endeuillé. Mais le deuil peut se compliquer. L’absence de deuil ou le deuil-non-fait en est une complication grave à l’origine de désordres somatiques et psychologiques et d’une entrave au bon développement psychique chez l’endeuillé et même sa descendance. L’auteur présente deux observations cliniques de deuils-non-faits qui illustrent d’une part, le concept (...) de crypte avec l’identification d’un enfant épileptique à un « double » mort tenu au secret, et d’autre part, celui d’absence symbolique de sépulture où le mort reste « accroché » au vivant. Ces observations montrent aussi qu’un deuil peut n’être pas définitivement gelé et s’enclencher bien des années plus tard, avec même, une surprenante facilité, pourvu que le deuil soit entendu. (shrink)

The pioneering moral philosopher Annette Baier presents a series of new and recent essays in ethics, broadly conceived to include both engagements with other philosophers and personal meditations on life. Baier's unique voice and insight illuminate topics ranging from patriotism and future generations to honesty, trust, hope, and friendship.

We discuss the variety of sorts of sympathy Hume recognizes, the extent to which he thinks our sympathy with others’ feelings depends on inferences from the other’s expression, and from her perceived situation, and consider also whether he later changed his views about the nature and role of sympathy, in particular its role in morals.

Die Spannungen zwischen deutscher Philosophie und jüdischer Politik waren für Hannah Arendt von existentieller Bedeutung.

Annette Baier's aim is to make sense of David Hume's Treatise as a whole. Hume's family motto, which appears on his bookplate, was True to the End. Baier argues that it is not until the end of the Treatise that we get his full story about truth and falsehood, reason and folly. By the end, we can see the cause to which Hume has been true throughout the work. Baier finds Hume's Treatise of Human Nature to be a carefully (...) crafted literary and philosophical work which itself displays a philosophical progress of sentiments. His starting place is an overly abstract intellectualism that deliberately thrusts passions and social concerns into the background. In the three interrelated books of the Treatise, his self-understander proceeds through partial successes and dramatic failures to emerge with new-found optimism, expecting that the exact knowledge the morally self-conscious anatomist of human nature can acquire will itself improve and correct our vision of morality. Baier describes how, by turning philosophy toward human nature instead of toward God and the universe, Hume initiated a new philosophy, a broader discipline of reflection that can embrace Charles Darwin and Michel Foucault as well as William James and Sigmund Freud. Hume belongs both to our present and to our past. (shrink)

David Hume has been invoked by those who want to found morality on human nature as well as by their critics. He is credited with showing us the fallacy of moving from premises about what is the case to conclusions about what ought to be the case; and yet, just a few pages after the famous is-ought remarks in A Treatise of Human Nature, he embarks on his equally famous derivation of the obligations of justice from facts about the cooperative (...) schemes accepted in human communities. Is he ambivalent on the relationship between facts about human nature and human evaluations? Does he contradict himself – and, if so, which part of his whole position is most valuable? Between the famous is-ought passage and the famous account of convention and the obligations arising from established cooperative schemes once they are morally endorsed, Hume discusses the various meanings of the term “natural.” “Shou'd it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these principles [upon which all our notions of morals are founded] in nature or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal.” The natural can be opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, or the artificial. It is the last contrast that Hume wants, for his contrast between the “artificial” culturally variant, convention-dependent obligations of justice and the more invariant “natural virtues,” and what he says about that contrast in this preparation for his account of the “artificial” virtues, makes it clear why he can later refer to justice as “natural” and to the general content of the rules of justice – that is, of basic human conventions of cooperation – as “Laws of Nature”. (shrink)

This paper aims at setting Montesquieu's 1729 sojourn in the Dutch Republic within its specific Dutch context whilst reconsidering the impact this short period may have exerted on his work. Based on a wide variety of Dutch, English and French sources, the article offers a study of Montesquieu's Dutch networks and contacts, a comparative Franco-Dutch approach to taxation and fiscal policy and an insight into the history of the stadholderate under William IV. The main argument made in the paper is (...) two-fold: first, that the Dutch Republic was a mirror Montesquieu held up to the French monarchy, allowing him to put a number of ideas of government to the test; secondly that, owing to the fluctuating nature of Dutch political events between 1729 and 1748, the Dutch model remained somewhat elusive in Montesquieu's broader understanding of the paradigm of republican regimes. (shrink)

Motion is both elementary and fleeting; it is a fundamental precondition to our survival and our civilisation. Motion is the functional basis to the discovery, measurement and exploration of the world that we live in. Elucidating and calculating motion are central issues within our culture, which is not only based on motion but designs it, being built upon a history of dynamics and acceleration. Representatives of different disciplines - ranging from architecture to car design, from art-, cultural- and media-studies to (...) sociology- discuss the depiction and design of motion in art, architecture, design, dance and technology. This overview of historic developments and current trends discloses some surprising, border-crossign correlations. (shrink)

David Hume's essay Of Moral Prejudices offers a spirited defense of "all the most endearing sentiments of the hearts, all the most useful biases and instincts, ...

"Huizenga examines the Greco-Roman moral-philosophical 'curriculum' for women by comparing these two epistolary collections. The analysis is organized around four elements: textual resources, teachers and learners, instructional strategies, and subject matter. Huizenga shows that the author of the Pastorals has adopted nearly all of the 'pagan' aspects of this curriculum, but has supplemented these with theological justifications drawn from Pauline literature and traditions"--Publisher description.

This essay examines the possible systematic bias against the disabled in the structure and practice of genetic counseling. Finding that the profession's “nondirective” imperative remains problematic, the authors recommend that methodology developed by feminist standpoint epistemology be used to incorporate the perspective of disabled individuals in genetic counselors' education and practice, thereby reforming society's view of the disabled and preventing possible negative effects of genetic counseling on the self-concept and material circumstance of disabled individuals.

Can aesthetic concepts reflect and provide answers for ethical aspects and issues? Is "more ethics, less aesthetics" applicable, according to the motto of the Venice Biennial for architecture in the year 2000? Or isn't "more aesthetics" in fact just what is required to encourage reflection about ethical responsibilities and dimensions in architecture, art, and design? This publication is a collection of reflections about the ethical and political dimensions of creations, presented from the point of view of art, architecture, design, and (...) curatorial practice. The contributions range from historical reviews to future-oriented outlooks, illustrating interdisciplinary connections. (shrink)

A recent French reform has revised the legal definition of the corporation. In essence, the law stipulates that the corporation must be run with due regard to the social and environmental impacts of its activity. It also introduces the notion of raison d’être and affords the possibility for any corporation to assign social or environmental purposes to itself, defined in its by-laws. This reform is similar to recent reforms in the UK and the US, but is based on an original (...) and distinctive theoretical argument. The aim of our article is to analyze the fundamental tenets of this reform and their implications for the theory of the corporation. It shows that the new law is based on a new positive definition of the enterprise as not only an economic organization or a productive entity, but more fundamentally a space for innovative collective action. We argue that this view of the enterprise challenges our conceptualization of the corporation in two important ways. First, it shows that the traditional theories overlook the activities of the enterprise and their related impacts, and that the corporation is not necessarily the appropriate legal vehicle for the innovative enterprise. Second, it suggests that the stipulation of the enterprise’s purpose or raison d’être in the corporate by-laws can provide new promising legal foundations for corporate responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify a theoretical and political role for ‘white ignorance’, present three alternative accounts of white ignorance, and assess how well each fulfils this role. On the Willful Ignorance View, white ignorance refers to white individuals’ willful ignorance about racial injustice. On the Cognitivist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance resulting from social practices that distribute faulty cognitive resources. On the Structuralist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance that (1) results as part of a social process that (...) systematically gives rise to racial injustice, and (2) is an active player in the process. I argue that, because of its greater power and flexibility, the Structuralist View better explains the patterns of ignorance that we observe, better illuminates the connection to white racial domination, and is overall better suited to the project of ameliorating racial injustice. As such, the Structuralist View should be preferred. (shrink)

It is becoming more common that the decision-makers in private and public institutions are predictive algorithmic systems, not humans. This article argues that relying on algorithmic systems is procedurally unjust in contexts involving background conditions of structural injustice. Under such nonideal conditions, algorithmic systems, if left to their own devices, cannot meet a necessary condition of procedural justice, because they fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced model of which cases count as relevantly similar. Resolving this problem requires deliberative capacities uniquely (...) available to human agents. After exploring the limitations of existing formal algorithmic fairness strategies, the article argues that procedural justice requires that human agents relying wholly or in part on algorithmic systems proceed with caution: by avoiding doxastic negligence about algorithmic outputs, by exercising deliberative capacities when making similarity judgments, and by suspending belief and gathering additional information in light of higher-order uncertainty. (shrink)

In the current debate on art, thought on time has commanded a prominent position. Do we live in a posthistorical time? Has objective art historical time and belief in a continual progress shifted to a more subjective experience of the ephemeral? Has history fallen away and, if so, what does this mean for the future of art? How does a visual archive relate to artistic memory? This volume investigates positions, arguments and comments regarding the stated theme. Philosophers and theorists explore (...) the subject matter theoretically. Curators articulate the practice of art. The participants are: Hans Belting, Jan Bor, Peter Bürger, Bart Cassiman, Leontine Coelewij, Hubert Damisch, Arthur C. Danto, Bart De Baere, Okwui Enwezor, Kasper König, Sven Lütticken, Manifesta, Hans Ulrich Obrist, Donald Preziosi, Survival of the Past Project, Ernst Van Alphen, Kirk Varnedoe, Gianni Vattimo, and Kees Vuyk. (shrink)

This is an essay at the intersection of metaethics and the history of contemporary analytic philosophy. It explores the relationships between Allan Gibbard’s mature quasi-realist expressivism and (i) three non-naturalistic varieties of what I call “non-inflationary realism” and (ii) moral fictionalism. Moral or normative realism is frequently (if mistakenly) taken to involve certain existence-affirming external assumptions about the metaphysical status of substantive normative thought and discourse. The non-inflationary realists seek to embrace moral or normative objectivity and truth without any distinctly—as (...) they see it, “inflated”—moral or normative ontology. This position, along with a shared emphasis on the primacy of substantive moral or normative thought and discourse, brings them very close to Gibbard, and so to what it is tempting to treat as a strikingly different metaethical account. Focusing on the non-inflationary realists Ronald Dworkin, T.M. Scanlon, and Derek Parfit, I examine similarities among their views, and between each of these views and Gibbard’s. I argue that the non-inflationary realist project should be understood as including the work not only of these figures, characteristically seen as among its paradigmatic representatives, but also, crucially, that of Gibbard. They all agree that our moral or normative claims purport to state normative truths and that such claims are capable of being true or false and that when true they do not depend on the particular standpoint anyone happens to take. Our moral or normative thoughts can be characterized as beliefs. We can have moral knowledge. There are substantive moral and normative facts. These facts are not reducible to non-normative facts. Normative concepts cannot be analyzed in purely naturalistic terms; and normative facts do not depend on any robustly existent truth-makers. Focusing on these shared commitments enables me to home in on the apparent differences that nonetheless remain. They differ in significant respects, for instance, about whether—and, if so, to what extent—we can make any meaningful external (non-substantive) judgments about the moral or normative and about whether there is a role for property-based explanations that minimalism about the normative fails to capture. By investigating these and other differences, I shed light on what is at stake in giving an adequate account of our moral and normative thought and talk. I pursue this aim further by considering why it might seem that quasi-realist expressivism was a form of normative fictionalism or error theory—though it is not. I attempt here to clear up confusions stemming from common assumptions associated with terms like “realism,” “cognitivism,” or “fictionalism” with respect to morality or normativity. I distinguish some differences in the ways in which normative properties can be understood by non-inflationary realists and the roles they can play in explaining normativity. I underscore the implausibility of treating the moral domain as completely autonomous. And I attempt to offer suggestions regarding some conceptual options that remain to be further explored. I maintain that Gibbard makes explicit otherwise unacknowledged implications of Scanlon’s or Dworkin’s accounts, implications regarding deep differences between normative or moral and other domains, implications which might help explain the uneasiness that prompts Scanlon and Dworkin to resist Gibbard’s account and that pushes Parfit toward what seems to be a sort of intermediate position between non-inflationary and more ontologically committed realism. Non-inflationary realism forces us to rethink metaethics in interesting and promising ways. (shrink)

La sociologie peut-elle nous aider à penser l'éthique? Proposant une nouvelle lecture des " pères fondateurs ", d'Auguste Comte à Max Weber en passant par Emile Durkheim, ce livre revient sur leurs conceptions des liens sociaux. Cette approche non conventionnelle de leurs écrits les plus connus remet en question nombre d'interprétations qui en ont été faites pour renouveler le discours moral. L'auteur montre ainsi que dans ses versions allemande et française, la sociologie s'adosse à des métaphysiques dualistes amenant à enfermer, (...) chacune à sa manière, les êtres humains dans une intériorité solipsiste. Le chapitre consacré à Weber constitue le point culminant de ce parcours : et si l'écrit le plus célèbre de l'histoire de la sociologie, L'Ethique protestante, illustrait une rencontre manquée entre l'exigence éthique et l'ordre temporel? En revisitant de façon originale des classiques de la sociologie, La sociologie et l'oubli du monde ouvre sur cette invitation fondamentale et très actuelle : penser une éthique de la responsabilité, en assumant nos limites et en sachant que la liberté morale n'est pas une liberté vagabonde. (shrink)

Population growth and demographic change are two distinct but interconnected phenomena of population development. Population growth refers to the quantitative change of a population over time and is usually expressed as a growth rate in percentage terms relative to the respective population. A population growth rate greater than 0 indicates that the population is increasing, while negative population growth signifies a numerical decline. Demographic change encompasses shifts in birth and death rates, age structure, gender ratios, and migration (emigration and immigration). (...) Population growth and demographic change can lead to ethical challenges in areas such as the environment and nutrition, reproduction, intergenerational and gender equity, and migration. ------ Bevölkerungswachstum und demographischer Wandel sind zwei distinkte, aber zusammenhängende Phänomene der Bevölkerungsentwicklung. Das Bevölkerungswachstum bezeichnet die quantitative Veränderung einer Population über die Zeit und wird meist als Wachstumsrate in Prozent der jeweiligen Bevölkerung ausgedrückt. Ein Bevölkerungswachstum, dessen Wert größer als 0 ist, bedeutet, dass die Bevölkerung zunimmt; negatives Bevölkerungswachstum bedeutet eine zahlenmäßige Abnahme. Verschiebungen hinsichtlich der Geburten- und Sterberaten, der Altersstruktur, der Geschlechterverhältnisse sowie der Migration (Emigration und Immigration) machen den demographischen Wandel aus. Bevölkerungswachstum und demographischer Wandel können u.a. zu ethischen Problemen in den Bereichen Umwelt und Ernährung, Reproduktion, Generationen- und Geschlechtergerechtigkeit sowie Migration führen. (shrink)