Over the history of the study of visual perception there has been great success at discovering countless visual illusions. There has been less success in organizing the overwhelming variety of illusions into empirical generalizations (much less explaining them all via a unifying theory). Here, this article shows that it is possible to systematically organize more than 50 kinds of illusion into a 7 × 4 matrix of 28 classes. In particular, this article demonstrates that (1) smaller sizes, (2) slower speeds, (...) (3) greater luminance contrast, (4) farther distance, (5) lower eccentricity, (6) greater proximity to the vanishing point, and (7) greater proximity to the focus of expansion all tend to have similar perceptual effects, namely, to (A) increase perceived size, (B) increase perceived speed, (C) decrease perceived luminance contrast, and (D) decrease perceived distance. The detection of these empirical regularities was motivated by a hypothesis, called “perceiving the present,” that the visual system possesses mechanisms for compensating neural delay during forward motion. This article shows how this hypothesis predicts the empirical regularity. (shrink)

In “The Responsibilities and Role of Business in Relation to Society,” Nien-hê Hsieh challenges Joseph Heath’s “market failure” or Paretian approach to business ethics by arguing for a “Back to Basics” approach. Here, I argue that two basics of Hsieh’s three-basics vision are flawed, because a. ordinary morality is in fact not sufficient for the adversarial realm of the market, and b. the ideal of a Pareto-optimal market economy with perfect competition does in fact provide an adequate basis (...) for normative rules against market failures. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the study of the nature of the influence of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization. The authors study different approaches to estimating the probability of revolutionary events in an election year. Different types of revolutionary events are distinguished within the framework of the level of political violence. The primary reasons for the activation of the politically active part of the population, both in autocracies and in transitional political regimes, are identified, including the factionalization of (...) elites, the activation of "sleeping" institutions, the growth of political competence among individuals, the consolidation of the prodemocratic opposition and its institutionalization, electoral fraud and other manifestations of unfair political competition, greater emotional involvement of the population in political processes, and so on. The findings support the conclusion that elections promote peaceful revolutionary episodes and reduce the likelihood of armed uprisings. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the influence of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization is considered in the regime context. The authors explore how elections affect violent or non-violent revolutionary actions in certain political regimes, according to Jack A. Goldstone's typology (full autocracies, partial autocracies, factional democracies, partial democracies and full democracies). The authors conclude that holding elections reduces the risks of armed revolutionary destabilization in all types of regimes, except for factional democracies. On the other hand, unarmed revolutionary action is more likely in an election year - in all regime types except full democracies. At the same time, holding elections primarily increases the risks of unarmed revolutionary uprisings in intermediate regimes / anocracies. However, even among anocracies, factional democracies stand out, where in the election year the risks of unarmed (as well as armed) revolutionary episodes increase significantly more than in partial autocracies and in partial non-factional democracies. At the same time, for consolidated democracies, holding elections is a factor that inhibits rather than provokes revolutionary destabilization. In full autocracies, the risk of unarmed revolutionary action increases in an election year, but not as much as in intermediate regimes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The articles in the special issue ofBusiness Ethics Quarterly, “Normative Business Ethics in a Global Economy: New Directions on Donaldsonian Themes,” were written by a set of outstanding scholars: Margaret M. Blair, Joseph P. Gaspar, Nien-hê Hsieh, Peter L. Jennings, Marietta Peytcheva, Andreas Georg Scherer, Amy J. Sepinwall, Andrew Stark, Danielle E. Warren, and Manuel Velasquez. In this commentary I reply to my colleagues, arranging my reply around the following themes: 1) the corporate moral agent; 2) the idea (...) of a social contract for business; 3) managing ethics within corporations; and 4) values in business. I discuss each in turn. However, I reflect first on my idiosyncratic approach to business ethics. (shrink)

Aristotle knew things about happiness, habits, and human nature. This book is about his book, the Nichomachean Ethics. What this book will NOT do: -Make you feel good. -Make you rich. -Make you a good person. -Make you happy. What this book MIGHT do: -Teach you some tips on how to become a better person. -And that might make you happy, which feels pretty good. -And maybe that will help you get rich (I don't know, I've never done that). Want (...) to know how being good, being happy, and feeling good are related? Buy this book. And then read it. Or buy it for your kids or nephews or whatever. (shrink)

Public reason in practice and theory -- False starts: unsuccessful justifications of public reason -- Respect for persons as a constraint on coercion -- Higher-order unanimity escape clause -- Civic friendship as a constraint on reasons for decision -- Public reason and (same-sex) marriage.

Pornography is everywhere, and it raises a host of difficult questions. What counts as pornography, first of all? When does material cross the line from being erotic to being objectionable? Where does a person's entitlement to sexual freedom end and another person's right not to feel objectified begin? How should rights be weighed against consequences in deciding what laws and policies ought to be adopted? Philosophers Andrew Altman and Lori Watson explore these and other issues in this succinct and (...) readable for-and-against volume. (shrink)

Social learning has been shown to be an evolutionarily adaptive strategy, but it can be implemented via many different cognitive mechanisms. The adaptive advantage of social learning depends crucially on the ability of each learner to obtain relevant and accurate information from informants. The source of informants’ knowledge is a particularly important cue for evaluating advice from multiple informants; if the informants share the source of their information or have obtained their information from each other, then their testimony is statistically (...) dependent and may be less reliable than testimony from informants who do not share information. In this study, we use a Bayesian model to determine how rational learners should incorporate the effects of shared information when learning from other people, conducting three experiments that examine whether human learners behave similarly. We find that people are sensitive to a number of different patterns of dependency, supporting the use of a sophisticated strategy for social learning that goes beyond copying the majority, and broadening the situations in which social learning is likely to be an adaptive strategy. (shrink)

It has become standard practice for scientists to avoid the possibility of references to God by adopting methodological naturalism, a method that assumes that the reality of the universe, as it can be accessed by empirical enquiry, is to be explained solely with recourse to natural phenomena. In this essay, I critique the Christian practice of this method, arguing that a Christian's practices should always reflect her belief that the universe is created and sustained by the triune God. This leads (...) me to contend that the Christian should adopt a theologically humble approach to the sciences, with which she humbly acknowledges that special divine action is not discernible by empirical science. To further my critique, I consider three ways in which the practice of MN can be particularly problematic for Christianity. (shrink)

A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel’s dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. In this essay, I argue that the Modification View is incorrect. Hegel’s insight, I show, is that one can only explain the objective validity of a form of thought through employing that very form. Consequently, the dialectical method cannot relate to its subject matter as (...) something given to it, and so cannot involve advancing and then correcting errors in one’s account. (shrink)

A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.

Much recent work on moral responsibility has focused on responsibility as accountability—a type of responsibility associated with the blame-oriented reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. The preoccupation with this admittedly important form of responsibility fosters a truncated portrait of our moral lives by largely ignoring responsibility for actions that merit praise and emulation. Through an examination of what is presupposed in the attitudes of gratitude and esteem, this essay argues that praiseworthiness is not best understood as the mirror image (...) of blameworthiness in the accountability sense. To make sense of praiseworthiness one must raise the profile of another type of responsibility —what Gary Watson has identified as its attributability, or aretaic face. Doing so also helps reveal some important features of virtuous agency, including a sense in which such agency may exhibit oft-overlooked and distinctive enhancements of an agent’s freedom. (shrink)

Anne Conway (1631–1679) is sometimes said to be a Monist. I present several kinds of Monism and then investigate whether any of these adequately capture Conway’s theory of substance and individuals. I outline Conway’s reasons for postulating that there are three irreducibly distinct kinds of essence or substance, which by itself demonstrates that she is not an unrestricted Token Monist. I then examine her various remarks about created substance, which she sometimes refers to as “a creature” and other times as (...) “creatures.” Here I argue that, while the texts are ambiguous, there are compelling reasons—especially given her views about salvation and justice—to believe that she is merely a Type Monist at the level of created substances. I then examine two theses that result from her relativized Type Monism. First, there are no substantial barriers between, say, horses and humans, and thus all created things can convert into one another as they improve or regress morally. Second, there is no substantial difference between minds and bodies. I suggest that Conway’s arguments against Descartes’ Type Pluralism could easily be included as part of a more inclusive philosophy syllabus. (shrink)

When it comes to the duty of beneficence, a formidable class of moderate positions holds that morally significant considerations emerge when one's actions are seen as part of a larger series. Agglomeration, according to these moderates, limits the demands of beneficence, thereby avoiding the extremely demanding view forcefully defended by Peter Singer. This idea has much appeal. What morality can demand of people is, it seems, appropriately modulated by how much they have already done or will do. Here we examine (...) a number of recent proposals that appeal to agglomeration. None of them, we argue, succeeds. (shrink)

Translated, with a philosophical introduction.

RÉSUMÉ : Le but de W.V. Quine, dans «Deux dogmes de l’empirisme», n’est pas de prouver contre tous que la distinction analytique/synthétique est intenable ni de fournir une conception originale de la connaissance. Il veut plutôt ébranler l’attrait de l’empiriste pour la distinction et montrer ce en quoi réside un empirisme exempt de dogme. En me concentrant sur §§1-3 et §6, je soutiens que son traitement de l’analyticité est structuré par des hypothèses philosophiques fondamentales et que la conception de la (...) connaissance qu’il défend l’habite depuis fort longtemps. «Deux Dogmes» est moins facilement invalidé quand il est interprété en référence aux premières conférences de Quine sur Carnap. (shrink)

The idea that religious belief is ‘almost inevitable’ is so forcefully argued by Justin Barrett that it can warrant justifiable concern – especially since he claims atheism is an unnatural handicap. In this article, I argue that religious belief in Homo sapiens isn’t inevitable – and that Barrett does agree when pushed. I describe the role played by a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device in the generation of belief in God as necessary but insufficient in explaining religious culture – I distance (...) myself from some common conceptions of HADD and the view I take of it is unorthodox. I point out that the conclusion to Barrett’s book, ‘Why Would Anyone Believe in God?’ is a fine example of the very hyperactive agency detection Barrett himself describes, and is therefore highly suspect. (shrink)

Reconsiders John Duns Scotus's theory of the univocity of being in connection to his conception of ultimate difference. Develops a systematic account of ultimate difference from disparate discussions throughout his corpus.

Summary The argument of this paper is (1) that, contrary to what is often thought, there are cases of disagreement among scientists concerning the relative acceptability of theories which do not turn on nonrational or extra-scientific considerations, (2) that agreement cannot be secured without adversely affecting the scientific enterprise as we know it, and (3) that disagreement can be accommodated within a theory of scientific rationality and progress based on the idea that the relative acceptability of scientific theories is a (...) function of their relative problem-solving effectiveness.The diversity of our opinions does not proceed from some men being more rational than others but solely from the fact that our thoughts pass through diverse channels and the same objects are not considered by all.’ Descartes, Discourse on Method. (shrink)

The present study assessed the degree to which probabilistic reasoning performance and thinking style influenced perception of risk and self-reported levels of terrorism-related behaviour change. A sample of 263 respondents, recruited via convenience sampling, completed a series of measures comprising probabilistic reasoning tasks (perception of randomness, base rate, probability, and conjunction fallacy), the Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT), the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale, and a terrorism-related behaviour change scale. Structural equation modelling examined three progressive models. Firstly, (...) the Independence Model assumed that probabilistic reasoning, perception of risk and reality testing independently predicted terrorism-related behaviour change. Secondly, the Mediation Model supposed that probabilistic reasoning and reality testing correlated, and indirectly predicted terrorism-related behaviour change through perception of risk. Lastly, the Dual-Influence Model proposed that probabilistic reasoning indirectly predicted terrorism-related behaviour change via perception of risk, independent of reality testing. Results indicated that performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks most strongly predicted perception of risk, and preference for an intuitive thinking style (measured by the IPO-RT) best explained terrorism-related behaviour change. The combination of perception of risk with probabilistic reasoning ability in the Dual-Influence Model enhanced the predictive power of the analytical-rational route, with conjunction fallacy having a significant indirect effect on terrorism-related behaviour change via perception of risk. The Dual-Influence Model possessed superior fit and reported similar predictive relations between intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational routes and terrorism-related behaviour change. The discussion critically examines these findings in relation to dual-processing frameworks. This includes considering the limitations of current operationalisations and recommendations for future research that align outcomes and subsequent work more closely to specific dual-process models. (shrink)

Agent-relative consequentialism is thought attractive because it can secure agent-centred constraints while retaining consequentialism's compelling idea—the idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available outcome. We argue, however, that the commitments of agent-relative consequentialism lead it to run afoul of a plausibility requirement on moral theories. A moral theory must not be such that, in any possible circumstance, were every agent to act impermissibly, each would have more reason to prefer the world thereby actualized over the (...) world that would have been actualized if every agent had instead acted permissibly. (shrink)

In the previous chapter ‘The Beauty of Sport', I made a distinction between classical and modernist aesthetics. The classical is exemplified in eighteenthcentury art criticism and its use of the la...

Boarding school is a major educational option for many students (e.g., students living in remote areas, or whose parents are working interstate or overseas, etc.). This study explored the motivation, engagement, and achievement of boarding and day students who are educated in the same classrooms and receive the same syllabus and instruction from the same teachers (thus a powerful research design to enable unique comparisons). Among 2,803 students (boardingn= 481; dayn= 2,322) from 6 Australian high schools and controlling for background (...) attributes and personality, we found predominant parity between boarding and day students in their motivation, engagement, and achievement. We also found that classroom-average motivation, engagement, and achievement was not significantly affected by the number of boarders (relative to day students) in the classroom. In addition, the effects of boarding were generally not moderated by students’ background or personality attributes. We conclude that boarders have academic opportunities and outcomes that are comparable to their day student counterparts. Implications for students, teachers, and parents are discussed. (shrink)

This collection of texts on the Sublime provides the historical context for the foundation and discussion of one of the most important aesthetic debates of the Enlightenment. The significance of the Sublime in the eighteenth century ranged across a number of fields - literary criticism, empirical psychology, political economy, connoisseurship, landscape design and aesthetics, painting and the fine arts, and moral philosophy - and has continued to animate aesthetic and theoretical debates to this day. However, the unavailability of many of (...) the crucial texts of the founding tradition has resulted in a conception of the Sublime often limited to the definitions of its most famous theorist Edmund Burke. Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla's anthology, which includes an introduction and notes to each entry, offers students and scholars ready access to a much deeper and more complex tradition of writings on the Sublime, many of them never before printed in modern editions. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the field of ‘art-science’ collaborations for their perceived capacity to develop new cultural understandings of technology and science. In this article, and through an engagement with the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, I argue that if art-science represents an important site for the formation of an alternate technical culture today, then it is because of the new technical mentalities that such practices might cultivate. Here, creating a new technical mentality is more than (...) just a representational concern with enhancing ‘public awareness’ of technology, instead referring to more material transformations in our embodied capacities for perceiving and affectively engaging with technologies. I flesh this potential out through an encounter with work of Art Orienté objet, whose art-science collaborations challenge the anthropocentric and utilitarian mentalities of contemporary bioscience through explorations of the transindividual conditions of human embodiment and its material immersion within nonhuman ecologies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Psychological Courage”Andrew Moore (bio)Putman’s abstract tells us that “philosophy has never addressed the type of courage involved in facing the fears generated by our habits and emotions.” Later he says “almost never.” I think either claim overstates the case. True, Aristotle’s main concern is with courage as a martial virtue, and his central case is the soldier at war. Most translations of Nicomachean Ethics thus talk (...) of “bravery,” rather than “courage.” Aristotle also says, however, that “certainly the brave person is also intrepid... in sickness” (1115b1–2). In sickness, we often face pain and suffering, fear of further sickness, and death. Aristotle takes these to be central concerns: “Then what sorts of frightening conditions concern the brave person? Surely the most frightening; for no one stands firmer against terrifying conditions. Now death is most frightening of all....” (1115a25–26). We may conclude that in Aristotle at least, some attention is paid to psychological bravery or courage. Even if Aristotle had paid no attention to psychological courage, it is still an open question whether his general account of bravery or courage in Book 3, chapters 6–9 of Nicomachean Ethics could be applied also to Putman’s psychological cases, in which the source of fear and object of courage are internal to the agent’s psychology. Even if not, the Aristotelian might still try, as Putman himself notes, to absorb psychological courage into the virtue of “temperance.” I shall not pursue any of these possibilities further here.I turn now to Putman’s general account of courage, and to the way he distinguishes its psychological from its other varieties. His view is that types of courage are to be distinguished from one another in terms of the fear to be faced, and the goal to be attained. Physical courage responds to a fear of death or physical harm. Moral courage responds to a fear of loss of ethical integrity or authenticity. Psychological courage addresses fear of psychic instability or loss of self. It involves us in facing our irrational fears and anxieties, ranging from bad habits and compulsions to phobias. Different kinds of psychological courage then arise from the different sources of the fear of psychic instability. Quick generalizations about the goal to be obtained from various kinds of courage are harder to come by, but in one way or another, they all concern facing up to or confronting fear.A problem for Putman’s general theoretical framework is that fear seems in fact to be inessential to courage. Socrates was a paradigm case of the morally courageous person, as Putman notes, and yet (as Putman also notes) this consisted at least in part in his fearless defense of his moral convictions, even in the face of death. Plato’s Socrates did not face fear.If he had, he would not have had Socratic virtue. We must conclude either that he lacked [End Page 13] courage, or that fear is not necessary to courage. I favor the latter view.If courage is not necessarily a matter of facing fear, then what is it? I suggest that is a matter of facing personal risk or threat. Usually, of course, we respond fearfully to personal threat or risk. But that is not always or essentially so. Socrates and others can still be courageous, even if they face their personal risk or threat without fear. A risk-based conception of courage can also distinguish physical, moral, and psychological courage from one another, in terms of the source of the risk to which they respond. For example, psychological courage is at issue wherever a person is facing up to personal risks generated by her or his own habits, dispositions, commitments, and so on. Note too that fears are not the only elements of one’s own psychology that might generate personal risk. My innocent kindness, for example, might be an ingrained disposition which puts me at risk of cruel exploitation. Facing up to this trait of mine seems to me to be an instance of courage, just as is facing up to my debilitating fears. I probably do not fear my own innocent kindness, though if I strongly identify... (shrink)

Philosophers of science have long been concerned with these questions. In the 1980s, influential work by Clark Glymour, Michael Friedman, John Watkins, and Philip Kitcher articulated general accounts of theory unification that attempted to underwrite a connection between unification, truth, and understanding. According to the ‘unifiers,’ as we may call them, a theory is unified to the extent that it has a small theoretical structure relative to the domain of phenomena it covers, and there are general syntactic criteria that allow (...) one to determine how unified a theory is. The explanatory power of a theory, and the understanding of nature it gives us, is a direct consequence of this unity. As well, the more unified a theory is, the better confirmed it will be, and under some conditions a theory’s unity can justify realism about unobservable entities posited by it. In the 1990s disunity became the dominant theme, with books such as John Dupré’s The Disorder of Things and the Galison and Stump anthology arguing that it is a mistake to view science as a unified practice and that rather than an epistemic virtue, unification in science is a metaphysical vice. (shrink)

In response to Singer Kuper suggests that only a wider range of institutional reforms and political strategies can generate sustained inclusion in governance and the global economy.

In a seventeenth-century English landscape populated with towering political and philosophical figures like Hobbes, Harrington, Cromwell, Milton, and Locke, William Penn remains in many ways a man apart. Yet despite being widely neglected by scholars, he was a sophisticated political thinker who contributed mightily to the theory and practice of religious liberty in the early modern Atlantic world. In this long-awaited intellectual biography of William Penn, Andrew R. Murphy presents a nuanced portrait of this remarkable entrepreneur, philosopher, Quaker, and (...) politician.Liberty, Conscience, and Toleration focuses on the major political episodes that attracted William Penn's sustained attention as a political thinker and actor: the controversy over the Second Conventicle Act, the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, the founding and settlement of Pennsylvania, and the contentious reign of James II. Through a careful examination of writings published in the midst of the religious and political conflicts of Restoration and Revolutionary England, Murphy contextualizes the development of Penn's thought in England and America, illuminating the mutual interconnections between Penn's political thought and his colonizing venture in America. An early advocate of representative institutions and religious freedom, William Penn remains a singular figure in the history of liberty of conscience. His political theorizing provides a window into the increasingly vocal, organized, and philosophically sophisticated tolerationist movement that gained strength over the second half of the seventeenth century. Not only did Penn attempt to articulate principles of religious liberty as a Quaker in England, but he actually governed an American polity and experienced firsthand the complex relationship between political theory and political practice. Murphy's insightful analysis shows Penn's ongoing significance to the broader study of Anglo-American political theory and practice, ultimately pointing scholars toward a new way of understanding the enterprise of political theory itself. (shrink)

Meta chronicles the journey of Andrew Murtagh and Adam Lee in their uncommon exchange turned friendship. Why is there something rather than nothing? Does God exist? What of goodness, free will, and consciousness – what is the ultimate nature of reality and how does that extend into the public square? In this treatise, two young passionate truth seekers aim to change the way the discussion is being had from the vantage points of Christianity and atheism. Is theism or atheism (...) more compelling? If theism, why Christianity? Did Jesus even exist? After theism/atheism, then what? What is the good life? Is morality objective? What does abortion, education, and healthcare look like in the just city? Embarking on a quest for truth on the big questions, their worldviews clash in a philosophical tour de force. In their discord, a blossoming friendship; in their agreement, vows to change the world…. (shrink)

America's supposed moral decline from an imagined golden age, and the threat of divine punishment for the sin of straying from the path of righteousness, have been consistent themes in its political and religious rhetoric. In Prodigal Nation, Andrew Murphy investigates the jeremiad's historical roots and probes the ways in which it continues to illuminate themes and tensions in American social and political life.

Applying basic concepts of Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), this paper addresses the author’s own struggle with demanding perfection, and seeks to provide a model for others to emulate.

This paper examines the use of “literature” in research projects in Sociology and Library & Information Science and proposes that there are some limits to the programme of interdisciplinarity. The loci of considerations are found in literature review sections of published articles. “The literature” is an arbitrary term that refers to recognized and relevant collections of work according to context. Associating aspects of disciplinary work such as concepts, methods and writings, with Wes Sharrock’s ethnomethodological notion of “ownership”, affords analysis of (...) interdisciplinary research strategies. This in turn facilitates examination of how discipline or field-specific terms are put to use. This paper suggests that the use of sociological and ethnomethodological approaches within some disciplinary and interdisciplinary studies is questionable. The equivocal nature of “literature” use arises from attempts to fit “literature” to research projects, and from misunderstanding the internal logic of research app... (shrink)

This essay considers attempts to refute scepticism by transcendental argumentation; in particular I explore attempts to refute traditional "Cartesian" scepticism with idealistic transcendental arguments. My main conclusions are: Transcendental arguments are indispensable for a refutation of scepticism, not redundant; Idealistic transcendental arguments cannot refute Cartesian sceptical doubts; Traditional sceptical doubts can be reformulated so as to be effective against accounts of knowledge based on an idealistic theory of truth; It is possible in principle that idealistic ("Kantian") transcendental arguments can refute (...) such idealistic sceptical doubts and also that non-idealistic ("Strawsonian") transcendental arguments can refute non-idealistic doubts; Merely to assume a theory of truth and just to dismiss certain sceptical doubts based on another theory of truth is to beg the question against the sceptic; but all arguments for a particular theory of truth beg the question against radical sceptics; Because radical scepticism must be taken seriously, a complete refutation of scepticism would require constructing both types of transcendental arguments, viz. Kantian idealistic arguments (to refute idealistic doubts) and Strawsonian non-idealistic arguments (to refute non-idealistic, "Cartesian" doubts). I argue that the allure of idealism as a way to refute scepticism is wholly unfounded, viz. because (1) sceptical doubts can be reformulated so as to be effective against idealistic conceptions of knowledge and (2) idealistic arguments cannot refute traditional Cartesian doubts. But although it doesn't lead where many have hoped, I argue that--in a strange way, for different reasons than are commonly supposed--idealism represents a road which must nevertheless be taken if scepticism is to be refuted. That is, though most of the essay attempts to establish that refuting Cartesian scepticism requires that they be separated, it also follows from my argument that transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism must not be kept apart if scepticism is to be fully refuted.. (shrink)