ZusammenfassungDer „Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur strukturellen Weiterentwicklung der Pflegeversicherung“ vom 17. 10. 2007 sieht Regelungen zur Einbeziehung von stationären Pflegeeinrichtungen in die ambulante ärztliche GKV-Versorgung vor. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert und bewertet den Ansatz zur „heimärztlichen Versorgung“ unter rechtlichen Aspekten vor dem Hintergrund der Problematik der Psychopharmakaversorgung von Heimbewohnern und schon bestehender Möglichkeiten der Verzahnung der ambulanten ärztlichen und der stationären pflegerischen Versorgung. Das geplante Modell verfolgt das begrüßenswerte Ziel, die gelegentlich als unzureichend beschriebene ambulante ärztliche Betreuung von Pflegebedürftigen in (...) Pflegeheimen zu verbessern, Schnittstellenprobleme abzubauen und gleichzeitig der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung unnötige Transport- und Krankenhauskosten zu ersparen. Es ist jedoch nur ein rudimentäres Heimarztmodell, da es gerade keine flächendeckende Versorgung der Heimbewohner mit Heimärzten erreichen will. Auch fehlen Anreize für eine Optimierung der ärztlichen und der pflegerischen Zusammenarbeit. Insofern können die Probleme, die sich im Rahmen der Psychopharmakaversorgung von stationär zu pflegenden Heimbewohnern abzeichnen, nur punktuell durch diese Reform verbessert werden. (shrink)

After the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953, scientists working in molecular biology embraced reductionism—the theory that all complex systems can be understood in terms of their components. Reductionism, however, has been widely resisted by both nonmolecular biologists and scientists working outside the field of biology. Many of these antireductionists, nevertheless, embrace the notion of physicalism—the idea that all biological processes are physical in nature. How, Alexander Rosenberg asks, can these self-proclaimed physicalists also be antireductionists? With clarity (...) and wit, Darwinian Reductionism navigates this difficult and seemingly intractable dualism with convincing analysis and timely evidence. In the spirit of the few distinguished biologists who accept reductionism—E. O. Wilson, Francis Crick, Jacques Monod, James Watson, and Richard Dawkins—Rosenberg provides a philosophically sophisticated defense of reductionism and applies it to molecular developmental biology and the theory of natural selection, ultimately proving that the physicalist must also be a reductionist. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1868 Edition.

In this paper, we investigate the trust-based mechanisms underlying the relationship between ethical leadership and followers’ organisational citizenship behaviours (OCBs). Based on three-wave survey data obtained from 184 employees and their supervisors, we find that ethical leadership leads to higher levels of both affective and cognitive trust. In addition, we find support for a three-path mediational model, where cognitive trust and affective trust, in turn, mediate the relationship between ethical leadership and follower OCBs. That is to say, we found that (...) ethical leadership leads to the development of cognitive trust, which subsequently influences the development of affective trust. Affective trust, in turn, induces followers to exhibit OCBs as a means of reciprocating the leader’s favourable behaviour. Our findings suggest that both affective and cognitive trust plays an important role in the social exchange processes that underlie the relationship between ethical leadership and the discretionary behaviour of followers. (shrink)

In September 2017 Alexander Nehamas kindly accepted our invitation to have a meeting in Athens in order to discuss several issues of philosophical interest; with his latest publication On Friendship as a starting point we soon moved over to a multitude of topics Nehamas has so far dealt with. The whole conversation spirals around the probably most challenging and demanding issue as far as practical philosophy is concerned – yet one every moral agent needs to provide an adequate answer (...) to during his lifetime: Values. Do they exclusively belong to the domain of morality? Nehamas claims that “although moral values […] are important […], they are not the only values that determine whether a life is or is not worthwhile”. This view inevitably shifts the focus from individual values - even fundamental ones such as friendship, art and truth- to the real issue: What is a good life, after all? (shrink)

In a homogeneous jury, the votes are exchangeable correlated Bernoulli random variables. We derive the bounds on a homogeneous jury’s competence as the minimum and maximum probability of the jury being correct, which arise due to unknown correlations among the votes. The lower bound delineates the downside risk associated with entrusting decisions to the jury. In large and not-too-competent juries the lower bound may fall below the success probability of a fair coin flip—one half, while the upper bound may not (...) reach a certainty. We also derive the bounds on the voting power of an individual juror as the minimum and maximum probability of her/his casting a decisive vote. The maximum is less than one, while the minimum of zero can be attained for infinitely many combinations of distribution moments. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 48-69, March 2022.

Two sources of possible disagreement in bioethics may be associated with pessimism about what bioethics can achieve. First, pluralism implies that bioethics engages with interlocutors who hold divergent moral beliefs. Pessimists might believe that these disagreements significantly limit the extent to which bioethics can provide normatively robust guidance in relevant areas. Second, the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics suggests that interlocutors may hold divergent views on the nature of bioethics itself—particularly its practicality. Pessimists may suppose that interdisciplinary disagreements could frustrate the (...) goals of bioethics. In this article, I explore how wonder may alleviate the concerns of the first group of pessimists regarding problems associated with pluralism, provided that we are willing to accept some interdisciplinary frustrations. Then, I invite readers of this issue of The Journal of Medicine & Philosophy to test these intuitions by considering the role of wonder in these articles. (shrink)

We still ask the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Every generation seems to offer new and contradictory answers to the question. In the last thirty or so years, the most interesting characterisations of Enlightenment have been by historians. They have told us that there is one Enlightenment, that there are two Enlightenments, that there are many Enlightenments. This has thrown up a second question, ‘How Many Enlightenments?’ In the spirit of collaboration and criticism, I answer both questions by arguing in this (...) article that there are in fact three Enlightenments: Radical, Sceptical and Liberal. These are abstracted from the rival theories of Enlightenment found in the writings of the historians Jonathan Israel, John Robertson and J.G.A. Pocock. Each form of Enlightenment is political; each involves an attitude to history; each takes a view of religion. They are arranged in a sequence of increasing sensitivity to history, as it is this which makes it possible to relate them to each other and indeed propose a composite definition of Enlightenment. The argument should be of interest to anyone concerned with ‘the Enlightenment’ as a historical phenomenon or with ‘Enlightenment’ as a philosophical abstraction. (shrink)

Must we obtain a patient’s consent before posthumously removing her organs? According to the consent requirement, in order to permissibly remove organs from a deceased person, it is necessary that her prior consent be obtained. If the consent requirement is true, then this seems to rule out policies that do not seek and obtain a patient’s prior consent to organ donation, while at the same time vindicating policies that do seek and obtain patient consent. In this paper, however, I argue (...) that once we recognize the difference between consent, on the one hand, and wishing or desiring, on the other, we will see that obtaining consent before organ removal is neither necessary nor sufficient to respect patient autonomy in organ procurement. (shrink)

À propos de la « pensée 68 » selon Serge AudierComme tous les dix ans, l’anniversaire de Mai 68 a donné lieu à un déluge de publications ; et, comme tous les dix ans, il fallait qu’émerge de la masse une poignée de titres qui dispenseraient de regarder les autres. Celui de Serge Audier fit partie de ceux-là, avec son titre accrocheur et toutes les apparences d’une grosse étude sérieuse sur un pan de l’histoire intellectuelle récen..

Einleitung Die Ausbreitung des Massentourismus und die Grundstücksspekulation gefährden frühbyzantinische und byzantinische archäologische Stätten im südwestlichen Kleinasien akut. Wie nun schon in den 1980er Jahren ein Vier-Sterne-Hotel einer spanischen Hotelkette direkt in das weit ausgedehnte spätantike und byzantinische Ruinengebiet von Kauniōn Panormos, das mittelalterliche Prepia (der heutige Name des benachbar ten Örtchens ist Sarigerme), das an der Mündung des Sarisu Çayi – zu deutsch: Gelbwasser-Fluß – im westlichen Lykien gelegen ist, hineingebaut wurde, so sind nun schon vorbereitende Hotelbauarbeiten im Auftrage (...) einer weiteren europäischen Hotelkette mitten im spätantiken Ruinengebiet der Ala-Kilise-Bucht (Anastasioúpolis?) in Karien im vollen Gange, nun soll hier in der Nähe noch eine Appartmenthaussiedlung entstehen. Ein Hilferuf des Verfassers bei der UNESCO Suborganisation ICOMOS verhallte bisher ungehört. Das Ruinengebiet von Sarigerme befindet sich südwestlich von Dalaman und südöstlich der Polis Kaunos. Auf der Kauniōn Panormos (Prepia) unmittelbar vorgelagerten Papas-Insel (Baba Adasi) befindet sich die Ruine eines antiken Mausoleums oder eines Leuchtturms und genauso wie Kaunos verfügte das Bistum (Kaunion) Panormos über ein in der Spätantike allerdings wohl noch intaktes, heute versumpftes, Hafenbecken. Offenbar im Zuge von Bauarbeiten in der Hotelanlage von Sarigerme wurden zwei im Ruinengebiet gefundene Kapitelle vor die Lobby des Hotels verschleppt. Es handelt sich hierbei zum einen um ein größeres korinthisches Normalkapitell aus Marmor mit einer durch ein Profil zweigeteilten Abakusleiste (vgl. Abb. 1), das möglicherweise ursprünglich aus einer der beiden großen Basiliken – von denen eine die Bischofskirche gewesen sein wird – des Ortes stammt und welches dem 5./6. Jh. zugeordnet werden kann, zum anderen um ein byzantinisches Kleinkapitell aus feinkristallinem weißen Marmor (vgl. Abb. 2–4). Das größere korinthische Kapitell gehört zu einem weit verbreiteten Standardtypus und soll deswegen hier nicht weiter besprochen werden. Das Kleinkapitell zeigt jedoch ein einzigartig gestaltetes Dekor, für das dem Verfasser bisher kein direktes Vergleichsbeispiel bekannt ist und das, durch diese kurze Vorlage, sicherlich eine Bereicherung des provinziellen byzantinischen Bauplastik-Katalogs sein wird. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Im Rahmen dieses Beitrags soll der Versuch unternommen werden, eine Antwort auf die Frage zu geben, welche Faktoren für den sportlichen Erfolg im modernen Berufsfußball verantwortlich sind bzw. hinsichtlich welcher Faktoren sich die sportlich erfolgreichen Vereine von den weniger erfolgreichen Vereinen unterscheiden. In diesem Zusammenhang ist insbesondere von Interesse, ob der sportliche Erfolg, wie vielfach behauptet wird, ausschließlich von monetären Faktoren determiniert wird und damit sprichwörtlich käuflich ist. Zu diesem Zweck wird eine diskriminanzanalytische Untersuchung möglicher Erfolgsfaktoren durchgeführt, wobei es (...) das umfangreich verfügbare Datenmaterial erlaubt, insgesamt 18 erfolgsrelevante Merkmalsvariablen in die Analysen einzubeziehen. (shrink)

In Ignorance of Law, Doug Husak defends a version of legal moralism on which ‘we should recognize a presumption that the criminal law should…be based, on conform to, or mirror critical morality’. Here I explore whether substantive criminal law rules should directly mirror not moral blameworthiness, but a distinct legal notion of criminal culpability – akin to moral blameworthiness but refined for deployment in legal systems. Contra Husak, I argue that the criminal law departing from the moral ideal embodied in (...) the standard of moral blameworthiness is not always to be regretted. After showing how criminal culpability might come apart from moral blameworthiness, I argue that my alternative to Husak’s view has practically interesting upshots. In particular, it allows us to resist Husak’s central conclusions about the exculpatory force of normative ignorance. There are good reasons for the criminal law to make certain charitable presumptions about citizens as competent agents, which the standard of moral blameworthiness needn’t similarly embody, and this calls into question Husak’s argument for the claim that normative ignorance exculpates. (shrink)

Levinas a cherche a eriger l'ethique en philosophie premiere. Comment ce projet est-il conciliable avec la methode phenomenologique dont il s'est toujours inspire et dont il est reste tributaire tout au long de sa vie? L'auteur essaie d'y repondre en mettant en evidence ce qu'il appelle une phenomenologie sans phenomenalite. Celle-ci s'inscrit expressement dans la tradition de la phenomenologie transcendantale que Levinas prolonge et actualise en promouvant un concept inedit du transcendantal (concu comme conditionnement mutuel du constituant et du constitue (...) ). Au sommet de cette phenomenologie est l' epiphanie du visage, manifestation d'une alterite radicale qui confere le sens a l'apparaissant sur un mode non intentionnel et non phenomenal. C'est autour du visage que s'articulent les categories fondamentales de son parcours: jouissance, demeure, possession, feminite, amour, erotisme, fecondite, etc. Le present ouvrage qui s'appuie essentiellement sur le premier chef d'oeuvre de Levinas (Totalite et infini, paru en 1961) tente d'eclaircir ces concepts, tout en exposant les idees directrices de la philosophie levinassienne de la subjectivite, de la transcendance, du langage, du temps et de la verite. (shrink)

Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allowing participation by all citizens, democracy can accommodate diversity among citizens, and by considering the perspectives of all, via ballots or debate, democratic results can approximate what the balance of reasons favors. I consider whether, and under what conditions, democratic institutions might reliably make publicly justified social decisions. I argue that conventional accounts of democracy, constituted by voting or deliberation, are unlikely to be effective public justification mechanisms. I (...) conclude that the limitations of conventional mechanisms can be ameliorated through the use of lotteries instead of elections. (shrink)

We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a portion of reality at different scales in the precise sense employed by measurement theory. The purpose of these scales is the numerical representation of primitive relations between (...) quantities of being. To show this, we prove representation and uniqueness theorems for composition. Thus, mereologically invariant composition is trans-scalar identity. (shrink)

Book Review: P.P. Tolochko. Ukraine between Russia and the West: Historical and Nonfiction Essays. Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2018. - 592 pp. ISBN 978-5-7621-0973-4This author discusses the problem of scientific objectivity and reviews a book written by the medievalist-historian P.P. Tolochko, full member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, honorable director of the NASU Institute of Archaeology. The book was published by the Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences in the (...) autumn of 2018. The book presents a collection of articles and reports devoted to processes in Ukraine and, first of all, in Ukrainian historical science, which, at the moment, is experiencing an era of serious reformation of its interpretative models. The author of the book shows that these models are being reformed to suit the requirements of the new ideology, with an obvious disregard for the conduct of objective scientific research. In this regard, the problem of objectivity of scientific research becomes the subject of this review because the requirement of objectivity can be viewed not only as a methodological requirement but also as a moral and political position, opposing the rigor of scientific research to the impact of ideological, political and moral systems and judgments. It is concluded that in this sense the position of P.P. Tolochko can be considered as the act of profound ethical choice. (shrink)

According to Immanuel Kant, legality means the quality of an action being merely and simply in conformity with a law. The article defends the significance of this notion and explains how it indicates the existence of a legal relation. The legal relation, in turn, is the result of resolving an antinomy between the social and the substantive dimension of moral judgment.

A natural reading of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas is that impressions are forceful perceptions whereas ideas are faint. A problem emerges, however, when Hume countenances the possibility of faint impressions and forceful ideas. In this paper, I attempt a resolution to the problem. I argue that Hume characterizes impressions and ideas intensionally and extensionally, and sometimes uses the term in only one of the two senses. I argue that Hume intensionally defines impressions and ideas as forceful perceptions and (...) weak perceptions, respectively, but takes these to be extensionally equivalent to original and copied perceptions, respectively. Hume recognizes that his two characterizations—the intensional and extensional—don’t perfectly match up, and that there are exceptions to the purported equivalences (the exceptions being disease, sleep, madness, and enthusiasm). Nonetheless, I argue that Hume’s willing to proceed with his definitions. (shrink)

The Borel-Kolmogorov paradox is often presented as an obscure problem that certain mathematical accounts of conditional probability must face. In this article, we point out that the paradox arises in the physical sciences, for physical probability or chance. By carefully formulating the paradox in this setting, we show that it is a puzzle for everyone, regardless of one’s preferred probability formalism. We propose a treatment that is inspired by the approach that scientists took when confronted with these cases.

The existence of experts raises a host of interesting questions in social, legal, and political epistemology. This article introduces and discusses interested experts – people who are experts on some topic, but who also have a distinct set of values and preferences regarding that topic, so that they are not well-described as “disinterested” parties. Interested experts raise several distinct problems in social, legal, and political epistemology. Some general questions arise: can we rationally or justifiably form beliefs relying on interested expert (...) testimony? Do they constitute knowledge? Under what circumstances? This article focuses on a specific question in legal epistemology: should interested experts be allowed to serve on juries and, if so, should it be permissible for lawyers to strike them from the pool of potential jurors? My hope is that concentrating on this question will provide insight into the more general questions concerning the epistemology of testimony with respect to interested experts, while also providing concrete recommendations for jury reform to improve the epistemic performance of juries. (shrink)

Human rights law has been called upon to help with the problem of persistently high greenhouse gas emissions. An obligation on states and other legal entities to lower their emissions (mitigation) is said to be deducible from that body of law. I refute this thesis. First, I consider two practical difficulties—causality and non-triviality—that face a plaintiff who, with emission mitigation as the objective, attempts to prove a human rights violation using the regular pattern of proof for a violation. Proponents of (...) the “human rights approach” to mitigation have held that proof of an emission “contribution” by the defendant together with proof of an “impact” by climate change on the plaintiff’s human rights are sufficient to discharge the evidentiary burden for the proof of causation. The rest of the causation chain is simply presumed. Thus, the original proof pattern for a human rights violation is abandoned. The proponents’ answer to the triviality difficulty has been to aggregate emitters into very large entities and sue _them_. However, aggregation can be shown to lead to a _reductio ad absurdum_. In my argument’s second part, I identify a more fundamental difficulty with the human rights approach to mitigation: The defendant’s emissions do not amount to a norm violation. Everyone contributes emissions without legislative or other prohibition. Treaty law on climate change itself recognizes emitting behaviour as lawful and permits the continuation of state emissions through to at least 2050. A rise in global warming from preindustrial levels to 1.5° Celsius with room for an even greater rise to close to 2° Celsius has been _budgeted for_ by the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The setting up of a budget affirms the normalized status of within-budget emissions. This universal license to emit denies the human rights approach to mitigation the very conditions of application of human rights law. (shrink)

This paper explores Ramon Llull’s critique of political astrology regarding both its literary expression and its epistemological foundations. It opens with a discussion of Llull’s reception of the...

Based on the standpoint close to that of philosophical functionalism, the paper addresses the history and present state of scientific research on artificial reconstruction of some of the rational thinking functions, and acquisition of valid knowledge of phenomenally given actuality, by way of engineering artificial intelligent automata. Thereby, the author examines the settings of emergence of an attendant basic ontology, and the place of logic in the process of knowing, by intelligent automata and humans, accordingly. Analysis and collations are made (...) by proceeding from the phenomenalistic logic and ontology presupposition in the theory of experience and knowing, as previously detailed by the author. Under this presupposition, the actual is considered temporally ordered facts with attached significance used to order them logically, in reciprocally defining them logical relations as a result of phenomenal statements on their identification and re-identification as such. The paper offers an overview of primary logical and ontological foundations for operation of intelligent automata classed as “expert systems” in their collation with a correspondent model of functionally determined meaningful activity of humans, while making the case for the observation on a sufficient functional parallelism between them, against the background of their noted specifics. By moving on to engineering intelligent automata classed as “machine learning systems” grounded on “connectionism”, prospects for overcoming the deficit of reflexive plasticity in “artificial intelligence”, and the effect of fundamental convergence between the human functional intelligence and an “artificial” intelligence, are clarified. Admitting a demonstrated functional success of such intelligent automata in the functional context, along with their logic being affined to that of humans, the notion of intelligence incurs significant de-humanization. Manuscript received 14.02.2020. (shrink)

Oakeshott’s theory of poetry was a pure theory. But it was so pure a theory it emptied out most of what we would normally mean by poetry, it ignored the history of poetry in extracting a meaning out of it, and it left to one side most of the questions about poetry which are of interest to poets, critics or indeed anyone. This chapter places Oakeshott’s theory of poetry in the context of theories of poetry from Aristotle through Johnson, Wordsworth (...) and Shelley through to figures as varied as Wittgenstein, Leavis, Eliot and Auden in order to suggest that Oakeshott theory was, as a theory of poetry, a provocation, and, as a theory of something undoubtedly worth thinking about, not a theory of poetry at all. (shrink)