: "Work on aspect has long focussed on classifications of linguistic expressions into aspectual types, or Vendler-classes. Typical Vendler-classes include states, processes, and events. Such classifications miss the important generalization about aspectual interpretationthat it is a compositional process. It has been noted in the literature that terms can switch Vendler-classes; this has been called the category-switch problem. In our analysis, it is proposed that meanings and not expressions fall into aspectual classes, and that the aspectual type of a meaning is (...) derived by a process of aspectual composition. This process operates on underlying generalized activities that are similar to the nuclei proposed by Moens & Steedman, which in turn resemble plans.The interplay between semantic selection for a certain aspectual type and the application of type-changing operators to the meanings of verbphrases and sentences that occurs during aspectual composition constitutes weak aspectual type coercion. Our approach is illustrated with a unification-based grammar fragment that accounts for aspectual composition with certain adverbials, such as in a day or for an hour.". (shrink)

In its first part, this paper shows why a recently made attempt to reduce the special theory of relativity to Newtonian kinematics is bound to fail. In the second part, we propose a differentiated notion of incommensurability which enables us to amend the contention that the special theory of relatively and Newtonian kinematics are “incommensurable”.

Several decades of work in both philosophy and psychology acutely highlights our limitations as individual inquirers. One way to recognize these limitations is to defer to experts: roughly, to form one’s beliefs on the basis of expert testimony. Yet, as has become salient in the age of Brexit, Trumpist politics, and climate change denial, people are often mistrustful of experts, and unwilling to defer to them. It’s a trope of highbrow public discourse that this unwillingness is a serious pathology. But (...) to what extent is this trope accurate? Answering this requires us to settle both a normative question—under exactly what conditions ought we to defer to experts?—and an empirical question—under what conditions are people willing to defer to experts? The first question has been investigated primarily by philosophers; the second, primarily by psychologists. Yet there is little work integrating these literatures and putting together their results. The aim of this review article is to begin this task, enabling us to begin reaching conclusions about how much real practices of deference diverge from the ideal. We present an opinionated guide to relevant work from both philosophy and psychology, and note places where the literature has important gaps. (shrink)

In the nineteenth century a group of “labor republicans” argued that the system of wage-labor should be replaced by a system of cooperative production. This system of cooperative production would realize republican liberty in economic, not just political, life. Today, neo-republicans argue that the republican theory of liberty only requires a universal basic income. A non-dominated ability to exit is sufficient to guarantee free labor. This essay reconstructs the more radical, labor republican view and defends it against the prevailing the (...) neo-republican one. It argues that neorepublicanism lacks an adequate conception of structural domination, which leaves it without theoretical resources to address certain forms of economic domination. The concept of structural domination allows us to comprehend the coherence of the nineteenth century, labor republican view and identify its relevance to modern labor markets. Labor republicanism takes us beyond a universal basic income to a concern with control over productive assets and workplace organization. As such, it shows us how the republican theory of liberty can support an argument for the transformation of work, not just the escape from it. (shrink)

When you hear music, you experience a repeating pulse that you naturally tap along to—you feel a beat. But you can feel a beat differently under sounds you hear as otherwise alike. Heard each way, things sound different. But, heard each way, nothing seems to change. So why do things sound different? I argue that, surprisingly, the usual theories of perception have no good answer. I then develop a view on which different ways of feeling a beat are different ways (...) of perceiving the same mind-independent features of things. On this view, feeling a beat is hearing sounds as organized within periods of time. And just as we can represent the same events using different calendars, we can perceive the same events using different beats. (shrink)

This paper defends two claims. First, I argue that you always have some reason to comply with the social norms applicable to your situation, no matter how immoral or ridiculous, provided you are in the social domain. This is not a baroque, technical fact about social norms: it is fundamental to understanding what they are, how they work, and how they can be a source of grave injustice. Second, I argue that this fact about social normativity requires re-thinking the distinction (...) between formal and robust normativity. Social norms are not robustly normative. But nor are they merely formally normative. Since these two categories are widely assumed to be exhaustive, this requires revising our normative taxonomy. (shrink)

Chapman et al. (2025) argue that further revisions must be made to the U.S. Common Rule to ensure adequate consideration of group risks, benefits, and interests, emphasizing the importance of robus...

The ‘explanation paradox’ due to Reiss can be resolved by recognizing that economic models that begin with assumptions of rational choice compel explanatory assent because they exploit a pattern of reasoning humans are hardwired to accept as explanatory: what cognitive scientists call the theory of mind. I review recent research in evolutionary anthropology, neuroscience and developmental psychology that substantiates the conclusion that explanations exploiting expectations and preferences (i.e. beliefs and desires) were hard wired into Hominins as the solution to a (...) design problem in early human evolution, and continue to drive our explanatory and predictive expectations even well beyond their domain of effective employment. Economic models employ this explanatory strategy outside the domain of the effective employment of rational choice models. This is the source of our conviction that they explain in spite of their failure to satisfy any reasonable criteria for scientific explanation. (shrink)

This volume presents a critical edition of the previously unpublished correspondence between Franz Brentano and Gustav Fechner along with a detailed introduction to provide context. A total of 11 letters discuss in detail Brentano's critical arguments against Fechner s psychophysics in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.".

Although critical differences exist between large companies and small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), limited empirical research has been done on human resource (HR)‐related corporate social responsibility (CSR). In this paper we study aging workforce management (AWM) as a component of CSR. Our study was conducted in the Netherlands through a randomly distributed online questionnaire. Managers and team leaders of 201 SMEs responded. The data were analyzed using multiple hierarchical regression analysis. Our results are twofold: first, findings suggest that CSR policies (...) in micro organizations with fewer than five employees seem to be strongly associated with AWM; and second, that companies with a focus on integration of older workers in daily activities do not perceive their actions as HR‐related. Using AWM as part of CSR helps to give insight into the role of the owner, company size and the nature of implicit CSR practices. Our study demonstrates that the use of AWM in CSR research can lead to valuable insights and therefore, our overarching research question is answered that AWM can be used when studying CSR. (shrink)

This article discusses Kracauer’s analysis of mass ornament in light of Deleuze’s concept of ritournelle. Kracauer was interested in the spectacle of Tiller Girls and found the principle of the capitalist production process in its ornamental formations. Capitalism destroys any natural organisms for its means and excludes any resistance from its effective procedure. This operation necessarily comes along with calculation and mechanisation. All individuals have scaled up statistics charts and scrambled with machines completely. People have turned into masses who are (...) no longer different in form but simple technical objects that can be equally employed at any point of the globe. Kracauer understood mass ornament as the surface-level expression of global capitalism, which revealed its unconscious. He emphasised the ambivalence of mass ornament and a possible line of escape from capitalist rationality through the emptiness of its formal excess. Deleuze’s concept of ritournelle may shed light on a similar question of mass ornament and push its scope beyond Kracauer’s analysis. The two philosophers seem to share the frame of formalism when they deploy their arguments concerning form and depth; however, Deleuze put forward the issue of temporality in his discussion of ritournelle, a crucial question that Kracauer omits. (shrink)

Hesiod begins his Theogony by telling his audience of rural shepherds and farmers about his encounter with the Muses on Mount Helikon. To assure them he's telling the truth, he claims the humble shepherd's staff of olive wood that he holds before them is in fact a gift from these same goddesses. An apparently mundane artifact is somehow supposed to attest to the divine source of the tales he is about to tell of events not even the Muses themselves could (...) have witnessed, to say nothing of mortal men. Hesiod's overture to his audience has echoes elsewhere in his poetry, as when he claims that a massive stone, visible to all, is the very one Kronos is said to have emitted long ago, after having unwittingly swallowed it... Read More. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It o¤ers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A di¤erent strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one's beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given (...) set of beliefs in the first place. We o¤er an account of rational belief formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on the role of reasons in rational agency. (shrink)