Co-published with the University of Queensland Press. HPC holds rights in North America and U. S. Dependencies. Since its first publication in 1976, Alan Chalmers's highly regarded and widely read work--translated into eighteen languages--has become a classic introduction to the scientific method, known for its accessibility to beginners and its value as a resource for advanced students and scholars. In addition to overall improvements and updates inspired by Chalmers's experience as a teacher, comments from his readers, and recent developments (...) in the field, this fourth edition features an extensive chapter-long postscript that draws on his research into the history of atomism to illustrate important themes in the philosophy of science. Identifying the qualitative difference between knowledge of atoms as it figures in contemporary science and metaphysical speculations about atoms common in philosophy since the time of Democritus offers a revealing and instructive way to address the question at the heart of this groundbreaking work: What is this thing called science? (shrink)

In a detailed and spirited critique, Professor James M. Humber has found my defence of the ontological argument unconvincing. Humber's case rests upon his claim that my ‘error’ is due to my ‘having accepted an incorrect definition of “physically necessary being” … ’. Now I do indeed claim that God must be conceived as a factuall necessary being, i.e. as eternally independent. I take the notion of God's aseity or eternal independence to be relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; it is accepted (...) as an essential component of the concept God by many philosophers who also insist that there is no acceptable form of demonstrative theism. Thus, it is widely held that ‘God is a factually necessary being’ does not imply ‘God is a logically necessary being’; that God is eternally independent does not imply that he exists in all possible worlds. But it is precisely this view that I have argued is incorrect. While I concur that there is an intelligible concept of God as factually necessary, I deny that the existence of such a being is logically contingent, a mere matter of empirical fact. Indeed, a rigorous inspection of the concept of an eternally independent being reveals that whether that concept is instantiated, i.e. whether there exists a being exemplifying that concept, is knowable a priori . My claim is in fact stronger than this. I argue that the existence of an eternal, independent, omniscient and omnipotent being is demonstrable by conceptual analysis. It is Humber's contention that my alleged demonstration of God's existence crumbles upon the discovery of the unacceptability of my definition of ‘factually necessary being’. Let us see. (shrink)

__Social Network Theory and Educational Change_ offers a provocative and fascinating exploration of how social networks in schools can impede or facilitate the work of education reform._ Drawing on the work of leading scholars, the book comprises a series of studies examining networks among teachers and school leaders, contrasting formal and informal organizational structures, and exploring the mechanisms by which ideas, information, and influence flow from person to person and group to group. The case studies provided in the book reflect (...) a rich variety of approaches and methodologies, showcasing the range and power of this dynamic new mode of analysis. An introductory chapter places social network theory in context and explains the basic tools and concepts, while a concluding chapter points toward new directions in the field. Taken together, they make a powerful statement: that the success or failure of education reform ultimately is not solely the result of technical plans and blueprints, but of the relational ties that support or constrain the pace, depth, and direction of change. This unique volume provides an invaluable introduction to an emerging and increasingly important field of education research. (shrink)

This dissertation attempts to expose the influence of Francis Bacon on the philosophy of Thomas Reid. Reid was a self-professed Baconian who viewed the human mind as a subject which was amenable to scientific investigation. Reid attempts to develop his own theory of mind according to the method of induction and experiment and general philosophy of science of Bacon. Further, Reid's use of the Baconian idols in his attack on the theory of ideas is explored. In addition, it is argued (...) that this Baconian approach helps to illuminate Reid's direct realism in perception as well as Reid's indebtedness to Bacon in his treatment of sensations as a system of signs. Finally, Reid develops a theory of evidence and common sense which owes much to the legal discussion of the time. This again links Reid to Bacon who made a similar use of legal metaphors in defending his philosophy of science against scholastic apologists. By appealing to textual evidence in the works of both philosophers' writings and reconstructing Reid's positions in light of this influence, it is hoped that a better understanding of Reid's notion of common sense is ultimately reached as well as a solution to the problem of intentionality in Reid's theory of perception. (shrink)

Mammalian cells frequently depend on homologous recombination (HR) to repair DNA damage accurately and to help rescue stalled or collapsed replication forks. The essence of HR is an exchange of nucleotides between identical or nearly identical sequences. Although HR fulfills important biological roles, recombination between inappropriate sequence partners can lead to translocations or other deleterious rearrangements and such events must be avoided. For example, the recombination machinery must follow stringent rules to preclude recombination between the many repetitive elements in a (...) mammalian genome that share significant but imperfect homology. This paper takes a conceptual approach in addressing the homology requirements for recombination in mammalian genomes as well as the general strategy used by cells to reject recombination between similar but imperfectly matched sequences. A mechanism of heteroduplex rejection that involves the unwinding of recombination intermediates that may form between mismatched sequences is discussed. BioEssays 30:1163–1171, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ regards both Hobbes and Constant as supporting the negative version. Both took a favourable view of the freedom to live as one pleases. But this shared preference arose from radically different overall philosophies. Hobbes’s support for freedom as ‘the silence of the laws’ reflected his view of happiness as preference-satisfaction. Constant’s support for freedom as a sphere of absolute rights was supplemented by support for active citizenship and connected with belief in ‘perfectibility’ that (...) was itself linked to religion. These theories involve altogether different understandings of the image of an ‘area’ preserved from interference. Berlin takes over from Constant an appeal to human nature without the idea of progress that had supported it. (shrink)

"Liverpool is going through the most significant period of change in its recent history, and the evidence is clear to see in the evolving cityscape. In this book, photographer Alan McKernan documents this process in his characteristically dramatic style, capturing the clutter and upheaval of reconstruction, the confidence of the glittering new skyscrapers, and the stubborn persistence of an architectural past that refuses to be swept away by the tide of the modern. With illuminating commentary by architectural historian Matthew (...) Whitfield, these photographs mark a time of gathering strength, of deep breaths and diggers. Unfamiliar Journeys Continued is a compelling exploration of the contest between light and shade in a re-forming city."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

In Recent years noncognitivist ethical theories have been supported by an argument which has come to be widely accepted among moral philosophers.1 According to this argument, an ethical term like ‘good’ has both a commending function and a describing function, but between these functions there is the important difference that the commending function alone is invariant while the describing function varies greatly. For many and different things may be called good—hammers, sunsets, paintings, missionaries, cannibals—but despite these differences in the descriptive (...) criteria for applying the word to objects, ‘good’ retains a common meaning in all these uses, for in each case the word is being used to commend. The conclusion drawn, then, is that because of its being the sole invariant or common feature of every use of ‘good’, the commendatory function rather than the varying descriptive function must be the primary meaning of ‘good’. I shall refer to this as the commendatory invariance argument. (shrink)

The practical moral problems, which really give substance to our ethical and moral talk, have been handed over to lawyers. Detailed studies of actual cases, where problems of remedy or redress are involved, are discussed in law journals. Most contemporary philosophers have just about given up on such matters.

I Wish to reply to some of the objections raised by Mr. A. Hudson-Williams in Class. Quart., vol. xlvi , p. 27, to my notes on Martial in vol. xliv. In two places, on pp. 17 and 22, he corrects an error of mine, and in one or two other of his remarks he may well be right; but in many cases he does nothing more than repeat the traditional interpretation of a passage without commending it any more effectively than (...) the editors do. I do not think there would be much profit in restating my view on all these passages, but there are some points I wish to make in reply. (shrink)

lecture 1. The patriarch, an overview -- lecture 2. The education of a philosophe -- lecture 3. Philosophical letters, part I -- lecture 4. Philosophical letters, part II -- lecture 5. The years at Cirey -- lecture 6. From optimism to humanism -- lecture 7. Voltaire and the "philosophical tale" -- lecture 8. Voltaire at Ferney -- lecture 9. Voltaire and God -- lecture 10. Voltaire and history -- lecture 11. Voltaire and toleration -- lecture 12. Apotheosis.