The dual career allows elite athletes to attain their maximum competitive and academic performance, but the COVID-19 pandemic hindered their development and changed their perception of the importance given to the sporting and educational environment. For this reason, the aim of the present study was to determine the differences in the motivations and perceived barriers, the importance given to academic qualifications, and the perception of the dual career from a multifactorial perspective, of elite athletes according to sex, type of sport (...) practiced, job performance, time of sports career, type of athlete, and type of scholarship received. A total of 100 student-athletes participated in the research study by completing the “Perceptions of dual career student-athletes” questionnaire. The results showed that athletes from individual modalities and those who did not receive any scholarships described more barriers. In addition, women studied more because they enjoyed it ; athletes from individual modalities studied to work later ; athletes who do not work perceived a greater influence between study and sports performance ; at the beginning and at the best stage of their sports career, a greater influence of academics on performance was perceived ; and athletes who considered themselves professionals, and athletes who did not receive any scholarships, reported that the conciliation between sports and academic life was difficult. The results obtained point to the importance of dual career scholarships for student-athletes, as well as the need for the programs implemented for these athletes to consider sex, sport modality or type of scholarship granted. (shrink)

In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, Italy, Spain, New York, and Hong Kong stood out for the ir high rates of infections. Given this scenario, a web-based international multisite and cross-sectional study was conducted between April and May 2020 to investigate the psychological impact of the pandemic and the restrictions imposed by the governments in these countries. We expected similar patterns in European countries, and no significant differences in terms of psychological impairment between Hong Kong and the other (...) areas. Participants were 1955 adults from the above-mentioned areas. We assessed anxiety, depression, COVID-19-related threats, and perceived burden of restrictive measures. Two-explorative factor analyses with Promax rotation identified COVID-19-related factors: personal physical threat, personal economic threat, global economic threat, and restriction-related burden. ANOVAs studied locations’ differences and two-separate hierarchical multiple regression analyses by location determined whether and how COVID-19-related variables were associated with anxiety and depression, adjusting for age and sex. Italy and Hong Kong showed higher anxiety than Spain ; Hong Kong scored higher on depression than Italy and Spain, which highlighted the lowest mean-score. New York participants showed the poorest mental health conditions. Anxiety was predicted by restriction-related burden and personal economic threat in New York and Hong Kong ; by global economic threat and restriction-related burden in Italy ; and by personal physical threat in Spain. Depression was predicted by restriction-related burden and personal economic threat in New York and Hong Kong ; by global economic threat in Italy ; and no predictors emerged in Spain. Findings could contribute to understanding the specific impact of the pandemic on people’s psychological health in each area, along with the factors that impacted mental health. This information may be useful to implementing prevention interventions in case of restrictions. (shrink)

Fear to contamination is an easy-to-provoke, intense, hard-to-control, and extraordinarily persistent fear. A worsening of preexisting psychiatric disorders was observed during the COVID-19 outbreak, and several studies suggest that those with obsessive–compulsive disorder may be more affected than any other group of people. In the face of worsening OCD symptoms, there is a need for mental health professionals to provide the support needed not only to treat patients who still report symptoms, but also to improve relapse prevention. In this line, (...) it is recommended to improve alternative strategies such as online consultations and digital psychiatry. The aim of this study is to develop augmented reality stimuli that are clinically relevant for patients with cleaning OCD and assess their efficiency to obtain emotionally significant responses. Four AR stimuli were developed: a plastic bag full of garbage, a piece of bread with mold, a dirty sports shoe, and a piece of rotten meat. All stimuli were shown to a clinical group and a control group. Relevant results were the design of the AR stimuli. These stimuli were validated with the statistical difference in perceived anxiety in the meat stimuli between the clinical and control groups. Nevertheless, when looking at effect sizes, all stimuli present effect sizes from small to large, with both shoe and bread between small and medium effect sizes. These results are a valuable support for the clinical use of these AR stimuli in the treatment of cleaning OCD. (shrink)

Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?

In this essay I consider the argument that Bernard Williams advances in ‘The Makropolus Case’ for the meaninglessness of immortality. I also consider various counter-arguments. I suggest that the more clearly these counter-arguments are targeted at the spirit of Williams's argument, rather than at its letter, the less clearly they pose a threat to it. I then turn to Nietzsche, whose views about the eternal recurrence might appear to make him an opponent of Williams. I argue that, properly interpreted, these (...) views in fact make him an ally. (shrink)

John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common-sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this (...) intended coincidence. The upshot is a dilemma: McDowell can retain his conception of the subject, but lose the coincidence; or he can keep the coincidence, but abandon his conception of the subject. (shrink)

It’s a truism of philosophy that Realists must not postulate more than we could reasonably hope to know, while Anti-Realists must not leave us with so little that all knowledge is impossible. But balance is not easily come by—and even less in philosophy than in life. So philosophy continues to struggle over the hard cases, with neither the Realist nor the Anti-Realist able to score an easy victory.

In section 1 I offer a definition of psychologism which applies to many of the apparently quite disparate uses that philosophers have made of the term. In section 2 I map out some distinct varieties of psychologism. In a short section 3 I indicate how the changing academic climate has injected a new urgency into the debate on psychologism. In section 4 I offer an argument for a variety of psychologism which has important consequences for cognitive science, and in section (...) 5 I consider some objections to the argument. (shrink)

I wish to defend the claim that given the content and structure of any moral theory we are likely to find palatable, there is no way of uniquely breaking down that theory into either consequentialist or deontological elements. Indeed, once we examine the actual structure of any such theory more closely, we see that it can be classified in either way arbitrarily. Hence if we ignore the metaethical pronouncements often made by adherents of the consequentialist-deontological distinction, we are quickly led (...) to the conclusion that this distinction contributes nothing of consequence to an understanding of moral theory. I will try to show that there are basically two reasons for this. First, what we mean by the terms endemic to the consequentialist-deontological distinction have no unique references to particular states of affairs in actual cases of moral decision making. Hence we may justify any such concrete moral decision by reference to typically consequentialist or deontological reasoning indifferently. Second, scrutiny of actual and viable moral theories reveals a much finer-grained structure than the consequentialist-deontological taxonomy can capture. And it is this structure, rather than simple attention to consequences or principles, that determines practical moral decision making. We would thus do better to develop the richer vocabulary of causes and constituents, goals and effects, states and events (mental, social, or physical). So in the end, the consequentialist-deontological distinction is irrelevant at the normative level of actual moral reasoning, whereas at the metaethical level it crudely schematizes two opposing types of dummy theory, neither of which is convincing, upon reflection, to any practicing moral philosopher. (shrink)

The theorist who denies the objective reality of non-relational temporal properties, or ‘A-series’ determinations, must explain our experience of the passage of time. D.H. Mellor, a prominent denier of the objective reality of temporal passage, draws, in part, on Kant in offering a theory according to which the experience of temporal passage is the result of the projection of change in belief. But Mellor has missed some important points Kant has to make about time-awareness. It turns out that Kant's theory (...) of time-awareness also involves projection – but for him, the projection of temporal passage is necessary to any coherent experience at all, and for this reason events in the world cannot be represented except as exhibiting real tensed change. Consequently we cannot intelligibly suppose the world we know to be without the passage of time. This fact would permit a modest transcendental argument the conclusion of which is that we are entitled to describe the world in terms of temporal passage. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the parameters that come into play when assessing the truth conditions of say reports and contrast them with belief attributions. We argue that these conditions are sensitive in intricate ways to the connection between the interpretation of the complement of say and the properties of the reported speech act. There are three general areas this exercise is relevant to, besides the immediate issue of understanding the meaning of say: (i) the discussion shows the need to (...) go beyond the simplest view of propositional attitudes, which treats them as restricted quantifiers over worlds; (ii) the complex connections that must exist between the say report and its source speech act show that one has to be able to differentiate between various layers of meaning for the antecedent sentences; (iii) finally, this paper is a small step towards a typology of propositional attitudes that allows us to uncover the complex web of relationships that grammatical mood is sensitive to. (shrink)

First paragraph: I want to discuss the place of naturalism in the philosophy of John McDowell. There are some people who think McDowell is a naturalist in name only. But I think there is an aspect of his thinking which merits the title. And I think it is an aspect he could well do without, in light of his recent attempt to understand his own philosophy as a Hegelian radicalization of Kantian themes.

We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for (...) introspection of different event types, e.g., the bilateral angular gyrus for introspection of intention. Our results suggest that event-time introspection engages specific neural networks to assess the contents of consciousness. Subjective event times should therefore be interpreted as the result of complex interactions between introspection and experience networks, rather than as direct reproduction of the individual’s conscious state or as a mere post hoc interpretation. (shrink)

The classical measures of voting power are based on players' decisiveness or full causal efficacy in vote configurations or divisions. We design an alternative, recursive measure departing from this classical approach. We motivate the measure via an axiomatic characterisation based on reasonable axioms and by offering two complementary interpretations of its meaning: first, we interpret the measure to represent, not the player's probability of being decisive in a voting structure, but its expected probability of being decisive in a uniform random (...) walk from a vote configuration in the subset lattice (through which we represent the voting structure); and, second, we interpret it as representing a player's expected efficacy, thereby incorporating the notion of partial and not just full causal efficacy. We shore up our measure by demonstrating that it satisfies a set of postulates any reasonable voting measure should satisfy, namely, the iso-invariance, dummy, dominance, donation, minimum-power bloc, and quarrel postulates. (shrink)

I sketch a line of thought about consciousness and physics that gives some motivation for the hypothesis that conscious observers deviate—perhaps only very subtly and slightly—from quantum dynamics. Although it is hard to know just how much credence to give this line of thought, it does add motivation for a stronger and more comprehensive programme of quantum experiments involving quantum observers.

In an earlier discussion, I argued that Kant's moral theory satisfies some of the basic criteria for being a genuine theory: it includes testable hypotheses, nomological higher-and lower-level laws, theoretical constructs, internal principles, and bridge principles. I tried to show that Kant's moral theory is an ideal, descriptive deductive-nomological theory that explains the behavior of a fully rational being and generates testable hypotheses about the moral behavior of actual agents whom we initially assume to conform to its theoretical constructs. I (...) argued that the moral "ought" is best understood as the "ought" of tentative prediction expressed in the range of uses of the German sollen; and that the degree to which such a theory is well-confirmed is a function of the degree to which we actually judge individual human agents, on a case-by-case basis, to be motivated by rationality, stupidity, or moral corruption in their actions. I assume that a similar case could be made for other major contenders, such as Utilitarianism or Aristotelianism. But there still remains unanswered the question of which of these theories is the best among the available alternatives. To answer this question, further criteria of selection must be invoked. Among these are structural elegance and explanatory simplicity, but even these do not exhaust the desiderata for an adequate moral theory. More pressing in the case of moral theory is the requirement that the theory enable us to understand all the available data of moral experience; that the theory be sufficiently inclusive that in the formulation of its descriptive laws and practical principles, it be capable of identifying as morally significant all the behavior to which moral praise, condemnation, or acquittal is a relevant and appropriate response. (shrink)

Political ecologists--the theorists of the Green movement--assert that if we do not fundamentally change the way in which our society makes use of nature, then we will destroy the physical basis of our social existence within the foreseeable future. In the light of this insight, this book is concerned to unearth the foundations of our cultural attitudes towards nature and to start the process of building philosophical foundations that could provide the basis of a sustainable relationship between society and the (...) environment. The objective is to provide a critique and reorientation of social theory at the level of epistemology and to question the nature of rationality; the role of ideology and assumptions about human nature which underpin conventional academic social theory. The heart of the analysis comprises a critique of the core values of the Enlightenment that have shaped modern Western thought: Science; Progress and Individualism. To political ecology these represent fundamental problem concepts and the intention of this book is to broaden and deepen our understanding of existing social processes particularly those identified as the 'post-modern' condition of aimless consumerism in relation to environmental issues. The analysis includes sketches of concepts and practices with which political ecology might transcend these values and shows how transformed attitudes can contribute towards solving environmental problems. This is a challenging and original synthesis of philosophy and theory directed towards the greatest issue of our time. It will be essential reading for everyone concerned with the future of the planet. (shrink)

I propose a new class of interpretations, real world interpretations, of the quantum theory of closed systems. These interpretations postulate a preferred factorization of Hilbert space and preferred projective measurements on one factor. They give a mathematical characterisation of the different possible worlds arising in an evolving closed quantum system, in which each possible world corresponds to a (generally mixed) evolving quantum state. In a realistic model, the states corresponding to different worlds should be expected to tend towards orthogonality as (...) different possible quasiclassical structures emerge or as measurement-like interactions produce different classical outcomes. However, as the worlds have a precise mathematical definition, real world interpretations need no definition of quasiclassicality, measurement, or other concepts whose imprecision is problematic in other interpretational approaches. It is natural to postulate that precisely one world is chosen randomly, using the natural probability distribution, as the world realised in Nature, and that this world’s mathematical characterisation is a complete description of reality. (shrink)

Adrian Piper argues that the Humean conception can be made to work only if it is placed in the context of a wider and genuinely universal conception of the self, whose origins are to be found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This conception comprises the basic canons of classical logic, which provide both a model of motivation and a model of rationality. These supply necessary conditions both for the coherence and integrity of the self and also for unified agency. (...) The Kantian conception solves certain intractable problems in decision theory by integrating it into classical predicate logic, and provides answers to longstanding controversies in metaethics concerning moral motivation, rational final ends, and moral justification that the Humean conception engenders. In addition, it sheds light on certain kinds of moral behavior – for example, the whistleblower – that the Humean conception is at a loss to explain. (shrink)

Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?

In the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant laments thatit still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us … must be accepted on faith, and if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. The two editions of the Critique each contain a celebrated refutation of epistemological scepticisms like those of Descartes and Hume. (...) The first edition refutation has been widely decried as relying on an objectionable sort of idealism. The refutation of the second edition, though rather more difficult to interpret than the first, has usually been read as a mere reworking of the first. (shrink)

"G. E. M. Anscombe is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. Known primarily for influencing research in action theory and moral philosophy, her work also has relevance in the study of metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and politics. The Anscombian Mind provides a comprehensive survey of Anscombe's thought, not only placing it in its historical context but also exploring its enduring significance in contemporary debates. Divided into three clear parts, 24 chapters (...) by an international team of contributors address the following themes: ancient philosophy metaphysics mind and language Wittgenstein action and ethics politics religion and faith. Also included is Anscombe's 1948 Mary Somerville Fellowship Report, making this fascinating document easily available to readers for the first time. The Anscombian Mind is an indispensable resource for anyone studying and researching Anscombe herself, action theory, ethics, moral philosophy, Wittgenstein, and twentieth-century philosophy"--. (shrink)

Last year the B.B.C. arranged for certain eminent men to broadcast their Points of View to the public. The result was a most interesting series of talks; but for the sceptical philosopher the series was chiefly entertaining for its brilliantly illustrating the old tag: quot homines, tot sententiæ. One was struck not merely by the discrepancy of opinion, but by how each speaker was ‘true to type': the biologist, the physicist with a taste for spiritualism, the Christian Platonist, and the (...) rest—each spoke his part and told of a world built according to his own particular measuring-rod. (shrink)

This is a study of Frege's permutation argument in Part I, Section 10, of Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic.

Volume 20, Issue 10, October 2020, Page 26-29.

This article seeks to answer the following questions: is Quentin Skinner right to claim that actions in the past should not be described by means of concepts not available at the time those actions occurred? And is Ian Hacking right to claim that such descriptions do not merely describe but actually change the past? The author begins by arguing that it is not clear precisely what Skinner is claiming and shows how, under the pressure of criticism, his methodological strictures collapse (...) into trivialities. The author then argues that, although Hacking has given us no reason to accept his claim, we can make sense of it by appealing to the idea of a "Cambridge change." The author concludes by suggesting that as long as we are exercising the right kind of concepts, a suitably modified version of Hacking 's conclusion can be retained. Key Words: action • history • changes in the past • Quentin Skinner • Ian Hacking. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge comes into serious conflict with mainstream epistemology. I argue that the programme has two aspects—one modest, and the other less so. The programme’s modest aspect—best represented by the “symmetry thesis”—does not contain anything to threaten much of the epistemological mainstream, but does come into conflict with a certain kind of epistemological “externalism”. The immodest aspect, however—in the form of “finitism”—pushes the programme towards a radical form of relativism (...) about truth. Accepting these points will allow us to put an end to much unnecessary debate surrounding the strong programme, and allow a more fruitful discussion to begin.Author Keywords: Author Keywords: Strong programme; Epistemology; Normativity; Relativism; Finitism. (shrink)

This is an obituary of Bernard Williams.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 57-59, September 2012.

Varying shades of green -- Green governmentality -- Green scare -- Fascist earth -- Commonism -- Welcome to the dark side of dignity and development -- Urban clearcutting -- Protest without people -- So to speak.

The information contained within the linear sequence of bases (the genome) must be faithfully replicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place over the course of evolution. Recently, it has become clear that additional information important for genetic regulation is contained within the chromatin proteins associated with DNA (the epigenome). Epigenetic information also must be faithfully duplicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place during the course of development (...) to achieve differentiation while maintaining identity within cell lineages. Both the genome and the epigenome are synthesized at the replication fork, so the events occurring during S‐phase provide a critical window of opportunity for eliciting change or maintaining existing genetic states. Cells discriminate between different states of chromatin through the activities of proteins that selectively modify the structure of chromatin. Several recent studies report the localization of certain chromatin modifying proteins to replication forks at specific times during S‐phase. Since transcriptionally active and inactive chromosome domains generally replicate at different times during S‐phase, this spatiotemporal regulation of chromatin assembly proteins may be an integral part of epigenetic inheritance. BioEssays 25:647–656, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Some logical properties of modal languages in which actuality is expressible are investigated. It is argued that, if a sentence like 'Actually, Quine is a distinguished philosopher' is understood as a special case of world-indexed sentences (the index being the actual world), then actuality can be expressed only under strong modal assumptions. Some rival rigid and indexical approaches to actuality are discussed.

(2002). Sartre on Friendship: Promoting Difference while Preserving Commitment. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 33, The Human Condition, Others, and Writing, pp. 260-272.

We will focus on the theory of complete concept in the philosophy of Leib-niz. We will not emphasise the epistemological aspects, but rather will concentrate on the metaphysical implications of this theory. Some questions requiring an answer will be: are there two individual substances of the same kind? What is the nature of a substance that is only possible? What kind of notion has the unactualised possible? What is the nature of the relationship between individual substance and the complete no-tion? (...) In order to answer these questions, we will present in the first part of the paper the concept of individual substance, in the second part, we will focus on the problem whether the possible objects have or have not a complete concept, and in the third part we will give some additional arguments to support our answer. (shrink)

This essay argues that modern sovereignty is not simply a legal or political concept that is coterminous with the modern nation-state. Rather, at the theoretical level modern sovereign power is inscribed into a wider theological dialectic between “the one” and “the many”. Modernity fuses juridical-constitutional models of supreme state authority with a new, “biopolitical” account of power whereby natural life and the living body of the individual are the object of politics and are subject to state control (section 1). The (...) origins of this dialectic go back to changes within Christian theology in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. In particular, these changes can be traced to Ockham's denial of the universal Good in things, Suárez's priority of the political community over the ecclesial body and Hobbes's “biopolitical” definition of power as state dominion over life (section 2). At the practical level, modern sovereignty has involved both the national state and the transnational market. The “revolutions in sovereignty” that gave rise to the modern state and the modern market were to some considerable extent shaped by theological concepts and changes in religious institutions and practices: first, the supremacy of the modern national state over the transnational papacy and national churches; second, the increasing priority of individuality over collectivity; third, a growing focus on contractual proprietary relations at the expense of covenantal ties and communal bonds (section 3). By subjecting both people and property to uniform standards of formal natural rights and abstract monetary value, financial capitalism and liberal secular democracy are part of the “biopolitical” logic that subordinates the sanctity of life and land to the secular sacrality of the state and the market. In Pope Benedict's theology, we can find the contours of a post-secular political economy that challenges the monopoly of modern sovereignty (sections 4–5). (shrink)

From Machiavelli via Hobbes, Locke and Grotius to J.S. Mill and John Rawls, the liberal (and republican) tradition pivots about the primacy of the individual over all forms of human association and allied to this primacy is the replacing of notions of substan¬tive goodness or truth with the ultimate foundation of society upon subjective rights secured by the power of the central state. Those rights are grounded in the human will and the artifice of the social contract that has supplanted (...) older ideas of covenantal relationships governed by a logic of reciprocity or gift-exchange. Liberalism is therefore inherently atomistic and oscillates between the isolated individual and some collective unity either objectively compounded or artificially supposed – ‘Leviathan’ was both. By positing an asocial ‘state of nature’, liberal contractualism purports to invent the artificial order of politics. By contrast, Romanticism – in the works of Novalis, Schlegel, Carlyle, Coleridge, de Biran and Bulgakov – develops develop in novel ways the ancient and Christian idea that human beings as social, political creatures have a natural desire for objective, substantive values by which to orientate their lives and give them that coherent shape which alone engenders a sense of real fulfilment. This teleological space cannot be equated with the impersonal, absolute sovereignty of national states and transnational markets but requires interpersonal relations within a mediated polity that has a transcendent outlook. So whereas liberalism merely regulates the evil and violence which it views as primary (and which therefore it perpetuates and even reinforces), Romanticism offers a vision of partial redemption in this life just because the Fall and original sin never fully destroyed the fundamentally peaceful, ontological ordering of the world. Rather, as fallen creatures equally capable of vice and virtue, human beings can discover their own particular purpose and place in society that is ordered to the good of the whole cosmos ultimately rooted in God’s creative action. By practising virtue, we can be redeemed in this life up to a point and we can begin to redeem the promise of an original harmony. (shrink)