Attaining and maintaining a substantial Jewish majority in Israel has been one of the basic goals of the State of Israel since its early years. A substantial Jewish majority within the borders of the state is thought to be necessary in order to preserve its Jewish nature. Many believe that the demographic consideration also stood behind the enactment of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law , 2003, which prohibits granting Israeli citizenship and residency to Palestinians from the West Bank (...) and the Gaza Strip, and prevents, inter alia, Israeli Arabs from living in Israel with their Palestinian spouses. I examine the legitimacy of the demographic consideration from the perspective of liberal political theory. I conclude that demography can, in principle, be a legitimate consideration in deciding immigration policy, and its justification can be derived from the liberal justification of the right to national self-determination. However, the demographic consideration must be assigned its proper role and weight relative to other important liberal values such as equality and other human rights. I suggest that the demographic consideration might be legitimate only to the extent that it is not used to justify immigration policies that violate constitutional rights. I then discuss the Supreme Court decision concerning the constitutionality of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law. I demonstrate that, contrary to statements by the judges themselves, the demographic consideration played a key role in the opinions of several judges. It was, however, a hidden consideration. It was not openly acknowledged and discussed. Consequently, a careful examination and balancing of the demographic consideration could not take place. The result was that the actual influence of the demographic consideration on the outcome of the case was much stronger than can be reasonably justified according to liberal principles of justice. (shrink)

Liberal political theory acknowledges the interdependence of the wellbeing of individuals and the flourishing of the cultural groups to which they belong. Consequently, many liberal political philosophers have proposed policies and laws aimed at multicultural accommodation. That is, policies and laws aimed at assisting communities to preserve their cultural values and practices, and at allowing them greater autonomy and self-government. However, certain religious and cultural groups hold beliefs, values, and practices that are oppressive and discriminatory against some of their own (...) members. Accommodating such groups may contribute to the discrimination and oppression. This question of “minorities within minorities” poses a real dilemma for liberal political philosophy. In this Paper I focus on certain cases that fall under the “minorities within minorities” framework that raise particularly complicated theoretical considerations. These are the cases where the demands for equal treatment are raised not by the state or by outsiders, but by disadvantaged individuals and groups within a community, who base their claim for greater equality not on the superiority of liberal values over the values of their culture but rather on an alternative, competing, interpretation of the values of their culture. I suggest that strong normative considerations support the view that the liberal state should assist challenges by marginalized individuals within communities to reinterpret cultural values and traditions in ways more favorable to them. (shrink)

The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore (B&M). Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.

Computers have changed not just the way we work but the way we love. Falling in and out of love, flirting, cheating, even having sex online have all become part of the modern way of living and loving. Yet we know very little about these new types of relationship. How is an online affair where the two people involved may never see or meet each other different from an affair in the real world? Is online sex still cheating on your (...) partner? Why do people tell complete strangers their most intimate secrets? What are the rules of engagement? Will online affairs change the monogamous nature of romantic relationships? These are just some of the questions Professor Aaron Ben Ze'ev, distinguished writer and academic, addresses in this book, a full-length study of love online. Accessible, shocking, entertaining, enlightening, this book will change the way you look at cyberspace and love forever. (shrink)

In this work I reject the contention that there is a perceptual stage which is devoid of contributions from the agent's cognitive framework. This contention is expressed in two different noncognitive views of perception. The traditional sensory core view which has prevailed since the seventeenth century; it claims that there is a stage of pure sensory core which precedes the interpretive percepts . The recent ecological approach whose main representative is J. J. Gibson; it claims that not only a certain (...) perceptual stage, but the whole perceptual process, is devoid of cognitive contributions. Before I deal with these views, I discuss the basic features of cognition in general. ;Cognition is concerned with the establishment of relations and order; it is a purposive placing of a cognized object into a meaningful order. Cognition begins with modifying a given order for the purpose of making it fit into a given meaningful framework. Throughout the work I show that, contrary to the aforementioned noncognitive views, perception fulfills this depiction of cognition. ;In the discussion of the sensory core view, I illustrate its main assumptions in various philosophical writings, and then indicate main reasons for its appearance in the seventeenth century. These reasons stem from the intermediate role sensation was supposed to have in the mental-physical gap. Sensations were considered to be primitive mental entities with physical causes; their physical origin prevents them from containing complex mental features such as the cognitive ones, and, thus, they are regarded as pure. This stage of pure sensation was postulated primarily out of theoretical considerations. Those did not coincide with the empirical and phenomenological description of that stage; hence, the empirical characterization and the phenomenological status of that stage were constantly modified. The various suggestions for describing that stage are examined and criticized from both empirical and theoretical respects. The empirical evidence presented indicates that there is no qualitative difference between perceiving what is regarded as pure sensations and what is regarded as inferential perceptions. The theoretical criticism points out that the assumption regarding pure sensation is not necessary for an adequate explanation of perception; and, since it has no empirical grounds, it is superfluous. ;After rejecting the sensory core view, I examine the ecological approach. This view rejects the traditional sensation-perception distinction and contends that we do not have to assume the existence of cognitive activities that interpret meaningless sensations into meaningful perceptions, since the perceiver directly encounters meaningful features. I claim that this solution is similar to Kant's approach, and, therefore, it has to pay a price which is similar to that which Kant pays, viz. the relational nature of the perceptual environment. The neglect of this feature results in unsolvable difficulties in central notions of the ecological approach. ;I conclude the work by suggesting a crude outline for approaching perception; in many respects it is close to Aristotle's view. I contend that causal explanations of the physiological processes cannot wholly explain perceiving; these processes are necessary supportive bases for perceiving and not the causes which precede and produce it. Accordingly, we should not assume the existence of separate percepts in the agent's head. The cognitive system is an integral part of the perceptual system; hence, perception may be conceived of as direct understanding. (shrink)

Emotions punctuate almost all significant events in our lives, but their nature, causes, and consequences are among the least well understood aspects of human experience. It is easier to express emotions than to describe them and even harder to analyse and explain them. Despite their apparent familiarity, emotions are an extremely subtle and complex topic. Unfortunately, the topic was neglected by philosophers and scientists in the past. In recent decades, however, interest in the emotions has grown considerably among scholars and (...) students from many disciplines, as well as among the public at large. If there is to be any progress in this theoretically and practically important field, not only is a broad philosophical examination of basic concepts and issues essential, but also an interdisciplinary approach that combines philosophical analysis with other types of scientific research. The clarification of basic emotional concepts as well as the unification of linguistic usages across disciplines and natural languages are necessary for integrating the growing body of interdisciplinary emotional research. The contemporary philosophy of emotions is equipped for this integrative task. It can provide us with a better and more comprehensive picture of the nature of emotions. (shrink)

Envy involves the wish to have something that someone else has; jealousy involves the wish not to lose something that the subject has and someone else does not. Envy and jealousy would seem to involve a similar emotional attitude. Both are concerned with a change in what one has: either a wish to obtain or a fear of losing. This is not a negligible distinction, however. The wish not to lose something is notably different from the wish to obtain something (...) and this difference has significant implications. (shrink)

Many testimonies, as well as fictional works, describe situations in which people find themselves hating the person that they love. This might initially appear to be contradiction, as how can one love and hate the same person at the same time? A discussion of this problem requires making a distinction between logical consistency and psychologically compatibility. Hating the one you love may be a consistent experience, but it raises difficulties concerning its psychological compatibility.

The relationship between emotions and argumentation is not always clear. I attempt to clarify this issue by referring to three basic questions: (1) Do emotions constitute a certain kind of argumentation?; (2) Do emotions constitute rational argumentation?; (3) Do emotions constitute efficient argumentation? I will claim that there are many circumstances in which the answer to these questions is positive. After describing such circumstances, the educational implications of the connection between emotions and argumentation will be indicated.

Koriat and Goldsmith clearly show the need for an alternative to the storehouse metaphor; however, the alternative metaphor they choose – the correspondence metaphor – is problematic. A more suitable one is the capacity metaphor.

Is love best when it is fresh? For many, the answer is a resounding “yes.” The intense experiences that characterize new love are impossible to replicate, leading to wistful reflection and even a repeated pursuit of such ecstatic beginnings. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev takes these experiences seriously, but he’s also here to remind us of the benefits of profound love—an emotion that can only develop with time. In The Arc of Love, he provides an in-depth, philosophical account of the experiences that (...) arise in early, intense love—sexual passion, novelty, change—as well as the benefits of cultivating long-term, profound love—stability, development, calmness. Ben-Ze’ev analyzes the core of emotions many experience in early love and the challenges they encounter, and he offers pointers for weathering these challenges. Deploying the rigorous analysis of a philosopher, but writing clearly and in an often humorous style with an eye to lived experience, he takes on topics like compromise, commitment, polyamory, choosing a partner, online dating, and when to say “I love you.” Ultimately, Ben-Ze’ev assures us, while love is indeed best when fresh, if we tend to it carefully, it can become more delicious and nourishing even as time marches on. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual map of the affective terrain while focusing on enduring positive affective attitudes, such as love and happiness. The first section of the article examines the basic characteristics of affective attitudes, i.e., intentionality, feeling, and dispositionality, and classifies the various affective attitudes accordingly. An important distinction in this regard is between acute, extended, and enduring affective attitudes. Then a discussion on the temporality of affective attitudes is presented. The second section discusses major mechanisms that enable long-lasting (...) affective attitudes to endure. These mechanisms include, Hedonic adaptation, which reduces affective intensity, thereby enabling adaptation to a stable, average level of affective intensity; Positive mood offset, which maintains a moderate level of positive mood in the absence of adverse stimuli; The enduring mood of being dissatisfied, thereby keeping the agent’s interest high, and Meaningful development, which underlies the continuation and enhancement of the affective attitude. Each of these mechanisms sustains, in its own unique way, the balance required for enduring affective attitudes. The third section applies the above considerations to two major enduring positive affective attitudes: the mood of lasting happiness and the enduring emotion of profound romantic love. Time is typically a necessary condition for the creation and enhancement of such love. However, it is not a sufficient condition. So only in some cases, but not in all, does loving longer mean loving more. (shrink)

When it comes to eggs, two aspects are central—taste and nutritional value. And it is when eggs are fresh that these are at their peak. Hate “tastes” worst, that is, its negative intensity is highest, when it is fresh. Yet, when hate is not merely a temporary eruption but a constant feature, it distorts the agent’s behavior and attitudes. As such, its moral value worsens with maturity.

In this article, James Gibson’s influential notion of “perceptual affordances” is applied to the romantic realm. The core idea of Gibson’s view rests on the possible, meaningful actions that the perceptual environment offers the animal. In order to sustain this idea, Gibson posits two additional major characteristics of affordances: (a) affordances are perceived in a direct cognitive manner, and (b) affordances have a unique ontological status that is neither subjective nor objective. While I accept the core idea, I have doubts (...) as to whether the two other characteristics are necessary in other types of affordances, such as social and romantic affordances. The romantic realm offers an abundance of many enticing affordances. In this regard, I discuss phenomena like the availability of a romantic alternative, romantic ambivalence, choosing a romantic partner, sexual fantasies, the road not taken, reciprocity, playing hard to get, cultivating backup mates, romantic affordances in old age and in the digital realm. In light of the abundance and complexity of romantic affordances in our current romantic environment, knowing the nature of these affordances is most useful from both pragmatic and theoretical viewpoints. (shrink)

Cholbi suggests three unique features of grief which are “unlike most emotional conditions”: (1) grief is a concatenation of affective states rather than a single such state, (2) grief is not a perception-like state but a form of affectively-laden attention directed at its object, and (3) grief is an activity with an inchoate aim. While I essentially accept this characterization, I believe that these arguments are not unique to grief but common to all (or at least most) emotions.

The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.

Enduring romantic love is highly significant for our wellbeing, and there is much scientific evidence for its value. There is also evidence that marital sex is important for the flourishing of wellbeing for both partners. Casual sexual relationships and experiences (CSREs) are often characterized in a non-normative way, as sexual behavior occurring outside a committed romantic relationship. However, the prevailing normative description is negative, perceived as superficial behavior that harms our wellbeing. Although sexual activities are linked to many psychological and (...) physical health benefits, these are rarely attributed to casual sex. Instead, scholars and laymen have warned against the negative consequences of non-committed sex, particularly for women. Yet, positive reactions to casual sex, such as satisfaction, confidence, self-knowledge and social engagement, are stronger and more common than negative reactions. Accordingly, the two major aims of this article are to understand the complexity of CSREs better, and to substantiate the claim that in various circumstances, CSREs contribute to our wellbeing. (shrink)