Background The number of coauthors in the medical literature has increased over the past 50 years as authorship continues to have important academic, social and financial implications.Aim and method The study aim was to determine the prevalence of honorary authorship in biomedical publications and identify the factors that lead to its existence. An email with a survey link was sent anonymously to 9283 corresponding authors of PubMed articles published within 1 year of contact.Results A completed survey was obtained from 1246 (...) corresponding authors, a response rate of 15.75%. One-third admitted that they had added authors who did not deserve authorship credit. Origin of the study from Europe and Asia , study type as case report/case series and increasing number of coauthors were found to be the associated factors on multivariate analysis. Journal impact factor was also found to be associated with honorary authorship for those who self-reported honorary authorship and 5.60 for those who did not report unjust authorship, p=0.05). In retrospect, 75% of the authors indicated that they would remove unjustified names from the authorship list. Reasons for adding honorary authors were complimentary , to avoid conflict at work , to facilitate article acceptance , and other .Conclusions Honorary authorship is relatively common in biomedical publications. Researchers should comply with the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors’ criteria for authorship. (shrink)

When surgeons transplant animal organs into humans, people who did not receive the organs incur risks. These third parties may stand near or far in time or space. No one knows the likelihood, breadth, or nature of the risks in question. The common wisdom among infectious-disease specialists is that in the best of xenotransplant conditions, such third-party risk may be minimized but not eliminated.

Approximately 62,000 people in this country await organ transplants. Ten years ago the waiting list numbered 16,000. The line gets longer every day. Up to 30% of those waiting in line will die waiting. We face a chronic shortage of organs. While demand for organs steadily increases, the number of cadaveric organ donors remains relatively constant: approximately 4,000 in 1988, and approximately 5,500 in 1997. In response to this environment of scarcity, policymakers have considered initiatives in a number of domains.

Strohminger gives a lively and accurate critique of McGinn’s book but is somewhat inaccurate herself in describing the current theoretical state of the science on disgust. My comment primarily focuses on the issues I have with McGinn’s and Strohminger’s discussions and briefly offers a possible unifying account of the function and meaning of disgust.

This article argues that one of our only pieces of evidence for Roman marriage between cinaedi, Juvenal's second satire, has been consistently misread and in fact describes a marriage between a cinaedus and a sex worker. It begins by providing the context for the passage in question and its traditional reading, and then demonstrates that the critical phrase siue hic recto cantauerat aere refers to financial, not erotic, exchanges. The article finally discusses the implications of this correction, which are far (...) more substantial than one might expect for a contentious ablative. (shrink)

A new academic discipline, Survival Research, is proposed to investigate how the survival of the human species and its civilizations can be assured. Today nuclear weapons, overpopulation, and the deteriorating environment threaten our future. These phenomena are interconnected, and must be considered together in their complexity in an interdisciplinary manner. Some major obstacles to a wider awareness of the problems and solutions are described. Survival issues, primarily ecological ones, have lately lost ground, especially in the United States. It is essential (...) that those still concerned, especially teachers and journalists, be informed about the problems and the urgency for finding solutions. (shrink)

Abstract«La divine proportion ne peut cependant pas être exprimée en nombres de façn exacte; néanmoins elle peut être exprimée de telle façon que, à travers un processus infini, nous pouvons en rapprocher de plus en plus et en délimitant le carré nous ne sommes jamais à plus d'une unité.» [Kepler, 1608].

Over the last two decades, we have begun to gain traction on the neural systems that support creative cognition. Specifically, a converging body of evidence from various domains has demonstrated that creativity arises from the interaction of two large-scale systems in the brain: Whereas the default network (DN) is involved in internally-oriented generation of novel concepts, the executive control network (ECN) exerts top-down control over that generative process to select task-appropriate output. In addition, the salience network (SN) regulates switching between (...) those networks in the course of creative cognition. In contrast, we know much less about the workings of these large-scale systems in support of creativity under extreme conditions, although that is beginning to change. Specifically, there is growing evidence from systems neuroscience to demonstrate that the functioning and connectivity of DN, ECN and SN are influenced by stress—findings that can be used to improve our understanding of the behavioural effects of stress on creativity. Toward that end, we review findings from the neuroscience of creativity, behavioural research on the impact of stress on creativity, and the systems-level view of the brain under stress to suggest ways in which creativity might be affected under extreme conditions. Although our focus is largely on acute stress, we also touch on the possible impact of chronic stress on creative cognition. (shrink)

Por una parte, la carta que Kant escribe a Marcus Herz el 2l de febrero de 1772 es famosa, pues ella es quizá el único documento de valor que informa sobre una década previa al criticismo durante la cual Kant dejo de publicar. Ésta es la década que va desde 1770, fecha de la De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis: Dissertatio, y la primera edición de la Crítica de la razón pura (1781). La carta de algún modo (...) es un vistazo al “taller del pensador”, donde Kant narraría las preocupaciones filosóficas de su pensamiento. Por otra parte, la carta es ambigua todavía, porque la crítica aún no se pone de acuerdo sobre su sentido. Mis páginas defienden que esta carta es un ejemplo del carácter híbrido del pensamiento de Kant en ese período, un pensamiento que, sin mayor influencia del escepticismo, aún se debate entre anticipaciones críticas y meras repeticiones dogmáticas. (shrink)

The existence of a mathematical theory determining the shape of the Great Pyramid is a long‐standing assumption, and speculation on the subject dates back to Herodotus. Roger Herz‐Fischler's study presents and discusses eleven major theories and their proponents in the light of archaeological and philosophical considerations. The historiographical aspect of the study is very useful, as is the formulation and discussion of some of the problems. A brief sociological case study of the Pi‐theory and the reasons for its propagation (...) and popularity in Britain is particularly interesting. But although this book offers much that will be of interest to professional and amateur historians of mathematics and pyramid enthusiasts, it does not provide a definitive conclusion to the 2,500‐year‐old debate.Having dismissed all but three of the theories and unable to decide among them, Herz‐Fischler reaches the rather extraordinary conclusion that there may have been no true theoretical basis for the angles of inclination that might have been established “by eye” . In settling for this interpretation, however, he fails to consider how the angle would have been replicated on the different sides of a pyramid or how angles of inclination would have been maintained or transferred to other pyramids of different sizes: for example, Khufu's three queens' pyramids have slopes virtually identical to those of the main pyramid .The three theories among which Herz‐Fischler cannot decide are all proportion‐based theories, two relating to the angle of inclination and one to the angle of the arris . This conclusion is significant in its own right and relates to practical building considerations. Herz‐Fischler is keen to distinguish mathematically between integer proportional systems and the seked theory , a system attested in ancient Egyptian mathematical texts and related to the division of the cubit into seven palms, each of four fingers. But the close relation between these two methods of measurement in practical terms is clear, and either one could have been used with ease by an ancient builder.Herz‐Fischler states that “there simply is no archaeological evidence for the above three rise over run based theories” . Here he is too quick to dismiss the evidence presented by Flinders Petrie from a mastaba at Meidum . Outside the corners of the structure are walls with traces of horizontal lines at cubit intervals and sloping lines marking the inclination of the faces. Herz‐Fischler points to the lack of marks to indicate how the slope was constructed, but he fails to consider how an identical slope was constructed eight times around the structure if such a horizontal measurement was not used. Nor are the corners of the structure level; thus the correct measurements must be calculated relative to the depth. Mark Lehner, in his Complete Pyramids , page 220, offers evidence from Giza that the builders constructed the corners by measuring in a certain distance from reference points outside the sides. The pyramid drawing from Meroe based on a rectangular grid does not necessarily conflict with a rise and run theory and certainly shows that a proportional system was used relating side length to height. I find this archaeological evidence for the use of rise over run theories convincing, if limited, and it strongly supports side‐inclination based theories over those relating to the arris.The Meroe drawing cannot be taken as reliable evidence that the seked theory was not used in Fourth Dynasty structures , as it dates to over 2,000 years after the Great Pyramid was constructed and lies outside Egypt. As for the question of whether a seked‐based system or integers were used to construct the angle of the sides, Herz‐Fischler could have used the measured angles of sloping corridors and shafts inside the Great Pyramid that must have been constructed using similar techniques. Further, he makes no attempt to apply these theories to the slopes of other pyramids, although in some cases he does consider examples presented by other authors. Applying these theories more broadly might lead to more decisive results. Before readers undertake to do so themselves, however, they should be alerted that some of the measurements given in Appendix 2 are out of date. Corrected figures are: Abu Rawash, c. 52° ; Bent Pyramid, 55° 00′ 30″ , 43° 01′ 30″ ; Red Pyramid, 44° 44′ . In this last example considerable variation was noted in the inclination of different stretches of the same pyramid face, which suggests that an angle of 45° was intended. This observed variation is very significant considering how little of the casing of the next pyramid constructed—the Great Pyramid—is preserved .Although I find Herz‐Fischler's conclusions rather weak and some of his treatments of archaeological sources too dismissive, this volume provides a useful introduction to the subject and a clear formulation of the problems involved. It is, then, a thought‐provoking contribution to a long‐standing debate. (shrink)

A group of theologians collaborated to publish a commentary on the Encyclical letter Haurietis Aquas. Among these were brothers Hugo and Karl Rahner. Their contribution is a theological reflection on the veneration of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, an example of a rich connection between spiritual reality and theological thought before the Second Vatican Council. In this case we see a remote theological preparation of the Council and an important theological work which was later developed by the Council itself. All (...) this was happening around the time when the Institute of Spirituality at the Gregorian University was founded. (shrink)

Salons evoke high-flown associations; we picture elegant people gathering in glamorous settings for cultivated conversations about the arts, literature, and politics. The so-called salons hosted around 1800 in Berlin by bourgeois Jewish women are tied to promises of emancipation and religious toleration. Scholars have either hailed the empowering functions of these convivial gatherings or debunked their enlightened promises as myths. Drawing on the latest research on conviviality in the social sciences, on Friedrich Schleiermacher's theory of sociability, and on writings by (...) and about Rahel Varnhagen, Henriette Herz and Fanny Lewald, this essay approaches the topic of the salon from a different angle. I argue that these women's social endeavours were not tied to specific ends that we can either admiringly endorse or expose as failures from today's perspective. The notions of the female self, of writing, and the conceptions of literature and philosophy emerging from these convivial constellations are inherently dialogical and shifting. Conversations may sometimes break open hierarchies, but they may also foster conflict and no improvement. The value of these encounters, I suggest, lies in the effort made rather than a classifiable outcome. (shrink)

The proliferation, globalization, and fragmentation of law in world politics have fostered an attempt to re-integrate International Law and International Relations scholarship, but so far the contribution of realist theory to this interdisciplinary perspective has been meagre. Combining intellectual history, the jurisprudence of IL and IR theory, this article provides an analysis of John H. Herz’s classical realism and its perspective on international law. In retrieving this vision, the article emphasizes the political and intellectual context from which Herz’s realism developed: (...) the study of public law in Germany during the interwar period and in particular the contribution of Hans Kelsen and the pure theory of law to the study of international law. Herz was deeply inspired by Kelsen but he criticized the pure theory for ignoring the sociological foundations of law. Following his emigration to the United States, Herz embraced realism but without disregarding international law. Indeed, his mature, globally oriented realism offers a balanced, fruitful perspective for thinking about the relationship between politics and law that is deeply relevant for contemporary theory: it challenges modern, law-blind variants of realism and holds considerable potential for contributing to the approaches that have most successfully studied the law–politics nexus. (shrink)

Kant's 1772 letter to Markus Herz is celebrated for its marking the ‘Critical turn’ in Kant's thought, a turn that would move Kant away from the speculative metaphysics of the 1750s towards the Critical philosophy of 1781. It is here, seemingly for the first time, that Kant asks the question concerning the relationship between concepts and objects, telling his former pupil that the answer to this question ‘constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics.’ For (...) anyone interested in the development of Kant's thought this makes for exciting news since it is the posing of this question that marks Kant's first step towards the Critique and it is the answer to this question that will come to identify the ‘objective portion’ of the Transcendental Deduction, a text that already begins with a rehearsal of points raised in Kant's letter. But while the letter to Herz is clearly itself a key to what Kant sees as the ‘whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics’, the question concerning concepts and objects itself poses interpretive problems that need to be addressed. Above all, one needs to ask how Kant arrived at such a question. (shrink)

This edition of _Prolegomena_ includes Kant’s letter of February, 1772 to Marcus Herz, a momentous document in which Kant relates the progress of his thinking and announces that he is now ready to present a critique of pure reason.

Was sind Maximen gemäß Kants Moralphilosophie? Diese Frage entsteht, da Kant zwar eine Explikation von ‚Maxime‘ als ‚subjektives Prinzip des Wollens‘ angibt, diese Explikation aber selbst wieder sehr dunkel bleibt und schwer verständlich ist. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage werde ich in einem ersten Teil versuchen, plausible Kandidaten dafür zu ermitteln, was unter Maximen zu verstehen ist. Dabei wird sich zeigen, dass Kandidaten, die aus Davidsons Handlungstheorie stammen, sehr geeignete Kandidaten sind. In einem zweiten Teil sollen diese Kandidaten dann ‚auf (...) class='Hi'>Herz und Nieren‘ geprüft werden. Dazu werde ich in Anlehnung an Rüdiger Bittner diskutieren, ob die Kandidaten, die sich im ersten Teil als die plausibelsten erweisen, gewisse Grundanforderungen an Maximen erfüllen (An die auf der Annahme, Maximen seien die hier favorisierten Kandidaten, beruhende Maximenkonzeption gibt es folgende zwei Grundanforderungen: erstens die Möglichkeit der Explikation, was es heißt, dass eine Maxime vorliegt, auch wenn ihr nicht gefolgt wird, zweitens die Möglichkeit der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Befolgen einer Maxime und dem Handeln lediglich gemäß einer Maxime). Und ich werde mich dazu ferner der Frage widmen, ob bestimmte Kritiken, die an – nicht identischen, aber – ähnlichen Kandidaten für Maximen vorgebracht wurden, auch für die hier präsentierten Kandidaten einschlägig sind. Schließlich werde ich in diesem zweiten Teil noch gewisse Schwächen der von mir favorisierten Maximenkonzeptionen erläutern, die man unabhängig von Bittners Kritikpunkten konstatieren könnte. What are maxims in Kant's moral philosophy? This question arises because the explanation of 'maxim' Kant offers, namely as being a subjective principle of volition, remains dark and hard to understand as it stands. To answer this question I will first try to find plausible candidates for what might count as a maxime. It will turn out that candidates which come from Davidson's theory of action are very plausible candidates, indeed. In a second part of the paper these candidates should be "put through the acid test", so to speak: Following Rüdiger Bittner, I will discuss whether those candidates, which are, according to part one of the paper, the most plausible ones, meet some basic requirements maxims have to fulfill. And I will - still following Bittner - attend to the question whether certain critiques that were put forward against some similar maxim-candidates are relevant for those candidates here presented. Finally I am going to explain in this second part of the paper some remaining weaknesses one could point out against the conceptions of maxims I favour and which could be stated independently from Bittner's critiques. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:246 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY f~ntlSetifr ~uftanbebrtn~en, [o,ba{~hie @i~e~t heeler~anbluu~ ~uaIet~ bee ~[u~e[t bee ~emu~tfein~ (~m ~e~riffe eiuer ~inie)i[t, u,b baburd~a[rerer[t em Dbieft (el, be[timmter ~a,,m) erfannt r0irb.") The notion of constructing a concept is a technical one for Kant ("r ~e@rlffabet f on ft r u i r en, beiflt: hie i~m focre[p0nblereube ~In [ c @a u u,@ a ~ c i o ~i bar[tdlen." Op. cit., B741)--to (...) construct a concept of space would be to produce a representation of a determinate region of space in accordance with some determining principle. 9Maimon, Salomon (1753-1800): Self-educated philosopher from Lithuania who appeared on the Berlin scene in the later 1780's. His Versuch ~ber die Transzendentalphilosophie (1790) was a critical study of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Kant had already seen some of it in manuscript, sent to him by Marcus Herz. In his letter of May 26, 1789 (~362), he describes to Herz how he had been on the point of returning the manuscript unread, with a note saying that he was too busy, but that on glancing at it he had realized its quality and had seen that none of his opponents had understood the Kritilc as well as had M. u Herz, Marcus (1747-1803): Student and subsequently close friend of Kant's. Medical doctor and, from 1786, Professor of Philosophy in Berlin. i Selle, Christian Gottlieb (1748-1800) : Medical doctor in Berlin, involved in experiments in animal magnetism. Kiesewetter regarded the experiments as fraudulent, but absolved S. of complicity. J Berlinische Monatr A liberal journal, founded in 1783, in which Kant frequently published. The editor in question was Johann Erich Biester (1749-1816), who was also Librarian of the Royal Library inBerlin. k Elsner, Christoph Friedrich (1749-1820): Professor of Medicine at K6aigsberg, who attended Kant in his final illness. A FURTHER NOTE ON PAUL MARHENKE'S "THE PHENOMENALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE" IN AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE to a paper, "The Phenomenalistic Interpretation of Kant's Theory of Knowledge," which was found in the effects of the late Paul Marhenke, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, and which was printed in the April, 1964 issue of this Journal I mentioned that an intensive inquiry failed to reveal when this paper was written or for what occasion. I have recently received a note from Professor Jacob Loewenberg, Professor Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy at Berkeley, informing me that the paper was written while Paul Marhenke was a student at Berkeley and was written for Professor Loewenberg's Seminar on Kant, during the session of 192526. Professor Loewenberg writes that "the seminar dealt with certain selected topics crucial in or growing out of the Critique of Pure Reason. Among those who in addition to Paul were in the seminar, I remember distinctly (largely because of their superior performance) Donald C. Williams and the late A. P. Ushenko. I am not quite sure whether or not Philip Wiener was also enrolled." University o] California, San Diego A YRD-~[STROLL A I~EPLY TO WALTER KAUFMANN WALTER KAUFMANN,in his article, "Nietzsche in the Light of his Suppressed Manuscripts" 1 converts a review of Erich F. Podach's book, Friedrich Nietzsche's 1This Journal, II, 2 (Oct., 1964), pp. 205-225. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 247 Werke des Zusammenbruchs into a bitter personal attack on Podach and an even more vitriolic assault on me. Every author and scholar is entitled to his own opinion, and had Kaufmann soberly stated his case by simply announcing that, to his mind, the re-editing of Nietzsche's works according to the genuine manuscripts now available in Weimar has not changed one iota of the true character of the philosopher's last books, then his efforts would certainly have been unexceptionable. Prof. Kaufmann could simply have said, "Much ado about nothing! Podach's findings will, by no means, alter the image of Nietzsche among philosophers. Period." Indeed, this is precisely what Kaufmann's elaborate tirades and invectives come to if one reduces them to their... (shrink)

[1] Experience is a real concrete phenomenon. The existence of experience entails the existence of a subject of experience. Therefore subjects of experience are concretely real. [2] The existence of a subject of experience in the lived present or living moment of experience, e.g. the period of time in which the grasping of a thought occurs, provably involves the existence of singleness or unity of an unsurpassably strong kind. The singleness or unity in question is a metaphysically real, concrete entity. (...) So if thoughts, or any experiences at all, really do occur or exist – and they do – then there exist entities that are genuine, concrete, metaphysical unities of an unsurpassable sort. [3] There is a metaphysically irreproachable sense in which we may – must – take these unsurpassable metaphysical unities to be themselves subjects of experience, although we may also take them to be thoughts or experiences. If so, there is a sound argument to the conclusion of the 2nd Paralogism. [4] Perhaps and are not in the final analysis distinct. Perhaps Kant is right, in his 1772 letter to Herz, that ‘the thinking or the existence of the thought and the existence of my own self are one and the same’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Contemporary IlluminationsReading Donne's "A Nocturnall upon S. Lucies Day through Three Twenty-First-Century PoemsTheresa M. DipasqualeIn his contribution to the 2017 volume John Donne and Contemporary Poetry, edited by Judith Scherer Herz, Jonathan F. S. Post explores "a nearly endless landscape of comparisons and contrasts" that unfolds between Stephen Edgar's 2008 poem "Nocturnal" and Donne's "A nocturnall upon S. Lucies day, Being the shortest day."1 Post's essay illuminates what (...) Calvin Bedient, in the same volume, calls the "great glacier-gloom" of Donne's "Nocturnall," its devastated "solemnity."2 In doing so, Post renders largely moot many questions that have preoccupied critics of Donne's poem: whether or how this poem reflects Donne's experience; whether the woman lamented by the speaker is a fiction or a historical person lamented by the poet; and if the latter, whether the poem mourns the 1617 death of John Donne's wife, Anne More Donne; the 1627 death of Donne's patroness Lucy, Countess of Bedford; or the Countess' near-fatal illness in 1612–13.3 These biographical and historical questions are not without value, but they draw the critic's attention away from more compelling questions regarding the "I" of the poem—a persona who claims not to be a person at all, but an inscription, a grave, "A quintessence" derived or "expresse[d]/... even from nothingnesse."4In this article, I widen and intensify the pool of light cast on Donne's "Nocturnall" by Post's presentist and intertextual analysis of Edgar's poem, examining three of the many other twenty-first-century poems that tap into Donne's poem, allude to it, quote it, adopt its structure, or respond to the anguish it expresses.5 Each of the three I discuss is [End Page 1] luminous in its own right but also a potent critical response to Donne's five-stanza poem. Each teaches something different about Donne's lyric. The poets whose work I consider—Liz Lochhead, Jay Wright, and Meena Alexander—all address twenty-first-century concerns; they grapple with questions and sorrows beyond the scope of Donne's conscious imagining yet latent in his poem. Each picks up where critics leave off when they "assume," as Alison R. Rieke notes, "that the speaker... is a husband or lover, possibly Donne, who experiences grief upon his wife's or mistress' death."6 Each takes up the challenge that Donne's persona issues when it denies that it is either "a man" (30) or any other living thing.In the first stanza of "A Nocturnall upon S. Lucies Day," this anti-persona observes that "all" other things around it are "Dead and enterr'd" and "yet" that "all these seeme to laugh, / Compar'd with mee, who am their Epitaph" (8–9). If it is an incised text rather than a human being, the poem's "mee" can no more speak than laugh; it is as silent as the grave it marks or as the dead flesh interred there. Indeed, it goes on to claim that it is "every dead thing" and that love's alchemical "art" has "expresse[d] / A quintessence even from" this mass of nonliving objects, this "nothingnesse" (12, 14–15). Struggling to define its anti-essential essence, it declares itself a mass burial site: "I, by loves limbecke, am the grave / Of all, that's nothing" (21–22). An epitaph, dead things, nothingness, a grave: all these are silent. And yet, in Donne's poem, they strenuously assert their nonbeing; they pulse with a paradoxically audible sense of self. After "Compar'd with mee" in the final line of the opening stanza, the reader encounters sixteen additional instances of the first-person singular in the poem's forty-five lines: "my" appears once, "mee" five times, and "I" eleven times. And the "I" issues a directive to readers: commanding, in the opening line of stanza 2, "Study me then, you who shall lovers bee" (10). But those who obey this order, making themselves students of the poem's inscribed nothingness, find themselves dismissed in the poem's final stanza. Having insisted that its "Sunne" will never "renew... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 127-128 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Kant: A Biography Manfred Kuehn. Kant: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xxii + 544. Cloth, $34.95. Kuehn's biography of Kant is an extraordinary scholarly and literary accomplishment. In nine masterful chapters (along with a prologue), Kuehn draws on an incredibly comprehensive and varied repository of historical evidence in painting a (...) detailed, yet also widely accessible picture of the successive stages of Kant's life and of how his major and minor writings emerge from them, a picture that is both more accurate and more informative than what could ever be pieced together from existing biographies, even those written in German or at a time much closer to Kant's own.What is distinctive about Kuehn's methodology--and part, but only part, of what makes his work superior to other Kant biographies--is the way in which he focuses on Kant's intellectual context. For Kuehn, to understand Kant requires understanding him not just in the global context of modern European philosophy or even German philosophy, but also in his local context of Prussia and Königsberg. Accordingly, in the first chapter Kuehn does not merely list the biographical details of Kant's family and the name of the school he attended, but rather explains what it would have meant for Kant's father to be a member of a guild in eighteenth-century Prussia, what values that guild incorporated, what consequences his parents' Pietism would have for him, and what the intellectual and social life of the Collegium Fridericianum was like. Kuehn's proper emphasis on figures and events in Königsberg runs throughout the book. Thus in the second chapter, Kuehn describes the various faculty members Kant would have encountered as a student, what philosophical [End Page 127] views they held, how Kant's own activities as a student deviated from those of the "typical" student, what religious movements became influential at what time in the university, and what political consequences they would have had on a student's intellectual life. In the third chapter (devoted to 1755-64), Kuehn reveals how Kant, forming a wide circle of friends that would include Hamann, Herder, Hippel, and the family of Count Keyserlingk, "became a person of elegance during this period, someone who shone at social events with his intelligence and wit" (115). In chapter 4 (1764-69), Kuehn describes how Kant developed a close friendship with Green that would radically change his life. In fact, Kuehn claims that it was at the age of forty and due to the influence of Green that Kant underwent a conversion or rebirth by coming to understand the centrality of character and the role that maxims play in it. Moreover, in describing the radical changes of position initiated in his inaugural dissertation and completed in the three Critiques, Kuehn connects biography and philosophy by positing that Kant saw these works as providing "his newfound character with a philosophical justification and defense" (187).While one might think that chapter 5, which covers the 1770s, would have to be very short, given Kant's sparse publications during this period, Kuehn describes at length the rich set of interactions that Kant had with Mendelssohn, Herz, Lambert, Kraus, Herder, and Hamann, exchanges that would be crucial in the final articulation of his mature view. Kuehn devotes chapters 6 and 7 to the period during which Kant published his mature theoretical and practical works, most notably the Critique of Pure Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and it is here that Kuehn's contextualism has perhaps its greatest philosophical payoff. For the close attention Kuehn has paid to Kant's interactions with his immediate contemporaries reveals that he did not understand Hume's position as we might today, namely as advocating global skepticism about knowledge of the external world. Rather, Kant saw Hume's skepticism as being local and methodological in combating rationalism and dogmatism. As a result, Kant saw Hume mainly as an ally, not an adversary. Kuehn... (shrink)

Does a hard-headed realist approach to international politics necessarily involve scepticism towards progressive foreign policy initiatives and global reform? Should proponents of realism always be seen as morally complacent and politically combative? In this major reconsideration of the main figures of international political theory, Bill Scheuerman challenges conventional wisdom to reveal a neglected tradition of progressive realism with much to contribute to contemporary debates about international policy-making and world government. Far from seeing international reform as well-meaning but potentially irresponsible idealism, (...) progressive realists like E.H. Carr, John Herz, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr developed forward-looking ideas which offer an indispensable corrective to many presently influential views about global politics. Progressive realism, Scheuerman argues, offers a compelling and provocative vision of radical global change which - when properly interpreted, can help buttress current efforts to address the most pressing international issues. After recovering key subterranean strands in mid-twentieth century realism, Scheuerman underscores their relevance to contemporary international theory. Criticizing more recent realists for abandoning their tradition's best insights, he also demonstrates that reform-minded international theories - including versions of cosmopolitanism, constructivism, the English School, liberalism, and republicanism - could all benefit from taking Progressive Realism seriously. A major contribution both to the history of international relations and contemporary debates in international theory, The Realist Case for Global Reform concludes by considering how progressive realism informs the foreign policies of US President Barack Obama. (shrink)

Kant's correspondence with his colleague and zealous disciple, Marcus Herz, was prophetic: only a few will understand the Critique of Pure Reason. Unfortunately, the problems are intractable and the necessary conceptual scheme to deal with the problems requires a "complete change of thinking in this part of human knowledge". But eventually people will "get over the initial numbness" Kant reassures another correspondent, Christian Garve. Fortunately, he suggests, there is a central question at the foundation of his difficult thought - (...) a question that is the key to his ideas. So what is this important question that Kant insists has been "stated clearly enough"? And how clear is it? I explore these issues in my paper. (shrink)

This volume provides English translations of texts that form the essential background to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Presenting the projects of Kant's predecessors and contemporaries in eighteenth-century Germany, it enables readers to understand the positions that Kant might have identified with 'pure reason', the criticisms of pure reason that had developed prior to Kant's, and alternative attempts at synthesizing empiricist elements within a rationalist framework. The volume contains chapters on Christian Wolff, Martin Knutzen, Alexander Baumgarten, Christian Crusius, Leonhard Euler, (...) Johann Lambert, Marcus Herz, Johann Eberhard, and Johann Tetens. Each chapter includes a brief introduction that provides succinct biographical and bibliographical information on these authors, a concise account of their projects, and information on the importance of these projects to Kant's First Critique. Extensive references to the First Critique, brought together in a concordance, highlight the potential relevance of each text. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to make sense of the immediate philosophical aftermath of Kant's Inaugural Dissertation. I will try to show what Kant himself took to be the problems left unsettled in the dissertation, and how he tried to deal with them. At the end of the paper, I will briefly sketch how he may have proceeded after the famous letter to Marcus Herz of 1772, and what path he would have had to take to recognize the (...) need for a transcendental deduction. (shrink)

In Plan 21 of the Xunzi, the essay Dubs titles “The Removal of Prejudices”1 and Watson calls “Dispelling Obsession”2, there is a sentence one's eyes slide over rather easily until one tries to fit it into its context and that of the Xunzi generally. Dubs translates it “The mind is the ruler of the body and the master of the spirit” ; Watson shows a slight discomfort with the second clause when he gives “The mind is the ruler of the (...) body and the master of its god‐like intelligence” [whatever that is] Koester3 raises a few more doubts with his “Das Herz nimmt im Koerper die Stelle des Herrschers ein, es ist der Gebieter ueber die shen‐ming ” . Interestingly enough, the commentatorial tradition seems to have felt no difficulties: Yang Liang's comment is merely a paraphrase of the sentence following, and Wang Xian‐jian and Liang Qi‐xiong simply quote him4. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ethics of Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) DAVID BAUMGARDT* SALOMON MAIMON is now generally considered the most acute mind among the earliest critics of Kant. Kant himself had praised his acumen,1 though later qualifying his regard decisively.2 Johann Gottfried Herder called * We have just learned of the death of the author. David Baumgardt, born in Germany on April 20, 1890, studied in Vienna and in Berlin and taught philosophy (...) at the University of Berlin from 1924 to 1935 as Privatdozent, Extraordinarius and Ordinarius, until he was forced by Germany's racial laws to resign, but after the end of the war the Free University of Berlin appointed him honorary professor. From 1935 to 1939 he taught at the University of Birmingham; after his arrival in the United States he first joined the staff of the Pendle Hill School and, from 1941 to 1954, he served with the Library of Congress as a consultant in the field of philosophy. In 1955-56 he was Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Columbia. After his retirement he continued to publish and at present there are five publications by him in the press. The number of books and articles written by him probably well exceeds two hundred. Just in the last months of his life he was presented with a Festschri[t (Horizons of a Philosopher), indicative of a wide range of friends, students, and fellow-scholars who wanted to express their appreciation of the man and his work. On the continent Baumgardt was perhaps best known for two books: Franz yon Baader (1927) and Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorliiufern der Modernen Ethik (1933). The former threw full light on an important but unduly neglected figure of the German romantic school of philosophy; the latter confronts Kant's rationalistic ethics with the irrationalism of a Herder, Hemsterhuis, and Jacobi. In the United States he published, among others, Bentham and the Ethics of Today (1952) and Great Western Mystics (1961), originally delivered as Matchette Lectures, but enriched, for publication, by voluminous notes containing a wealth of information on mystics, some of whom, especially Jewish ones, are familiar only to the expert. At the time of his death he was working on a book which would probably have become his opus magnum: an attempt to reconcile what he called the ethics of force with the ethics of love. Baumgardt described his own philosophic position as that of a Benthamian hedonist, asserting that only hedonism, when carried to its conclusions, would permit such a reconciliation. Systematic, ethical and religious problems underlay all his historic research; thus his loss will be felt keenly and widely. (PHILIP MERLAN) t See Kant's Gesammelte Schri[ten, ed. K6nig. Preuss. Akad. Wissenschaften, Vol. XI, Abt. II, Kant's Briefwechsel (1900), Vol. II, p. 49, letter to Marcus Herz, May 26, 1789: "Nicht allein" hat "niemand yon meinen Gegnern reich und die Hauptfrage so wohl verstanden, sondern nur wenige... mochten zu dergleichen tiefen Untersuchungen so viel Scharfsinn besitzen... als Hr. Maymon." 2See ibid., p. 476, letter to Carl Leonhard Reinhold, March 28, 1794: "Was aber z. B. ein Maimon mit seiner Nachbesserung der critischen Philosophie... eigentlich wolle," habe ich "nie recht fassen k6nnen." The noticeable change in Kant's judgment of Maimon's work is hardly due to the fact that his praising remarks were addressed to a Jewish friend and the disapproving ones to a gentile disciple. The reason for this shift in his evaluation of Maimon's later writings 099] 200 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Maimon's Versuch iiber die Transzendentalphilosophie "profound" and "comprehensive.''~ Even Goethe and Schiller mentioned him with esteem in their correspondence;~ and Johann Gottlieb Fichte explicitly' warned that coming centuries would ridicule us bitterly for disregarding this "immensely great talent." It may, therefore, not be out of place if, even more than 150 years after Maimon's death, some attention is paid to his generally neglected criticism of Kant's categorical imperative. Maimon's acute critical observations on Kant's ethics may claim to be of interest even to the analysis of some basic issues of contemporary moral philosophy. In an autobiography, culturally of general interest, edited by the psychologist and esthetician Karl... (shrink)

The dominant feature of eighteenth-century aesthetic is the inquiry and discussion concerning the theory of “taste.” There is material or bibliographical evidence of this in the rapid sequence of treatises, essays, inquiries, observations, and controversies on this subject, extending from the close of the seventeenth to the last years of the eighteenth century, and bearing the names, in France, of Dacier, Bellegarde, Bouhours, Rollin, Seran de la Tour, Trublet, Formey, Bitaubé, Marmontel, and, still more eminent, of Montesquieu, Voltaire, d’Alembert; in (...) England, of Addison, Hume, Gerard, Home, Burke, Priestley, Blair, Beattie, Percival, Reid, Alison; in Italy, of Muratori, Calepio, Pagano, Corniani; in Germany, of Thomasius, J. U. König, Bodmer, A. von Schlegel, Wegelin, Heyne, Herz, Eberhard, J. C. König, and, by German influence in Hungary, Szardahely; and, greatest of all, Immanuel Kant, whose Critique of Judgment consists in the main of a critique of the aesthetic judgment of taste. (shrink)

Mendelssohn's disagreement with Kant's definition survived on a two-sided Folio sheet (Statsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preuss. Kulturbesitz:, Nachlass 162, D I.4.). The dispute relates to Kant's inaugural lecture in Königsberg (August 1770): "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis". A copy was immediately delivered to Mendelssohn by Kant's and Mendelssohn's mutual disciple, Marcus Herz. From Herz's long letter-report we know of a four-hour long discussion concerning Mendelssohn's intention to contrast Kant's definition of 'Raum' and 'Zeit' with that by (...) Leibniz. Apparently Mendelssohn's objection was never concluded or in print, hence, the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) still retains the interpretation that Mendelssohn's contested in 1770. (shrink)

The author analyses the problem of the communication from the epistemological point of view, noting that the interest to the theme is obviously determined by the enormous ambiguity and by the disciplinary vagueness of the communication's notion itself. It is argued that it is the philosophical conceptualization of the communication that allows in a certain sense to «save» philosophy itself. The author notes that the philosophical studies of communication as if return the relevance to the classical philosophical problems: to the (...) (communicative) sphere, (communicative) time, (social) causality, (collective) subject and object, filling them with the meaningful characteristics and testing their concepts by the experience of the functioning of real society and communication. He concludes that the epistemological content of the concept of communication is comes together with several aspects of human cognition. The first aspect has to do with the dimensions for defining the adequacy for determination of the statement made by the Other (i.e. the other participant), given that the content of the Other's consciousness is unavailable. The second aspect is related to the principle of a double purpose of any communication: on the one hand, integration and mutual understanding and, on the other, informational description of the subject of the message. The third aspect is that communication is based on the most important epistemological distinction between knowledge and ignorance, i.e. on the predominance of any information to one participant of the communication and of its uncertainty to the other participant, and that such a situation actually conditions the formation of communication systems, as well as of a wide variety of forms of sociality. The author also addresses the problem of whether contemporary media make communication at all possible since they decrease the impact that the secrecy of the Other's consciousness has on communication by triggering a communicative act. (shrink)

Excerpt from Vom Lebenswege, Gesammelte Vortrage und Aufsatze "Ich habe Gedanken fur manche Menschen an allen Enden meines Weges verstreut. Etwas wird aus allem und jedem; was, - das kummert mich nicht. Aueh in den Waldern fallen die Blatter ungezahlt zu Boden; wer fragt naeh ihnen und hebt sie auf? Aber die Wurzeln der Baume, die sie schutzend deeken, wissen von ihnen und wachsen auf zu hohen Kronen, die uber alles Land ihre Bluten schutten." Villers. Dem Motto, das Friedrich Jodl (...) dieser Sammlung eines Teiles seiner kleinen und allerorten zerstreuten Schriften selbst vorausgesetzt, ist nicht viel hinzuzufugen. Es druckt vollkommen die Stimmung aus, in welcher er dieselben schrieb und sehr oft seine Vortrage hielt. Wie tief ihm selbst auch seine Zeit ans Herz gewachsen war und wie eng er ihre Note und ihre Hoffnungen, ihre Wunsche und Bedurfnisse mit seinem innersten Ringen und Streben verband - er wusste es doch sehr genau, da Ber mit vielen seiner heiligsten Gedanken und Uberzeugungen der Zeit fremd blieb und daB der Same, den er ausstreute, nicht Felder bestellen konnte, sondern nur da und dort zu neuer Blute und Frucht trieb. Aber so klar er das uberschaute und erkannte, so klar und selbstsicher, so voll Zuversicht schaute er auch in die Zukunft. Es gab fur seinen Geist keinen Zweifel daruber, dass das, was er der Welt zu sagen hatte, einmal auch von den Vielen begehrt werden wurde und dass er es sagen musse, um sein Teil an der fortschreitenden Entwicklung der Menschheit zu leisten. Von Jugend an lebte er nach diesem, seinem innersten Gesetz, ohne rechts oder links zu sehen und den Rucksichten des Tages oder wissenschaftlichen Modestromungen Rechnung zu tragen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

Als Xenotransplantation werden medizinische Interventionen bezeichnet, die die Transplantation oder Infusion lebender tierischer Zellen, Gewebe oder Organe in den Menschen beinhalten. Der Begriff schließt auch all jene Maßnahmen ein, in denen menschliche Körperflüssigkeiten, Zellen, Gewebe oder Organe exvivo in Kontakt mit lebenden tierischen Zellen, Gewebe oder Organen kommen. Im weiteren Sinne steht der Begriff Xenotransplantation für jede Form von artenübergreifender Transplantation.Der in der biomedizinischen Forschung seit Ende der 1990er Jahre vorrangig verfolgte Ansatz der Xenotransplantation zielt darauf ab, Schweine als Organquelle (...) für den Menschen zu gewinnen und solide Schweineorgane wie Niere, Herz und Leber auf den Menschen zu verpflanzen. Hierfür müssen die Schweine gentechnisch verändert werden. Darüber hinaus wurden in einigen Fällen exvivo Schweinelebern auch zur temporären Perfusion eingesetzt, um akutes Leberversagen bei Patientinnen und Patienten zu überbrücken. Weitere Ziele sind u. a. der Einsatz von eingekapselten Inselzellen von Schweinen in der Diabetestherapie oder der Einsatz von fötalen Nervenzellen aus Schweinen in der Behandlung von Parkinsonpatienten. Die Transplantation von inaktiven Materialien tierischen Ursprungs, wie z. B. Herzklappen von Schweinen, fällt nicht unter diese Definition, da sie kein lebendes Gewebe mehr sind. (shrink)