The Intelligible Living Thing, posited as the model of our visible and tangible universe in Plato’s Timaeus, is often taken for a richly structured whole, which is not a simple sum of its four major parts. This assumption seems unwarranted – most specifically, the dialogue contains no hint at any complex intelligible blue print of the world as a teleologically arranged whole, whose goodness is irreducible to the well-being and individual perfection of its parts. To construe the rich structure of (...) the world is necessary insofar as the Demiurge creates material likenesses of the austere immaterial species. While the life forms included in our universe conform to their intelligible paradigms, this is not, strictly speaking, true about the considerations guiding the Demiurgic activity which gives rise to the universe itself, whose goodness is also to be measured by comparing it to the disordered pre-cosmic matter. The paper discusses several implications of this austere interpretation of the model and its role in creation. It suggests that the Forms that compose the model should be understood as abstract particulars rather than universals, and critically discusses the relation of Timaeus’ account to the so-called Principle of Plenitude. (shrink)

In this paper I shall suggest that philosophy which bases itself firmly inlife is incompatible with idealism. The example of such a philosophy to be discussed is the later work of Wittgenstein, and I shall define in what sense this is ‘based in life’, with particular reference to his concept of ‘Lebensform’, or ‘life-form’. I shall understand idealism to be, in general terms, the doctrine that idea is the primary, or the only, category of being. Various kinds of (...) idealism may then be distinguished according to the precise definition each gives of ‘idea’, and of the category, if any, which is held to be less fundamental. Thus, in brief, in Platonic idealism, absolute immaterial being is ontologically prior to the changing world given to sense-experience; in the idealistic systems of more modern thought, mind is more fundamental than matter; or again, subject, or spirit, is more fundamental than object. While the various systems of idealism are properly classed together so far as they assign priority to the concept idea , it is clear that they differ in their interpretations of the concept. When one has in mind these differences, it is of course misconceived to speak of idealism as a single doctrine; nevertheless, it is plausible to suppose that philosophers have been led to apply the term ‘idealism’ to various systems despite their differences, because there is indeed a common tendency of thought to be found in them. The present paper takes this supposition as a working hypothesis, with the particular aim of establishing that philosophy based in life is incompatible with philosophy based in idea, whatever be reasonably meant by ‘idea’. In brief my argument will be this: that life is no idea. (shrink)

Artists and designers working in the fields of generative and bio art frequently focus on designing speculative visions of how nature can be reimagined with the use of computational media and synthetic biology. Centered on the unique artistic strategies of reimagining life forms, this paper analyzes and compares a selection of generative software-based projects, in which artists are mimicking different natural phenomena and have the tendency to beautify nature and life, with bio art projects, where ethical considerations (...) are prioritized over other aspects of the work. Experimenting with software and producing code-based generative art can be a relatively accessible creative endeavor while working with synthetic biology requires more demanding and controlled workplace conditions and specialized equipment. Despite the differences in accessibility and usability, both fields of generative and bio art challenge the boundaries of contemporary artistic practice and research by mapping, provoking and contemplating the dramatic changes of life forms, in the era when living matter can be re-engineered into a new material capable of computing. (shrink)

This volume contains a translation of four early manuscripts by Alfred Schutz, unpublished at the time, written between 1924 and 1928. The publication of these four essays adds much to our knowledge and appreciation of the wide range of Schutz’s phenomenological and sociological interests. Originally published in 1987. The essays consist of: a challenging presentation of a phenomenology of cognition and a treatment of Bergson’s conceptions of images, duration, space time and memory; a discussion of the meanings connected with the (...) grammatical forms of language in general; a consideration of the relation between meaning-contents and literary forms in poetry, literary prose narration and dramatic presentation; and an examination of resemblances and differences in the inner forms and characteristics of the major theatrical art forms. (shrink)

Aristotelian naturalism (AN) holds that the norms governing the human will are special instances of a broader type of normativity that is also found in other living things: natural goodness and natural defect. Both critics and defenders of AN have tended to focus on the thorny issues that are specific to human beings. But some philosophers claim that AN faces other difficulties, arguing that its broader conception of natural normativity is incompatible with current biological science. This paper has three aims. (...) First, we consider a distinctive and nuanced critique of AN’s general understanding of natural normativity put forward by Tim Lewens. Second, after giving a defense of AN, we explore and evaluate Lewens’ proposed alternative view—Kantian projectivism about life forms. We present a problem for Kantian projectivism and suggest reasons for thinking that AN is, after all, the superior position. Finally, we clarify and explain how AN’s claims about life forms and our knowledge of them, relate to empirical observation and to contemporary biological science. (shrink)

J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to (...) the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three “plateaus” or “stages”, between physical nature, psycho-physical nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute. (shrink)

For many years, scholars have been moving away from the idea of a singular, secular, rationalistic, and mechanistic "Enlightenment project." Historian Peter Reill has been one of those at the forefront of this development, demonstrating the need for a broader and more varied understanding of eighteenth-century conceptions of nature. Life Forms in the Thinking of the Long Eighteenth Century is a unique reappraisal of Enlightenment thought on nature, biology, and the organic world that responds to Reill's work. The (...) ten essays included in the collection analyse the place of historicism, vitalism, and esotericism in the eighteenth century--three strands of thought rarely connected, but all of which are central to Reill's innovative work. Working across national and regional boundaries, they engage not only French and English but also Italian, Swiss, and German writers. (shrink)

Phenomenological approaches to empathy and intersubjectivity have overcome some critical and open issues of traditional representationalist accounts, placing the embodied character of the social encounter at the centre of the debate. At this stage, I suggest that it would be possible and important to take a further step away from Cartesian vestiges by abandoning the affective and ontological dualism between human beings and other living beings. I argue that phenomenological and enactivist accounts based on characteristics such as pre-reflectivity and sensory (...) experience should posit the fundamental level of empathy and intercorporeality as not anthropocentric, but biocentric. To demonstrate my thesis about the presence of an extended embodied intersubjectivity, I investigate Edith Stein's taxonomy of empathy and I point out how life forms are lived bodies that share a mutual empathic space with human beings. In conclusion, I outline a biocentric refinement of the model of intercorporeality. (shrink)

The article explores aspects of the notion of forms of life in the Wittgensteinian tradition especially following Iris Murdoch’s lead. On the one hand, the notion signals the hardness and inexhaustible character of reality, as the background needed in order to make sense of our lives in various ways. On the other, the hardness of reality is the object of a moral work of apprehension and deepening to the point at which its distinctive character dissolves into the family (...) of connections we have gained for ourselves. The two movements of thought are connected and necessary. (shrink)

Technology extends human perception and it intervenes in relations to the environment. Life in cities is particularly affected by newest technological developments, and city dwellers are most shielded and disconnected from the natural world by these very same technologies. The term technology stems from the Greek techne, and it refers to an instrumental relation to the world—a manipulation and adaptation of the environment to human needs. However, by intervening in everyday life and modifying relations to the environment, technology (...) also produces new forms of life and is therefore also poetic in the sense of poiesis. It is clearly distinguished from literary works because it opens worlds of possibilities that are not fictional. This makes a reflection on its poeticity all the more urgent, because the large-scale advent of new technologies such as the industrialization or the digitization radically changes the modes of perception and relations to urban environments. Art works like literature absorb and articulate these changes and are therefore useful “strange tools” for putting on display the changing modes of experiencing cities. For instance, industrialization, explosive urban growth and the rapid modernization of cities overwhelmed the senses. In its very form and rhythm, modernist literature performs the fragmented and brisk-paced experience of modernity. The digital age ostensibly promises intelligibility and order, for digital technologies can survey and manage vast amounts of information. Smart cities are designed for this purpose and for offering tailored solutions to the inhabitants’ individual needs. However, data analytics cannot capture the phenomenological quality of lived experience. Art works can, and contemporary literary works put on display urban life-forms characterized by disembodiment and by exhaustive information on any subject that on its own does not translate into any sense of meaning or belonging. (shrink)

Different forms of life can be described making use of hermeneutical description of the life-world (Lebenswelt) the field of vision of which encompasses the changes of value systems and lifestyles. Contemporary life forms typical of Europe are: upward, forward, on the surface. Life forms display differing attitude towards space, time, universal ideas, differences, hierarchy, mind, body, causal relationships, chance, language and etc. Contemporary changes are not a string of spontaneous incidents, but a relationship (...) of life forms where the form upward gives way to the form forward, the form on the surface following. Contemporary Europe is peculiar in none of these forms being lost or having emerged victorious. The characteristic manifestation of the life form upward is Christianity. The life form forward is typical of capitalistic ideas with the predominance of history and economical development, the main categories being progress, more and more. The majority of people in contemporary Europe live leaning forward, be a citizen and workforce. Man is perceived as a functional totality, pragmatism arepredominant in societies. Things tend to rule over man, ideals turn into ideologies. That certainly strengthens the technological and military might, but it does not form the common idea of Europe. The form on the surface finds manifestation in post-modernism, which spread up around the world. A question arises: can there appear a fourth form of contemporary life – perhaps we might call it a dimension of depth, which comes from the dialogue between civilizations? (shrink)

What is recognition and why is it so important? This book develops a synoptic conception of the significance of recognition in its many forms for human persons by means of a rational reconstruction and internal critique of classical and contemporary accounts. The book begins with a clarification of several fundamental questions concerning recognition. It then reconstructs the core ideas of Fichte, Hegel, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth and utilizes the insights and conceptual tools developed across these chapters (...) for developing a case for the universal importance of recognition for humans. It argues in favour of a universalist anthropological position, unusual in the literature on recognition, that aims to construe a philosophically sound basis for a discourse of common humanity, or of a shared human life-form for which moral relations of recognition are essential. This synthetic conception of the importance of recognition provides tools for articulating deep intuitions shared across cultures about what makes human life and forms of human co-existence better or worse, and thus tools for mutual understanding about the deepest shared concerns of humanity, or of what makes us all human persons despite our differences. -/- Recognition and the Human Life-Form will appeal to readers interested in philosophical anthropology, social and political philosophy, critical theory, and the history of philosophy. It also provides ideas and conceptual tools for fields such as anthropology, education, disability studies, international relations, law, politics, religious studies, sociology, and social research. (shrink)

Our everyday life is increasingly permeated with digital objects that carry out smart and complex functions. The latest (but certainly not final) advancement of smart digital applications – is to be identified the creation of a field, at once conceptual and material, of things denominated smart objects (henceforth SOs). This technological evolution is so pervasive that it is referred to as smartification. Smart objects have some distinctive features including in particular varying degrees of agency, autonomy and authority. There is (...) no doubt that the SO category is extremely broad, various and intrinsically fuzzy, it is evident that the phenomenon is by no means easy to define: which objects are really smart and which are not? But above all: what do we mean in semio-linguistic, and not psychological nor merely phenomenological terms, when we attribute the qualifier smart to an artifact? What is clear is that a new, or at least different (and controversial) relationship is developing between objects and subjects, or rather between human beings and objects inhabiting the spaces of social action: that is, a new system of objects, to cite Baudrillard (1968), or a new “society of objects” (see Landowski and Marrone 2002). In this paper we will focus on a type of smart physical device designed to interact with its users in the domestic sphere, assisting them in a variety of tasks – such as for example Amazon Echo, capable of connecting to Alexa, an intelligent personal assistant based on machine learning, or the more recent Google Assistant. Our semiotic-oriented – or, more precisely, potentially socio-semiotic/ethno-semiotic – analysis will deal with these issues theoretically by concentrating on the problem of identity, which is anthropologically, but also and above all philosophically, sensitive. We shall look at the impact of technological devices on the perceptive/cognitive systems of human beings, starting with a reflection on the practices of interaction, signification and interpretation that also involve digital objects with a possible impact on everyday life. (shrink)

This paper studies the concept of form of life as central to ordinary language philosophy : philosophy of our language as spoken ; pronounced by a human voice within a form of life. Such an approach to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy shifts the question of the common use of language – central to Wittgenstein’s Investigations – to the definition of the subject as voice, and to the reinvention of subjectivity in language. The voice is both a subjective and common (...) expression: it is what makes it possible for my individual voice, or claim, to become shared and for our forms of life to be intertwined with a lifeform. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Values Micro‐organisms and Plants Animals Humans Patents References.

ABSTRACT The article critically discusses Rahel Jaeggi’s recent philosophical contribution to a critical theory of capitalism. The first part reconstructs Jaeggi’s account of Lebensform, life-form, that builds up the main ontological framework for addressing and problematizing capitalism intended not as an economic system but as a social whole. The second part focuses on the three different theoretical strategies that Jaeggi puts forward to detect and deal with capitalism’s immanent flaws. The third and last part problematizes the metaphysical assumptions and (...) implications of Jaeggi’s understanding of life-form and outlines a more dialectical, or “transactional” notion of form of life, which is inspired by Dewey’s non-reductionist naturalist method of inquiry. The overall aim is to strengthen the philosophical critique of the capitalist form of life. (shrink)

Australia experienced the most devastating bush-fire season in recorded history, and right after that the world economy stalled due to a global virus outbreak the severity of which has no modern precedent. Crises tend up speed paradigm shifts, and the one begun in 2020 certainly will. In this paper I will contribute to a shift that has been gathering momentum for some time now, the need for which the current crisis has made all too obvious. This is a shift in (...) Kant and Hegel influenced philosophy from thinking of ‘spirit’ (Geist) as an abstract realm or dimension insulated from nature—frictionlessly spinning without touching it, or at least with a tendency to do this as essential to it—to thinking of spirit as a life-form, situated in nature at large, just as all life is. I will work on this theme by elaborating on three broadly Hegelian ideas. Firstly, that the subjective and objective aspects of ‘spirit’, that is to say the psychological and social structures distinctive of persons and their life, are co-constitutive elements of a whole. This whole is the human life-form, or as I call it more technically ‘the life-form of persons’. Secondly, that recognition (Anerkennung) as self-transcendence and inclusion of otherness is ontologically constitutive of both, and key to their internal interrelations. Thirdly, that though freedom as collective autonomy is distinctive of this life-form, thought on the model of abstraction from necessarily determining otherness it is theoretically mistaken and put in practice pathological of the life-form in a literal sense of ‘pathology’. (shrink)

Australia experienced the most devastating bush-fire season in recorded history, and right after that the world economy stalled due to a global virus outbreak the severity of which has no modern precedent. Crises tend up speed paradigm shifts, and the one begun in 2020 certainly will. In this paper I will contribute to a shift that has been gathering momentum for some time now, the need for which the current crisis has made all too obvious. This is a shift in (...) Kant and Hegel influenced philosophy from thinking of ‘spirit’ (Geist) as an abstract realm or dimension insulated from nature—frictionlessly spinning without touching it, or at least with a tendency to do this as essential to it—to thinking of spirit as a life-form, situated in nature at large, just as all life is. I will work on this theme by elaborating on three broadly Hegelian ideas. Firstly, that the subjective and objective aspects of ‘spirit’, that is to say the psychological and social structures distinctive of persons and their life, are co-constitutive elements of a whole. This whole is the human life-form, or as I call it more technically ‘the life-form of persons’. Secondly, that recognition (Anerkennung) as self-transcendence and inclusion of otherness is ontologically constitutive of both, and key to their internal interrelations. Thirdly, that though freedom as collective autonomy is distinctive of this life-form, thought on the model of abstraction from necessarily determining otherness it is theoretically mistaken and put in practice pathological of the life-form in a literal sense of ‘pathology’. (shrink)

The rationale of patents on transgenic organisms leads to the startling notion of the human qua infringement. The moral reasons by which we may tenably reject such notion are not conclusive as to human life forms outside the body. A close look at recombinant DNA experimentation reveals ingenious processes, but not entities that the body lacks. Except for artificial genes, the genes of biotechnology are found on chromosomes, albeit nonconsecutively, and their uninterrupted transcripts appear in messenger RNA. An (...) enhanced form of protection for ingenious processes, the human methods patent, is proposed and defended as a replacement for product patents. The proposed patent would pertain to biotechnology manufacturing and genetic intervention in somatic and germ cells. A counterpart could govern nonhuman life forms. It is argued that compulsory licensing protections should be a condition of such patent. Contrary to the conservative assumption that statutory sobriquets suffice, the reckoning of what qualifies as a patentable ingenious process will continue to require systematic scientific guidance. (shrink)

Die weltweite Praxis der Vergabe von Patenten auf Gene, die isoliert und von ihren natürlichen Gegebenheiten gereinigt worden sind, wird auf die Behauptung gestützt, dass diese Gene neu, nicht offensichtlich und nützlich sind. Während die Behauptungen von Nicht-Offensichtlichkeit und Nützlichkeit unbestreitbar sind, beruht die Behauptung von Neuheit auf einer rechtlichen Fiktion und enthält einen fundamentalen logischen Fehler. Darüber hinaus stellt das Argument, das diese Fiktion unterstützt, etwas als res nullius dar, was doch tatsächlich res communis ist. Die gängige Praxis sanktioniert (...) demnach eine ungerechtfertigte Aneignung und involviert eine fundamentale Verletzung des Begriffs des Rechtsanspruchs. Im Lichte der entgegenstehenden Gründe kann diese Verletzung auch nicht unter Berufung auf wirtschaftliche Notwendigkeiten gerettet werden. Im Unterschied dazu trifft die hier vorgetragene Kritik nicht Patentansprüche für künstliche Gene oder genetisch modifizierte Lebensformen, die daher anerkannt werden sollten. Mögliche Implikationen im Hinblick auf ein genetisch modifiziertes menschliches Genom werden kurz erörtert. The worldwide practice of granting patents on genes that have been isolated and purified from their natural occurrences is based on the claim that these genes are novel, non-obvious and have utility. While the claims of non-obviousness and utility are indisputable, the claim of novelty rests on a legal fiction and involves a fundamental logical error. Moreover, the argument in support of the fiction portrays as res nullius what in fact is res communis . Current practice therefore constitutes the legal sanction of an unjustified appropriation, and involves a fundamental violation of the notion of entitlement. In light of evidence to the contrary, this violation cannot be saved by an appeal to economic necessity. By contrast, patent claims for artificial genes or genetically modified life-forms are not subject to such a critique and should be granted. Possible implications with respect to a genetically modified human genome are briefly considered. (shrink)

Alfred Schutz, an Austrian-American philosopher, is best known for his application of phenomenological methods to the problems of sociology. His insistence that sociology must deal with the assumptions involved in ordinary social relations is found particularly in his Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, an important source of contemporary ethnomethodology.

This article attempts to gain purchase on the information society via the notion of `technological forms of life'. It first addresses the idea of `forms of life'. Forms of life are a mode of conceiving of culture that arose at the turn of the 20th century in conjunction with phenomenology. Previously, in early modernity, culture was conceived very much on a representational model. The rest of the essay explores the possibility that a new paradigm (...) of culture, i.e. technological forms of life is emerging at the turn of the 21st century. Technological forms of life are understood as `culture-at-a-distance'. They are the flattening, stretch-out, speed-up and lift-out of forms of life. They are forms of life become non-linear. They involve the exteriorization of inferiority and reflexivity. (shrink)

Ali Haydar Efendi, son devir Osmanlı âlimlerinden olup döneminin önde gelen hukukçularındandır. Yargı görevlerinde bulunmuş ve yükseköğretim kurumlarında uzun yıllar Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye ve Arazi hukuku derslerini okutmuştur. Dürerü’l-Hukkâm adlı eseri Osmanlı medeni kanunu olarak nitelendirebileceğimiz Mecelle’nin önemli şerhlerinden biridir. Fetva emini olarak kanunlaştırma hareketi içinde yer almış ve komisyonlarda görev alarak başta Kitâbu’n-Nafakât olmak üzere çeşitli kanun taslakları hazırlamıştır. Ali Haydar Efendi, Osmanlı kanunlaştırma çalışmalarında esas alınması gereken kaynağın İslâm hukuku olduğunu savunmuş ve Batı hukukunun iktibas edilmesini tenkit etmiştir. (...) Ona göre Osmanlıdaki problemlerin temelinde şer’î hukuktan kopma yer almaktadır; Şer’î kaynaklara dayanan kanunlar, müktebes kanunlara nazaran her zaman adalete daha uygundur. (shrink)

This article examines an often-mentioned but largely undeveloped concept in the work of Giorgio Agamben and in particular his Homo Sacer project: form-of-life. What is at stake in this concept is, I attempt to show, a way of thinking “politics” outside of the space of sovereignty. By examining a short text on this notion published just before the opening installment of the Homo Sacer sequence, this article demonstrates the way this early formulation of the concept is indebted to certain (...) strains of Italian workerist and post-workerist thought. The fundamental question this analysis poses, however, is whether the concept of form-of-life, being to some extent “beyond” the classical space of politics, should in fact be understood as fundamentally aesthetic in nature. (shrink)

The current issue considers the logical parameters of life and the living in their respective determinations in Kant and in Hegel. These two different approaches and philosophical methods are examined through the term „form“ and its respective conceptions in order to show, on the one hand, the immanent relation of life and form, which in turn refers elementarily to thinking and its systematic foundations − in Kant it is space and substance and in Hegel idea and objectivity − (...) in order to, on the other hand, reveal to what extent the handling of the „supersensory principle“ differs in the philosophy of Hegel and Kant, which is the condition for the determination of time and perseverance in both Kant and Hegel, which in turn affects the concepts of life and the living and their relation to form. (shrink)

One branch of practical philosophy in whichWittgenstein’s writings might be fruitful, is political philosophy. The concept “forms of life” gives rise to a pluralistic interpretation of society. However, the question arises how societal conflicts in such a pluralistic view con be solved. We will develop a method of criticism which relies on Wittgenstein’s later work and which combines the normative demands of practical philosophy with methodological standards from ethnology and cultural anthropology.

Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase ‘form of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Some univocal interpreters suggest that, for Wittgenstein, ‘form of life’ captures a uniquely biological notion: the biologically human form of life. Others suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of differently enculturated forms of human life. Non-univocal interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein does not use ‘form of life’ univocally, but that he (...) uses it sometimes to highlight a cluster of biological notions and sometimes a cluster of cultural ones. The debate between univocal and non-univocal readers has generated a raft of intricate, illuminating literature on both sides. If it remains to an extent open, it is partly as a result of the fact that the textual evidence available on this matter, in Wittgenstein’s later published and unpublished writings, is so limited. In this paper, I argue that considering Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of ‘form’ can help to shed light on his later treatment of ‘form of life’. More specifically I argue that revisiting the Tractatus ’ treatment of ‘form’ gives us – perhaps surprisingly – reasons to support a non-univocal later reading of ‘forms of life’. (shrink)

While Christian college students often develop a worldview that emphasizes both individual and social flourishing for the Kingdom of God, there are a number of barriers that may prevent them from living lives committed to others’ flourishing. In particular, many of their regular practices generate dispositions that lead in the direction of personal advancement, material security, and devotion to a narrow sphere of family and friends. The development of an others-focused Christian worldview may not be enough to combat these deeply (...) rooted and self-focused dispositional tendencies. Instead, faculty, staff, and mentors must recognize the importance of students’ spiritual practices and the ways these can develop inclinations that both foster commitments to others’ flourishing and combat the self-focused dispositions that block such commitments. This article highlights some of those practices and addresses the ways in which these can help bridge the gap between students’ worldviews and their concrete “ways of life.”. (shrink)

The bestseller from our pre-eminent philosopher, A.C. Grayling 'Grief and loneliness, depression, despair and failure - those things are the common human lot at least at times in all our lives'. Yet it is philosophy which, while not providing an answer to these problems, can enable us to prepare for them, and create strategies with which to deal with them. It is only through reflecting upon the world around us, reading, thinking, questioning, enjoying, that we can inculcate understanding, tolerance and (...) importantly the courage to live our lives. It is our responsibility to live such 'considered lives' and to realise that we are authors of a narrative that can be shaped and controlled. This is the fifth in a series of essay miscellanies from our foremost philosopher A.C. Grayling, reflecting upon the form of our world and its multiplicity. The essays are grouped by theme into reflections upon life and the standards we live by, including vivid polemics and perceptive pieces on significant thinkers, contemporary rights and liberties issues. This book brilliantly articulates the philosophical debate and reflection that is needed to prepare us for life in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

A common contention of literary criticism is that literary forms can express, reflect, shape, represent or otherwise give form to human life. Literature can seem to offer the same idea as a promise of life’s meaningfulness; where expressive form is powerful, life need not be empty. Can literary forms give form to human life? I will argue for one sense in which this is true. As will become clear, at stake in this inquiry is (...) not simply an idea about the meaningfulness of literature’s poetry, but a way of answering the question of what it means to be human. (shrink)

The paper investigates the cultural unit of “sanctity” in the light of the notion of “form of life”, in order to show how jazz master John Coltrane pursued sanctity as a regulative model with regards both to personhood and musicianship, so as to translate his existential quest into music. Firstly, the paper briefly summarizes: what we mean today by sanctity ; what are the relationships interweaving music and sanctity ; what we mean by form of life—a notion brought (...) into philosophical discourse by Ludwig Wittgenstein—in semiotic terms and why we can apply it to sanctity. Afterwards, the paper addresses Coltrane’s musical career, relying both on hagiographic discourse built around him and his discography, with special focus on three game-changers among his albums: Giant Steps, A Love Supreme, and Ascension. Coltrane headed a twofold conversion: he abandoned his native Methodist faith to embrace a personal form of syncretic pantheism; he abandoned the language of traditional jazz to embrace the avant-garde technique of modal composition and the once despised free jazz. Not only Coltrane wanted to be a saint, not only was he regarded as such to the extent that a “St. John William Coltrane Church” was established in San Francisco, but he tried to be one through music; namely, by conveying his spiritual journey via sonic means: proposing a musical catechism, a musical mass, and his own mystique. Consistently with the process of selection any saintly figure—and mystiques especially—undergoes in order to be canonized stricto sensu, only some tokens within Coltrane’s body of work were included in the canon, while his later works were left out due to their radicalism. (shrink)

In the preliminary work for his Theses On the Concept of History, Walter Benjamin quotes a passage from Henri Focillon’s La vie des formes, using Focillon’s description of classical style for his own notion of the dialectical image. The Essay locates Benjamin’s surprising reception of Focillon in their common interest in a life of forms, not so much in the sense of aesthetic liveliness as defined by Kant, but in its productiveness of other forms. Focillon’s idea of (...) art history is based on the dynamis or potentiality of artistic shapes giving way to ever new figures and forms. This is not only a key to Benjamin’s concepts of Fortleben/Nachleben in the early Essay The Task of the Translator but also to the ‘dialectical image‘ outlined in the Arcades Project. Benjamin, this Essay argues, refers to Focillon’s life of forms to conceptualise disharmonious and sudden changes of form. (shrink)

“Life” has become an enigmatic keyword in diverse fields of contemporary philosophy in the past years – from political thought and its reflections on biopolitics to practical philosophy and its recourse to forms of life, to aesthetics and its reflections on the modes of life and liveliness in aesthetic representation. The contributions included in the following special section investigate the peculiar way this keyword functions in a diversity of fields, in order to bring to light the (...) underlying conceptual and structural implications of this term in these different domains. As these contributions show, the use of the marker “life” is more than a fleeting fashion – it articulates a modern predicament with deep historical roots. (shrink)

In her paper titled “The End of Personhood,” Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) takes a swipe at the functionalist account of personhood. The problem with the functionalist view of personhood is that...

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.