The essays in this book present a complex theme at the heart of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, what in his last writing he called simply "a life." They capture a problem that runs throughout his work--his long search for a new and superior empiricism. Announced in his first book, on David Hume, then taking off with his early studies of Nietzsche and Bergson, the problem of an "empiricist conversion" became central to Deleuze's work, in particular to his aesthetics and (...) his conception of the art of cinema. In the new regime of communication and information-machines with which he thought we are confronted today, he came to believe that such a conversion, such an empiricism, such a new art and will-to-art, was what we need most. The last, seemingly minor question of "a life" is thus inseparable from Deleuze's striking image of philosophy not as a wisdom we already possess, but as a pure immanence of what is yet to come. Perhaps the full exploitation of that image, from one of the most original trajectories in contemporary philosophy, is also yet to come. (shrink)

When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such criticism? Political philosophers often assume that we must rely on universal moral principles that are not necessarily connected to the particular social practices of our communities. Traditionally,continental critical theory has rejected this claim through its endorsement of the method of immanent critique. Immanent critique is a critique of social practices that draws on norms already present within these practices to demand social change, rather than (...) merely conservatively reproducing them. This book defends the claim that such a critique is not only possible, but also has politically powerful potential. Taking up recent developments in analytic collective intentionality theory and in the philosophy of language, the book argues that all social practices rest on structures of mutual recognition between persons that allow social theorists to reconstruct hidden norms present within these practices. Starting from a comprehensive critique of contemporary critical theory, the book also spells out the consequences of this line of thought for the practice of social critique, for the social sciences and for political philosophy. (shrink)

Critical theories often express scepticism towards the idea that social critique should draw on general normative principles, seeing such principles as bound to dominant conceptual frameworks. However, even the models of immanent critique developed in the Frankfurt School tradition seem to privilege principles over particular moral experiences. Discussing the place that particular moral experience has in the models of Honneth, Ferrara and Adorno, the article argues that experience can play an important negative role even for a critical theory that is (...) committed to the necessity of conceptual mediation, as moral experiences can undermine our confidence in the appropriateness of our moral concepts. Building on McDowell’s account of moral perception and Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of experience, one can reconstruct Adorno as providing a “radically negativist” approach to immanent critique that takes particular moral experience seriously. (shrink)

The terms immanence and transcendence have played a significant role in philosophical thought since its inception. Implicit in the notions of immanence and transcendence, as typified within the history of ideas, is often a separation and division between the human and the godly. This division has served to generate ontologies of isolation and set up epistemologies that can be both binary and divided. The terms immanence and transcendence thus sit at the heart of contemporary onto-epistemic accounts of (...) the world. As such, in seeking to examine the nature of what is, this paper traces a line through the history of ideas in an attempt to clarify the connections and dissonances in the notions of immanence and transcendence. This is done for the purpose of demonstrating what philosophical and religious accounts may offer in attempting to create a sound account of the godly and thus the world in a secular age. (shrink)

In the past fifteen years or so there has been a lot of attention paid to theories of “sparse” universals, particularly because of the work of D. M. Armstrong. These theories are of particular interest to those of us concerned with the distinction between natural and non-natural properties, since, as David Lewis has observed, it seems possible to analyze naturalness in terms of sparse universals. Moreover, Armstrong claims that we should conceive of universals as being “immanent” as opposed to “transcendent”, (...) and if universals are immanent then, as we will see, there is pressure to admit they are sparse as well. But I will argue that neither of these alleged reasons to accept a sparse conception of universals succeeds: the outlook for a fully general analysis of naturalness in terms of universals is not good, and the apparent advantages of immanence over transcendence are illusory. (shrink)

This article develops, illustrates, and defends a conception of immanent critique. Immanent critique is construed as a form of hermeneutical practice and second-order political and normative criticism. The common charge that immanent critique is a form of philosophical conventionalism necessarily committed to value relativism and to the rejection of transcultural and cosmopolitan norms is denied. But immanent critique insists that meaningful and potentially efficacious criticism must be connected to relevant criteria and understandings internal to the culture or social order at (...) which the criticism is directed. The complaint that this demand will likely limit political and moral criticism is also denied, and the ability of immanent critique to develop from convention unconventional thinking is defended and demonstrated. (shrink)

Summary This paper presents an immanent criticism of Lakatos' reconstruction of the degenerating phase of Bohr's atomic theory. That is to say, the historiographical methods used are exclusively of a Lakatosian kind. Such a closer Lakatosian look at the historical episode in question shows that Lakatos' own reconstruction is incorrect on three essential points. These are the role of the correspondence principle, the position of the hard core in Bohr's programme, and the presence of important novel predicted facts. I conclude (...) that these defects are irreparable within the framework of Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes. (shrink)

At some point the mechanics of schooling begin running of their own accord. Such has become the case with grades (A's, B's, C's, etc.). This article reconsiders the history of grades through the concepts of immanence and abstract machines from the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari. In the first section, the history of grades as presently written until now is laid out. In the second, the concepts of immanence and abstract machines are described, and in the third section, (...) problems are raised by reconsidering grades as machines (grade-machines). (shrink)

Rocco Gangle addresses the methodological questions raised by a commitment to immanence in terms of how diagrams may be used both as tools and as objects of philosophical investigation. Gangle integrates insights from Spinoza, Pierce and Deleuze in conjunction with the formal operations of category theory.

This chapter considers the ‘hosting question’ of how immanent universals, in contrast to transcendent universals, are ‘brought down to earth’ from ‘Plato’s heaven’. It explores the thesis that the hosting amounts to their being constituents of the states of affairs that result from their instantiations. These states of affairs are concrete complexes consisting of particulars and universals, and perhaps something that links them together. The traditional view that immanent universals are concrete is briefly defended against a recent prominent objection. On (...) relationalism, states of affairs are unified by a relation of some sort; on non-relationalism they are unified non-relationally. Roughly, these two conceptions of states of affairs are equivalent to Armstrong’s relational and non-relational versions of immanent realism, respectively. Armstrong mostly criticises the former and defends the latter. It is argued, however, that relationalism, at least potentially, answers the hosting question, whereas non-relationalism realism does not. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a theory on which each of a thing’s abundant properties is immanent in that thing. On the version of the theory I will propose, universals are abundant, each instantiated universal is immanent, and each uninstantiated universal is such that it could have been instantiated, in which case it would have been immanent. After setting out the theory, I will defend it from David Lewis’s argument that such a combination of immanence and abundance is absurd. (...) I will then advocate the theory on the grounds that it accomplishes all of Lewis’s “new work” while providing a gain in parsimony and a new account of fine-grained content. I will close with a discussion of how the theory also affords a new reply to two objections to uninstantiated universals: Armstrong’s charge that they are inconsistent with naturalism, and a Benacerraf-Field-style objection about epistemic access. (shrink)

This paper endeavors to argue that Derrida’s deconstructionist ethics can be construed as an embodiment of immanent ethics. To achieve this goal, it commences with Friedrich Nietzsche’s articulation of immanent ethics, drawing a contrast with formalist and conformist accounts of morality, exemplified in Kant. Following that, the paper explores the ethical thoughts of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze to establish a connection between immanent ethics and the problem of life. In this context, we observe how immanent ethics redirects ethical concerns (...) from human consciousness to the domain of life, modes of existence, the unconscious desire and its exteriority. Within this framework, the paper characterizes Derrida’s ethics of deconstruction as a convergence of the immanence of deconstruction and deconstruction as a creative mode of life. As a result, Derrida’s formulation of ethical challenges within the context of aporias, impossibility, and responsibility can be understood as a call for resistance against conformity to established forms of life. This imbues deconstruction with an intrinsic ethical-political character. (shrink)

The Implications of Immanence develops a philosophy of life in opposition to the notion of “bio-power,” which reduces the human to the question of power over what Giorgio Agamben terms “bare life,” mere biological existence. Breaking with all biologism or vitalism, Lawlor attends to the dispersion of death at the heart of life, in the “minuscule hiatus” that divides the living present, separating lived experience from the living body and, crucially for phenomenology, inserting a blind spot into a visual (...) field.Lawlor charts here a post-phenomenological French philosophy. What lies beyond phenomenologyis “life-ism,” the positive working out of the effects of the “minuscule hiatus” in a thinking that takes place on a “plane of immanence,” whose implications cannot be predicted. Life-ism means thinking life and death together, thinking death as dispersed throughout life. In carefully argued and extensively documented chapters, Lawlor sets out the surpassing of phenomenology and the advent of life-ism in Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and Foucault, with careful attention to the writings by Husserl and Heidegger to which these thinkers refer.A philosophy of life has direct implications for present-day political and medical issues. The book takes its point of departure from the current genocide in Darfur and provides conceptual tools for intervening in such issues as the AIDS epidemic and life-support for the infirm. Indeed, the investigations contained in The Implications of Immanence are designed to help us emerge once and for all out of the epoch of bio-power.“Lawlor’s novel way of treating the concept of life is stimulating, original, and necessary for the social well being of our time.”—Fred Evans, Duquesne University“The Implications of Immanence continues the most promising, rigorous, and fruitful ongoing research project among scholars of twentieth-century philosophy. . . .A wonderful new book.”—John Protevi, Louisiana State University. (shrink)

This monograph proposes a new way of implementing interaction in logic. It also provides an elementary introduction to Constructive Type Theory. The authors equally emphasize basic ideas and finer technical details. In addition, many worked out exercises and examples will help readers to better understand the concepts under discussion. One of the chief ideas animating this study is that the dialogical understanding of definitional equality and its execution provide both a simple and a direct way of implementing the CTT approach (...) within a game-theoretical conception of meaning. In addition, the importance of the play level over the strategy level is stressed, binding together the matter of execution with that of equality and the finitary perspective on games constituting meaning. According to this perspective the emergence of concepts are not only games of giving and asking for reasons, they are also games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish their explicative task. Thus, immanent reasoning games are dialogical games of Why and How. (shrink)

I begin by identifying an ambiguity in the post-Hegelian literature on Immanent Critique, distinguishing two possible definitions: judging an object against its ‘internal’ norms; and accounting for one’s own standpoint with reference to the object. I then claim that both definitions are represented in Hegel’s Phenomenology, and develop extended interpretations of material from the Introduction in order to clarify and substantiate this thesis. This yields revisionist readings of the famous ‘internal criteria’ and ‘self examination’ tropes. My discussion builds towards elucidating (...) the relation between the two definitions of Immanent Critique I have distinguished, as it is developed in the Phenomenology. (shrink)

Band 1. Mit Deleuze auf den Spuren von Spinoza und Leibniz --.

This paper develops an immanent ecological ethics that locates human flourishing within sustaining ecological relationships. I outline the features of an immanent ethics drawn from Spinoza, and indicate how this model addresses gaps left by approaches based in moral considerability. I argue that an immanent ecological ethics provides unique resources for contesting anthropogenic harm, by 1) shifting the focus from what qualifies as a moral subject to what bodies can or cannot do under particular relations, 2) emphasizing the constitutive role (...) of interaction and interdependence in ecosystemic existence, and 3) extending ethical regard to ecologically-ramified scales. (shrink)

It is argued in this paper that recent work on immanence and transcendence in Whitehead scholarship, notably by Basile and Nobo, provides helpful guidelines and ideas for work on problems regarding immanence in Deleuze's philosophy. By following arguments on theism and naturalism in the reception of Whitehead, it argues that Deleuze's philosophy depends on reciprocal relations between that actual and the virtual such that they cannot be considered as separate without also being incomplete. It is then shown that (...) Deleuze's philosophy allows for metaphysical terms such as ‘pure’ without having to concede a separate and self-sufficient pure realm. (shrink)

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail (...) at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it. (shrink)

Immanence is a key concept in Gilles Deleuze's thought. It emerges in 1968, in the book Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza and it is a focus until his last text. Immanence is a concept steeped in theological resonances, which disturbs Western metaphysics and politics. But, according to Deleuze, immanence is not really a concept, rather it is a ‘plan’. ‘The plan of immanence’ is the ‘prephilosophical’ working plan of philosophy. The point is that, according to Deleuze, philosophy (...) cannot be understood only conceptually, although it begins with the creation of concepts. Here, rather, what is at stake is a prephilosophical origin of philosophy itself. This relationship between the plane of immanence and philosophy is the most important aspect that some of best-known exponents of contemporary Italian philosophy have inherited from Deleuze. The focus of this essay is on three expressions of the plane of immanence in the sense of Deleuze that have been developed in contemporary Italian Thought: the ‘constituent power’ of politics in Antonio Negri; the ‘impersonal’ in Roberto Esposito; and the ‘potentiality’ in Giorgio Agamben. (shrink)

The paper concerns the metaphysical possibility of life after death. It argues that the existence of a psychological duplicate is insufficient for resurrection, even if psychological continuity suffices for personal identity. That is because our persistence requires immanent causation. There are at most three ways of having life after death: if we are immaterial souls; if we are snatched bodily from our deathbeds; or if there is immanent causation ‘at a distance’ as Zimmerman proposes--but this requires an ontology of temporal (...) parts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Transcendence, Immanence, and Ultimacy: The Theological Adequacy of Religious NaturalismJeffrey B. Speaks (bio)I. IntroductionIn the Introduction of Volume II of his Systematic Theology, Paul Tillich positions his “self-transcendent” and “ecstatic” conception of God as a via media that moves beyond the conflict of supranaturalism and naturalism.1 While Tillich’s rejection of Supranaturalism (i.e., God as a being, or the highest being) and more aggressively reductive forms of naturalism (i.e., (...) eliminative materialism) is not surprising, ST:II has remained a challenging piece for the religious naturalist due to Tillich’s rejection of non-reductive, religious forms of naturalism (as well as pantheism) as theologically insufficient. For Tillich, even a religious naturalism that claims God is “identical with natura naturans, the creative nature, the creative ground of all natural objects” is objectionable because it “denies the infinite distance between the whole of finite things and their infinite ground, with the consequence that the term ‘God’ becomes interchangeable with the term ‘universe’ and therefore is semantically superfluous.”2 For the religious naturalist who has taken seriously Tillich’s claim that the object of religious concern should be something ultimate (i.e., the religious ultimate should also be metaphysically ultimate), this critique has the potential to be devastating by leaving the religious naturalist open to the charge of idolatry. Clearly, the challenge that Tillich raises to religious naturalism must be explored, wrestled with, and answered.The central problem that Tillich raises is that of transcendence—namely, that to qualify as metaphysically and religiously ultimate the referent of the word “God” must infinitely transcend the finite creature. How is it possible for a religious naturalism to register infinite transcendence (whether it uses the language of God or not) in what is often considered to be a radically immanentist theology? To establish the theological adequacy of religious naturalism, it is necessary to clarify what are religiously significant conceptions of transcendence and establish a metric by which varieties of religious naturalism can be evaluated. [End Page 44]The first section of this article will unpack Tillich’s conceptions of supra-naturalism, naturalism, and ecstatic/self-transcendent theism to clarify his critique of religious naturalism and explain why Tillich thinks infinite self-transcendence is necessary for a theologically satisfactory religious ultimate. The second section of this article will develop a conceptual framework for evaluating dimensions of transcendence within a religious naturalist metaphysical system. It will establish immanent transcendence as a vague comparative category, within which are three dimensions of transcendence at play: axiological self-transcendence, conceptual transcendence, and ontological transcendence. The three dimensions provide a framework for evaluating a religious naturalist philosophical theology: high scores in all three dimensions show that metaphysics registers a greater degree of transcendence. The third section of the article will test the evaluative framework on a test-subject, by examining the role of transcendence in Donald A. Crosby’s Religion of Nature.3 It will be shown that Crosby’s metaphysics show a great deal of promise in the dimensions of axiological self-transcendence and conceptual transcendence, but cannot register the degree of ontological self-transcendence that Tillich thinks an adequate religious ultimate requires.II. Paul Tillich’s Self-Transcendent TheismIn between the publication of the first and second volumes of his Systematic Theology, Tillich faced substantial criticism over the doctrine of God developed in the first volume: namely, that God is to be identified as being-itself, and beyond this statement “nothing else can be said about God as God which is not symbolic.”4 In the second volume, Tillich hoped to shed new light on his conception by reframing his God as being “beyond naturalism and supranaturalism,” or as “[overcoming] the conflict of naturalism and supranaturalism.”5 As Tillich’s terminology is somewhat idiosyncratic (e.g., supranaturalism), it behooves the reader to carefully determine what Tillich means by these terms in order to properly identify why his ecstatic conception of God overcomes this conflict.Tillich defines supranaturalism as the belief that God is the highest being. “In this position [God] has brought the universe into being at a certain moment... governs it according to his plan, directs it toward an end, interferes... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the controversial concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ in the work of the Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–...

People's desire not to limit the meaning of Hancang driving force, continuous development and self-transcendence, which is people from within and beyond the root driving force. The so-called "inner beyond" is not a process of idealism, which began with the desire, from the bottom of the body, and go up on the layer by layer through the heart of the development process裡and mental flexibility, and would therefore have to enhance and transform. We regard the body as I desire the presence (...) of mode. Significance by the driving force in the body and thus close to the appearance, at first non-verbal, and then eventually completed in the language of representation. Through a variety of different non-linguistic representation, the meaning of the body of the driving force to obtain specific and differentiation, as music, art, dance, drama art form ... ... and so on. These different forms of art of common origins, is made ​​to understand the forms of physical exercise, as they are each other's differences, then is made ​​to understand the form of different, such as voice, image, attitude ... ... and so the nature and rules lawyers, and the rise because of their differences on the artistic and cultural expressions of different, and even the formation of the various arts precinct. In order to film art integrated voice, image and body movement, presented at the time of the current moving image, to the above description of the story. Different types of art is "the desire of the induced mover", which provides clear instructions and guidance In order to man the desire for meaning. The meaning of desire is the driving force of development of art in different fields to cross-border basic driving force. Story has entered into a description of the classification of the appearance of language, its basic features is metaphorical. Cross-disciplinary domain of the past will pin their hopes on the concepts and logical reasoning and arguments permit. Today, the language of metaphor for understanding the nature, making metaphor and narrative clues as cross-domain, and in the humanities, social sciences, natural sciences and even among. The reason why life events, actions and circumstances can be constructed to the story, because there I am with the interaction between multiple otherness, its impetus came from one continuous extrapolation, and extrapolation of each other. And diversity of his stories were always the people the story, and always coming to the multivariate description of those who hear him. Through stories, we witness In order to the meaning of life, but always to witness the way metaphor and description of each story to each other through mutual enrichment. Description of the future, after all, the story, no matter real or imagined, there is established based on the relationship regardless of which I was with him who have the freedom in the relationship, a relationship in freedom. It is also across the world who can not break the fundamental driving force and field-based. This paper assumes that there is an undetermined dynamic energy for meaningfulness in human desire, which develops and transcends any particular realization. This is the original energy by which human beings could attain transcendence by way of immanence, which is not an idealist process, but rather originated from a body-based desire that develops upwards and fuller to integrate the mental and the spiritual. Representability, first non-linguistic and then linguistic, is the access to meaning for our desire that takes body as its mode of existence. Through different forms of representation, such as sounds, pictures and gestures ... etc., the project of meaning is specified. The movement of body in intelligible forms is the common origin of music, dancing and performative arts. Cultural difference and artistic boundaries are based upon differences in the nature and rule of these intelligible forms. The art of filming, which synthesizes image, music and body movement in presenting images moving in time so as to tell stories of various kinds. All forms of art are "inducers of desire" by articulating, determining and guiding our desire for meaning. This dynamic development of our desire for meaning is the common basic energy by which we can cross the borders of different arts. Story-telling presupposes linguistic representation accessible to our meaning dynamism. In the past, concepts and logical reasoning and argumentation were taken to be the hope for interdisciplinary research. But now, with the better understanding we have of the metaphoric nature of language, metaphors and narratives are taken to be the clue for a cross-bordering effort in different sciences, human , social and natural. If there are events, actions and plots in human existence to be constructed as stories, it is because there is always interaction with multiple others, the dynamism of it consisting in our incessant act of strangification and mutual strangification. Stories are always stories about one self with multiple others and told to multiple others. By telling stories, we witness a particular way of meaningful life, always metaphorically interpreted. We achieve mutual enrichment by telling stories to each other. The ultimate foundation of cross-bordering in arts and scientific disciplines consists in the ontology of dynamic relation, in which there is relatedness in freedom and freedom in being related, and this is the ground on which all our life stories, both real and imaginative, are based. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There are two traditions of immanent social critique. One of them, prominent in contemporary Frankfurt school critical theory, regards the immanence of critique as a quality of the standard employed. Such a conception of immanent critique needs to show, prior to the concrete practice of critique, how the standard is immanent in the object of critique. Showing this is the task of a “model of immanent critique.” The other tradition, going back to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and practiced (...) in particular by Dewey in his later works, regards the immanence of critique as the form of critical practice itself. Because such a conception of immanent critique does not, at the outset, ask how the standard is immanent to its object, it also does not need a model licensing critical practice. Indeed, it must be inherently hostile to any attempt at modeling immanent critique because the immanence lies in the power of critical practice to transform any models it applies. (shrink)

Christian Gilliam argues that a philosophy of 'pure' immanence is integral to the development of an alternative understanding of 'the political'; one that re-orients our understanding of the self toward the concept of an unconscious or 'micropolitical' life of desire. He argues that here, in this 'life', is where the power relations integral to the continuation of post-industrial capitalism are most present and most at stake. Through proving its philosophical context, lineage and political import, Gilliam ultimately comes to outline (...) and justify the conceptual importance and necessity of immanence in understanding politics and resistance, thereby challenging the claim that ontologies of 'pure' immanence are either apolitical and/or politically incoherent. (shrink)

Le socle philosophique de l'oeuvre multiforme d'Alain Badiou (théâtre, romans, essais esthétiques ou politiques, éloges, polémiques...) est déposé dans trois grands livres, qui constituent une sorte de saga métaphysique : L'être et l'événement (1988), Logiques des mondes (2006) et enfin L'Immanence des vérités, auquel il travaille depuis une quinzaine d'années. Apres avoir étudié vérités et sujets du point de vue de la théorie de l'être, après avoir rendu raison de ce que cette universalité des vérités et de leurs sujets (...) peut se plier aux règles de l'apparaître dans un monde particulier, ce troisième volume aborde une question redoutable : d'où peut se soutenir que les vérités sont absolues, c'est-à-dire non seulement opposées à toute interprétation empiriste, mais encore garanties contre toute construction transcendantale? Qu'en est-il des vérités et des sujets, saisis, au-delà des formes structurales de leur être et des formes historico-existentielles de leur apparaître, dans l'irréversible absoluité de leur action et dans l'infini destin de leur oeuvre finie? Et que faut-il entendre par l'absoluité du vrai, puisque les dieux sont morts? Il s'est agi, au fond, d'un bout à l'autre, de construire pour notre temps une pensée complète, tirée, comme le firent Platon, Descartes ou Hegel, de matériaux rationnels contemporains, mathématiques, poétiques, amoureux et politiques. Il s'est agi de la vraie vie : nous sommes capables, dans la forme d'une oeuvre, individuelle ou collective, dans les quatre registres que fréquente l'animal humain survolté, de processus créateurs où se conjuguent dialectiquement la singularité, l'universalité et l'absoluité. Depuis sa naissance, la tâche de la philosophie ne tient qu'à ceci : créer, dans les conditions de son temps, le savoir de la possibilité existentielle du vrai. (shrink)

More women are currently incarcerated than at any other time in US history. Though the United States has begun to acknowledge mass incarceration as an international embarrassment, the discourse has centered on men of color, and the experiences and consequences of US mass incarceration for women of color have been largely ignored. This is the case in spite of a now strong mainstream, institutionalized movement to end violence against women, and a growing prison reform movement ostensibly meant to help vulnerable (...) women. This paper uses the method of immanent critique to explain why women of color have been left behind by reform strategies, and to make a normative argument for abolitionist strategies. I use Beth E. Richie’s analysis of the failure of the feminist anti-violence movement to protect poor women of color, to expose the contradictory circumstance that turns “public safety” and “anti-violence” against the women they claim to protect, and to argue that reform is not enough. (shrink)

The following article compares the notion of the absolute in the work of Georg Cantor and in Alain Badiou’s third volume of Being and Event: The Immanence of Truths and proposes an interpretation of mathematical concepts used in the book. By describing the absolute as a universe or a place in line with the mathematical theory of large cardinals, Badiou avoided some of the paradoxes related to Cantor’s notion of the “absolutely infinite” or the set of all that is (...) thinkable in mathematics W: namely the idea that W would be a potential infinity. The article provides an elucidation of the putative criticism of the statement “mathematics is ontology” which Badiou presented at the conference Thinking the Infinite in Prague. It emphasizes the role that philosophical decision plays in the construction of Badiou’s system of mathematical ontology and portrays the relationship between philosophy and mathematics on the basis of an inductive not deductive reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE IMMANENT AND THE ECONOMIC TRINITY THOMAS WEINANDY Greyfriars Hall Oxford, England I N HER MAJOR study on the Trinity, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, Catherine Mowry LaCugna contends that theology should abandon the distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity as it has been understood within contemporary theology. She believes that such a distinction segregates " God in himself " from " God for (...) us " and thereby fixes an unbridgeable gap between them. This divorce renders the Trinitarian God irrelevant to the Christian life. In contrast, LaCugna proposes-and this is the theme of her entire bookthat the whole trinitarian enterprise must be executed within a soteriological context.1 Since the Council of Nicea, however, the history of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity has focused, both in the East and in the West, on the immanent Trinity and the intradivine relationships between the persons. This is especially true of Latin trinitarian theology where Augustine and Aquinas founded their trinitarian conception on substance and articulated a trinity of persons who are enclosed upon one another.2 The more theology developed the doctrine of the immanent Trinity, 1 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991). See pp. 15, 211. 2 With reference to the Western conception of the Trinity in contrast to the East, LaCugna comments: " However, the economy of salvation a Patre ad Patrem becomes all the harder to see once the consubstantiality of persons is situated in the intradivine domain, or beyond, in a permanently unknowable and imparticipable divine essence" (ibid., p. 73). For comments on how Augustine 's trinitarian thought brought about a rupture between God in himself and God for us see pp. 80, 91, 97, 101-02, 104. For a similar criticism of Aquinas see pp. 157, 167-68. 655 656 THOMAS WEINANDY the more the doctrine of the Trinity became irrelevant. LaCugna completes her lengthy, and often insightful, study of the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity by concluding: " The history of doctrine and theology tells the story of the emergence and defeat of the doctrine of the Trinity." 3 Even if one argues, as Rahner and many others do, that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, the very distinction still places a gulf between God as he exists in himself and the God who exists for us.4 There remains, according to LaCugna, a separation between theologia, that is, knowledge and speculation about God qua God, and oikonomia, that is, knowledge and speculation about God-for-us. For LaCugna, if theologia is to be relevant it must be inherently and thoroughly soteriological. Hence it follows that theologia can only be theologia of the oikonomia, that is, a theology of God's action within the world. A theologia of the Trinity must then be a theologia of the trinitarian pattern of God's self-revelation within the economy. Her governing principle is : " theologia is fully revealed and bestowed in oikonomia, and oikonomia truly expresses the ineffable mystery of theologia." 5 [The economy is not] a mirror dimly reflecting a hidden realm of intradivine relations; the economy is God's concrete existence in Christ and as Spirit. The economy is the 'distribution' of God's life lived with and for the creature. Economy and theology are two aspects of one reality: the mystery of divine-human communion.6 Thus the Trinity that is revealed is not a Trinity apart or distinct from the economy, but a Trinity of the economy. " The referent for the immanent Trinity is not 'God in se,' or 'God's essence as it is in itself.' Theories about what God is apart from a Ibid., p. 198. Also, pp. 209-10, 392. 4 LaCugna gives a clear exposition of Rahner's position on the distinction and relationship between the immanent and economic Trinity (cf. ibid., pp. 211-21). She concludes: "Finally, according to Rahner at least, distinctions in the economy originate in and are grounded in distinctions ' in ' God. It is on the last point that we part ways with Rahner" (p. 221). 5 Ibid., p. 221. a Ibid., p. 222. IMMANENT AND ECONOMIC TRIN11'Y 657... (shrink)

American Immanence begins with the following premise: as the Earth becomes increasingly a product of human existence, we are faced with a radical unsettling of our traditional modes of self-understanding, both in relation to each other and to the broader environment. As Hogue succinctly observes, “By making the Earth homo imago, by terraforming our own self-image into the Earth, we have discovered ourselves as earth creatures, terra bēstiae”. The anthropogenic shifts that have beset our ecological, religious, and political climates, (...) he insists, require us to reconceive many of our basic anthropological, ethical, and theological assumptions. These shifts signify the paradoxicality of the Anthropocene as, at... (shrink)

Charles Taylor’s method of philosophical argumentation is distinctive, interlacing historical, ontological, phenomenological, hermeneutical, theistic, and ethical strands. His writings contribute t...

The fractious but potentially fruitful dialogue between legal history and legal theory has been the subject of much recent scholarly attention. Despite this, instances of meaningful engagement over the role of history in legal theorising remain scarce. This is particularly true in respect of normative theorising—the difficult but crucial tasks of critiquing and reforming law—where history is frequently considered to play a relativising role that threatens to destabilise strong evaluation. In this article, I argue that in order to advance the (...) dialogue it is essential to look beyond disciplinary differences and instead focus on the divide between immanence and transcendence, which arises within and also between legal history and legal theory. Reorienting our attention in this way discloses important sources of dissonance but also points towards significant opportunities for cooperation; it is therefore an essential first step in the pursuit of meaningful dialogue, either critical or collaborative. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.4 (2001) 3-10 [Access article in PDF] Can Immanence Explain Social Struggles? Ernesto Laclau Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000. In a recent interview 1 Jacques Rancière opposes his notion of "people" (peuple) 2 to the category of "multitude" as presented by the authors of Empire. As is well known, Rancière differentiates between police and politics, the first being the logic of (...) counting and assigning the population to differential places, and the second the subversion of that differentiating logic through the constitution of an egalitarian discourse which puts into question established identities. "The people" is the specific subject of politics, and this term presupposes a sharp division in the social body which cannot be led back to any kind of immanent unity. Empire, on the contrary, makes immanence its central category and the ultimate ground of the multitude's unity.The main lines of Rancière's critique provide a good starting point for what we have to say about the book. The immanentism of Hardt and Negri would be linked, according to Rancière, to their Nietzschean/Deleuzian ethics of affirmation, which does away with any reactive or negative dimension. Empire would belong, in that respect, to the whole tradition of modern political philosophy, which is profoundly metapolitical: "the kernel of metapolitics is to lead back the precarious artifices of the political scene to the truth of an immanent power which organizes beings in a community and identifies the true community with the grasped and sensible operation of this truth" ["Peuple ou multitudes" 96]. From Hardt and Negri's rejection of any inherent negativity in political subjects, it follows that the power inherent in the multitude has to be a disruptive power, "lodged in all states of domination as its ultimate content, a content destined to destroy all barriers. 'Multitudes' have to be a content whose continent is Empire" ["Peuple ou multitudes" 97]. Disruptive forces operating through a purely immanent movement are what Marxist theory called "productive forces," and there would be, according to Rancière, a strict homology between the place of productive forces and that in which multitudes, as described in Empire, act. Rancière points out that productive forces should not necessarily be understood in any narrow productivist sense: there has been a constant widening of the concept from the strict economism of classical Marxism, to the recent attempts to introduce in it the ensemble of scientific and intellectual abilities, passing through the Leninist attempt to supplement via political intervention a role that productive forces refused to fulfill.I think that Rancière has rightly stressed what I see as the main source of several weaknesses of Empire, including a central one: that within its theoretical framework politics become unthinkable. So I will start from a discussion of its notion of immanence and move later to various other theoretical and political aspects of the book. [End Page 3]Let us start with the authors' discussion of the origins of European modernity. While the usual insistence is on the secularization process, that process would be, "in our view... only a symptom of the primary event of modernity: the affirmation of the powers of this world, the discovery of the plane of immanence. 'Omne ens habet aliquod esse proprium'—every entity has a singular essence. Duns Scotus' affirmation subverts the medieval conception of being as an object of analogical, and thus dualistic predication—a being with one foot in this world and one in a transcendent realm" [Empire 71]. Duns Scotus's insistence on the singularity of being would have initiated an assertion of immanence that the authors describe as a process whose representative names would have been Nicholas of Cusa, Pico della Mirandola, and Bovillus—other names quoted are Bacon and Occam—and whose point of arrival is Spinoza. "By the time we arrive at Spinoza, in fact, the horizon of immanence and the horizon of the democratic political order coincide completely. The plane of immanence is the one on which the powers of singularity are realized and the one on which the truth of the new... (shrink)

This paper argues that ontological immanence involves but is not reducible to substance monism. Attending to immanence in Spinoza’s ontology, I provide a creative exegesis of the defining features of Spinoza’s immanent ontology, arguing that it recasts the concept of substance itself, from a term of transcendence and totalization to one of immanence and differentiation. In critical conversation with Deleuze’s influential reading, I identify five interconnected features which, taken together, elaborate Spinoza’s ontology of immanence: substance monism, (...) univocity of attributes, immanent causality, the identification between G-d and Nature, and the status of finite modes as explications of substance rather than its extrinsic effects. I argue that, taken together, these features refashion the concept of substance, such that substance becomes not a term of totalization but rather one of ongoing production of diversity. Attending to the role of finite modes in this ontology, I emphasize the ways in which immanence can lend force to vital reconfigurations of ethical and political life: by defining beings and systems in terms of their capacities, which are augmented, diminished, or maintained depending on how they converge in relation. (shrink)

Since the late 1960s there has been a resurgence of interest in Spinozism in France: Gilles Deleuze was among the first who gave life to a ‘new Spinoza’ with his seminal book Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. While Deleuze was primarily interested in Spinoza’s ontology and ethics, the contemporary French philosopher Étienne Balibar focuses on the political writings. Despite their common fascination for Spinoza’s relational definition of the individual, both thinkers have drawn very different consequences from the Spinozist inspiration regarding the (...) relevance of his philosophy for a contemporary ethical and political thought. Deleuze draws from Spinoza an ethics of the encounter, an ‘ethology’ that is concerned with the composition of bodies on a plane of immanence. Balibar, on the contrary, deals with the modes of communication that we institute between one another and that are always effectuations on two levels at once: the real and the imaginary. Whereas Deleuze emphasizes the conception of a... (shrink)

One of the terminological constants in the philosophical work of Gilles Deleuze is the word 'immanence', and it has therefore become a foothold for those wishing to understand exactly what 'Deleuzian philosophy' is. Deleuze's philosophy of immanence is held to be fundamentally characterised by its opposition to all philosophies of 'transcendence'. On that basis, it is widely believed that Deleuze's project is premised on a return to a materialist metaphysics. Christian Kerslake argues that such an interpretation is fundamentally (...) misconceived, and has led to misunderstandings of Deleuze's philosophy, which is rather one of the latest heirs to the post-Kantian tradition of thought about immanence. This will be the first book to assess Deleuze's relationship to Kantian epistemology and post-Kantian philosophy, and will attempt to make Deleuze's philosophy intelligible to students working within that tradition. But it also attempts to reconstruct our image of the post-Kantian tradition, isolating a lineage that takes shape in the work of Schelling and Wronski, and which is developed in the twentieth century by Bergson, Warrain and Deleuze. (shrink)

This article aims to study the intersection between critical realism and complexity theories through the existing literature on complex systems via an engagement with Luhmann’s autopoiesis. With reference to the philosophies of substance and persistence, I build on previous critical realist scholarship and provide an explanation for what the literature has only noted as the limitations and potentials of autopoiesis for complex systems thinking and its compatibility with Critical Realism. By highlighting how Luhmann’s autopoiesis is not a trans-immanent/ perdurantist-exdurantist system, (...) I show first how a trans immanent system through the method of calibration entails a complex causation involving objects in the environment of systems and not just within their boundaries. Second, I explain how a trans-immanent system fits with CR via the Morphogenetic Régulation framework by exploring the theme of crisis in terms of the movement from inadequate to adequate understanding of objects. (shrink)

Salomon Maïmon argues that the formal determination of experience in Kant’s first Kritik insufficiently answers the question ‘quid juris?’. As an alternative to Kant’s theory, he develops a genetic transcendentalism in which experience is completely determined a priori. Discussing this genetic approach, I focus on how the spatiotemporal determinations of conscious experience are traced back to pure ideal relations. Relying on Leibniz and his theory of space and time, I explain how the extensive magnitudes of consciousness are founded in intensive (...) magnitudes of what Maïmon calls ‘pure thought’. As the latter is the transcendental ground for both sensibility and the understanding, Maïmon’s theory contains a radical form of immanence, much like the philosophy of Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze. (shrink)

I defend an expanded reading of immanent causation that includes both inherence and causal efficacy; I argue that the latter is required if God is to remain the immanent cause of finite modes.

The alleged but unclear distinction between so-called “immanent” and so-called “transeunt” causation is structurally similar to an Aristotelian distinction between two kinds of potentiality (dunamis). It is argued that Aristotle’s distinction is in turn grounded in one between a metaphysically basic notion, rooted in his property theory, and a metaphysically posterior notion proper to the understanding of change in the science of nature. By examining Aristotle’s distinction, we can give a satisfying account of immanent and transeunt causation more generally. Furthermore, (...) once we clarify the distinction in this way, some contemporary appeals to immanent causation turn out to be misguided, while others look promising. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that it is possible to approach teaching from a fully affirmative perspective: as an educational practice that has its own internal logic and intrinsic value. By analysing a fragment from one of the Leonard Bernstein’s Young People’s Concerts presented in this article as a teaching event, we show that when starting from an empirical example of teaching it is possible to distinguish principles and gestures that testify to an ontological dimension of teaching. This is possible, (...) however, only when a particular reading of this empirical material is applied. We call this an immanent reading, as opposed to a transcendent (in this case critical) reading. It should be clear that this kind of inquiry we briefly demonstrate here is exactly a post-critical attempt to re-establish our affirmative relation with one of the most devalued, repressed, and neglected educational practice, namely teaching. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 676-692, June 2022.

In this paper I present a philosophically-inspired approach to the field of human resource management (HRM). Such an approach demands a certain kind of reader and a certain kind of HR professional: readers and professionals who are less occupied with the application and implementation of new HR technologies and more with the complex impact of HRM technologies and practices on individuality and sociality. I argue that concepts, technologies and practices of HRM are in practice elements in an immanent philosophy, which (...) reproduces and transforms how individuals and organisations can come into being. Two seemingly contradictory, simultaneous tendencies are discussed. First, the practices and technologies of HRM can and have been seen as disciplining, conservative forces, creating egoistic individuals with little or no interest in sharing a common responsibility towards the organisation. Second, a new kind of sociality arises from the openings that practices and technologies are creating, as the social does not so much disappear as take on new forms. I will discuss these different kinds of beings through a case example involving a group performance appraisal system in a major financial institution. I conclude by reflecting on the matter-of-fact spirit in which HR technologies and practices are implemented and the vast power which the ‘Resource Management’ exercises in creating the ‘Human’. (shrink)

Charts the themes of 'immanence' and the 'sacred' in Bataille's "On Nietzsche" in order to articulate the distinctive features of Bataille's response to Nietzsche's thought and its place in the development of his conception of the sacred. The paper also identifies and develops some critical tensions between Bataille's and Nietzsche's thought.

This working paper examines the notion of "immanent critique", a central methodological commitment of critical theories of society. In the first part, I distinguish immanent critique - a critique which reconstructs norms immanent in a social practice which point beyond the normative self-understanding of its members - from both external and internal critique and examine three questions that a theory of immanent critique has to answer (a social ontological, an epistemological and a justificatory question). After surveying some of the classic (...) accounts of immanent critique in part two, I then distinguish two varieties of immanent critique, a hermeneutic and a practice-theoretic approach. Drawing on theories in recent analytic philosophy, I finally argue for a practice-theoretic approach to immanent critique that locates the relevant norms in a practice constituted by mutual recognition. (shrink)