According to simulationism, the function of episodic memory is not to remember the past, but to help construct representations of possible future episodes, by drawing together features from different experiential sources. This article suggests that the relationship between the traditional storehouse view, on which the function of memory is remembering, and the simulationist approach is more complicated than has been typically acknowledged. This is attributed, in part, to incorrect interpretations of what remembering on the storehouse view requires. Further, (...) by appeal to function pluralism, the article questions both the assumption that the traditional view and simulationism are inconsistent, and the simulationist’s inference to the best explanation strategy that is based upon this assumption. The article then provides an evaluation of the simulationist argument against the traditional view, and finds it in need of further support. (shrink)

Traditionally, the sense of touch—alongside the senses of taste and smell—has been excluded from the aesthetic domain. These proximal modalities are thought to deliver only sensory pleasures, not the complex, world-directed perceptual states that characterize aesthetic experience. In this paper, I argue that this tradition fails to recognize the perceptual possibilities of haptic touch, which allows us to experience properties of the objects with which we make bodily contact, including their weight, shape, solidity, elasticity, and smoothness. These features, moreover, may (...) be indicative of how well-suited an object is for its function, and in feeling them we can thus feel the positive aesthetic quality of functional beauty. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior (...) to other interpretations discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining (...) class='Hi'>function of propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

A century after the discovery of quantum mechanics, the meaning of quantum mechanics still remains elusive. This is largely due to the puzzling nature of the wave function, the central object in quantum mechanics. If we are realists about quantum mechanics, how should we understand the wave function? What does it represent? What is its physical meaning? Answering these questions would improve our understanding of what it means to be a realist about quantum mechanics. In this survey article, (...) I review and compare several realist interpretations of the wave function. They fall into three categories: ontological interpretations, nomological interpretations, and the sui generis interpretation. For simplicity, I will focus on non-relativistic quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This is an introduction to wave function realism for a compendium on the philosophy of quantum mechanics that will be edited and translated into Portuguese by Raoni Arroyo, entitled Compêndio de Filosofia da Física Quântica. This essay presents the history of wave function realism, its various interpretations, the main arguments that are given for the position, and the main objections that have been raised to it.

Function emerges in certain kinds of far-from-equilibrium systems. One important kind of function is that of interactive anticipation, an adaptedness to temporal complexity. Interactive anticipation is the locus of the emergence of normative representational content, and, thus, of representation in general: interactive anticipation is the naturalistic core of the evolution of cognition. Higher forms of such anticipation are involved in the subsequent macro-evolutionary sequence of learning, emotions, and reflexive consciousness.

The aim of this investigation is to discuss the merits of the three radically divergent views as to the nature and function of the categories held by Kant, Ward and Alexander.

Why do people share or publicly engage with fake stories? Two possible answers come to mind: (a) people are deeply irrational and believe these stories to be true; or (b) they intend to deceive their audience. Both answers presuppose the idea that people put the stories forward as true. But I argue that in some cases, these outlandish (yet also very popular) stories function as signals of one's group membership. This signaling function can make better sense of why, (...) despite their unusual nature or lack of a factual basis, some of these stories are so widespread. (shrink)

Joint attention is an everyday phenomenon in which two or more individuals attend to an object, event process or property in the presence of each other, such that their attention to that object is to some degree intertwined with the other’s attention to it. This paper argues that joint attention has the normative role of enabling subjects to coordinate their actions in a way that would contribute to the rational execution of a joint action in accordance with a prior shared (...) plan or shared intention. This understanding of the normative function of joint attention underpins a particular understanding of the nature of joint attention: what I shall call Rich Relationalism. Rich Relationalism argues for the view that joint attention acts as an epistemically significant interface between the world, other people, and their background plans and concepts. It understands joint attention as an object-dependent, conceptually structured, token experiential state that is shared by two (or more) people. It can be contrasted with non-relational (i.e., Representational or Enactivist) accounts of joint attention on the one hand, and Lean Relationalist accounts on the other (such as John Campbell’s influential account). (shrink)

We share Nair-Collins and Joffe's (2023) concern with the accuracy of the “whole brain-death” diagnosis, which fails to take into account current understandings of residual brain function (neurohor...

The dual role of microbial communities as either beneficial/functional or harmful/pathogenic involves two issues concerning causality in physiology and medicine, etiology of disease, and the notion of function in biology. Causal explanation formulated by the germ theory of disease and the Koch postulates connects the existence of a specifically identified microbe to disease by the isolation and identification of a pathogen from an organism with the disease and the successful infection of a healthy individual. Similarly, microbiome research in medicine (...) centers on taxonomic composition in correlation with physiological conditions and germ-free mice experimentations to establish causal connections. However, because the microbiome is an ecological community, it lacks the specificity of identification assumed in the germ theory. Furthermore, the ecological aspects within and between microbiomes such as background conditions, microbial interactions, and interdependence, are treated as confounding. Looking at ecological studies, the causal explanations are less specific regarding complex systems with their processes of interactions. This article makes the following two points: One is that microbiome causality in the host should be understood similarly to the microbiome causality in an ecosystem. The second is that if considering a microbiome’s causality in the host as an ecosystem, its etiological explanation needs to be revisited to include a heterogeneous and mutual notion of interactions. Finally, according to the second point, the notion of function in ecology with its relevant notion of causality should be considered accordingly. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop a novel account of the normativity of assertion. Its core thesis is that assertion has an etiological epistemic function, viz. to generate knowledge in hearers. In conjunction with a general account of etiological functions and their normative import, it is argued that an assertion is epistemically good if and only if it has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers. In addition, reason is provided to believe that it makes sense to regulate the practice (...) of assertion by a speaker rule—and, more specifically, by a knowledge rule—as so regulating assertion contributes to ensuring that assertion fulfils its etiological function reliably. (shrink)

Deflationists claim that the truth predicate was introduced into our language merely to full a certain logico-linguistic function. Oddly enough, the question what this function exactly consists in has received little attention. We argue that the best way of understanding the function of the truth predicate is as enabling us to mimic higher-order quantification in a first-order framework. Indeed, one can show that the full simple theory of types is reducible to disquotational principles of truth. Our analysis (...) has important consequences for our understanding of truth. In this paper, we can only touch on one of them: we will argue that the insubstantiality of truth does not imply a conservativity requirement on our best theories of truth. (shrink)

While robots were traditionally built to achieve economic efficiency and financial profits, their roles are likely to change in the future with the aim to provide social support and companionship. In this research, we examined whether the robot’s proposed function (social vs. economic) impacts judgments of mind and moral treatment. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated that robots with social function were perceived to possess greater ability for emotional experience, but not cognition, compared to those with economic function (...) and whose function was not mentioned explicitly. Study 2 replicated this finding and further showed that low economic value reduced ascriptions of cognitive capacity, whereas high social value resulted in increased emotion perception. In Study 3, robots with high social value were more likely to be afforded protection from harm, and such effect was related to levels of ascribed emotional experience. Together, the findings demonstrate a dissociation between function type (social vs. economic) and ascribed mind (emotion vs. cognition). In addition, the two types of functions exert asymmetric influences on the moral treatment of robots. Theoretical and practical implications for the field of social psychology and human-computer interaction are discussed. (shrink)

Justin Garson has recently advanced a Generalised Selected Effects Theory of biological proper function. According to Garson, his theory spells trouble for the Dysfunction Account of Disorder. This paper argues that Garson’s critique of the Dysfunction Account from the Generalised Theory fails, and that we should reject the Generalised Theory outright. I first show that the Generalised Theory does not, as Garson asserts, imply that neurally selected disorders are not dysfunctional. Rather, it implies that they are both functional and (...) dysfunctional. I argue on this basis that the Generalised Theory yields conflicting functional norms, and we that should reject it outright on these grounds. (shrink)

This book explains the relationship between intelligence and environmental complexity, and in so doing links philosophy of mind to more general issues about the relations between organisms and environments, and to the general pattern of 'externalist' explanations. The author provides a biological approach to the investigation of mind and cognition in nature. In particular he explores the idea that the function of cognition is to enable agents to deal with environmental complexity. The history of the idea in the work (...) of Dewey and Spencer is considered, as is the impact of recent evolutionary theory on our understanding of the place of mind in nature. (shrink)

This research is an investigation of whether consciousness—one's ongoing experience—influences one's behavior and, if so, how. Analysis of the components, structure, properties, and temporal sequences of consciousness has established that, (1) contrary to one's intuitive understanding, consciousness does not have an active, executive role in determining behavior; (2) consciousness does have a biological function; and (3) consciousness is solely information in various forms. Consciousness is associated with a flexible response mechanism (FRM) for decision-making, planning, and generally responding in nonautomatic (...) ways. The FRM generates responses by manipulating information and, to function effectively, its data input must be restricted to task-relevant information. The properties of consciousness correspond to the various input requirements of the FRM; and when important information is missing from consciousness, functions of the FRM are adversely affected; both of which indicate that consciousness is the input data to the FRM. Qualitative and quantitative information (shape, size, location, etc.) are incorporated into the input data by a qualia array of colors, sounds, and so on, which makes the input conscious. This view of the biological function of consciousness provides an explanation why we have experiences; why we have emotional and other feelings, and why their loss is associated with poor decision-making; why blindsight patients do not spontaneously initiate responses to events in their blind field; why counter-habitual actions are only possible when the intended action is in mind; and the reason for inattentional blindness. (shrink)

Revonsuo proposed an intriguing and detailed evolutionary theory of dreams which stipulates that the biological function of dreaming is to simulate threatening events and to rehearse threat avoidance behaviors. The goal of the present study was to test this theory using a sample of 212 recurrent dreams that was scored using a slightly expanded version of the DreamThreat rating scale. Six of the eight hypotheses tested were supported. Among the positive findings, 66% of the recurrent dream reports contained one (...) or more threats, the threats tended to be dangerous and aimed at the dreamer, and when facing a threat, the dreamer tended to take defensive or evasive actions that were possible and reasonable. However, less than 15% of the recurrent dreams depicted realistic and probable situations critical for one’s physical survival or reproductive success and the dreamer rarely succeeded in fleeing the threat despite important and appropriate efforts. The findings thus provide mixed support for the threat simulation theory. (shrink)

A complete sourcebook for philosophical discussion of the nature of function in biology.

Alea, Bluck, Mroz and Edwards examine how the communication of autobiographical stories via face‐to‐face vs. instant message (IM) influences the extent to which social bonds form between strangers. The results of their study show that the in‐person communication of strangers’ autobiographical memories leads to greater engagement and higher empathy rates in the listener of those stories. That is, sharing autobiographical memories face‐to‐face (compared to IM) is positively correlated with positive feelings and closeness in the listener of those stories.

Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation (...) bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. (shrink)

With an increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, theorists have analyzed and argued for the promotion of trust in AI and trustworthy AI. Critics have objected that AI does not have the characteristics to be an appropriate subject for trust. However, this argumentation is open to counterarguments. Firstly, rejecting trust in AI denies the trust attitudes that some people experience. Secondly, we can trust other non‐human entities, such as animals and institutions, so why can we not trust AI systems? (...) Finally, human–AI trust is criticized based on a conception of human–human trust, which does not recognize the distinctiveness of the human–AI relationship. This article aims to refute these counterarguments based on the genealogical analyses of ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ of Karen Jones and Thomas Simpson, who show that trust and trustworthiness help to overcome vulnerabilities. This function of trust gives reason to use human–human trust as a standard. For this function, it is important that trustees are responsive to trust. While animals and institutions could be responsive, narrow AI systems are unable to be responsive to trust. Therefore, we should not apply trust to AI and instead direct our trust to those who can be responsive to and held responsible for our trust. (shrink)

Objectives: The present study aimed to systematically analyze the effects of physical activity on executive function, working memory, cognitive flexibility, and activities of daily living in Alzheimer's disease patients and to provide a scientific evidence-based exercise prescription.Methods: Both Chinese and English databases were used as sources of data to search for randomized controlled trials published between January 1980 and December 2019 relating to the effects of physical activity on executive function, working memory, cognitive flexibility, and ADL issues in (...) AD patients. Sixteen eligible RCTs were ultimately included in the meta-analysis.Results: Physical activity had significant benefits on executive function [standard mean difference = 0.42, 95% confidence interval 0.22–0.62, p < 0.05], working memory, cognitive flexibility, and ADLs among AD patients. Subgroup analysis indicated that, for executive function issues, more than 60 min per session for 16 weeks of moderate-to-high-intensity dual-task exercises or multimodal exercise had a greater effect on AD patients. For working memory and cognitive flexibility issues, 60–90 min of moderate-intensity dual-task exercises 1–4 times/week was more effective. For ADL issues, 30–90 min of multimodal exercise at 60–79% of maximal heart rate 3–4 times/week had a greater effect on AD patients.Conclusions: Physical activity was found to lead to significant improvements in executive function, working memory, cognitive flexibility, and ADLs in AD patients and can be used as an effective method for clinical exercise intervention in these patients. However, more objective, scientific, and effective RCTs are needed to confirm this conclusion. (shrink)

This paper discusses what the function of the aesthetic sense is for Hutcheson, and how its function bears on a number of exegetical issues viz. Whether there is any possibility of objectivity within the scope of the theory and what the status of his analogy between secondary qualities and beauty actually amounts to. I argue that the aesthetic sense is analogous to a prevalent account of bodily sensations, which saw bodily sensation as having the function jointly signalling (...) and eliciting motivational dispositions toward features that are harmful or beneficial to the body. The aesthetic sense is supposed to motivate us toward gaining knowledge of the world, and allows for a standard of taste relative to its function. The paper is a complement to my 'Hutcheson's Moral Sense', History of Philosophy Quarterly (forthcoming 2001). (shrink)

The primary function of Sanskrit kāvya was always to please the readers. Literary theoreticians like Abhinavagupta often considered esthetic experience as a supramundane (alaukika) experience where the readers transcend their mundane attachments. Viśvanatha compared it to the experience of knowing brahman, the ultimate truth. But this does not mean that Sanskrit kāvya was devoid of any pragmatic concerns and was exclusively concerned with esthetic bliss. This paper examines how the purvamīmāmsā theory of bhāvanā was effectively employed by Sanskrit literary (...) theoreticians in Early India to make the readers of Sanskrit kāvya self-fashion themselves according to the existing notions about the practice of puruṣārtha-s. This mechanism, which literary critics from Kuntaka onwards explicitly mentioned, capacitated kāvya with a symbolic power to influence the worldview of readers and to make them conform to the existing dharmavidhi (legal injunction with respect to the four aims of human life). How did the idea of bhāvanā function in the composition of Sanskrit kāvya to self-fashion the readers? And how did the writers of kāvya precondition their texts so that readers should self-fashion themselves? The present paper explores these two crucial questions which shed light on the pragmatic use of Sanskrit kāvya. (shrink)

“Realization” and “emergence” are two concepts that are sometimes used to describe same or similar phenomena in philosophy of mind and the special sciences, where such phenomena involve the synchronic dependence of some higher-level states of affairs on the lower-level ones. According to a popular line of thought, higher-level properties that are invoked in the special sciences are realized by, and/or emergent from, lower-level, broadly physical, properties. So, these two concepts are taken to refer to relations between properties from different (...) levels where the lower-level ones somehow “bring about” the higher-level ones. However, for those who specialise in inter-level relations, there are important differences between these two concepts – especially if emergence is understood as strong emergence. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these differences. (shrink)

Neuroanatomy and neurophysiology are insufficient to specify function. Modeling is essential to elucidate function, but psychophysics is also required. An example is the cognitive and sensorimotor branches of the visual system: anatomy shows direct cross talk between the branches. Psychophysics in normal humans shows links from cognitive to sensorimotor, but the reverse link is excluded by visual illusions affecting the cognitive system but not the sensorimotor system.

Chinese calligraphy is a potent tool for intercultural communication in addition to being an art form, especially with its graceful brushstrokes and flowing letters. Chinese calligraphy, a blend of artistic and aesthetic beauty, enables intercultural exchange and reveals the intricacies of Chinese writing, fostering understanding and appreciation among different cultures. The aim of the research is to investigate the function and influence of Chinese calligraphy in fostering cross- cultural communication. This research evaluated the aesthetic assessments of different Chinese calligraphy (...) scripts on Chinese participants and non-Chinese international students from East Asia, Europe, and Latin America. This research explores how calligraphy brings down linguistic boundaries and promotes intercultural understanding and appreciation through a thorough examination of calligraphic styles, methods, and historical settings. The study explores calligraphy's use in modern contexts, including its use in art exhibits, classrooms, and online forums, and finds that it can improve identification and cross-cultural communication. The findings show Chinese calligraphy's continuing significance in a world growing more interconnected by offering insights into how it affects cross-cultural relationships. The study contributes to the conversation on identity, cultural legacy, and the transformational potential of art in promoting cross-cultural communication. (shrink)

What is the role of intention in the identification of encoding that arises for images and other non-lexical objects of semiosis? This proposal of the “intentional function” resolves the syntagmatic problems posed by visual imagery: it identifies the viewer’s treatment of what they encounter as if it is encoded based on formal non-signifying cues visible in the image and learned through past experience. This decision about the organization and structure of the work becomes apparent from the consideration of a (...) photographic “selfie” made by a monkey in the rainforest. (shrink)

Among psychiatric conditions, delusions have received significant attention in the philosophical literature. This is partly due to the fact that many delusions are bizarre, and their contents interesting in and of themselves. But the disproportionate attention is also due to the notion that by studying what happens when perception, cognition, and belief go wrong, we can better understand what happens when these go right. In this paper, I attend to delusions for the second reason—by evaluating the epistemology of delusions, we (...) can better understand the epistemology of ordinary belief. More specifically, given recent advancements in our understanding of how delusions are formed, the epistemology of delusions motivates a proper functionalist account of the justification of belief. Proper functionalist accounts of the justification of belief hold that whether a belief is justified is partly determined by whether the system that produces the belief is functioning properly. Whatever pathology is responsible for delusion formation, restoring it to its proper function resolves the epistemic condition, an effect which motivates proper functionalism. (shrink)

This paper reviews the debate on the notion of biological function and on functional explanation as this takes place in philosophy. It describes the different perspectives, issues, intuitions, theories and arguments that have emerged. The author shows that the debate has been too heavily influenced by the concerns of a naturalistic philosophy of mind and argues that in order to improve our understanding of biology the attention should be shifted from the study of intuitions to the study of the (...) actual practice of biological inquiry. (shrink)