This article targets the use of unclaimed bodies at American medical schools. Despite a growing sensitivity to the ethics of whole body donation in the field of clinical anatomy, unclaimed bodies continue to be used in teaching and research across the United States. I argue that the ongoing use of unclaimed bodies is unethical on the basis of its disregard for autonomy and consent, its potential to harm various individuals and groups, considerations of justice, and the threat it poses to (...) public trust in medical institutions. Additionally, I show how the best available defenses of the use of unclaimed bodies fail to be ethically persuasive. I argue that whole body donation ethically requires either the prior consent of the deceased or the explicit permission of their next of kin. Finally, I offer practical suggestions for institutions transitioning away from the use of unclaimed bodies. (shrink)

In her recent book, L. A. Paul presses a serious problem for normative decision theory. Normative decision theory seems to be inapplicable when the values of potential outcomes are unknown, or when our preferences may change as a result of our choice. Paul then offers a framework for overcoming these problems, known as therevelation approach. I argue that, contrary to what Paul suggests, this approach is unhelpful in the large class of cases where the decision at hand centrally concerns persons (...) other than the decision-maker. Unless Paul’s account is supplemented in order to handle such cases, many decisions will remain rationally intractable. (shrink)

I defend the claim that we have the capacity to perceptually represent objects and events in experience as deviating from an expectation, or, for short, as deviant. The rival hypothesis is that we may ascribe the property of deviance to a stimulus at a cognitive level, but that property is not a representational content of perceptual experience. I provide empirical reasons to think that, contrary to the rival hypothesis, we do perceptually represent deviance.

There has been recent speculation that some animals are moral agents. Using a retributivist framework, I argue that if some animals are moral agents, then there are circumstances in which some of them deserve punishment. But who is best situated to punish animal wrongdoers? This paper explores the idea that the answer to this question is humans.

I present a bipartite model of organ stewardship that places it at the intersection of resource stewardship and gift stewardship. Though both forms of stewardship are grounded in relationships of trust, they are importantly distinct, as are the duties they confer. This bipartite model of organ stewardship functions as a beneficial instrument for understanding and resolving conflicts among transplant stakeholders. As proof of concept, I apply the bipartite model of organ stewardship to a controversial case of conditional organ donation, showing (...) that we can better understand the underlying moral conflict if we recognize that it involves a tension between resource and gift stewardship. Then, demonstrating that the model can do more than just explanatory work, I use it to resolve the long‐standing debate over whether organ transplant recipients are organ stewards. Although some transplant recipients are gift stewards, I argue, none are resource stewards, and they therefore do not owe anything to members of the transplant team. (shrink)